Patent ambush

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A patent ambush occurs when a member of a standard-setting organization withholds information, during participation in development and setting a standard, about a patent that the member or the member's company owns, has pending, or intends to file, which is relevant to the standard, and subsequently the company asserts that a patent is infringed by use of the standard as adopted. [1] [2]

Contents

Standards-setting organizations, such as the IEEE [3] and ANSI, typically require each member of their committees engaged in standard setting to file a letter with the organization stating either that the member does not know of any patents of their company relevant to the standard or else identifying those patents about which they know. When the organization is advised of relevant patents, often it will either seek to use a different technology for the standard or obtain a commitment from the patent owner that it will license users of the standard on fair reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms.

Once the proposed standard has been adopted, companies wishing to implement the standard may be forced to pay substantial royalties to the patent holder, [1] creating barriers to entry that distort competition within the market. [4] Consequently, the practice has been considered to be in breach of antitrust or competition law in the United States [5] and the European Union [2] and has resulted in several lawsuits and other actions.

In the United States, a patent ambush may involve the filing of a continuation application with claims targeting a standard [6] or the exploitation of a submarine patent, that is, a patent application which has been filed but has not yet been made public years after the filing. [7]

See also

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Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964), was a Supreme Court of the United States decision holding that a contract calling for payment of patent royalties after the expiration of the licensed patent was misuse of the patent right and unenforceable under the Supremacy Clause, state contract law notwithstanding. The decision was widely subjected to academic criticism but the Supreme Court has rejected that criticism and reaffirmed the Brulotte decision in Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC.

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Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm Incorporated was a noted American antitrust case, in which the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) accused Qualcomm's licensing agreements as anticompetitive, mainly because their practices excluded competition and harmed competitors in the modern chip market, which according to the FTC, violated both Section 1 and Section 2 of the Sherman Act. On May 21, 2019, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California ruled in favor of the plaintiff, the FTC, by alleging that Qualcomm had indeed violated the federal antitrust laws by (1) refusing to license its patents to direct competitors, in its relevant product market (2) by placing an extra fee on rival chip sales through its licensing of its patent, and (3) by entering in an exclusive business deal with Apple from 2011 to 2013. The case was seen as controversial when the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit decided to unanimously reverse the decision of the district court by arguing that the FTC failed to prove through its rule of reason analysis that Qualcomm's policies have a considerable negative effect towards the consumer in the CDMA and cellular chips market.

References

  1. 1 2 "Telecom standards face patent ambush threat". ZDNet. 2005-06-15. Archived from the original on 2007-09-30. Retrieved 2007-08-30.
  2. 1 2 "Antitrust: Commission confirms sending a Statement of Objections to Rambus". European Commission. 2007-08-23. Retrieved 2007-08-30.
  3. See IEEE Standards Association
  4. Matt Whipp (2005-12-12). "EC thwarts 'patent ambush' tactics". PC Pro. Archived from the original on 2013-12-02. Retrieved 2013-11-23.
  5. See, for example, FTC Challenges Patent Holder's Refusal to Meet Commitment to License Patents Covering 'Ethernet' Standard Used in Virtually All Personal Computers in U.S. (FTC press release about its suit against N-Data, 23 Jan. 2008); FTC Charges Unocal with Anticompetitive Conduct Related to Reformulated Gasoline: Complaint Alleges Company Gained Monopoly Power by Defrauding the California Air Resources Board and Industry Groups During Phase 2 Gasoline Rulemaking Archived 2009-01-19 at the Wayback Machine (FTC press release about its suit against Union Oil Co., 4 March 2003). See also Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc. Archived 2010-10-11 at the Wayback Machine (4 Sept. 2007 opinion of Third Circuit holding that deceptive conduct in the standard-setting process can constitute actual or attempted monopolization).
  6. Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Patent Continuations, Patent Deception, and Standard Setting: the Rambus and Broadcom decisions, University of Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper (June 2008), page 6, first paragraph.
  7. Stacy Baird, "The Government at the Standards Bazaar", 18 Stanford Law & Policy Rev. 35, 82 n.138 (2007) (noting that "the risks of assault on a standards-setting proceeding are most notably that of the imposition of a "submarine patent" or of patent royalty "hold up" risks".

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