People v. Berry

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People v. Berry
Seal of the Supreme Court of California.svg
Decided December 8, 1976
Full case nameThe People, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Albert Joseph Berry, Defendant and Appellant.
Citation(s)18 Cal.3d 509; 556 P.2d 777 ; 134 Cal. Rptr. 415
Holding
The defendant received adequate provocation to have committed a crime of passion.
Court membership
Chief Justice Donald Wright
Associate Justices Marshall F. McComb, Mathew Tobriner, Stanley Mosk, Raymond L. Sullivan, William P. Clark Jr., Frank K. Richardson
Case opinions
MajoritySullivan, joined by Wright, McComb, Tobriner, Mosk, Clark, Richardson

People v. Berry [1] is a voluntary manslaughter case that is widely taught in American law schools for the appellate court 's unusual interpretation of heat of passion doctrine. Although the defendant had time to "cool down" between his wife's verbal admission of infidelity and the killing, the California Supreme Court held that the provocation in this case was adequate to reduce a murder charge to manslaughter. The lower court had relied on the traditional definition of "adequate provocation" in its jury instructions. The California Supreme Court reversed Berry's murder conviction, while affirming Berry's conviction for assault using deadly force.

Contents

The case has also been discussed or mentioned in more than forty separate academic journal articles relating to murder, female victims of domestic violence, and rape. [2] More than 160 court decisions in California have cited, mentioned, or discussed this opinion. [3]

Background

Voluntary manslaughter is a form of homicide where a defendant's culpability is mitigated by an "adequate provocation", thereby resulting in a lesser sentence than a murder charge. [4] Traditionally, at common law, manslaughter was limited to certain categories of actions, but by the time the Berry case was decided in 1976 the categorical approach had been broadened to include verbal provocation, and the court notes in the decision that "no specific type of provocation is required" and "verbal provocation may be sufficient." [5] [6]

Although Berry did not change the law of manslaughter at the time, instead applying a previous precedent Borchers, it is taught in most first-year law courses as an example of how the doctrine of provocation developed and moved away from the "no cooling period" requirement that had traditionally been a requirement for manslaughter. [5]

Facts

Albert Joseph Berry was charged with murdering his wife, Rachel Pessah. The couple married in May 1974; Ms. Pessah was 26 years younger than Berry, and a recent immigrant from Israel. Three days after their wedding Rachel left for Israel, where she stayed for six weeks. Upon her return, she told her husband, Berry, that she had fallen in love with a man named Yako. The court summarized the facts leading up to Rachel's killing as "a tormenting two weeks in which Rachel alternately taunted defendant with her involvement with Yako and at the same time sexually excited defendant". [7] The crime was committed two weeks after Rachel first admitted the infidelity to her husband. Between Rachel's admission and the homicide, Berry had left the apartment and spent time with friends. When he returned to the apartment, Rachel wasn't home. Rachel returned home the next morning, on July 26, 1974. When Berry tried to talk to Rachel, she started screaming, and that was when he strangled her with a telephone cord. [8] Police arrested Albert Joseph Berry for her murder on August 1, 1974.

Procedural history

The defendant was charged under § 187 of the California Penal Code. He was convicted of first degree murder by a jury. This defense appealed the murder conviction on the grounds that the trial court 's failure to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter was a reversible error. The defense claimed that a voluntary manslaughter instruction should have been given for both heat of passion and diminished capacity. The appeals court granted an appeal only for the heat of passion claim. [7]

Issue

The issue decided in the case was whether taunts and provocation over a period of time could be adequate provocation for heat of passion manslaughter. [8]

Appellate court's decision

The court reversed the first-degree murder conviction, explaining that the question of whether the defendant had acted under the heat of passion should have properly been resolved by the jury. Relying on a previous case People v. Borchers the court wrote that "evidence of admissions of infidelity by the defendant's paramour, taunts directed to him and other conduct, 'supports a finding that the defendant killed in wild desperation induced by (the woman's) long, continued provocatory conduct'. [7] [5]

Prosecutors argued that manslaughter was not applicable because there had been a "cooling period" between the initial admission and the homicide, but the court rejected the argument writing that "the long course of provocatory conduct...reached its final culmination in the apartment when Rachel began screaming". [7] [5] Wayne LaFave has described this as rekindling an earlier passion, writing that the Court found that Pessah's screaming was "sufficient to rekindle passion regarding her earlier confession of adultery". [9]

A prominent psychiatrist, Dr. Martin Blinder, had testified at trial that the victim was suicidal and that her taunting of Berry was an attempt to provoke him into killing her. He also testified that the long course of psychological torment she inflicted on Berry would have produced the same type of blind, uncontrollable rage traditionally associated with "heat of passion" defenses.

Other information

The lead prosecutor in this case was Evelle J. Younger. The defense attorney on appeal was Edward W. Suman.

Transcripts of testimonies from the trial, which have been reviewed by law professor Donna Coker contain additional facts that the California Supreme Court did not include in their decision. The defendant, Berry, had a history of intimate violence and before his marriage to Pessah, had stabbed his second wife eleven times after she called out another man's name during sex. Berry had also admitted to police that he "deliberately waited to kill [Rachel]. No pretense, no bullshit, no nothing." [10]

Two years passed before the California Supreme Court remanded the case for a new trial. Berry's trial attorney, public defender Geoffrey Brown had obtained Pessah's hospital records for psychiatric treatment she had received after a previous incident where Berry had strangled. The records provided details about Pessah's relationship with Yacob, and supported Dr. Blinder's testimony about Rachel's depression. The defense accepted a plea agreement for second degree murder, which carried a minimum 5 year sentence. [5]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Murder</span> Unlawful killing of a human with malice aforethought

Murder is the unlawful killing of another human without justification or valid excuse, especially the unlawful killing of another human with malice aforethought. This state of mind may, depending upon the jurisdiction, distinguish murder from other forms of unlawful homicide, such as manslaughter. Manslaughter is killing committed in the absence of malice, brought about by reasonable provocation, or diminished capacity. Involuntary manslaughter, where it is recognized, is a killing that lacks all but the most attenuated guilty intent, recklessness.

The gay panic defense or homosexual advance defence is a strategy of legal defense, which refers to a situation in which a heterosexual individual charged with a violent crime against a homosexual individual claims they lost control and reacted violently because of an unwanted sexual advance that was made upon them. A defendant will use available legal defenses against assault and murder, with the aim of seeking an acquittal, a mitigated sentence, or a conviction of a lesser offense. A defendant may allege to have found the same-sex sexual advances so offensive or frightening that they were provoked into reacting, were acting in self-defense, were of diminished capacity, or were temporarily insane, and that this circumstance is exculpatory or mitigating.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Homicide</span> Killing of a human by another human

Homicide occurs when a person kills another person. A homicide requires only a volitional act or omission that causes the death of another, and thus a homicide may result from accidental, reckless, or negligent acts even if there is no intent to cause harm. Homicides can be divided into many overlapping legal categories, such as murder, manslaughter, justifiable homicide, assassination, killing in war, euthanasia, and capital punishment, depending on the circumstances of the death. These different types of homicides are often treated very differently in human societies; some are considered crimes, while others are permitted or even ordered by the legal system.

A crime of passion, in popular usage, refers to a violent crime, especially homicide, in which the perpetrator commits the act against someone because of sudden strong impulse such as anger or jealousy rather than as a premeditated crime. A high level of social and legal acceptance of crimes of passion has been historically associated with France from the 19th century to the 1970s, and until recently with Latin America.

In law, provocation is when a person is considered to have committed a criminal act partly because of a preceding set of events that might cause a reasonable individual to lose self control. This makes them less morally culpable than if the act was premeditated (pre-planned) and done out of pure malice. It "affects the quality of the actor's state of mind as an indicator of moral blameworthiness."

The concept of justifiable homicide in criminal law is a defense to culpable homicide. Generally, there is a burden to produce exculpatory evidence in the legal defense of justification.

Battered woman syndrome (BWS) is a psychological trauma that results from ongoing physical, psychological, and/or sexual abuse, typically at the hands of an intimate partner. This syndrome is one of a group of conditions known as Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) and can lead to symptoms of depression, anxiety, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and even physical health problems. BWS can also result in the development of a “survival personality”, in which the person acts out of fear and attempts to avoid further harm. The symptoms of BWS are often divided into three categories: physical, psychological, and behavioral. Physically, victims of BWS may display signs of physical injury or illness, such as bruises, broken bones, or chronic fatigue. Psychologically, they may experience depression, anxiety, low self-esteem, and feelings of helplessness, guilt, and fear. Behaviorally, victims may exhibit a range of behaviors, including self-isolation, suicidal thoughts, and substance abuse. It is important to recognize that the effects of BWS may vary from person to person. Treatment for BWS typically includes individual and group therapy, as well as support from family and friends. Treatment may focus on helping the victim to develop healthy coping mechanisms, identify triggers for abusive behavior, and build self-esteem. In addition, it is important to ensure that the victim has access to safe housing and other resources, such as legal aid and counseling. Battered woman syndrome (BWS) is a pattern of signs and symptoms displayed by a woman who has suffered persistent intimate partner violence: whether psychological, physical, or sexual, from her male partner. It is classified in the ICD-9 (code 995.81) as battered person syndrome, but is not in the DSM-5. It may be diagnosed as a subcategory of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

Voluntary manslaughter is the killing of a human being in which the offender acted during the heat of passion, under circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to become emotionally or mentally disturbed to the point that they cannot reasonably control their emotions. Voluntary manslaughter is one of two main types of manslaughter, the other being involuntary manslaughter.

In English law, provocation was a mitigatory defence to murder which had taken many guises over generations many of which had been strongly disapproved and modified. In closing decades, in widely upheld form, it amounted to proving a reasonable total loss of control as a response to another's objectively provocative conduct sufficient to convert what would otherwise have been murder into manslaughter. It only applied to murder. It was abolished on 4 October 2010 by section 56(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, but thereby replaced by the superseding—and more precisely worded—loss of control.

In the English law of homicide, manslaughter is a less serious offence than murder, the differential being between levels of fault based on the mens rea or by reason of a partial defence. In England and Wales, a common practice is to prefer a charge of murder, with the judge or defence able to introduce manslaughter as an option. The jury then decides whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of either murder or manslaughter. On conviction for manslaughter, sentencing is at the judge's discretion, whereas a sentence of life imprisonment is mandatory on conviction for murder. Manslaughter may be either voluntary or involuntary, depending on whether the accused has the required mens rea for murder.

Manslaughter is a common law legal term for homicide considered by law as less culpable than murder. The distinction between murder and manslaughter is sometimes said to have first been made by the ancient Athenian lawmaker Draco in the 7th century BC.

Berry v. Superior Court, 256 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1989), is an unofficially reported California Court of Appeal case. The case is relevant to the legal topic of criminal homicide and liability for unintentional killings.

In the United States, the law for murder varies by jurisdiction. In many US jurisdictions there is a hierarchy of acts, known collectively as homicide, of which first-degree murder and felony murder are the most serious, followed by second-degree murder and, in a few states, third-degree murder, which in other states is divided into voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter such as reckless homicide and negligent homicide, which are the least serious, and ending finally in justifiable homicide, which is not a crime. However, because there are at least 52 relevant jurisdictions, each with its own criminal code, this is a considerable simplification.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Criminal law of the United States</span>

Criminal law is a system of laws that is connected with crimes and punishments of an individual who commits crimes. In comparison, civil law is where the case argues their issues with one entity to another entity with support of the law. Crimes can vary in definition by jurisdiction but the basis for a crime are fairly consistent regardless.

Manslaughter is a crime in the United States. Definitions can vary among jurisdictions, but manslaughter is invariably the act of causing the death of another person in a manner less culpable than murder. Three types of unlawful killings constitute manslaughter. First, there is voluntary manslaughter which is an intentional homicide committed in "sudden heat of passion" as the result of adequate provocation. Second, there is the form of involuntary manslaughter which is an unintentional homicide that was committed in a criminally negligent manner. Finally, there is the form of involuntary manslaughter which is an unintentional homicide that occurred during the commission or attempted commission of an unlawful act which does not amount to a felony.

State v. Dumlao is a 1986 criminal Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals case appealing a murder conviction on the ground that the court's decision to not issue a jury instruction for voluntary manslaughter based on extreme emotional disturbance was a reversible error. The court found that the Model Penal Code required a subjective analysis of whether provocation is adequate from the defendant's perspective. Based on medical testimony that Dumlao suffered from "paranoid personality disorder", which included symptoms of "unwarranted suspiciousness" and hypersensitivity, the Court granted Dumlao's appeal, holding that his actions on the night he killed his mother in law had been "reasonable" from his perspective.

<i>People v. Chevalier</i>

People v. Chevalier, 131 Ill.2d 66, 544 N.E.2d 942 (1989), was a 1989 Illinois Supreme Court decision that affirmed murder convictions in two consolidated appeals, holding that mere words or verbal admission of infidelity was not sufficient provocation for a manslaughter.

<i>State v. Shane</i>

State v. Shane is a 1992 Ohio Supreme Court voluntary manslaughter case that developed a two-step test for "reasonably sufficient provocation" and held that verbal confessions of adultery could not be "reasonably sufficient" provocation.

People v. Valentine, 28 Cal.2d 121, 169 P.2d 1 (1946) is a landmark California Supreme Court voluntary manslaughter case where the court holds that mere words may be adequate provocation.

The categorical test is a legal standard for determining whether there has been adequate provocation to reduce a murder charge to voluntary manslaughter. Traditionally, the mens rea for murder was malice aforethought. While murder and voluntary manslaughter are both intentional homicides, adequate provocation mitigates a defendant's culpability. Adequate provocation is a legal requirement for a murder charge to be reduced to voluntary manslaughter. The test for adequate provocation varies across jurisdictions and has changed over time. The categorical approach is based on common law principles, but most courts today apply less restrictive tests, such as the extreme emotional disturbance test in Model Penal Code jurisdictions.

References

  1. ↑ 18 Cal.3d 509 , 134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777 (Cal. 1976)
  2. ↑ Redefining Violence: Some Thoughts About Justice, Power, Peace, Respect, And The Fabric Of Our Social Experience, 9 Am. U.J. Gender Soc. Pol'y & L. 305, 393 (2001); A Heat Of Passion Offense: Emotions And Bias In "Trans Panic" Mitigation Claims, 25 B.C. Third World L.J. 499, 524 (2005); Rape, Violence, And Women's Autonomy, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 359, 388 (1993); Restoring Hope Or Tolerating Abuse? Responses To Domestic Violence Against Immigrant Women, 9 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 263, 290 (1995); Notes From The Underground: Battered Women, The State, And Conceptions Of Accountability, 23 Harv. Women's L.J. 133, 172 (2000); Equality, Objectivity, And Neutrality, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1043, 1080 (2005); Legal Images Of Battered Women: Redefining The Issue Of Separation, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 94+ (1991); Achilles Fuming, Odysseus Stewing, And Hamlet Brooding: On The Story Of The Murder/Manslaughter Distinction, 74 Neb. L. Rev. 742, 803 (1995); The Cultural Defense And The Problem Of Cultural Preemption: A Framework For Analysis, 27 N.M. L. Rev. 101, 139 (1997); A Matter Of Prostitution: Becoming Respectable, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1220, 1303 (1999); The Admissibility Of Expert Testimony Of Battered Wife Syndrome: An Evidentiary Analysis, 77 Nw. U. L. Rev. 348, 373 (1982); Changing Paradigms In The Law Of Homicide, 62 Ohio St. L.J. 1007, 1076 (2001); The Admissibility Of Prior Acts Of Domestic Violence: Simpson And Beyond, 69 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1463, 1517 (1996); Heat Of Passion And Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women's Stud. 71, 77 (1992); Diminished Capacity In California: Premature Reports Of Its Demise, 3 Stan. L. & Pol'y Rev. 216, 224 (1991); Interpretive Construction In The Substantive Criminal Law, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 591, 673+ (1981); Provoked Reason In Men And Women: Heat-Of-Passion Manslaughter And Imperfect Self-Defense, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 1679, 1735+ (1986)
  3. ↑ See e.g., Birdwell v. Roe, 95 Fed.Appx. 866, 868+ (9th Cir.(Cal.) Apr 14, 2004); People v. Cole, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 580+, 95 P.3d 811, 851, (Cal. Aug 16, 2004); People v. Lujan, 112 Cal.Rptr.2d 769, 785+, 92 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1410 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. Oct 23, 2001); People v. Brooks, 230 Cal.Rptr. 86, 88, 185 Cal.App.3d 687, 693 (Cal.App. 2 Dist. Sep 18, 1986); People v. Steele, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 449+, 47 P.3d 225, 239 (Cal. May 30, 2002); People v. Breverman, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 883+, 960 P.2d 1094, 1106 (Cal. Aug 31, 1998); People v. Wharton, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 659+, 809 P.2d 290, 318, 53 Cal.3d 522, 569+ (Cal. Apr 29, 1991); People v. Wickersham, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 446, 650 P.2d 311, 321, 32 Cal.3d 307, 326+ (Cal. Sep 02, 1982)
  4. ↑ Carlson, Mr David (2009-07-01). "Manslaughter". LII / Legal Information Institute. Retrieved 2018-01-19.
  5. 1 2 3 4 5 Coker, Donna; Weisberg, Robert (2012-11-30). Criminal Law Stories (Stories Series). West Academic. ISBN   978-1-63459-261-1.
  6. ↑ Emanuel, Steven L. (2007). Criminal Law. Aspen Publishers Online. ISBN   978-0-7355-5818-2.
  7. 1 2 3 4 People v. Berry , 18 Cal.3d 509
  8. 1 2 Casenotes; Johnson; Publishers, Aspen (2002-11-07). Criminal Law. Aspen Publishers Online. ISBN   978-0-7355-3575-6.
  9. ↑ LaFave, Wayne (2017-07-06). Criminal Law. West Academic. ISBN   978-1-64020-148-4.
  10. ↑ Lee, Cynthia (2007-10-01). Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion and Fear in the Criminal Courtroom. NYU Press. ISBN   978-0-8147-6514-2.

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