Prigg v. Pennsylvania

Last updated
Prigg v. Pennsylvania
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Decided March 1, 1842
Full case nameEdward Prigg v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Citations41 U.S. 539 ( more )
16 Pet. 539; 10 L. Ed. 1060; 1842 U.S. LEXIS 387
Case history
PriorIn error to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Holding
Federal law is superior to state law, but states are not required to use their resources to enforce federal law.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Roger B. Taney
Associate Justices
Joseph Story  · Smith Thompson
John McLean  · Henry Baldwin
James M. Wayne  · John Catron
John McKinley  · Peter V. Daniel
Case opinions
MajorityStory
ConcurrenceTaney, Thompson, Wayne, Daniel
DissentMcLean

Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 precluded a Pennsylvania state law that prohibited blacks from being taken out of the free state of Pennsylvania into slavery. The Court overturned the conviction of slavecatcher Edward Prigg as a result. [1] [2]

Contents

Occurring under the presidency of John Tyler, Prigg v. Pennsylvania weakened the enforcement mechanisms of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 by allowing states to forbid their officials from cooperating in the return of fugitive slaves. But, by asserting federal government authority and responsibility over the area of fugitive slave return, it set the stage for future more stringent laws that would bypass individual state decisions about slavery. (Northern states by this time had abolished slavery, and most prohibited slaveowners from bringing slaves to their states, saying they would be considered free if brought in state.) Later, the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 (part of the Compromise of 1850) required even free states to support capture and return of fugitive slaves with their law enforcement, increasing penalties for non-compliance.

Also, by refusing to take judicial notice of the problem of free blacks being kidnapped in free states and sold into slavery, the Prigg decision established an implicit precedent that blacks were entitled to fewer procedural protections than were whites. [3]

Federal law

In March 1789, the Constitution of the United States came into force, having been ratified by nine states. Article IV, Section 2 contained two clauses (the Extradition Clause and the Fugitive Slave Clause) [4] related to the legality of fleeing justice, creditors, owners, or other agencies across state borders and to escaped slaves, but it did not mention "slavery" directly:

On February 12, 1793, the Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, the long title of which was "An Act respecting fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from the service of their masters." [6]

State law

On March 29, 1788, the State of Pennsylvania passed an amendment to one of its laws (An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery, originally enacted March 1, 1780): "No negro or mulatto slave... shall be removed out of this state, with the design and intention that the place of abode or residence of such slave or servant shall be thereby altered or changed."

On March 25, 1826, the State of Pennsylvania passed a further law:

If any person or persons shall, from and after the passing of this act, by force and violence, take and carry away, or cause to be taken or carried away, and shall, by fraud or false pretense, seduce, or cause to be seduced, or shall attempt so to take, carry away or seduce, any negro or mulatto, from any part or parts of this commonwealth, to any other place or places whatsoever, out of this commonwealth, with a design and intention of selling and disposing of, or of causing to be sold, or of keeping and detaining, or of causing to be kept and detained, such negro or mulatto, as a slave or servant for life, or for any term whatsoever, every such person or persons, his or their aiders or abettors, shall on conviction thereof, in any court of this commonwealth having competent jurisdiction, be deemed guilty of a felony. [7]

Background

In 1832, a black woman named Margaret Morgan moved to Pennsylvania from Maryland. There she had been born into slavery and held by John Ashmore. In Maryland, she had lived in virtual freedom but Ashmore had never formally manumitted her. [8] After his death, Ashmore's heirs eventually decided to claim her as a slave and hired slavecatcher Edward Prigg to recover her.

On April 1, 1837, Prigg led an assault and abduction on Morgan in York County, Pennsylvania. They took Morgan to Maryland, intending to sell her as a slave (her children, one of whom was born free in Pennsylvania, were also captured and sold). The four men involved in the abduction were arraigned under the 1826 act. Prigg pleaded not guilty and argued that he had been duly appointed by Ashmore heirs to arrest and return Morgan to their estate in Maryland. In a ruling on May 22, 1839, the Court of Quarter Sessions of York County convicted him of violation of the state law.

Prigg appealed to the US Supreme Court on the grounds that the Pennsylvania law was not able to supersede federal law or the US Constitution; the Fugitive Slave Act and Article IV of the Constitution were in conflict with the Pennsylvania law of 1788. The case was Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U. S. 539 (1842). [1]

Prigg and his lawyer argued that the 1788 and 1826 Pennsylvania laws were unconstitutional:

As a consequence, they argued, the 1788 Pennsylvania law, in all its provisions applicable to this case, should be voided. The question was whether Pennsylvania law violated the constitutional guarantee of fugitive slave return and the 1793 Act of Congress, passed to implement it.

Decision

Writing for the Court, Justice Joseph Story reversed the conviction and held the Pennsylvania law was unconstitutional, as it denied both the right of slaveholders to recover their slaves under Article IV and the Federal Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, which trumped the state law per the Supremacy Clause. Six justices wrote separate opinions.

Although Story ruled the Pennsylvania laws were unconstitutional, his opinion left the door open for the state to forbid state officials to cooperate in the return of fugitive slaves:

As to the authority so conferred upon state magistrates [to deal with runaway slaves], while a difference of opinion has existed, and may exist still on the point, in different states, whether state magistrates are bound to act under it; none is entertained by this Court that state magistrates may, if they choose, exercise that authority, unless prohibited by state legislation.

However, state laws could not interfere with a slave-owner's right to go to another state and recapture a fugitive slave by private action, as long as no breach of the peace was committed.

Five of the seven Supreme Court justices (including Story) referred to the commonly held view at the time that the Southern states in the Constitutional Convention of 1787 would not have agreed to the U.S. Constitution if the Fugitive Slave Clause had not been included. Since then historians such as Don E. Fehrenbacher have argued that there is little historical evidence for this. [9]

Dissent

Justice John McLean was the sole dissenter in the case. He pointed out that the 1793 fugitive slave act required anyone seizing an accused fugitive slave in different state to take them before a federal judge or local magistrate to receive certification that the seizure was legal. Prigg had not done this before removing Morgan and her children from Pennsylvania. Therefore, he saw no conflict between Pennsylvania's laws criminalizing the forcible removal of blacks from the state and the 1793 law, which required bringing an accused fugitive slave to a judge or magistrate before removing them from the state. In McLean's view, Congress possessed the authority for enforcing the constitutional fugitive slave provision, and they had used this authority to allow for the return of fugitive slaves from free states only with the approval of a judge or magistrate. By failing to use this method, Prigg had exceeded any authority he could possibly claim for recovering fugitive slaves, and Pennsylvania's laws were consistent with the constitution and the 1793 law in holding him accountable.

McLean felt Pennsylvania's laws against forced removal were particularly important for preventing free blacks from being wrongfully enslaved, as without them, slave catchers could easily kidnap free blacks and remove them from a state's jurisdiction before said state could investigate or arrest them. [10]

Effects

Story's phrase "unless prohibited by state legislation" was a catalyst for a number of personal liberty laws enacted by Pennsylvania and other Northern states. The laws prohibited state officials from interfering with runaway or fugitive slaves in any capacity. Runaways could not be caught or incarcerated by state action, cases could not be heard in state courts, and no assistance could be offered by state officials to those wishing to recapture slaves. The Fugitive Slave Act still stood, but only federal agents could enforce it. That is known as the "anti-commandeering doctrine."

Such an emphatic refusal to uphold the Fugitive Slave Act was viewed in the Southern states as a brazen violation of the federal compact. A constituent complained by letter to South Carolina Senator John C. Calhoun that the new personal liberty laws "rendered slave property utterly insecure" and constituted a "flagrant violation of the spirit of the U.S. Constitution". [11] [ full citation needed ]

Increasing sectional tension over slavery resulted in the Compromise of 1850, which covered several issues related to the status of territories acquired in the Mexican–American War. The South allowed California to enter the Union as a free state, but the Northern states would have to agree to a strengthened Fugitive Slave Act, which required law enforcement in free states to cooperate in the capture and return of fugitive slaves within their borders.

The South had been forced to look to the federal government for a national solution. The Supreme Court had pledged itself in advance to support such a solution although aware that many persons in the North would certainly be mobilized against it. In addition, people began to believe that the Court was uniquely qualified to soothe the growing agitation over slavery. [12]

However, the Liberty Party platform of 1843 (which was adopted in advance of the 1844 presidential election) condemned the Prigg v. Pennsylvania decision and said that the ruling nullified habeas corpus protection for free blacks and took away their "whole legal security of personal freedom." [13]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Article Four of the United States Constitution</span> Portion of the US Constitution regarding states

Article Four of the United States Constitution outlines the relationship between the various states, as well as the relationship between each state and the United States federal government. It also empowers Congress to admit new states and administer the territories and other federal lands.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Joseph Story</span> US Supreme Court justice from 1812 to 1845

Joseph Story was an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, serving from 1812 to 1845. He is most remembered for his opinions in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee and United States v. The Amistad, and especially for his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, first published in 1833. Dominating the field in the 19th century, this work is a cornerstone of early American jurisprudence. It is the second comprehensive treatise on the provisions of the U.S. Constitution and remains a critical source of historical information about the forming of the American republic and the early struggles to define its law.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fugitive Slave Act of 1850</span> Act of the United States Congress

The Fugitive Slave Act or Fugitive Slave Law was passed by the United States Congress on September 18, 1850, as part of the Compromise of 1850 between Southern interests in slavery and Northern Free-Soilers.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fugitive Slave Act of 1793</span> Act of the United States Congress

The Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was an Act of the United States Congress to give effect to the Fugitive Slave Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which was later superseded by the Thirteenth Amendment, and to also give effect to the Extradition Clause. The Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause guaranteed a right for a slaveholder to recover an escaped slave. The subsequent Act, "An Act respecting fugitives from justice, and persons escaping from the service of their masters", created the legal mechanism by which that could be accomplished.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fugitive slaves in the United States</span> Aspect of history

In the United States, fugitive slaves or runaway slaves were terms used in the 18th and 19th centuries to describe people who fled slavery. The term also refers to the federal Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850. Such people are also called freedom seekers to avoid implying that the enslaved person had committed a crime and that the slaveholder was the injured party.

In the context of slavery in the United States, the personal liberty laws were laws passed by several U.S. states in the North to counter the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850. Different laws did this in different ways, including allowing jury trials for escaped slaves and forbidding state authorities from cooperating in their capture and return. States with personal liberty laws included Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, Maine, New Hampshire, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and Vermont.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fugitive slave laws in the United States</span> Laws passed by the United States Congress in 1793 and 1850

The fugitive slave laws were laws passed by the United States Congress in 1793 and 1850 to provide for the return of enslaved people who escaped from one state into another state or territory. The idea of the fugitive slave law was derived from the Fugitive Slave Clause which is in the United States Constitution. It was thought that forcing states to deliver fugitive slaves back to enslavement violated states' rights due to state sovereignty and was believed that seizing state property should not be left up to the states. The Fugitive Slave Clause states that fugitive slaves "shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due", which abridged state rights because forcing people back into slavery was a form of retrieving private property. The Compromise of 1850 entailed a series of laws that allowed slavery in the new territories and forced officials in free states to give a hearing to slave-owners without a jury.

The Fugitive Slave Clause in the United States Constitution, also known as either the Slave Clause or the Fugitives From Labor Clause, is Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3, which requires a "Person held to Service or Labour" who flees to another state to be returned to his or her master in the state from which that person escaped. The enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which abolished slavery except as a punishment for criminal acts, has made the clause mostly irrelevant.

Nullification, in United States constitutional history, is a legal theory that a state has the right to nullify, or invalidate, any federal laws which they deem unconstitutional with respect to the United States Constitution. There are similar theories that any officer, jury, or individual may do the same. The theory of state nullification has never been legally upheld by federal courts, although jury nullification has.

Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1859), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously held that state courts cannot issue rulings that contradict the decisions of federal courts, overturning a decision by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. The Court found that under the Constitution, federal courts have the final power to decide cases arising under the Constitution and federal statutes, and that the States do not have the power to overturn those decisions. Thus, Wisconsin did not have the authority to nullify federal judgments or statutes. For example, it is illegal for state officials to interfere with the work of U.S. Marshals acting under federal laws. The Ableman decision emphasized the dual form of American government and the independence of State and federal courts from each other.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">John McLean</span> American jurist and politician (1785–1861)

John McLean was an American jurist and politician who served in the United States Congress, as U.S. Postmaster General, and as a justice of the Ohio and U.S. Supreme Courts. He was often discussed for the Whig Party nominations for president, and is also one of the few people who served in all three branches of government.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Samuel Nelson</span> US Supreme Court justice from 1845 to 1872

Samuel Nelson was an American attorney and appointed as judge of New York State courts. He was appointed as a Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, serving from 1845 to 1872. He concurred on the 1857 Dred Scott decision, although for reasons different from Chief Justice Taney's.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Levi Woodbury</span> US Supreme Court justice from 1845 to 1851

Levi Woodbury was an American attorney, jurist, and Democratic politician from New Hampshire. During a four-decade career in public office, Woodbury served as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, a United States Senator, the ninth governor of New Hampshire, and cabinet member in the Andrew Jackson and Martin Van Buren administrations. He was promoted as a candidate for the Democratic nomination for President of the United States in 1848.

<i>Lemmon v. New York</i> Nineteenth-century freedom suit

Lemmon v. New York, or Lemmon v. The People (1860), popularly known as the Lemmon Slave Case, was a freedom suit initiated in 1852 by a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition was granted by the Superior Court in New York City, a decision upheld by the New York Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, in 1860 on the eve of the Civil War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Criminal law in the Taney Court</span> Aspect of U.S. judicial history (1836–1864)

The Taney Court heard thirty criminal law cases, approximately one per year. Notable cases include Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), United States v. Rogers (1846), Ableman v. Booth (1858), Ex parte Vallandigham (1861), and United States v. Jackalow (1862).

Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. 215 (1847), was a landmark US Supreme Court decision involving the constitutionality of slavery that was a predecessor of Dred Scott v. Sandford. The Supreme Court was then led by Chief Justice Roger Taney, who owned slaves and wrote the Dred Scott decision but not Jones. The Court unanimously reached the decision that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 was constitutional and that the institution of slavery remained a matter for individual states to decide.

Margaret Morgan was an African American woman who was born to former slaves. They were considered free by their slaveholder, but they had not received an official deed of manumission. They lived on their former slaveholder's property, where they then had a daughter, Margaret. After she was married and had children, her family was taken from her home in the middle of the night around late March 1837 at the request of the former slaveholder's widow, Margaret Ashmore. Morgan became the subject of legal cases at the county, state and national level from 1837 to 1842. Prigg v. Pennsylvania was tried before the United States Supreme Court and the four men who apprehended Morgan and her children were found to be not guilty.

Although the United States Constitution did not use the words "slave" or "slavery", it explicitly protected American slavery in at least five articles and indirectly protected the institution elsewhere in the document.

References

  1. 1 2 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet. ) 539 (1842).
  2. Levinson, Sanford. 2006. "Prigg v. Pennsylvania." Federalism in America: An Encyclopedia.
  3. Don E. Fehrenbacher (1981), Slavery, Law, and Politics: The Dred Scott Case in Historical Perspective, ISBN   0-19-502883-X, pp. 22–23.
  4. Article IV | LII / Legal Information Institute
  5. Thirteenth Amendment|LII / Legal Information Institute
  6. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793
  7. "Milestone Documents – Primary Source Anthologies". Archived from the original on 2009-02-07. Retrieved 2009-11-10.
  8. Amar, Akhil Reed (2005). America's Constitution: A Biography . Random House. p.  262. ISBN   978-1-4000-6262-1.
  9. Don E. Fehrenbacher (1981), Slavery, Law, and Politics: The Dred Scott Case in Historical Perspective. ISBN   0-19-502883-X, p. 21.
  10. "FindLaw's United States Supreme Court case and opinions".
  11. "Fugitive Slaves", Slavery in the North
  12. Paul Finkelman, ed. (2014). The Supreme Court: Controversies, Cases, and Characters from John Jay to John Roberts. ABC-CLIO. p. 241. ISBN   9781610693950.
  13. McKee, Thomas Hudson. The National Conventions and Platforms of All Political Parties 1789–1905. p. 54. ISBN   0-403-00356-3.

Further reading