Rational irrationality

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The concept known as rational irrationality was popularized by economist Bryan Caplan in 2001 to reconcile the widespread existence of irrational behavior (particularly in the realms of religion and politics) with the assumption of rationality made by mainstream economics and game theory. [1] [2] The theory, along with its implications for democracy, was expanded upon by Caplan in his book The Myth of the Rational Voter .

Contents

The original purpose of the concept was to explain how (allegedly) detrimental policies could be implemented in a democracy, and, unlike conventional public choice theory, Caplan posited that bad policies were selected by voters themselves. The theory has also been embraced by the ethical intuitionist philosopher Michael Huemer as an explanation for irrationality in politics. [3] [4] The theory has also been applied to explain religious belief. [5]

Theory

Two types of rationality, and preferences over beliefs

Caplan posits that there are two types of rationality:

Rational irrationality describes a situation in which it is instrumentally rational for an actor to be epistemically irrational.

Caplan argues that rational irrationality is more likely in situations in which:

In the framework of neoclassical economics, Caplan posits that there is a demand for irrationality. A person's demand curve describes the amount of irrationality that the person is willing to tolerate at any given cost of irrationality. By the law of demand, the lower the cost of irrationality, the higher the demand for it. When the cost of error is effectively zero, a person's demand for irrationality is high.

Rational irrationality versus doublethink

Rational irrationality is not doublethink and does not state that the individual deliberately chooses to believe something he or she knows to be false. Rather, the theory is that when the costs of having erroneous beliefs are low, people relax their intellectual standards and allow themselves to be more easily influenced by fallacious reasoning, cognitive biases, and emotional appeals. In other words, people do not deliberately seek to believe false things but stop putting in the intellectual effort to be open to evidence that may contradict their beliefs.

Sources of preferences over beliefs

For rational irrationality to exist, people must have preferences over beliefs: certain beliefs must be appealing to people for reasons other than their truth value. In an essay on irrationality in politics Michael Huemer [3] identifies some possible sources of preferences over beliefs:

Religion

Many of the claims of religions are not easily verifiable in the day-to-day world. There are many competing religious theories about the origins of life, reincarnation, and paradise, but mistaken beliefs about these rarely impose real world costs upon the believers themselves. Thus, it may be instrumentally rational to be epistemically irrational about these matters. In other words, when forming or updating their religious beliefs, people may tend to relax their intellectual standards for the sake of driving popular support towards their beliefs. [5]

Politics

Rational irrationality in individual political beliefs

Politics is a situation where rational irrationality is expected to be common, according to Caplan's theory. In typical large democracies, each individual voter has a very low probability of influencing the outcome of an election or determining whether a particular policy will be implemented. Thus, the expected cost of supporting an erroneous policy (obtained by multiplying the cost of the policy by the probability that the individual voter will have a decisive role in influencing the policy) is very low. The psychological benefits of supporting policies that feel good but are in fact harmful may be greater than these small expected costs. This creates a situation where voters may be rationally irrational for practical morale reasons.

Rational irrationality and systemic biases

For rational irrationality at an individual level to have an effect on political outcomes, it is necessary that there be systemic ways in which people are irrational. In other words, people need to have systemic biases: there needs to be a systemic difference between people's preferences over beliefs and true beliefs. In the absence of systemic biases, different forms of irrationality would cancel out when aggregated using the voting process.

Caplan attempts to demonstrate empirically the existence of systemic biases in beliefs about economics in his book The Myth of the Rational Voter .

Implications for the outcomes of democracy

When a large number of individuals hold systematically biased beliefs, the total cost to the democracy of all these irrational beliefs could be significant. Thus, even though every individual voter may be behaving rationally, the voters as a whole are not acting in their collective self-interest. This is analogous to the tragedy of the commons. Another way of thinking about it is that each voter, by being rationally irrational, creates a small negative externality for other voters.

Caplan believes that the rational irrationality of voters is one of the reasons why democracies choose suboptimal economic policies, particularly in the area of free trade versus protectionism. Philosopher Michael Huemer, in a TEDx talk on rational irrationality in politics, cited the war on terror and protectionism as two examples of rational irrationality in politics. [4]

Competing and opposing theories of democracy and politics

Any theory of democracy must take into account the empirical fact that most voters in a democracy have very little idea about the details of politics, including the names of their elected representatives, the terms of office, and the platforms of candidates of major political parties.

Like rational irrationality, some theories of democracy claim that democracies tend to choose bad policies. Other theories claim that despite the empirical observations about voter ignorance, democracies do in fact do fairly well. Below are listed some of these theories and their relation to rational irrationality.

Rational ignorance and public choice theory

The most famous theory of democratic failure is public choice theory. The theory, developed by James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and others, relies on rational ignorance. Voters have a very small probability of influencing policy outcomes, so they do not put much effort to stay up-to-date on politics. This allows special interests to manipulate the political process and engage in rent seeking. A key idea of public choice theory is that many harmful policies have concentrated benefits (experienced by special interests) and diffuse costs. The special interests experiencing the benefits are willing to lobby for the policies, while the costs are spread out very diffusely among a much larger group of people. Because these costs are diffuse, the people bearing the costs do not have enough at stake to lobby against the policies.

Rational irrationality and rational ignorance share some key similarities but are also different in a number of ways. The similarities are that both theories reject the claim that voters are rational and well-informed, and both theories claim that democracy does not function well. However, the theories differ in a number of ways:

There are two main objections to public choice theory and rational ignorance that do not apply to rational irrationality:

Expressive voting

Brennan and Lomasky have an alternative theory of democratic failure that is quite similar to Caplan's theory of rational irrationality. Their theory, called expressive voting, states that people vote to express certain beliefs. The key difference between expressive voting and rational irrationality is that the former does not require people to actually hold systematically biased beliefs, while the latter does.

Loren Lomasky, one of the proponents of expressive voting, explained some of the key differences between the theories in a critical review of Caplan's book. [6]

Wittman's theory of democratic success

Donald Wittman has argued that democracy works well. [7] Wittman's argument rests on raising a number of objections to public choice theory, such as those outlined above while contrasting public choice theory and rational irrationality. Caplan described his own work on rational irrationality as an attempt to rescue democratic failure from Wittman's attacks. After the publication of Caplan's book, Wittman and Caplan debated each other. [8]

See also

Related Research Articles

Logrolling is the trading of favors, or quid pro quo, such as vote trading by legislative members to obtain passage of actions of interest to each legislative member. In organizational analysis, it refers to a practice in which different organizations promote each other's agendas, each in the expectation that the other will reciprocate. In an academic context, the Nuttall Encyclopedia describes logrolling as "mutual praise by authors of each other's work".

Rational choice theory refers to a set of guidelines that help understand economic and social behaviour. The theory originated in the eighteenth century and can be traced back to political economist and philosopher, Adam Smith. The theory postulates that an individual will perform a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether an option is right for them. It also suggests that an individual's self-driven rational actions will help better the overall economy. Rational choice theory looks at three concepts: rational actors, self interest and the invisible hand.

Public choice, or public choice theory, is "the use of economic tools to deal with traditional problems of political science". Its content includes the study of political behavior. In political science, it is the subset of positive political theory that studies self-interested agents and their interactions, which can be represented in a number of ways – using standard constrained utility maximization, game theory, or decision theory. It is the origin and intellectual foundation of contemporary work in political economy.

Rationality is the quality or state of being rational – that is, being based on or agreeable to reason. Rationality implies the conformity of one's beliefs with one's reasons to believe, and of one's actions with one's reasons for action. "Rationality" has different specialized meanings in philosophy, economics, sociology, psychology, evolutionary biology, game theory and political science.

Sunk cost Cost that has already been incurred and cannot be recovered

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Bryan Caplan American behavioral economist and author

Bryan Douglas Caplan is an American economist and author. Caplan is a professor of economics at George Mason University, research fellow at the Mercatus Center, adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, and former contributor to the Freakonomics blog; he also publishes his own blog, EconLog. He is a self-described "economic libertarian". The bulk of Caplan's academic work is in behavioral economics and public economics, especially public choice theory.

Rational ignorance is refraining from acquiring knowledge when the supposed cost of educating oneself on an issue exceeds the expected potential benefit that the knowledge would provide.

The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy is a book published by economists James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in 1962. It is considered to be one of the classic works from the discipline of public choice in economics and political science. This work presents the basic principles of public choice theory.

Anthony Downs was an American economist specializing in public policy and public administration. His research focuses included political choice theory, rent control, affordable housing, and transportation economics. He wrote a number of books including, An Economic Theory of Democracy (1957) and Inside Bureaucracy (1967), which have been major influences on the public choice school of political economy. In Downs's Law of Peak-Hour Traffic Congestion (1962), he accurately predicted that expanding expressways could not reduce traffic congestion, since demand would increase as well, and that reducing speeds increases capacity.

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Paradox of voting The larger the electorate, the less each vote matters

The paradox of voting, also called Downs' paradox, is that for a rational, self-interested voter, the costs of voting will normally exceed the expected benefits. Because the chance of exercising the pivotal vote is minuscule compared to any realistic estimate of the private individual benefits of the different possible outcomes, the expected benefits of voting are less than the costs.

Bent Flyvbjerg is a Danish economic geographer. He is the First BT Professor and Inaugural Chair of Major Programme Management at Oxford University's Saïd Business School and the Villum Kann Rasmussen Professor and Chair of Major Program Management at the IT University of Copenhagen. He was previously Professor of Planning at Aalborg University, Denmark and Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands. He is a fellow of St Anne's College, Oxford.

<i>The Myth of the Rational Voter</i> 2007 book by Bryan Caplan

The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies is a 2007 book by the economist Bryan Caplan, in which the author challenges the idea that voters are reasonable people whom society can trust to make laws. Rather, Caplan contends that voters are irrational in the political sphere and have systematically biased ideas concerning economics.

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Criticism of democracy has been a key part of democracy and its functions.

The altruism theory of voting is a model of voter behavior which states that if citizens in a democracy have "social" preferences for the welfare of others, the extremely low probability of a single vote determining an election will be outweighed by the large cumulative benefits society will receive from the voter's preferred policy being enacted, such that it is rational for an “altruistic” citizen, who receives utility from helping others, to vote. Altruistic voting has been compared to purchasing a lottery ticket, in which the probability of winning is extremely low but the payoff is large enough that the expected benefit outweighs the cost.

Ilya Somin American law professor

Ilya Somin is a law professor at George Mason University, an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute, a blogger for the Volokh Conspiracy, and a former co-editor of the Supreme Court Economic Review (2006–2013). His research focuses on constitutional law, property law, migration rights, and the study of popular political participation and its implications for constitutional democracy.

<i>The Ethics of Voting</i>

The Ethics of Voting by Jason Brennan is a book which outlines a contrasting argument to the idea that it is the civic duty of individuals within a democracy to vote. The core tenet upon which his argument resides is that the individuals who do not know what they are voting for should not feel the moral obligation to vote on issues about which they are uninformed, and that democracies would benefit as a whole from their abstaining from the polls.

Political cognition refers to the study of how individuals come to understand the political world, and how this understanding leads to political behavior. Some of the processes studied under the umbrella of political cognition include attention, interpretation, judgment, and memory. Most of the advancements in the area have been made by scholars in the fields of social psychology, political science, and communication studies.

References

  1. "Caplan's original paper on rational irrationality". Bryan Caplan. Archived from the original on 2009-07-15. Retrieved 2012-02-13.
  2. "Caplan's paper on rational irrationality versus rational ignorance". Bryan Caplan. Retrieved 2012-02-13.
  3. 1 2 "Michael Huemer on irrationality in politics". Michael Huemer. Archived from the original on 2017-03-19. Retrieved 2012-02-13.
  4. 1 2 "Michael Huemer's TEDX talk on irrationality in politics". Michael Huemer. Archived from the original on 2021-12-20.
  5. 1 2 "Debate between Caplan and Iannaccone on rational irrationality in religion". Bryan Caplan. Retrieved 2012-02-13.
  6. Lomasky, Loren (June 2008). "Loren Lomasky's review of Caplan's book". Public Choice. 135 (3–4): 469–484. doi:10.1007/s11127-007-9273-7. S2CID   153330363.
  7. Wittman, Donald A. (1995). The myth of democratic failure : why political institutions are efficient. University of Chicago Press. ISBN   0226904229. OCLC   31710344.
  8. "Debate between Bryan Caplan and Donald Wittman on democracy".