Security theater

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Security theater is the practice of implementing security measures that are considered to provide the feeling of improved security while doing little or nothing to achieve it. [1] [2]

Contents

The term was originally coined by Bruce Schneier for his book Beyond Fear , [3] but has since been widely adopted by the media and the public, particularly in discussions surrounding the Transportation Security Administration. [4]

The use of Security theater tactics is a somewhat controversial subject that involves discussions of alleged discrimination, and potential economic disadvantages. Therefore, the term has a negative connotation and is used as a means of critiquing. [3]

Practices called into question by the critiques of security theater include airport security measures, stop and frisk policies on public transportation, and clear bag policies at sports venues. [5] [6] [7]

Etymology

The term security theater was coined by computer security specialist and writer Bruce Schneier for his book Beyond Fear , [8] but has gained currency in security circles, particularly for describing airport security measures.

Examples of use of the term:

For theater on a grand scale, you can't do better than the audience-participation dramas performed at airports, under the direction of the Transportation Security Administration. ... The T.S.A.'s profession of outrage is nothing but 'security theater,' Mr. Schneier said, using the phrase he coined in 2003 to describe some of the agency's procedures.

— "Theater of the Absurd at the T.S.A.", The New York Times ; December 17, 2006 [9]

Airline passengers will be able to bring many types of cigarette lighters on board again starting next month after authorities found that a ban on the devices did little to make flying safer, a newspaper reported Friday. 'Taking lighters away is security theater,' Transportation Security Administration chief Kip Hawley told The (New York) Times in an interview.

— "Report: Plane Lighter Ban to Be Lifted", Associated Press; July 20, 2007 [10]

Examples

Some measures which have been called security theater include:

Airport security measures

Many procedures of the Transportation Security Administration have been criticized as security theater. Specific measures critiqued as security theater include the "patting down the crotches of children, the elderly and even infants as part of the post-9/11 airport security show" and the use of full body scanners, which "are ineffective and can be easily manipulated." [11] Many measures are put in place in reaction to past threats and "are ineffective at actually stopping terrorism, as potential attackers can simply change tactics." [11]

Security Checkpoint at the Berlin-Schonefeld Airport Flughafenkontrolle.jpg
Security Checkpoint at the Berlin-Schönefeld Airport

The use of Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) and its successor, Secure Flight – programs which rely on static screening of airline passenger profiles to choose which people should be searched – has been criticized as ineffective security theater. [12] The TSA's Registered Traveler Program and Trusted Traveler Program have been criticized on similar grounds. [12] The CAPPS has been demonstrated to reduce the effectiveness of searching below that of random searches since terrorists can test the system and use those who are searched least often for their operations. [13]

A 2010 United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) report found that the TSA's $900 million Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) program, a behavioral-detection program introduced in 2007 that is aimed at detecting terrorists, had detected no terrorists and failed to detect at least 16 people who had traveled through airports where the program was in use and were later involved in terrorism cases. [14] [15] In 2013, a GAO report found that no evidence existed to support the idea that "behavioral indicators ... can be used to identify persons who may pose a risk to aviation security." [14] A separate 2013 report by the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General found that the TSA had failed to evaluate the SPOT program and could not "show that the program is cost effective." [14] The SPOT program has been described as security theater. [15] [16] [17]

A TSA officer checks a passenger's ID. The TSA is often criticized for their use of Security Theater practices. TSA Officer Checking ID.png
A TSA officer checks a passenger's ID. The TSA is often criticized for their use of Security Theater practices.

With the aim of preventing individuals on a No Fly List from flying in commercial airliners, U.S. airports require all passengers to show valid picture ID (e.g. a passport or driver's license) along with their boarding pass before entering the boarding terminal. At this checkpoint, the name on the ID is matched to that on the boarding pass, but is not recorded. In order to be effective, this practice must assume that 1) the ticket was bought under the passenger's real name (at which point the name was recorded and checked against the No Fly List), 2) the boarding pass shown is real, and 3) the ID shown is real. However, the rise of print-at-home boarding passes, which can be easily forged, allows a potential attacker to buy a ticket under someone else's name, to go into the boarding terminal using a real ID and a fake boarding pass, and then to fly on the ticket that has someone else's name on it. [18] [19] [20] [21] Additionally, a 2007 investigation showed that obviously false IDs could be used when claiming a boarding pass and entering the departures terminal, so a person on the No Fly List can simply travel under a different name. [22]

Facial recognition technology was introduced at Manchester Airport in August 2008. A journalist for The Register claimed that "the gates in Manchester were throwing up so many false results that staff effectively turned them off." [23] Previously matches had to be 80% the same to their passport pictures to go through, and this was quickly changed to 30%. According to Rob Jenkins, a facial recognition expert at Glasgow University, when testing similar machines at a 30% recognition level, the machines were unable to distinguish between the faces of Osama bin Laden and Winona Ryder, bin Laden and Kevin Spacey, nor between Gordon Brown and Mel Gibson. [24]

Random search programs on public transit and sports venues

Random bag searches on subway systems – a practice that has been used on the Washington Metro and on New York City mass transit – have been condemned as ineffective security theater and a waste of resources. [25] [26] Such programs have also been criticized by members of the public and civil liberties groups. [25] [26] After eighteen months of random bag checks by the Metro Transit Police from December 2010, the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority reported that the program, which was funded by a federal homeland security grant, had yielded zero arrests. [27]

Similarly, the Chicago Transit Authority police's deployment of random explosive-residue-swabbing checkpoints at public transit stations has been criticized as an ineffective means of security. [28] Pat-downs of fans entering arenas for National Football League and metal detectors at Major League Baseball games have also been criticized as security theater. [29] [30] Additionally, the effectiveness of Clear and Large Bag policies at many major sports venues in the United States has been questioned repeatedly. [7]

Other

During the COVID-19 pandemic, some measures such as surface sanitation and temperature checks at airports have been criticized as being security theater or "hygiene theater". [31] [32]

Credit card signatures have been a longstanding subject of scrutiny and generally referred to as theatrical measure, as they have been notably criticized for having no true effect on deterring or stopping credit card fraud. [33] [34]

Benefits

While it may seem that security theater must always cause loss, it may be beneficial, at least in a localized situation. This is because perception of security is sometimes more important than security itself. [35] If the potential victims of an attack feel more protected and safer as a result of the measures, then they may carry on activities they would have otherwise avoided, which could lead to economic benefits.

Disadvantages

By definition, security theater practices provide no measurable security benefits, or minimal benefits that do not outweigh the cost of such practices. [36] Security theater typically involves restricting or modifying aspects of people's behavior or surroundings in very visible and highly specific ways, [36] which could involve potential restrictions of personal liberty and privacy, ranging from mild inconveniences such as confiscating liquids over a limited amount, to sensitive issues, such as a full body strip search. [37]

Critics such as the American Civil Liberties Union have argued that the benefits of security theater are temporary and illusory since after such security measures inevitably fail, not only is the feeling of insecurity increased, but there is also loss of belief in the competence of those responsible for security. [38] [37]

Organizations such as the United States' Transportation Security Administration (TSA), who have implemented security theater practices, have been found to be highly ineffective, with one 2015 investigation resulting in TSA agents failing to prevent illegal items in 95% of trials. [39] A follow up study in 2017 found similar results, though the TSA did not release an exact rate of success or failure. [40]

Researchers such as Edward Felten have described the airport security repercussions due to the September 11, 2001 attacks as security theater. [41]

Increased casualties

In 2007, researchers at Cornell University studied the specific effects of a change to security practices instituted by the TSA in late 2002. They concluded that this change reduced the number of air travelers by 6%, and estimated that consequently, 129 more people died in car accidents in the fourth quarter of 2002. [42] Extrapolating this rate of fatalities, New York Times contributor Nate Silver remarked that this is equivalent to "four fully loaded Boeing 737s crashing each year." [43]

Economic costs

The 2007 Cornell study also noted that strict airport security hurts the airline industry; it was estimated that the 6% reduction in the number of passengers in the fourth quarter of 2002 cost the industry $1.1 billion in lost business. [44]

The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) has reported that between October 2008 and June 2010, over 6,500 people traveling to and from the United States had their electronic devices searched at the border. [45] The Association of Corporate Travel Executives, whose member companies are responsible for over 1 million travelers and represent over $300 billion in annual business travel expenditures, reported in February 2008 that 7% of their members had been subject to the seizure of a laptop or other electronic device. Electronic device seizure may have a severe economic and behavioral impact. Entrepreneurs for whom their laptop represents a mobile office can be deprived of their entire business. Fifty percent of the respondents to ACTE's survey indicated that having a laptop seizure could damage a traveler's professional standing within a company. [46]

The executive director of the Association of Corporate Travel Executives testified at a 2008 hearing of the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution seizure of data or computers carrying business proprietary information has forced and will force companies to implement new and expensive internal travel policies. [47]

Increased risk of targeted attacks

The direct costs of security theater may be lower than that of more elaborate security measures. However, it may divert portions of the budget for effective security measures without resulting in an adequate, measurable gain in security. [48]

Because security theater measures are often so specific (such as concentrating on potential explosives in shoes), it allows potential attackers to divert to other methods of attack. [36] This not only applies to the extremely specific measures, but can also involve possible tactics such as switching from using highly scrutinized airline passengers as attackers to getting attackers employed as airline or airport staff. Another alternate tactic would be simply avoiding attacking aircraft in favor of attacking other areas where sufficient damage would be done, such as check-in counters (as was done, for example, in the attacks on Brussels airport on 22 March 2016), or simply targeting other places where people gather in large numbers, such as cinemas. [36]

Discriminatory practices

An additional disadvantage of security theater is the potential for biases to lead to negative outcomes and unequal treatment for certain groups. Airport racial profiling in the United States is an issue that largely began in the wake of the September 11 attacks on the United States, and persists today. [49] [50]

Documents uncovered by the ACLU found that until late 2012, the United States' Transportation Security Administration (TSA) maintained training manuals that exclusively focused on examples of Arab or Muslim terrorists. [51] In 2022, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that advanced imaging technologies by the TSA disproportionally selected passengers of minority groups for additional screening, and a follow up report in 2023 found the same issue. [52] [50]

The ACLU also filed a 2015 lawsuit against the TSA's Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques, or "SPOT" program, and was successful in obtaining thousands of pages of documents regarding the program. [53] The ALCU dropped their lawsuit against the TSA in 2017, but a report published by the organization, as well as reports published by the US GAO and a scientific advisory group found that the SPOT program had no scientific basis for effectiveness. [54] [55] [56]

See also

Related Research Articles

After the September 11 attacks, there was an immediate call to action regarding the state of aviation security measures as the hijackers involved in 9/11 were able to successfully pass through security and take command of the plane. The existing security measures flagged more than half of the 19 hijackers in 9/11; however, they were cleared to board the plane because their bags were not found to contain any explosives. In the months and years following September 11, 2001, security at many airports worldwide were reformed to deter similar terrorist plots.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Transportation Security Administration</span> United States federal government agency

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is an agency of the United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that has authority over the security of transportation systems within, and connecting to, the United States. It was created as a response to the September 11 attacks to improve airport security procedures and consolidate air travel security under a combined federal law enforcement and regulatory agency.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Airport security</span> Measures to prevent crime at an airport

Airport security includes the techniques and methods used in an attempt to protect passengers, staff, aircraft, and airport property from malicious harm, crime, terrorism, and other threats.

The Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) is a counter-terrorism system in place in the United States air travel industry that matches passenger information with other data sources. The United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA) maintains a watchlist, pursuant to 49 USC § 114 (h)(2), of "individuals known to pose, or suspected of posing, a risk of air piracy or terrorism or a threat to airline or passenger safety." The list is used to pre-emptively identify terrorists attempting to buy airline tickets or board aircraft traveling in the United States, and to mitigate perceived threats.

The No Fly List, maintained by the United States federal government's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), is one of several lists included in algorithmic rulesets used by government agencies and airlines to decide who to allow to board airline flights. The TSC's No Fly List is a list of people who are prohibited from boarding commercial aircraft for travel within, into, or out of the United States. This list has also been used to divert aircraft away from U.S. airspace that do not have start- or end-point destinations within the United States. The number of people on the list rises and falls according to threat and intelligence reporting. There were reportedly 16,000 names on the list in 2011, 21,000 in 2012, and 47,000 in 2013.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Registered Traveler</span>

A registered traveler is a person qualified through an airline passenger security assessment system in the United States air travel industry. Such programs were initially tested in 2005. Registered traveler programs are currently in operation in various airports around the country and are administered by TTAC, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) office responsible for Secure Flight, the replacement for the Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) and the canceled CAPPS II counter-terrorism system.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Backscatter X-ray</span> Advanced X-ray imaging technology

Backscatter X-ray is an advanced X-ray imaging technology. Traditional X-ray machines detect hard and soft materials by the variation in x-ray intensity transmitted through the target. In contrast, backscatter X-ray detects the radiation that reflects from the target. It has potential applications where less-destructive examination is required, and can operate even if only one side of the target is available for examination.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Hand luggage</span> Luggage small enough to be carried in the passenger compartment of a vehicle

The term hand luggage or cabin baggage refers to the type of luggage that passengers are allowed to carry along in the passenger compartment of a vehicle instead of a separate cargo compartment. Passengers are allowed to carry a limited number of smaller bags with them in the vehicle, which typically contain valuables and items needed during the journey. There is normally storage space provided for hand luggage, either under seating, or in overhead lockers. Trains usually have luggage racks above the seats and may also have luggage space between the backs of seats facing opposite directions, or in extra luggage racks, for example, at the ends of the carriage near the doors.

Secure Flight is an airline passenger pre-screening program, implemented from August 2009 by the United States Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Secure Flight matches passenger information against watch lists maintained by the federal government. The initial implementation phase of Secure Flight resulted in the complete transfer of responsibility for passenger watch list matching to TSA from aircraft operators whose flights operate within the United States. The second phase of Secure Flight will result in the transfer of responsibility for passenger watch list matching to TSA for flights into, out of, and over the United States.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kip Hawley</span> American government official (1953–2022)

Edmund Summers "Kip" Hawley III was an American government official and business executive who was administrator of the Transportation Security Administration, part of United States government's Department of Homeland Security, from July 27, 2005, to January 20, 2009. He replaced the previous Director, Rear Admiral David Stone. He was succeeded by Acting Administrator Gale Rossides.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Secondary Security Screening Selection</span> Airport security measure in the United States

Secondary Security Screening Selection or Secondary Security Screening Selectee, known by its initials SSSS, is an airport security measure in the United States which selects passengers for additional inspection. People from certain countries are subject to it by default. The passengers may be known as Selectee, Automatic Selectee or the Selectee list. The size and contents of the list fluctuates and is a secret, although the Transportation Security Administration has stated there are tens of thousands of names on it.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Full body scanner</span> Device which detects objects in or around a persons body

A full-body scanner is a device that detects objects on or inside a person's body for security screening purposes, without physically removing clothes or making physical contact. Unlike metal detectors, full-body scanners can detect non-metal objects, which became an increasing concern after various airliner bombing attempts in the 2000s. Some scanners can also detect swallowed items or items hidden in the body cavities of a person. Starting in 2007, full-body scanners started supplementing metal detectors at airports and train stations in many countries.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Sensitive security information</span>

Sensitive security information (SSI) is a category of United States sensitive but unclassified information obtained or developed in the conduct of security activities, the public disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy, reveal trade secrets or privileged or confidential information, or be detrimental to the security of transportation. It is not a form of classification under Executive Order 12958 as amended. SSI is not a security classification for national security information. The safeguarding and sharing of SSI is governed by Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) parts 15 and 1520. This designation is assigned to information to limit the exposure of the information to only those individuals that "need to know" in order to participate in or oversee the protection of the nation's transportation system. Those with a need to know can include persons outside of TSA, such as airport operators, aircraft operators, railroad carriers, rail hazardous materials shippers and receivers, vessel and maritime port owners and operators, foreign vessel owners, and other persons.

In the United States, border security includes the protection of ports, airports, and the country's 3,017-mile (4,855 km) land border with Canada and 1,933-mile (3,111 km) border with Mexico. The U.S. concept of border security is deeply entwined with the persistent actual or perceived threat of terrorism, as well as more universal concerns such as immigration control, smuggling, and human trafficking. As such, the U.S. federal government is constantly reevaluating and adjusting its border security policies to reflect the perceived threats posed to the United States.

Airport racial profiling in the United States is U.S. government activity directed at a suspect or group of suspects because of their race or ethnicity. Under Fourth Amendment analysis, objective factors measure whether law enforcement action is constitutional, and under the Fourteenth Amendment challenges to the practice are assessed under the customary strict scrutiny test for racial classifications.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response team</span>

A Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response team, sometimes Visible Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR) is a Transportation Security Administration program. Various government sources have differing descriptions of VIPR's exact mission. It is specifically authorized by 6 U.S.C. § 1112 which says that the program is to "augment the security of any mode of transportation at any location within the United States". Authority for the program is under the Secretary of Homeland Security. The program falls under TSA's Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service. TSA OLE/FAMS shares responsibility for the program with the Office of Security Operations and Transportation Sector Network Management.

BDA, until 2016 called SPOT, is a program launched in the United States by the Transportation Security Administration to identify potential terrorists among people at an airport by a set of 94 objective criteria, all of which are signs for either stress, fear, or deception. Passengers meeting enough of the criteria are, under the program, referred for a patdown and additional screening. The criteria were initially secret, but in March 2015, The Intercept published them after obtaining the information from an anonymous source.

The 2017 electronics ban was an order issued by the United States government in March 2017 banning electronics beyond the size of a mobile phone on carry-on luggage for direct flights departing from 10 major airports in the Middle East and traveling to the United States, and requiring airlines to enforce this ban. The order was issued based on intelligence that the Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was planning on using batteries and compartments of large electronic equipment to conceal explosives that are not detectable by current aviation security scanners. The US government has been accused by the International Air Transport Association of implementing the ban more of as a protectionist measure to shield major US airlines from increasing competition of major airlines from the Middle East than for security reasons. The United Kingdom has issued a similar ban but covers a different range of airports and airlines, including low-cost airlines. US officials lifted the ban in July 2017, citing improved airport security.

Airport privacy involves the right of personal privacy for passengers when it comes to screening procedures, surveillance, and personal data being stored at airports. This practice intertwines airport security measures and privacy specifically the advancement of security measures following the 9/11 attacks in the United States and other global terrorist attacks. Several terrorist attacks, such as 9/11, have led airports all over the world to look to the advancement of new technology such as body and baggage screening, detection dogs, facial recognition, and the use of biometrics in electronic passports. Amidst the introduction of new technology and security measures in airports and the growing rates of travelers there has been a rise of risk and concern in privacy.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">TSA PreCheck</span> U.S. Transportation Security Administration traveler program

TSA PreCheck is a Trusted Traveler program initiated in December 2013 and administered by the U.S. Transportation Security Administration that allows selected members of select frequent flyer programs, members of Global Entry, Free and Secure Trade, NEXUS, and SENTRI, members of the US military, and cadets and midshipmen of the United States service academies to receive expedited screening for domestic and select international itineraries. As of July 2023, this program was available at more than 200 airports.

References

  1. ↑ Schneier, Bruce (2003). Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly about Security in an Uncertain World . Copernicus Books. p.  38. ISBN   0-387-02620-7.
  2. ↑ Thedell, Terry (October 2013). "The Theater of Safety". Professional Safety. 58 (10). Des Plaines: 28. ProQuest   1492258883.
  3. 1 2 "Expert: TSA Screening Is Security Theater - CBS News". www.cbsnews.com. 2008-12-18. Retrieved 2023-12-12.
  4. ↑ Campbell, Darryl (2022-04-21). "The Humiliating History of the TSA". The Verge. Retrieved 2023-12-12.
  5. ↑ Levenson, Eric (2014-01-31). "The TSA Is in the Business of 'Security Theater,' Not Security". The Atlantic. Retrieved 2023-12-12.
  6. ↑ "Metro's Bag Searches Are Pretty Empty, It Turns Out". DCist. Archived from the original on September 7, 2020. Retrieved 2023-12-12.
  7. 1 2 Jeva Lange (2022-04-21). "The absurdity and incoherence of security theater at the stadium". theweek. Retrieved 2023-12-12.
  8. ↑ "Expert: TSA Screening is Security Theater". CBS News. 2008-12-18. Retrieved 2009-07-22.
  9. ↑ Stross, Randall (December 17, 2006). "Theater of the Absurd at the T.S.A." The New York Times.
  10. ↑ "TSA To Lift Ban On Most Lighters On Planes". www.cbsnews.com. July 20, 2007. Retrieved October 25, 2021.
  11. 1 2 Levenson, Eric (January 31, 2014). "The TSA Is in the Business of 'Security Theater,' Not Security". The Atlantic.
  12. 1 2 Bruce Schneier, Airline Security a Waste of Cash, Wired (December 1, 2005).
  13. ↑ Chakrabarti, Samidh & Strauss, Aaron (2002-05-16). "Carnival Booth: An Algorithm for Defeating the Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening System". Law and Ethics on the Electronic Frontier. Massachusetts Institute of Technology . Retrieved 2006-09-06.
  14. 1 2 3 Jana Winter & Cora Currier, Exclusive: TSA’s Secret Behavior Checklist to Spot Terrorists
  15. 1 2 Kevin D. Williamson, The TSA's 95 Percent Failure Rate: Security Theater as Farce, National Review (June 3, 2015).
  16. ↑ Jeffrey Goldberg, The Things He Carried, The Atlantic (November 2008).
  17. ↑ Thomas Cincotta, Behavior Profiling: Ineffective and Expensive Security Theater, Political Research Associates (July 29, 2010).
  18. ↑ "Slate's Andy Bowers on Airport Security loopholes – Boing Boing". Archived from the original on January 24, 2007.
  19. ↑ "Crypto-gram: August 15, 2003 - Schneier on Security". www.schneier.com.
  20. ↑ "A dangerous loophole in airport security. – By Andy Bowers – Slate Magazine". Archived from the original on April 28, 2007.
  21. ↑ "Fake Boarding Pass Generator mirror site – Boing Boing". Archived from the original on April 27, 2007.
  22. ↑ "Flying without ID won't work? Try making your own ID. – Boing Boing". Archived from the original on May 17, 2007.
  23. ↑ "Cardiff Airport gets more security theatre". www.theregister.com.
  24. ↑ Gardham, Duncan (2009-04-05). "Airport face scanners 'cannot tell the difference between Osama bin Laden and Winona Ryder'". Telegraph, The. Retrieved 2013-04-20.
  25. 1 2 Markus Rauschecker, Metro's Random Bag Searches: Reasonableness, Randomness, and "Security Theater", University of Maryland Center for Health and Homeland Security (January 7, 2011).
  26. 1 2 Ann Scott Tyson, Metro bag searches criticized by public, Washington Post (January 4, 2011).
  27. ↑ Benjamin R. Freed, Metro's Bag Searches Are Pretty Empty, It Turns Out Archived 2017-02-18 at the Wayback Machine , DCist (June 12, 2012).
  28. ↑ Tim Cushing, Chicago Transit Cops Start Up Their Own Security Theater, Will Start Randomly Swabbing Bags For Explosive Residue, TechDirt (November 6, 2014).
  29. ↑ Timothy Geigner, NFL Ramps Up Security Theatre, TechDirt (September 21, 2011).
  30. ↑ Schneier, Bruce (2021-10-06). "Baseball's new metal detectors won't keep you safe. They'll just make you miss a few innings". Washington Post. ISSN   0190-8286 . Retrieved 2023-12-12.
  31. ↑ Thompson, Derek (27 July 2020). "Hygiene Theater Is a Huge Waste of Time". The Atlantic .
  32. ↑ Brueck, Hilary. "Coronavirus temperature scans are nothing more than pandemic security theater. In some cases, they're dangerous". Business Insider .
  33. ↑ Vasel, Kathryn, https://money.cnn.com/2018/04/13/pf/credit-card-signature/index.html
  34. ↑ Dale, Rosie (2018-04-16). "Why Credit Card Signatures are Security Theatre". Ditto PR’s TrendComms. Retrieved 2023-12-12.
  35. ↑ Peter N. Glaskowsky (2008-04-09). "Bruce Schneier's new view on Security Theater" . Retrieved 2019-10-07.
  36. 1 2 3 4 "Smoke Screening". Vanity Fair. 20 December 2011. Retrieved 27 December 2011.
  37. 1 2 "After 9/11, the U.S. leaned into security theater. Here's how that's playing out 20 years later". Mic. Retrieved 2021-12-04.
  38. ↑ "TSA on the Defensive Again: Effective Security or Security Theater?". American Civil Liberties Union. 29 March 2012. Retrieved 2021-12-04.
  39. ↑ "EXCLUSIVE: Undercover DHS Tests Find Security Failures at US Airports". ABC News. Retrieved 2023-12-06.
  40. ↑ "TSA fails most tests in latest undercover operation at US airports". ABC News. Retrieved 2023-12-06.
  41. ↑ Edward Felten (2004-07-09). "Security Theater" . Retrieved 2009-07-22.
  42. ↑ "AEM.cornell.edu" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2011-02-01. Retrieved 2012-01-16.
  43. ↑ Silver, Nate (19 November 2010). "The Hidden Costs of Extra Airport Security". FiveThirtyEight.
  44. ↑ Blalock, Garrick; Kadiyali, Vrinda; Simon, Daniel H. (November 2007). "The Impact of Post-9/11 Airport Security Measures on the Demand for Air Travel". The Journal of Law and Economics. 50 (4): 731–755. doi:10.1086/519816. S2CID   681649.
  45. ↑ "GOVERNMENT DATA ABOUT SEARCHES OF INTERNATIONAL TRAVELERS' LAPTOPS AND PERSONAL ELECTRONIC DEVICES". American Civil Liberties Union . Retrieved 11 May 2015.
  46. ↑ "- LAPTOP SEARCHES AND OTHER VIOLATIONS OF PRIVACY FACED BY AMERICANS RETURNING FROM OVERSEAS TRAVEL". www.govinfo.gov. Retrieved 2023-12-12.
  47. ↑ "Statement of Susan K. Gurley, executive director, Association of Corporate Travel Executives, Alexandria, Virginia". Laptop searches and other violations of privacy faced by Americans returning from overseas travel. Hearing before the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 25 June 2008.
  48. ↑ Zack Phillips (2007-08-01). "FEATURES Security Theater". Government Executive. Archived from the original on 2007-08-24. Retrieved 2009-07-22.
  49. ↑ Tate, Curtis. "Racial bias in facial recognition software: What travelers should know as TSA, CBP expand programs". USA TODAY. Retrieved 2023-12-06.
  50. 1 2 Office, U. S. Government Accountability. "Aviation Security: TSA Could Better Ensure Detection and Assess the Potential for Discrimination in Its Screening Technologies | U.S. GAO". www.gao.gov. Retrieved 2023-12-06.
  51. ↑ "New Documents Show This TSA Program Blamed for Profiling Is Unscientific and Unreliable — But Still It Continues | ACLU". American Civil Liberties Union. 2017-02-08. Retrieved 2023-12-06.
  52. ↑ Office, U. S. Government Accountability. "Aviation Security: TSA Should Assess Potential for Discrimination and Better Inform Passengers of the Complaint Process | U.S. GAO". www.gao.gov. Retrieved 2023-12-06.
  53. ↑ "ACLU Sues TSA for Records on Discredited 'Behavior Detection' Program". American Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved 2023-12-06.
  54. ↑ "ACLU v. TSA". American Civil Liberties Union. Retrieved 2023-12-06.
  55. ↑ Office, U. S. Government Accountability. "Aviation Security: TSA Should Limit Future Funding for Behavior Detection Activities | U.S. GAO". www.gao.gov. Retrieved 2023-12-06.
  56. ↑ Weinberger, Sharon (2010-05-01). "Airport security: Intent to deceive?". Nature. 465 (7297): 412–415. doi:10.1038/465412a. ISSN   1476-4687.

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