Sharon Street

Last updated
Sharon Street
Born1973
Alma mater Amherst College
Harvard University
Era Contemporary philosophy
Region Western philosophy
School Analytic philosophy
Institutions New York University
Harvard University
Main interests
Metaethics, normative ethics
Notable ideas
The metaethical implications of evolutionary biological explanations of normative capacities

Sharon Street (born 1973) is a professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at New York University. [1] She specializes in metaethics, focusing in particular on how to reconcile our understanding of normativity with a scientific conception of the world. [1]

Contents

Education and career

Street received her B.A. from Amherst College in 1995 and her Ph.D. from Harvard University in 2003 under the supervision of Christine Korsgaard. Street's doctoral dissertation examined the metaethical implications of evolutionary biological explanations of our normative capacities, and whether such explanations might have an undermining effect on our moral and other normative commitments.

Street is currently Professor of Philosophy at New York University. She joined the NYU Philosophy Department in 2002. [2]

Philosophical work

Street's work has been particularly influential in the fields of metaethics, where she defends a doctrine she calls "Humean Constructivism", a term she uses to differentiate her work from the "Kantian Constructivism" of her mentor, Christine Korsgaard. [3] In addition to the development of Humean Constructivism, Street has also been an influential critic of naturalist and non-naturalist accounts of moral realism, as well as quasi-realist and theist metaethical positions. [4]

Bibliography (selected)

Related Research Articles

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References

  1. 1 2 "Online directory (New York University)". New York University. Retrieved 8 March 2017.
  2. "Curriculum Vitae (Sharon Street)". Academia. Retrieved 8 March 2017.
  3. Jezzi, Nathaniel. "Constructivism in Metaethics". IEP. Retrieved 8 March 2017.
  4. Dorsey, Dale. "Featured Philosopher: Sharon Street". PEASoup. Retrieved 8 March 2017.