Smith v. City of Jackson

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Smith v. City of Jackson
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued November 3, 2004
Decided March 30, 2005
Full case nameAzel P. Smith, et al., Petitioners v. City of Jackson, Mississippi, et al.
Docket no. 03-1160
Citations544 U.S. 228 ( more )
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
David Souter  · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg  · Stephen Breyer
Case opinions
MajorityStevens (Parts I, II, IV), joined by Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer
PluralityStevens (Part III), joined by Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer
ConcurrenceScalia (in part and judgment)
ConcurrenceO'Connor (in judgment), joined by Kennedy, Thomas
Rehnquist took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967

Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on March 30, 2005. It concerned the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) and the disparate impact theory. The Court held that although the theory of disparate impact set forth in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. , 401 U.S. 424 (1971) is also applicable under the ADEA, the ADEA is narrower as it permits “otherwise prohibited” actions “where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.” [1] [2] [3]

Contents

Background

In a revised employee pay plan, the City of Jackson in Mississippi increased the salaries of all police officers and dispatchers. Employees with less than five years of service received greater raises than ones with more seniority. In this police department, most officers over the age of 40 had served for more than five years. Azel Smith and a group of other department employees filed suit under the ADEA, claiming disparate impact and arguing that the City and police department unintentionally discriminated against them based on their age group. The District Court and Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that disparate impact claims were not available under the ADEA. [2] [4] [5]

Result

In a 5–3 decision, the Court held that disparate impact claims are available under the ADEA, similar to such claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as set forth in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. The Court reasoned that the ADEA and Title VII contain identical language concerning unlawful discrimination. However, the ADEA is narrower and permits “otherwise prohibited” actions “where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age.” [2] [6] [7] [8]

The Court further ruled that the petitioners in this case failed to set forth a valid disparate impact claim, as they did not identify any specific test or practice in the pay plan that had an adverse impact on older employees. The Court noted that the City’s explanation that the differentiation in raise proportions was based on its goal to make junior officers’ salaries more competitive in the market provided “reasonable factors other than age.” [1] [2] [4]

See also

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References

  1. 1 2 544 U.S. 228
  2. 1 2 3 4 "Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005)". Justia Law. Retrieved August 26, 2023.
  3. ↑ "29 CFR § 1625.7 - Differentiations based on reasonable factors other than age". LII / Legal Information Institute. Retrieved August 26, 2023.
  4. 1 2 "Smith v. City of Jackson, Mississippi." Oyez,www.oyez.org/cases/2004/03-1160. Accessed 26 Aug. 2023.
  5. ↑ Bitter, Adam N. (2006–2007). "Smith v. City of Jackson: Solving an Age-Old Problem". Catholic University Law Review. 56: 647.
  6. ↑ Stoehr, Paul (2006–2007). "Passing the Buck: How the Supreme Court Could Have Sidestepped the Impact of Its Controversial Decision in Smith v. City of Jackson". Saint Louis University Law Journal. 51: 549.
  7. ↑ Sturgeon, Jessica (2007). "Smith v. City of Jackson: Setting an Unreasonable Standard". Duke Law Journal. 56 (5): 1377–1402. ISSN   0012-7086.
  8. ↑ Ajunwa, Ifeoma, ed. (2019). "Age Discrimination by Platforms". Berkeley Journal of Employment & Labor Law. doi:10.15779/Z38GH9B924.
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