Survivability is the ability to remain alive or continue to exist. The term has more specific meaning in certain contexts.
Following disruptive forces such as flood, fire, disease, war, or climate change some species of flora, fauna, and local life forms are likely to survive more successfully than others because of consequent changes to their surrounding biophysical conditions.
In engineering, survivability is the quantified ability of a system, subsystem, equipment, process, or procedure to continue to function during and after a natural or man-made disturbance; for example a nuclear electromagnetic pulse from the detonation of a nuclear weapon.
For a given application, survivability must be qualified by specifying the range of conditions over which the entity will survive, the minimum acceptable level or post-disturbance functionality, and the maximum acceptable downtime. [1]
It has been suggested that this section be split out into another articletitled Survivability (military) . (Discuss) (May 2023) |
In the military environment, survivability can be defined as the ability to remain mission capable after a single engagement. Engineers working in survivability are often responsible for improving four main system elements: [2]
The European Survivability Workshop introduced the concept of "Mission Survivability" whilst retaining the three core areas above, either pertaining to the "survivability" of a platform through a complete mission, or the "survivability" of the mission itself (i.e. probability of mission success). Recent studies have also introduced the concept of "Force Survivability" which relates to the ability of a force rather than an individual platform to remain "mission capable".
There is no clear prioritisation of the three elements; this will depend on the characteristics and role of the platform. Some platform types, such as submarines and airplanes, minimise their susceptibility and may, to some extent, compromise in the other areas. Main Battle Tanks minimise vulnerability through the use of heavy armours. Present day surface warship designs tend to aim for a balanced combination of all three areas.
A popular term is the "survivability onion"; described as 5-8 layers: [3] [4]
Don't be there. If you are there, don’t be seen. If you are seen, don’t be targeted/acquired. If you are targeted/acquired, don’t be hit. If you are hit, don’t be penetrated. If you are penetrated, don’t be killed.
Survivability denotes the ability of a ship and its on-board systems to remain functional and continue designated mission in a man-made hostile environment. [5] The naval vessels are designed to operate in a man-made hostile environment, and therefore the survivability is a vital feature required from them. The naval vessel's survivability is a complicated subject affecting the whole life cycle of the vessel, and should be considered from the initial design phase of every war ship. [6]
The classical definition of naval survivability includes three main aspects, which are susceptibility, vulnerability, and recoverability; although, recoverability is often subsumed within vulnerability. [7] [3] Susceptibility consists of all the factors that expose the ship to the weapons effects in a combat environment. These factors in general are the operating conditions, the threat, and the features of the ship itself. The operating conditions, such as sea state, weather and atmospheric conditions, vary considerably, and their influence is difficult to address (hence they are often not accounted for in survivability assessment). The threat is dependent on the weapons directed against the ship and weapon's performance, such as the range. The features of the ship in this sense include platform signatures (radar, infrared, acoustic, magnetic), the defensive systems on board, such as surface-to-air missiles, EW and decoys, and also the tactics employed by the platform in countering the attack (aspects such as speed, maneuverability, chosen aspect presented to the threat). [6] Vulnerability refers to the ability of the vessel to withstand the short-term effects of the threat weapon. Vulnerability is an attribute typical to the vessel and therefore heavily affected by the vessel's basic characteristics such as size, subdivision, armouring, and other hardening features, and also the design of the ship's systems, in particular the location of equipment, degrees of redundancy and separation, and the presence within a system of single point failures. Recoverability refers to vessel's ability to restore and maintain its functionality after sustaining damage. Thus, recoverability is dependent on the actions aimed to neutralize the effects of the damage. These actions include firefighting, limiting the extent of flooding, and dewatering. Besides the equipment, the crew also has a vital role in recoverability. [8]
The crews of military combat vehicles face numerous lethal hazards which are both diverse and constantly evolving. Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), mines, and enemy fire are examples of such persistent and variable threats. Historically, measures taken to mitigate these hazards were concerned with protecting the vehicle itself, but due to this achieving only limited protection, the focus has now shifted to safeguarding the crew within from an ever-broadening range of threats, including Radio Controlled IEDs (RCIEDs), blast, fragmentation, heat stress, and dehydration.
The expressed goal of "crew survivability" is to ensure vehicle occupants are best protected. It goes beyond simply ensuring crew have the appropriate protective equipment and has expanded to include measuring the overpressure and blunt impact forces experienced by a vehicle from real blast incidents in order to develop medical treatment and improve overall crew survivability. Sustainable crew survivability is dependent on the effective integration of knowledge, training, and equipment.
Threat intelligence identifying trends, emerging technologies, and attack tactics used by enemy forces enables crews to implement procedures that will reduce their exposure to unnecessary risks. Such intelligence also allows for more effective pre-deployment training programs where personnel can be taught the most up-to-date developments in IED concealment, for example, or undertake tailored training that will enable them to identify the likely attack strategy of enemy forces. In addition, with expert, current threat intelligence, the most effective equipment can be procured or rapidly developed in support of operations.
"The capability of a system to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of threats such as attacks or large-scale natural disasters. Survivability is a subset of resilience." [9] [10]
“The capability of a system to fulfill its mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents.” [11]
A littoral combat ship (LCS) is either of two classes of relatively small surface vessels designed for near-shore operations by the United States Navy. It was "envisioned to be a networked, agile, stealthy surface combatant capable of defeating anti-access and asymmetric threats in the littorals", although their ability to perform these missions in practice has been called into question.
The Albion-class landing platform dock is a class of amphibious warfare ship in service with the Royal Navy. The class consists of two vessels, HMS Albion and HMS Bulwark, ordered in 1996 to replace the ageing Fearless class. Both ships were built by BAE Systems Marine at the former Vickers Shipbuilding and Engineering yard in Barrow-in-Furness. Albion was commissioned in 2003 and Bulwark in 2004. Each of the ships has a crew of 325 and can accommodate up to 405 troops. Thirty-one large trucks and thirty-six smaller vehicles and main battle tanks can be carried inside the vehicle deck. To disembark troops and vehicles, the vessels are equipped with eight landing craft. As of 2024, both vessels were in reserve.
The names of commissioned ships of the United States Navy all start with USS, for United States Ship. Non-commissioned, primarily civilian-crewed vessels of the U.S. Navy under the Military Sealift Command have names that begin with USNS, standing for United States Naval Ship. A letter-based hull classification symbol is used to designate a vessel's type. The names of ships are selected by the Secretary of the Navy. The names are those of states, cities, towns, important persons, important locations, famous battles, fish, and ideals. Usually, different types of ships have names originated from different types of sources.
An anti-submarine weapon (ASW) is any one of a number of devices that are intended to act against a submarine and its crew, to destroy (sink) the vessel or reduce its capability as a weapon of war. In its simplest sense, an anti-submarine weapon is usually a projectile, missile or bomb that is optimized to destroy submarines.
Sa'ar 5 is a class of Israeli Navy corvettes. They were Israeli designed using lessons learned from the Sa'ar 4.5-class missile boats. Three Sa'ar 5 ships were built by Huntington Ingalls Industries for the Israeli Navy, based on Israeli designs.
Anti-submarine warfare is a branch of underwater warfare that uses surface warships, aircraft, submarines, or other platforms, to find, track, and deter, damage, or destroy enemy submarines. Such operations are typically carried out to protect friendly shipping and coastal facilities from submarine attacks and to overcome blockades.
Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane Division is the principal tenant command located at Naval Support Activity Crane in Indiana.
Anti-surface warfare is the branch of naval warfare concerned with the suppression of surface combatants. More generally, it is any weapons, sensors, or operations intended to attack or limit the effectiveness of an adversary's surface ships. Before the adoption of the submarine and naval aviation, all naval warfare consisted of anti-surface warfare. The distinct concept of an anti-surface warfare capability emerged after World War II, and literature on the subject as a distinct discipline is inherently dominated by the dynamics of the Cold War.
An unmanned surface vehicle, unmanned surface vessel or uncrewed surface vessel (USV), colloquially called a drone boat, drone ship or sea drone, is a boat or ship that operates on the surface of the water without a crew. USVs operate with various levels of autonomy, from remote control to fully autonomous surface vehicles (ASV).
The Audace-class destroyers were two guided missile destroyers built for the Italian Navy during the Cold War. An improvement of the Impavido class, these ships were designed for area air defence and also had a heavy gun armament. They were fitted with contemporary American radars and sonars, but also, as the next Italian ships, all the modern weapons made by Italian industry of the time, such torpedoes, helicopters and guns. Also some indigenous radars were fitted.
Seakeeping ability or seaworthiness is a measure of how well-suited a watercraft is to conditions when underway. A ship or boat which has good seakeeping ability is said to be very seaworthy and is able to operate effectively even in high sea states.
The Spearhead-class expeditionary fast transport (EPF) is a United States Navy–led shipbuilding program to provide a high-speed, shallow draft vessel intended for rapid intra-theater transport of medium-sized cargo payloads. The EPFs can reach speeds of 35–45 knots, and allow the rapid transit and deployment of conventional or special forces, equipment and supplies.
Program Executive Office Soldier is a US Army organization that is responsible for rapid prototyping, procurement, and fielding of equipment for the soldiers.
The Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) was a United States Navy program to develop an autonomous carrier-based unmanned combat aerial vehicle providing an unmanned intelligence and strike asset to the fleet. After debate over whether the UCLASS should primarily focus on stealthy bombing or scouting, the Pentagon instead changed the program entirely into the Carrier-Based Aerial-Refueling System (CBARS) to create a UAV for aerial refueling duties to extend the range of manned fighters, which led to the Boeing MQ-25 Stingray.
Counter-IED efforts are done primarily by military and law enforcement with the assistance of the diplomatic and financial communities. It involves a comprehensive approach of countering the threat networks that employ improvised explosive devices (IEDs), defeating the devices themselves, and training others. Counter-IED, or C-IED, is usually part of a broader counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, or law enforcement effort. Because IEDs are a subset of a number of forms of asymmetric warfare used by insurgents and terrorists, C-IED activities are principally against adversaries and not only against IEDs. C-IED treats the IED as a systemic problem and aims to defeat the IED threat networks themselves.
Counter-IED equipment are created primarily for military and law enforcement. They are used for standoff detection of explosives and explosive precursor components and defeating the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) devices themselves as part of a broader counter-terrorism, counter-insurgency, or law enforcement effort.
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) is a sensor network with integrated fire control capability that is intended to significantly improve battle force air and missile defense capabilities by combining data from multiple battle force air search sensors on CEC-equipped units into a single, real-time, composite track picture. This will greatly enhance fleet air defense by making jamming more difficult and allocating defensive missiles on a battle group basis.
The Storm Search and Rescue Tactical Vehicle (SRTV) is an all-terrain light military vehicle developed by the United States. It was the winner of the Guardian Angel Air-Deployable Rescue Vehicle (GAARV) competition awarded by the Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC). The competition was named for the pararescuemen and combat rescue officers known as the "Guardian Angel Weapon System." The Storm SRTV is to be used by the United States Air Force Pararescue.
Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron 73 (HSM-73) is a United States Navy Maritime Strike helicopter squadron based on Naval Air Station North Island, California.
Iran's anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy in the Strait of Hormuz mixes advanced technology with guerilla tactics to deny, deter or delay foreign forces access and maritime freedom of maneuver. The regular attempt by adversaries to deny one another freedom of movement on the battlefield can be observed throughout history. What makes anti-access/area-denial nowadays different from the past is the rapid improvement in military and communication technology in recent decades and new ways of implementing these strategies that such technology creates. Most scholarly attention seems to have gone to Chinese anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities, most likely because modern military technology is required to uphold A2/AD, it is almost always exclusively practiced by advanced regional powers like China. The A2/AD portfolio leverages diplomatic, information, military, and economic (DIME) activities. The focus of the Iranian A2/AD threat in the Strait of Hormuz is limited to the military dimension.
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