Theory and History

Last updated
Theory and History
Theory and History, Front Cover, Ludwig von Mises.jpg
First edition cover
Author Ludwig von Mises
Preface by Murray N. Rothbard
CountryUnited States
LanguageEnglish
Subjects Philosophy, Methodology, History, Economics
Publisher Yale University Press, Ludwig von Mises Institute
Publication date
1957
Media typePrint (Hardback & Paperback)
Pages384
ISBN 978-0865975699
OCLC 167149

Theory and History: An Interpretation of Social and Economic Evolution is a treatise by Austrian school economist and philosopher Ludwig von Mises. It can be thought of as a continuation in the development of the Misesian system of social science. In particular, it provides further epistemological support for his earlier works, esp. Human Action. Most notably, Mises elaborates on methodological dualism, develops the concept of thymology – a historical branch of the sciences of human action – and presents his critique of Marxist materialism.

Contents

Furthermore, Mises puts forward a theory of knowledge and value. He later explores and critically analyzes paradigms of thought like determinism, materialism, dialectic materialism, historicism, scientism, positivism, behaviorism and psychology. He argues that these schools of thought – some politically motivated, [1] others blinded by dogmatism [2] – have committed epistemological and methodological blunders and are not conducive to a scientific understanding of human behavior.

Economist Murray Rothbard considered Theory and History to be Mises's most overlooked work. [3]

Synopsis

Mises presents the book in four parts.

Introduction and Part One – Value:

The first part sets the overall theme of the book with Mises introducing the concept of methodological dualism. He then expounds a theory of value that is central throughout. Regarding his view on science – as systematic body of knowledge, of both natural and social phenomena – as a means to successful action in the world, Mises argues that in order to properly understand human behavior we must attribute – as a methodological resort – volition and purpose to human behaviour. Mises considers this the epistemological and methodological basis of the sciences of human action. The branch that deals with the logical implications of action as such is called praxeology.

Part Two – Determinism and Materialism:

In the second part, Mises weighs in on the free will vs. determinism controversy and comments that the long historical debates did little to settle the problems at hand. He argues that while the natural sciences, in discovering scientific laws, must presuppose a strict regularity in the occurrence of causes and effects, i.e. determinism, such a presupposition cannot be held in the case of human action. He argues further that the social sciences must take thoughts, ideas, and judgments of value as ultimately given in the analysis of human action. Our ignorance of the origins and causes of these phenomena, Mises argues, forces us – at least for the time being – to adopt a dualistic approach. He contends that attempts to find the origins and causes of these phenomena are vain, as is the task of all varieties of materialism. [4] Mises then turns his attention to the doctrine of materialism, more specifically, that of Marxist dialectical materialism.

Part Three – Epistemological Problems of History:

The third part deals with the logical and epistemological problems of historical analysis. Mises explains the individualistic character of historical human events. He argues that the historian must ultimately face – when tracing back the causal factors behind past human action – a point at which no further reduction is possible, i.e. the ideas and actions of individuals. This, he claims, is the "ultimate given of history". [5] In spite of the individuality of historical events, Mises still insists there are general laws of human behaviour but that they are praxeological laws, i.e. a priori, not historical laws, i.e. a posteriori. However, historicism, according to Mises, claimed there were no general laws – especially economic laws – of human behavior. Mises then enters into a critique of historicism.

Mises also addresses the challenges of scientism in the context of social science, namely the application of positivism and behaviorism in the realm of human action. However, more noteworthy is Mises's presentation of thymology, a historical branch of the sciences of human action. Mises argues that thymology is what everybody resorts to when trying to understand and anticipate the historical and future actions of their fellow men, and is particularly useful to the historian. He then expounds the scope of thymology and its relation to praxeology.

Part Four – The Course of History:

In the final part of his treatise, Mises dissects and critiques various speculations and interpretations of history, including a common interpretation of modern Western civilization. He also comments on his observation regarding society's move away from classical liberalism, freedom, and capitalism towards socialism and totalitarianism. Moreover, Mises notes the rising ideology of wealth and income equality and speculates on its origins. He argues that rising anti-capitalistic ideology is fostering a present trend toward the impoverishment of society. He criticizes the notion of society's inevitable "trend toward progress", [6] and argues that the evolution of society and civilization is predicated – not on an automatic and inevitable path – but on the underlying ideology which can, at any time, change. To this point, Mises closes with some remarks on the uncertainty of the future and the neglect of ideological factors that can give rise to civilization but also stamp it out.

See also

Related Research Articles

The Austrian School is a heterodox school of economic thought that advocates strict adherence to methodological individualism, the concept that social phenomena result exclusively from the motivations and actions of individuals. Austrian school theorists hold that economic theory should be exclusively derived from basic principles of human action.

Scientism is the opinion that science and the scientific method are the best or only way to render truth about the world and reality.

Methodenstreit, in intellectual history beyond German-language discourse, was an economics controversy commenced in the 1880s and persisting for more than a decade, between that field's Austrian School and the (German) Historical School. The debate concerned the place of general theory in social science and the use of history in explaining the dynamics of human action. It also touched on policy and political issues, including the roles of the individual and state. Nevertheless, methodological concerns were uppermost and some early members of the Austrian School also defended a form of welfare state, as prominently advocated by the Historical School.

<i>Human Action</i>

Human Action: A Treatise on Economics is a work by the Austrian economist and philosopher Ludwig von Mises. Widely considered Mises' magnum opus, it presents the case for laissez-faire capitalism based on praxeology, his method to understand the structure of human decision-making. Mises rejected positivism within economics, and defended an a priori foundation for praxeology, as well as methodological individualism and laws of self-evident certainty. Mises argues that the free-market economy not only outdistances any government-planned system, but ultimately serves as the foundation of civilization itself.

In philosophy, praxeology or praxiology is the theory of human action, based on the notion that humans engage in purposeful behavior, contrary to reflexive behavior and other unintentional behavior.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Postpositivism</span> Metatheoretical stance on scientific inquiry

Postpositivism or postempiricism is a metatheoretical stance that critiques and amends positivism and has impacted theories and practices across philosophy, social sciences, and various models of scientific inquiry. While positivists emphasize independence between the researcher and the researched person, postpositivists argue that theories, hypotheses, background knowledge and values of the researcher can influence what is observed. Postpositivists pursue objectivity by recognizing the possible effects of biases. While positivists emphasize quantitative methods, postpositivists consider both quantitative and qualitative methods to be valid approaches.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Antipositivism</span> Theoretical stance in social science

In social science, antipositivism is a theoretical stance that proposes that the social realm cannot be studied with the methods of investigation utilized within the natural sciences, and that investigation of the social realm requires a different epistemology. Fundamental to that antipositivist epistemology is the belief that the concepts and language that researchers use in their research shape their perceptions of the social world they are investigating and defining.

The philosophy of social science is the study of the logic, methods, and foundations of social sciences. Philosophers of social science are concerned with the differences and similarities between the social and the natural sciences, causal relationships between social phenomena, the possible existence of social laws, and the ontological significance of structure and agency.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Philosophy and economics</span> Branch of philosophy

Philosophy and economics studies topics such as public economics, behavioural economics, rationality, justice, history of economic thought, rational choice, the appraisal of economic outcomes, institutions and processes, the status of highly idealized economic models, the ontology of economic phenomena and the possibilities of acquiring knowledge of them.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Positivism</span> Empiricist philosophical theory

Positivism is an empiricist philosophical theory that holds that all genuine knowledge is either true by definition or positive—meaning a posteriori facts derived by reason and logic from sensory experience. Other ways of knowing, such as theology, metaphysics, intuition, or introspection, are rejected or considered meaningless.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Glossary of philosophy</span> List of definitions of terms and concepts commonly used in philosophy

This glossary of philosophy is a list of definitions of terms and concepts relevant to philosophy and related disciplines, including logic, ethics, and theology.

Antiscience is a set of attitudes that involve a rejection of science and the scientific method. People holding antiscientific views do not accept science as an objective method that can generate universal knowledge. Antiscience commonly manifests through rejection of scientific ideas such as climate change and evolution. It also includes pseudoscience, methods that claim to be scientific but reject the scientific method. Antiscience leads to belief in conspiracy theories and alternative medicine. Lack of faith in science has been linked to promote political extremism and distrust in medical treatments.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Action theory (sociology)</span> Sociological concept developed by Talcott Parsons

In sociology, action theory is the theory of social action presented by the American theorist Talcott Parsons.

An index list of articles about the philosophy of science.

In praxeology, thymology is the study of those human aspects that precede or cause purposeful human behavior.

Feminist empiricism is a perspective within feminist research that combines the objectives and observations of feminism with the research methods and empiricism. Feminist empiricism is typically connected to mainstream notions of positivism. Feminist empiricism critiques what it perceives to be inadequacies and biases within mainstream research methods, including positivism.

Marxist philosophy or Marxist theory are works in philosophy that are strongly influenced by Karl Marx's materialist approach to theory, or works written by Marxists. Marxist philosophy may be broadly divided into Western Marxism, which drew from various sources, and the official philosophy in the Soviet Union, which enforced a rigid reading of Marx called dialectical materialism, in particular during the 1930s. Marxist philosophy is not a strictly defined sub-field of philosophy, because the diverse influence of Marxist theory has extended into fields as varied as aesthetics, ethics, ontology, epistemology, social philosophy, political philosophy, the philosophy of science, and the philosophy of history. The key characteristics of Marxism in philosophy are its materialism and its commitment to political practice as the end goal of all thought. The theory is also about the struggles of the proletariat and their reprimand of the bourgeoisie.

Historical materialism is Karl Marx's theory of history. Marx locates historical change in the rise of class societies and the way humans labor together to make their livelihoods. For Marx and his lifetime collaborator, Friedrich Engels, the ultimate cause and moving power of historical events are to be found in the economic development of society and the social and political upheavals wrought by changes to the mode of production. Historical materialism provides a challenge to the view that historical processes have come to a close and that capitalism is the end of history. Although Marx never brought together a formal or comprehensive description of historical materialism in one published work, his key ideas are woven into a variety of works from the 1840s onward. Since Marx's time, the theory has been modified and expanded. It now has many Marxist and non-Marxist variants.

In praxeology, methodological dualism is an epistemological position which states that it is necessary ─ based on our current state of knowledge and understanding ─ to use a different method in analysing the actions of human beings than the methods of the natural sciences.

References

  1. Mises. (1957). Theory and history, pp. 26, 134.
  2. id. pp. 30, 77, 111, 247.
  3. id. pp. xi–xix
  4. id. p. 69.
  5. id. pp. 183–8.
  6. id. pp. 367–370.