Federalist No. 75

Last updated

Alexander Hamilton, author of Federalist No. 75 Alexander Hamilton portrait by John Trumbull 1806.jpg
Alexander Hamilton, author of Federalist No. 75

Federalist No. 75 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton and seventy-fifth in the series of The Federalist Papers . It was published on March 26, 1788 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all The Federalist papers were published. Its title is "The Treaty Making Power of the Executive", and it is the ninth in a series of 11 essays discussing the powers and limitations of the Executive branch.

Contents

In this paper, Hamilton discusses the reasons for the concurrent power of the Senate and Executive branch to make treaties.

Overview

The topic of Federalist No. 75, written by Alexander Hamilton, is "The Treaty Making Power of the Executive" which discusses why the treaty making power should not be solely entrusted in a single branch of the government. In the opening statements, the main point of the essay is immediately stated which allows the reader of the document to have a short summary of the expected results of the presented arguments. Hamilton proclaims, "The president is to have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur." [1] From this statement, the reader can see a foreshadowing of a debate for the power struggle between the executive and legislative branches.

The next topic covered in the document was the proposition of the interest of investing sole power in the President of the United States. Hamilton makes many interesting points, one of which includes his statement, "An avaricious man might be tempted to betray the interests of the state to the acquisition of wealth." [1] Simply put, a president who is greedy or develops greed might be tempted to use this treaty making power to line his own pockets for a financial gain. Besides the obvious financial benefits possible from gaining this treaty making power, Hamilton argues that it would be utterly irresponsible to let a single person possess this power for a minimum of four years at a time. He states, "However proper or safe it may be in governments where the executive magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to him the entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly unsafe and improper to entrust that power to an elective magistrate of four years' duration." [1] Although Hamilton makes solid arguments against the executive branch having sole treaty making power, he also forms an equally impressive self-rebuttal from the opposite end of the spectrum. Referring back to his previous statement about entrusting the senate with such an important power, Hamilton writes, "To have entrusted the power of making treaties to the Senate alone would have been to relinquish the benefits of the constitutional agency of the President in the conduct of foreign negotiations." [1] Hamilton is defending the power, rights, and responsibility of the executive branch. Furthermore, it is vital that the United States has a sole representative to physically travel to or communicate with foreign nations when making treaties. It would be an impossible feat to have the entire senate debate and hash out a treaty with a foreign country, especially if said country was thousands of miles across a vast ocean. He claims, "The essence of the legislative authority is to enact laws or in other words to prescribe rules for the regulation of the society. While the execution of the laws and the employment of the common strength, either for this purpose or for the common defense, seem to comprise all the functions of the executive magistrate." This sentence basically describes the function of the executive branch which is to enforce laws made by congress and protect the country. Treaties do not fall completely under this category nor do they fall under the jurisdiction of the legislative branch.

Since he does not clearly support one side or the other, he proposes a joint responsibility of power. In the seventy-fifth essay, Hamilton makes his conclusion based on elements such as security, intermixture of powers, and making a small alteration to the existing voting style of the senate. This particular section of the essay is started with Hamilton making a general statement proclaiming, "One ground of objection is the trite topic of the intermixture of powers; some contending that the President ought alone to possess the power of making treaties; others, that it ought to have been exclusively deposited in the Senate." [1] This is Hamilton's primary statement in his conclusion which branches out to grab both sides and harmonize them together to create one final solution to the ownership of the power in question. Concerned with the country's security and principles of anti-corruption, Hamilton states, "It must indeed be clear to a demonstration that the joint possession of the power in question, by the President and the Senate, would afford a greater prospect of security than the separate possession of it by either of them." [1] Combining both sides' previous arguments, Hamilton suggests that the treaty-making power must be shared between both the senate and executive to prevent one side from becoming too powerful and creating a rift in the country's principle of security. The final opinion shared by Hamilton refers to the alteration of the existing number of senate members required to pass a proposition. Before the Federalist Papers of September 17, 1787, the law was stated as two-thirds of the total members in which composed the senatorial body had to vote on the proposed issues. Instead, Hamilton suggested, "The only objection which remains to be canvassed, is that which would substitute the proportion of two-thirds of all the members composing the senatorial body, to that of two-thirds of the members present." [1] Although Federalist No. 75 sheds light on various important topics and seemingly solves many discrepancies in the previous set of laws, not everyone agrees with Hamilton's point of view.

The outcome would be a common ground reached between each side; the final statement was declared and submitted to be included in the new United States Constitution. Neither the legislative nor executive branches would receive sole treaty making power, rather they both would work together as a powerhouse to arrive at the best possible outcome with the country's best interests in mind. The official statement produced by Hamilton was, "The president is to have power, by and with the advice and consent of the senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur." [1] After gathering thoughts, comments, and feedback from the people of the United States, Hamilton finalized and submitted what eventually became a key piece of the foundation of the United States Constitution.

Related Research Articles

Separation of powers refers to the division of a state's government into "branches", each with separate, independent powers and responsibilities, so that the powers of one branch are not in conflict with those of the other branches. The typical division into three branches of government, sometimes called the trias politica model, includes a legislature, an executive, and a judiciary. It can be contrasted with the fusion of powers in parliamentary and semi-presidential systems where there can be overlap in membership and functions between different branches, especially the executive and legislative, although in most non-authoritarian jurisdictions, the judiciary almost never overlaps with the other branches, whether powers in the jurisdiction are separated or fused.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Article One of the United States Constitution</span> Portion of the US Constitution regarding Congress

Article One of the United States Constitution establishes the legislative branch of the federal government, the United States Congress. Under Article One, Congress is a bicameral legislature consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Article One grants Congress various enumerated powers and the ability to pass laws "necessary and proper" to carry out those powers. Article One also establishes the procedures for passing a bill and places various limits on the powers of Congress and the states from abusing their powers.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Separation of powers under the United States Constitution</span> Overview of the separation of powers under the United States Constitution

Separation of powers is a political doctrine originating in the writings of Charles de Secondat, Baron de Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws, in which he argued for a constitutional government with three separate branches, each of which would have defined abilities to check the powers of the others. This philosophy heavily influenced the drafting of the United States Constitution, according to which the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of the United States government are kept distinct in order to prevent abuse of power. The American form of separation of powers is associated with a system of checks and balances.

The Midnight Judges Act represented an effort to solve an issue in the U.S. Supreme Court during the early 19th century. There was concern, beginning in 1789, about the system that required the Justices of the Supreme Court to "ride circuit" and reiterate decisions made in the appellate level courts. The Supreme Court Justices had often expressed concern and suggested that the judges of the Supreme and circuit courts be divided. The Act was repealed by Congress on January 22, 1802.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Federalist No. 78</span> Most-cited Federalist Paper; by Alexander Hamilton and about the Supreme Court

Federalist No. 78 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the seventy-eighth of The Federalist Papers. Like all of The Federalist papers, it was published under the pseudonym Publius.

Advice and consent is an English phrase frequently used in enacting formulae of bills and in other legal or constitutional contexts. It describes either of two situations: where a weak executive branch of a government enacts something previously approved of by the legislative branch or where the legislative branch concurs and approves something previously enacted by a strong executive branch.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Federalist No. 64</span> Federalist Paper by John Jay

Federalist No. 64, titled "The Power of the Senate", is an essay published on March 5, 1788 by John Jay as part of the ongoing Federalist Papers. Throughout the Federalist Papers, Madison, Hamilton, and Jay emphasize, the special role in the field of foreign affairs (Golove). However, Federalist No. 64 specifically focuses more deeply on the concept of treaties and how they are formed. This specific essay in the Federalist Papers is very influential; while discussing with the concept of treaties, the mystery behind the author, and the invalidity of the Anti-Federalists' argument.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Federalist No. 66</span> Federalist Paper by Alexander Hamilton

Federalist No. 66 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the sixty-sixth of The Federalist Papers. It was published on March 8, 1788 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all The Federalist papers were published. The title is "Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for Impeachments Further Considered".

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Federalist No. 67</span> Federalist Paper by Alexander Hamilton about the Executive Department

Federalist No. 67 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the sixty-seventh of The Federalist Papers. This essay's title is "The Executive Department", and it begins a series of eleven separate papers discussing the powers and limitations of that branch. Federalist No. 67 was published, like the rest of the Federalist Papers, under the pseudonym Publius. It was published in the New York Packet on Tuesday, March 11, 1788.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Federalist No. 68</span> Federalist Paper by Alexander Hamilton

Federalist No. 68 is the 68th essay of The Federalist Papers, and was published on March 12, 1788. It is probably written by Alexander Hamilton under the pseudonym "Publius", the name under which all of the Federalist Papers were published. Since all of them were written under this pseudonym, who wrote what cannot be verified with certainty. Titled "The Mode of Electing the President", No. 68 describes a perspective on the process of selecting the chief executive of the United States. In writing this essay, the author sought to convince the people of New York of the merits of the proposed constitution. Number 68 is the second in a series of 11 essays discussing the powers and limitations of the executive branch and the only one to describe the method of selecting the president.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Federalist No. 69</span> Federalist Paper by Alexander Hamilton

Federalist No. 69 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the sixty-ninth of The Federalist Papers. It was published on March 14, 1788 under the pseudonym Publius, under which all The Federalist papers were published. The title is "The Real Character of the Executive", and is the third in a series of 11 essays discussing the powers and limitations of the Executive branch in response to the Anti-Federalist Papers, and in comparison to the King of England's powers.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Federalist No. 70</span> Federalist Paper by Alexander Hamilton

Federalist No. 70, titled "The Executive Department Further Considered", is an essay written by Alexander Hamilton arguing for a single, robust executive provided for in the United States Constitution. It was originally published on March 15, 1788 in The New York Packet under the pseudonym Publius as part of The Federalist Papers and as the fourth in Hamilton's series of eleven essays discussing executive power.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Federalist No. 71</span> Federalist Paper by Alexander Hamilton about executive term durations and limits

Federalist No. 71 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the seventy-first of The Federalist Papers. It was published on March 18, 1788, under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all The Federalist papers were published. Its title is "The Duration in Office of the Executive", and it is the fifth in a series of 11 essays discussing the powers and limitations of the executive branch.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Federalist No. 76</span> Federalist Paper by Alexander Hamilton

Federalist No. 76, written by Alexander Hamilton, was published on April 1, 1788. The Federalist Papers are a series of eighty-five essays written to urge the ratification of the United States Constitution. These letters were written by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay under the name of Publius in the late 1780s. This paper discusses the arrangement of the power of appointment and the system of checks and balances. The title is "The Appointing Power of the Executive", and is the tenth in a series of 11 essays discussing the powers and limitations of the Executive branch. There are three options for entrusting power: a single individual, a select congregation, or an individual with the unanimity of the assembly. Of all of the options, Hamilton supports bestowing the president with the nominating power and the ratifying power to the senate in order to have a strategy with the least bias.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Federalist No. 77</span> Federalist Paper by Alexander Hamilton

Federalist No. 77 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the seventy-seventh of The Federalist Papers. It was published on April 2, 1788, under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all The Federalist papers were published. The title is "The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive Considered", and it is the last in a series of 11 essays discussing the powers and limitations of the Executive Branch.

<i>Federalist No. 80</i> Federalist Paper by Alexander Hamilton

Federalist No. 80 is an essay by Alexander Hamilton, the eightieth of The Federalist Papers. It was published on June 21, 1788 under the pseudonym Publius, the name under which all The Federalist papers were published. It is titled "The Powers of the Judiciary", and it is the third in a series of six essays discussing the powers and limitations of the judicial branch.

The unitary executive theory is a theory of United States constitutional law which holds that the President of the United States possesses the power to control the entire federal executive branch. The doctrine is rooted in Article Two of the United States Constitution, which vests "the executive power" of the United States in the President. Although that general principle is widely accepted, there is disagreement about the strength and scope of the doctrine. It can be said that some favor a "strongly unitary" executive, while others favor a "weakly unitary" executive. The former group argue, for example, that Congress's power to interfere with intra-executive decision-making is limited, and that the President can control policy-making by all executive agencies within the limits set for those agencies by Congress. Still others agree that the Constitution requires a unitary executive, but believe this to be harmful, and propose its abolition by constitutional amendment.

The Appointments Clause of Article II, Section 2, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution empowers the President of the United States to nominate and, with the advice and consent (confirmation) of the United States Senate, appoint public officials. Although the Senate must confirm certain principal officers, Congress may by law invest the appointment of "inferior" officers to the President alone, or the courts of law, or the heads of departments.

The Treaty Clause of the United States Constitution establishes the procedure for ratifying international agreements. It empowers the President as the primary negotiator of agreements between the United States and other countries, and holds that the advice and consent of a two-thirds supermajority of the Senate renders a treaty binding with the force of federal law.

The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States establishes that the Constitution, federal laws made pursuant to it, and treaties made under its authority, constitute the "supreme Law of the Land", and thus take priority over any conflicting state laws. It provides that state courts are bound by, and state constitutions subordinate to, the supreme law. However, federal statutes and treaties must be within the parameters of the Constitution; that is, they must be pursuant to the federal government's enumerated powers, and not violate other constitutional limits on federal power, such as the Bill of Rights—of particular interest is the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that the federal government has only those powers delegated to it by the Constitution.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 "The Federalist #75" . Retrieved October 29, 2016.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.