Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States

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Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued November 12, 1954
Decided February 7, 1955
Full case nameTee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States
Citations348 U.S. 272 ( more )
75 S. Ct. 313; 99 L. Ed. 2d 314; 1955 U.S. LEXIS 1186
Case history
PriorAppeal from the United States Court of Claims, 120 F. Supp. 202 (1954)
Subsequent132 F. Supp. 695 (1955)
Holding
Congress did not intend to grant the Tribe any permanent rights to the occupied lands and therefore Government did not owe Tribe compensation for timber taken from tribal-occupied lands in Alaska under the Fifth Amendment.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Earl Warren
Associate Justices
Hugo Black  · Stanley F. Reed
Felix Frankfurter  · William O. Douglas
Harold H. Burton  · Tom C. Clark
Sherman Minton
Case opinions
MajorityReed, joined by Black, Burton, Clark, Minton
DissentDouglas, joined by Warren, Frankfurter

Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955), is a United States Supreme Court case involving a suit by the Tee-Hit-Ton, a subgroup of the Tlingit people. The Tee-Hit-Ton sought compensation from Congress for lumber taken from lands they occupied. The court ruled against the Tee-Hit-Ton.

Contents

Background

The Tee-Hit-Ton, a subgroup of the Tlingit people, brought an action in Court of Claims for compensation, under Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, for timber taken from tribal-occupied lands in Alaska authorized by the Secretary of Agriculture. The tribe contended it had "full proprietary ownership" or at least a recognized right to unrestricted possession; the federal government asserted the opposite, and argued that if the tribe had any rights, they were to use the land at the government’s will.

Procedural posture

The tribe first filed a suit in the United States Court of Claims, which found that the tribe was an identifiable group residing in Alaska; its interest in the lands prior to the purchase of Alaska was an “original Indian title” but such a title was not enough to bring suit because the Congress did not recognize the tribe's legal rights of property ownership. The Court of Claims dismissed the tribe's suit.

Decision

Justice Stanley Forman Reed, writing for the Court, stated that Congress did not intend to grant the Tee-Hit-Ton any permanent rights to the occupied lands but had given them permission to occupy it. Under the concept of conquest, any title to the land was extinguished when the "white man" came per Johnson v. McIntosh . No case has held that taking of Indian title or use by Congress required compensation. Because there was no recognized title to the land, the court decided there was no right to compensation under the Fifth Amendment.

See also

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