Map of the territorial disputes of Lithuania in 1939–1940, including the Vilnius Region in brown and orange
The 1938 Polish ultimatum to Lithuania was delivered to Lithuania by Poland on March 17, 1938. The Lithuanian government had steadfastly refused to have any diplomatic relations with Poland after 1920, protesting the annexation of the Vilnius Region by Poland.[1] As pre-World War II tensions in Europe intensified, Poland perceived the need to secure its northern borders. On March 12, Poland, feeling supported by international recognition of the annexation of Austria by Nazi Germany, decided to deliver an ultimatum to Lithuania.[1] The ultimatum demanded that the Lithuanian government unconditionally agree to establish diplomatic relations with Warsaw within 48 hours, and that the terms be finalized before March 31. The establishment of diplomatic relations would mean a de facto renunciation of Lithuanian claims to the region containing its historic capital, Vilnius (Wilno in Polish).
In preferring peace to war, Lithuania accepted the ultimatum on March 19. Although diplomatic relations were established as a result of the ultimatum, Lithuania did not agree to recognize the loss of Vilnius de jure.[2] The government of Poland made a similar move against the Czechoslovak government in Prague on September 30, 1938, when it took advantage of the Sudeten Crisis to demand Trans-Olza, annexed by Czechoslovakia 20 years earlier. On both occasions, Poland used the international crises to address long-standing border disputes.[3]
At the end of the 19th and in the early 20th century, Vilnius was located outside the Lithuanian ethno-linguistic territory.[5] Demographically, it was the least Lithuanian of Lithuanian cities. Its population was divided nearly evenly between Poles and Jews,[6] with ethnic Lithuanians comprising a small percentage of the inhabitants.[6][7][8] According to Russian (1897), German (1916), and Polish (1919) censuses, Lithuanians or Lithuanian speakers constituted 2–2.6% of the city's population.[9][10][11] During the interwar period, the Lithuanian side, while admitting that there were few Lithuanians living in Vilnius, claimed it on historical grounds – as the former capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania.[12][7]
Lithuania demanded Polish troops withdraw behind the line established by the Suwałki Agreement. Poland rejected Żeligowski's actions. The league attempted to mediate the dispute and Paul Hymans presented concrete proposals to form a federation. However, both sides were unwilling to make compromises and negotiations collapsed in January 1922.[13] In January 1923, Lithuanian troops crossed over to the Allied-held Memelland and staged the Klaipėda revolt. It was one of the main factors that led to the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors to award Vilnius to Poland in March 1923.[14]
The result was a state of "no war, no peace" as Lithuania avoided recognising any Polish claims to the city and the region,[6] as well as refusing to undertake any actions that would recognise Poland's control of Vilnius even de facto.[4] Hence, Lithuania broke off all diplomatic relations with Poland and continuously emphasised that Vilnius remained its permanent capital (Kaunas was designated as the temporary capital).
Poland refused to formally recognise the existence of any dispute regarding the region, since that would have lent legitimacy to the Lithuanian claims.[15] Railroad traffic and telegraph lines could not cross the border, and mail service was complicated. For example, a letter from Poland to Lithuania needed to be sent to a neutral country, repackaged in a new envelope to remove any Polish signs and only then delivered to Lithuania.[16]
The conflict over Vilnius remained the most important foreign policy issue in Lithuania, but it became increasingly marginalized in the international arena. There were unsuccessful informal attempts to normalise the situation; most notably by the Lithuanian Prime Minister Augustinas Voldemaras, between 1927 and 1928; and by Foreign Minister Stasys Lozoraitis, between 1934 and 1936, who asked President Smetona to re-establish diplomatic relations with Poland. Both sides engaged in emotional and nationalistic rhetoric.[17]
Rationale
On March 11, 1938, [note 1] a day before Austria was annexed into Greater Germany following the Anschluss, Justas Lukoševičius, a Lithuanian border guard shot Stanisław Serafin, a Polish soldier, on the demarcation line in the village of Trasninkas near Merkinė. The exact circumstances are not clear; the obscure event was variously portrayed as a Lithuanian provocation, a Polish provocation, or an accident.[18] Between 1927 and 1938, seven Lithuanian border guards had been killed in 78 similar events.[19] Usually, such incidents were handled at the local level in an attempt to forestall escalation. On this occasion, however, Polish radio and newspapers picked up the story and fanned anti-Lithuanian sentiment. Protests were held in Warsaw, Vilnius, and four other cities where the crowds shouted for military action against Lithuania. There is evidence that the Camp of National Unity was involved in organising the protests.[18]
On March 13, 1938, the Polish government issued a threatening statement accusing Lithuania of provocation. The following day, the Senate of the Republic of Poland called for the establishment of diplomatic relations and for the Lithuanian renunciation of claims to Vilnius.[18] Upon receiving news that Poland was considering extreme measures, President Smetona was verging towards agreeing to discuss diplomatic relations. He changed his mind at the last minute.[19]
On the night of March 14, the Lithuanians, acting through France's envoy to Warsaw, proposed a commission to investigate the shooting incident and to agree on measures to avoid such incidents in the future.[18] This was a partial measure that clearly did not satisfy Poland,[19] who responded by refusing, in the first paragraph of the ultimatum delivered three days later,[20] to establish such a commission. At the same time, Lithuanian diplomats approached foreign powers in a bid for international support.
The Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck, who had just returned from a trip to Sorrento, called for a government meeting on the night of March 16. During the meeting, he argued that the ultimatum needed to contain only one demand: the establishment of diplomatic relations. In his view, such an ultimatum would not have violated any genuine Lithuanian interests and would offer much-improved prospects for peaceful resolution of the conflict and a speedy relief of tension.[18] It was in accordance with Beck's vision for Eastern Europe, which was based on a Warsaw-dominated Polish–Baltic–Scandinavian bloc free of Soviet or German influence,[23] a modified version of Józef Piłsudski's Międzymorze, which required the normalisation of relations with Lithuania.[18] The removal of the other demands also reflected political pressure on Poland from the Soviet Union, France and the United Kingdom to prevent the conflict from escalating into warfare.[2]
The Polish government agreed to Beck's proposal and the ultimatum was toned down. However, at the same time, Beck ordered military preparations. Poland assembled four divisions along the demarcation line; about 50,000 Polish troops were present and just over 20,000 Lithuanian troops.[24] The Polish troops were reinforced by armoured vehicles, by two air force regiments, consisting of about one hundred aircraft, and by the Polish fleet in the waters of the Baltic Sea along the Lithuanian shore.[18]
The ultimatum
The final text of the ultimatum, completed by Józef Beck and delivered through a Polish envoy in Tallinn to Bronius Dailidė, the Lithuanian envoy in Tallinn, was as follows:[20]
1. The proposition of the Lithuanian Government of 14 March cannot be accepted for it does not give sufficient guarantees concerning the security of the frontier in view of the negative results of all Polish–Lithuanian negotiations made up to the present time.
2. For this reason the Polish Government declares that it considers as the only solution corresponding to the gravity of the situation the immediate establishment of normal diplomatic relations without any previous condition. This is the only way to regulate the neighbourly questions for a Government animated by good faith to avoid events dangerous to peace.
3. The Polish Government allows the Lithuanian Government 48 hours from the moment the note is presented for the acceptance of this proposition in making it known that diplomatic representations at Kaunas and Warsaw will be accredited not later than March 31, of this year. Until that date, all discussions of a technical or other character between the Polish and Lithuanian Governments shall be continued by the envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary at Tallinn.
The exchange of notes attached concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations shall take place, before the expiration of the period of 48 hours mentioned, at Tallinn between the Polish and Lithuanian Ministers at Tallinn.
4. The proposition above mentioned will not be the subject of discussion with regard to its content or form—it is an unchangeable proposition.
The failure to respond or the presentation of any supplements or reservations shall be considered by the Polish Government as a refusal. In the event of a negative reply the Polish Government will guarantee the just interest of the state by its proper means.
The ultimatum contained an attachment: a draft of what would be deemed an acceptable response to the ultimatum. The proposed response stated only that Lithuania agreed to establish regular diplomatic relations, send a legation to Warsaw and guarantee normal conditions of operation for a Polish legation in Kaunas.[20]
International reaction
After the Soviet–Lithuanian Peace Treaty was ratified in 1920, the Russian SFSR recognised Lithuanian claims to the Vilnius Region and continued to support them.[25] In its responses to the 1938 ultimatum, the Soviet Union threatened to abrogate the Soviet–Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1932. It made it clear, though, that it did not wish to be drawn into an armed conflict.[19] This stance has been attributed to the growth of a threat from Japan;[18] armed assistance to Lithuania would have required the Red Army to invade either Poland or Latvia[24] and could have resulted in a war on two fronts.[18] The Soviets urged France, a major ally of Poland at the time, to de-escalate the conflict and encourage a more moderate version of the ultimatum.[21] France and the United Kingdom, preoccupied with the Anschluss, pressured Lithuania to normalise the relationship with Poland as soon as possible. They feared that the ultimatum had been approved by Nazi Germany.[26]
Germany, led by Adolf Hitler, now turned its attention to the Klaipėda Region, then held by Lithuania. In April 1938, Hitler stated that control of the Port of Klaipėda (German: Memel) and its surrounding area was Germany's second-most important issue, following the status of the Sudeten area.[27] In the event of armed hostilities between Poland and Lithuania, German troops were to defend and occupy the Klaipėda region and significant portions of western Lithuania.[19] The Polish ambassador to Nazi Germany, Józef Lipski, was informed of these plans. The Poles agreed to cooperate with German troops and to respect German interests in Klaipėda if such an armed conflict were to arise.[21] However, in Hitler's assessment, an immediate bid for Klaipėda was impolitic; he wished to maintain the status quo until more time had passed after the Anschluss. The German suggestion was that Lithuania concede to the Polish demands.[19]
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, the three Baltic states, had formed the Baltic Entente in 1934. Its principal purposes were coordination of joint foreign policy and mutual international diplomatic support; it was not a military alliance.[28] In Latvian and Estonian opinion, the Polish–Lithuanian dispute over Vilnius was outside the scope of the Entente, but they wished for a resolution, considering the conflict detrimental to the stability of the region.[18] Latvia attempted to persuade Estonia to exert mutual pressure on Lithuania for a speedy acceptance of the ultimatum. This reaction from an ally was unexpected.[19]
Acceptance
President Smetona held a government meeting late on the night of March 18, 1938, to decide whether to accept the ultimatum.[29] Lithuania clearly lacked international support and the demand was rather tame. A refusal would have cast Lithuania in an unfavourable light as an unreasonable disputant that had irrationally rejected peaceful diplomatic relations for eighteen years.[30] Lithuanian diplomats were divided on the issue, while popular opinion was strongly against accepting the ultimatum.[31] Various campaigns for the Lithuanian liberation of Vilnius had attracted massive participation. "Mourning of Vilnius Day" (October 9, when Żeligowski invaded Lithuania and captured Vilnius), had become an annual event,[1] and the largest social organisation in interwar Lithuania was the Union for the Liberation of Vilnius,[6] with some 25,000 members.[1]
Passionate feelings about Vilnius were expressed in a popular slogan "Mes be Vilniaus nenurimsim" (we will not calm down without Vilnius),[32] part of a poem by Petras Vaičiūnas.[33] While Paul Hymans' regional peace plans at the League of Nations were under negotiation, Lithuanian Prime Minister Ernestas Galvanauskas barely survived an assassination attempt.[34]
A government decision to open over 80 Polish schools in Lithuania was a probable factor in the 1926 Lithuanian coup d'état.[35] Any government making concessions to Poland at that time risked an ouster.[36]
President Smetona received memoranda from nine nationalistic organisations urging the government to reject the ultimatum.[1] However, a decisive comment was made by General Stasys Raštikis, the commander of the Lithuanian army. He testified that a military victory over Poland was impossible and argued for a peaceful resolution.[19] The government's decision was confirmed by the Fourth Seimas with minimal discussion.[29] On March 19, Dailidė relayed acceptance of the ultimatum to the Poles, who gave a 12-hour extension to decide on the ultimatum as a show of good faith.[2]
Aftermath
The ultimatum contributed to the general atmosphere of tension and fear in Europe. It relieved some of the pressure on Germany that had arisen in the aftermath of the Anschluss and tested the Soviets' willingness to defend their interests in Eastern Europe.[37] Fears were expressed, both in Lithuania and abroad, that the establishment of diplomatic relations was not the only goal of Warsaw and that more far-reaching ultimata might follow.[1][38] Speculations arose that Poland might seek to resurrect the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, using Germany's annexation of Austria as a precedent.[37]
Poland announced that it planned to create a neutral bloc comprising Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Romania to counter both fascism and communism. It stated that it had no wish to incorporate Lithuanian territories and maintained that the bloc would be formed on the basis of bilateral non-aggression and economic treaties.[39] According to The New York Times, the impact of the ultimatum was felt on Wall Street; on March 17, the foreign currency and bond markets sagged, in some cases reaching the lowest points seen in several years.[40] These markets recovered on March 19, after the ultimatum was accepted.[41]
The acceptance triggered a government crisis in Lithuania: on March 24, Prime Minister Juozas Tūbelis, who held uncompromising positions over Vilnius and at the time of the ultimatum was undergoing medical treatment in Switzerland, stepped down.[29] His successor, Vladas Mironas, who was in favour of normalising relations with Poland, assembled a new cabinet of ministers. Despite increasing pressure to form a broader coalition, the new cabinet was composed solely of members of the Lithuanian Nationalists Union. The unconditional acceptance hurt Lithuanian pride and damaged the reputation of the party.[1] The suppressed opposition used this damage as an opportunity to renew its activities and formed a group called Ašis (Axis).[1] In Poland, the acceptance was greeted with enthusiasm, described as a "great bloodless victory",[42] and celebrated by a military march in Vilnius.[43]
A few days after the ultimatum, both Lithuania and Poland named their ambassadors. Kazys Škirpa was sent to Warsaw, and Franciszek Charwat was sent to Kaunas before March 31, the deadline indicated in the ultimatum.[44] Negotiations over practical matters began on March 25, in Augustów, and by June three agreements covering rail transit, mail service, and river navigation had been concluded.[18]
The railway, torn apart for several kilometers at the border, was repaired. A customs post was established in Vievis, and consulates were opened in Klaipėda and Vilnius. Lithuania closed the League for the Liberation of Vilnius and the Vilnius Foundation; the latter organization had given financial support to Lithuanian activities in the Vilnius Region.[45] Nevertheless, Lithuania continued to claim Vilnius as its de jure capital. In May 1938 a new constitution was adopted, which echoed the previous constitution's statement that Vilnius was the permanent capital of Lithuania and that Kaunas was merely a temporary capital.[1] Poland continued to suppress Lithuanian organisations in Vilnius.[1][18]
A thaw in Polish–Lithuanian relations began in spring 1939. After the German–Czech and German–Lithuanian crises, Poland made more active efforts to ensure Lithuania's assistance, or at least neutrality, in the event of a war with Nazi Germany.[1] Lithuanian General Stasys Raštikis and Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck made high-profile visits to each other's countries,[18] and Poland improved the conditions of Lithuanians in the Vilnius Region.[1] However, Lithuania did not believe that Poland and its western allies were strong enough to resist Germany and the Soviet Union. When Germany invaded Poland in September 1939, Lithuania maintained a policy of strict neutrality, refusing repeated German offers for a joint attack on Poland to capture Vilnius.[46] Instead, Lithuania interned about 15,000 Polish soldiers and accepted about 35,000 Polish civilian refugees.[1] The Soviet Union returned Vilnius to Lithuania after the Soviet invasion of Eastern Poland in September 1939.[47] Neither country was aware at the time of the secret protocols of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, signed in August 1939, in which Germany and the Soviet Union agreed to divide the region into their spheres of influence. In June 1940, the Soviet Union occupied and annexed Lithuania in accordance with the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact.[48][49] A year later Russia was attacked by Nazi Germany leading to the Nazi occupation of Lithuania.
Poland and Czechoslovakia
Poland made a similar move against Czechoslovakia in Prague on September 30, 1938. In this instance, Poland took advantage of the Sudeten Crisis to demand a portion of Trans-Olza. On both occasions, Poland used international crisis to address long-standing border disputes.[50]
The Klaipėda Revolt took place in January 1923 in the Klaipėda Region. The region, located north of the Neman River, was detached from East Prussia, German Empire by the Treaty of Versailles and became a mandate of the League of Nations. It was placed under provisional French administration until a more permanent solution could be worked out. Lithuania wanted to unite with the region due to its large Lithuanian-speaking population of Prussian Lithuanians and major port of Klaipėda (Memel) – the only viable access to the Baltic Sea for Lithuania. As the Conference of Ambassadors favoured leaving the region as a free city, similar to the Free City of Danzig, the Lithuanians organized and staged a revolt.
Vladas Mironas was a Lithuanian Catholic priest and politician. He was one of the twenty signatories of the Act of Independence of Lithuania and served as the Prime Minister of Lithuania from March 1938 to March 1939.
The Soviet–Lithuanian Peace Treaty, also known as the Moscow Peace Treaty, was signed between Lithuania and Soviet Russia on July 12, 1920. In exchange for Lithuania's neutrality and permission to move its troops in the territory that was recognised during its war against Poland, Soviet Russia recognized the sovereignty of Lithuania. The treaty was a major milestone in Lithuania's struggle for international recognition and recognised Lithuania's eastern borders. Interwar Lithuania officially maintained that its de jure borders were those delineated by the treaty although a large territory, the Vilnius Region, was actually controlled by Poland.
The general election in the Republic of Central Lithuania was an election to the Vilnius Sejm (parliament) of the Polish-dominated Republic of Central Lithuania on 8 January 1922. The new parliament was intended to formally legalize incorporation of Central Lithuania into Poland. Such measure was fiercely opposed by Lithuania, which claimed the territory for itself. The election was boycotted by non-Polish population and its results were unrecognized by either the Lithuanian government in Kaunas or the League of Nations. The elected parliament convened in February and, as expected, voted on 20 February 1922 to have the Republic incorporated into Poland. At the end of March 1922, Central Lithuania became Wilno Land of the Second Polish Republic.
The Foch Line was a temporary demarcation line between Poland and Lithuania proposed by the Entente in the aftermath of World War I. The line was proposed by Marshal of France Ferdinand Foch, which was discussed only with Polish side, was accepted by the Conference of Ambassadors in 1919. After the Polish–Lithuanian War, with small adjustments the line formed the basis of the inter-war Polish-Lithuanian border. The line left Vilnius on the Polish side. After World War II only its westernmost part, close to the town of Suwałki, follows the line.
The German–Soviet Boundary and Friendship Treaty was a second supplementary protocol of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact of 23 August 1939. It was a secret clause as amended on 28 September 1939 by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union after their joint invasion and occupation of sovereign Poland. It was signed by Joachim von Ribbentrop and Vyacheslav Molotov, the foreign ministers of Germany and the Soviet Union respectively, in the presence of Joseph Stalin. Only a small portion of the protocol, which superseded the first treaty, was publicly announced, while the spheres of influence of Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union remained secret. The third secret protocol of the Pact was signed on 10 January 1941 by Friedrich Werner von Schulenburg and Molotov, in which Germany renounced its claims on a part of Lithuania, west of the Šešupė river. Only a few months after this, Germany started its invasion of the Soviet Union.
The 1926 Lithuanian coup d'état was a military coup d'état in Lithuania that replaced the democratically elected government with a nationalist regime led by Antanas Smetona. The coup took place on 17 December 1926 and was largely organized by the military; Smetona's role remains the subject of debate. The coup brought the Lithuanian Nationalist Union, the most conservative party at the time, to power. Previously it had been a fairly new and insignificant nationalistic party. By 1926, its membership reached about 2,000 and it had won only three seats in the parliamentary elections. The Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party, the largest party in the Seimas at the time, collaborated with the military and provided constitutional legitimacy to the coup, but accepted no major posts in the new government and withdrew in May 1927. After the military handed power over to the civilian government, it ceased playing a direct role in political life.
First Seimas of Lithuania was the first parliament (Seimas) democratically elected in Lithuania after it declared independence on February 16, 1918.
The Third Seimas of Lithuania was the third parliament (Seimas) democratically elected in Lithuania after it declared independence on 16 February 1918. The elections took place on 8–10 May 1926. For the first time the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party were forced to remain in opposition. The coalition government made some unpopular decisions and was sharply criticized. Regular Seimas work was interrupted by a military coup d'état in December 1926 when the democratically elected government was replaced with the authoritarian government of Antanas Smetona and Augustinas Voldemaras. The Third Seimas was dissolved on 12 March 1927 and new elections were not called until 1936.
The Second Seimas of Lithuania was the second parliament (Seimas) democratically elected in Lithuania after it declared independence on February 16, 1918. It was the only regular interwar Seimas which completed its full three-year term from May 1923 to March 1926.
The Fourth Seimas of Lithuania was the fourth parliament (Seimas) elected in Lithuania after it declared independence on 16 February 1918. The elections took place on 9 and 10 June 1936, a bit less than ten years after the Third Seimas was dissolved by President Antanas Smetona. The Seimas commenced its work on 1 September 1936. Its five-year term was cut short on 1 July 1940 when Lithuania lost its independence to the Soviet Union. It was replaced by the People's Seimas in order to legitimize the occupation. Konstantinas Šakenis was the chairman of the Seimas.
On 20 March 1939, Nazi Germany's foreign minister Joachim von Ribbentrop presented an oral ultimatum to Juozas Urbšys, foreign minister of Lithuania. Germany demanded that Lithuania give up the Klaipėda Region which had been detached from Germany after World War I, or the Wehrmacht would invade Lithuania and the de facto Lithuanian capital Kaunas would be bombed. The Lithuanians had been expecting the demand after years of rising tension between Lithuania and Germany, increasing pro-Nazi propaganda in the region, and continued German expansion. It was issued just five days after the Nazi occupation of Czechoslovakia. The 1924 Klaipėda Convention had guaranteed the protection of the status quo in the region, but the four signatories to that convention did not offer any material assistance. The United Kingdom and France followed a policy of appeasement, while Italy and Japan openly supported Germany, and Lithuania accepted the ultimatum on 23 March 1939. It proved to be the last territorial acquisition for Germany before World War II, producing a major downturn in Lithuania's economy and escalating pre-war tensions for Europe as a whole.
Soviet–Lithuanian Non-Aggression Pact was a non-aggression pact, signed between the Soviet Union and Lithuania on September 28, 1926. The pact confirmed all basic provisions of the Soviet–Lithuanian Peace Treaty of 1920. The Soviet Union continued to recognize Vilnius and Vilnius Region to Lithuania, despite the fact that the territories were under Polish control since the Żeligowski's Mutiny in 1920. It also recognized Lithuania's interests in the Klaipėda Region. In exchange Lithuania agreed not to join any alliances directed against the Soviet Union, which meant international isolation at the time when Soviet Union was not a member of the League of Nations. Ratifications were exchanged in Kaunas on November 9, 1926, and the pact became effective on the same day. The pact was registered in League of Nations Treaty Series on March 4, 1927.
Juozas Urbšys was a prominent interwar Lithuanian diplomat, the last head of foreign affairs in independent interwar Lithuania, and a translator. He served in the military between 1916 and 1922, afterwards joining the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1938 Urbšys was named its head and served in this position until Lithuania's occupation in 1940. Urbšys was imprisoned by the Soviet authorities in 1940 and deported to Siberia, where he spent the next 13 years in various prisons. Urbšys died in 1991, having lived long enough to see Lithuania's independence restored, and was buried in Petrašiūnai Cemetery, Kaunas.
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (LSSR) was a short-lived Soviet puppet state during the early Interwar period. It was declared on 16 December 1918 by a provisional revolutionary government led by Vincas Mickevičius-Kapsukas. It ceased to exist on 27 February 1919, when it was merged with the Socialist Soviet Republic of Byelorussia to form the Lithuanian–Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (Litbel).
The Soviet–Lithuanian Mutual Assistance Treaty was a bilateral treaty signed between the Soviet Union and Lithuania on October 10, 1939. According to provisions outlined in the treaty, Lithuania would acquire about one fifth of the Vilnius Region, including Lithuania's historical capital, Vilnius, and in exchange would allow five Soviet military bases with 20,000 troops to be established across Lithuania. In essence the treaty with Lithuania was very similar to the treaties that the Soviet Union signed with Estonia on September 28, and with Latvia on October 5. According to official Soviet sources, the Soviet military was strengthening the defenses of a weak nation against possible attacks by Nazi Germany. The treaty provided that Lithuania's sovereignty would not be affected. However, in reality the treaty opened the door for the first Soviet occupation of Lithuania and was described by The New York Times as "virtual sacrifice of independence."
The Klaipėda Convention was an international agreement between Lithuania and the countries of the Conference of Ambassadors signed in Paris on May 8, 1924. According to the convention, the Klaipėda Region became an autonomous region under unconditional sovereignty of Lithuania.
Sejm of Central Lithuania, also known as the Vilnius Sejm, or Wilno Sejm or the Adjudicating Sejm, was the parliament of the short-lived state of Central Lithuania. Formed after the elections of 8 January 1922, it held its proceedings from 1 February to 1 March of that year. It had 106 deputies. Dominated by Polish representatives, it requested Central Lithuania's annexation by Poland and dissolved shortly afterward.
The Battle of Radviliškis was fought between the Lithuanian Armed Forces and the Western Russian Volunteer Army, also known as Bermontians, a pro-German military formation, commanded by Pavel Bermondt-Avalov near the city of Radviliškis as part of the Lithuanian Wars of Independence. Fought on 21–22 November 1919, it saw the decisive defeat of the Bermontians and their subsequent retreat from the Baltic States.
↑ Petronis, Vytautas (2007). Constructing Lithuania. Ethnic Mapping in Tsarist Russia, ca. 1800-1914. Stockholm University. pp.274–275. ISBN978-91-85445-79-0. Therefore, the paradox of the national Lithuanian territory at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century was that regardless of the intention of the Lithuanian map-makers to depict contemporary ethnic Lithuanian territory, their maps usually presented ethnic borders that no longer existed.(...) some of the significant national symbols (the most important of which was the city of Vil'na) were located outside ethnic Lithuanian space.
1 2 3 4 MacQueen, Michael (1998). "The Context of Mass Destruction: Agents and Prerequisites of the Holocaust in Lithuania". Holocaust and Genocide Studies. 12 (1): 27–48. doi:10.1093/hgs/12.1.27.
1 2 Weeks, Theodore R. (2015). Vilnius between Nations, 1795–2000. Northern Illinois University Press. p.2. ISBN978-0875807300. The Lithuanian claim on the city was always based on history (and a very specific understanding of history), not on demography: from the eighteenth century to 1939, this ethnicity never made up more than a small percentage of the city's population.
↑ Snyder, Timothy (1998). "The Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth since 1989: National narratives in relations among Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine". Nationalism and Ethnic Politics. 4 (3). Routledge: 8. doi:10.1080/13537119808428536.
↑ Brensztejn, Michał Eustachy (1919). Spisy ludności m. Wilna za okupacji niemieckiej od. 1 listopada 1915 r. (in Polish). Warsaw: Biblioteka Delegacji Rad Polskich Litwy i Białej Rusi.
↑ Senn, Alfred Erich (2007). Lithuania 1940: Revolution from Above. Rodopi. p.51. ISBN978-9042022256.
↑ Alfred Eric Senn. The Great Powers Lithuania and the Vilna Question, 1920-1928. E.J. Brill. 1966. pp. 107-113.
↑ Eidintas, Alfonsas; Vytautas Žalys; Alfred Erich Senn (September 1999). Ed. Edvardas Tuskenis (ed.). Lithuania in European Politics: The Years of the First Republic, 1918–1940 (Paperbacked.). New York: St. Martin's Press. p.146. ISBN0-312-22458-3.
↑ Lengyel, Emil (March 20, 1939). "Poland and Lithuania in a Long Feud". The New York Times: 63.
↑ Eidintas, Alfonsas; Vytautas Žalys; Alfred Erich Senn (September 1999). Ed. Edvardas Tuskenis (ed.). Lithuania in European Politics: The Years of the First Republic, 1918–1940 (Paperbacked.). New York: St. Martin's Press. pp.146, 152–153. ISBN0-312-22458-3.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Eidintas, Alfonsas; Vytautas Žalys; Alfred Erich Senn (September 1999). Ed. Edvardas Tuskenis (ed.). Lithuania in European Politics: The Years of the First Republic, 1918–1940 (Paperbacked.). New York: St. Martin's Press. pp.154–158. ISBN0-312-22458-3.
↑ Eidintas, Alfonsas; Vytautas Žalys; Alfred Erich Senn (September 1999). Ed. Edvardas Tuskenis (ed.). Lithuania in European Politics: The Years of the First Republic, 1918–1940 (Paperbacked.). New York: St. Martin's Press. p.109. ISBN0-312-22458-3.
↑ Streit, Clarence K. (March 16, 1938). "Reich-Polish Deal Feared in Geneva". The New York Times: 11.
↑ Eidintas, Alfonsas; Vytautas Žalys; Alfred Erich Senn (September 1999). Ed. Edvardas Tuskenis (ed.). Lithuania in European Politics: The Years of the First Republic, 1918–1940 (Paperbacked.). New York: St. Martin's Press. pp.83–84. ISBN0-312-22458-3.
↑ Gerutis, Albertas (1984). "Independent Lithuania". In Ed. Albertas Gerutis (ed.). Lithuania: 700 Years. Translated by Algirdas Budreckis (6thed.). New York: Manyland Books. p.219. ISBN0-87141-028-1. LCCN75-80057.
↑ Shapiro, Jerzy (March 19, 1938). "Poland Ready for Action". The New York Times: 1–2.
1 2 "Nazis are Pleased with Polish "Peace"". The New York Times: 34. March 20, 1939.
↑ Streit, Clarence K. (March 20, 1939). "Geneva's Anxiety on Poles Persists". The New York Times: 34.
↑ "Envoy Says Poland Plans Neutral Bloc". The New York Times: 1, 12. March 22, 1939.
↑ "Wall St. Reflects Turmoil in Europe". The New York Times: 4. March 18, 1939.
↑ "Bond Prices Rise on a Broad Front". The New York Times: 52. March 20, 1939.
↑ Shapiro, Jerzy (March 20, 1939). "Warsaw, Pleased with Results, Now Would Form a Baltic Entente". The New York Times: 1, 33.
↑ Shapiro, Jerzy (March 21, 1939). "Poland Calls Back Army on Frontier; Talks Will Begin". The New York Times: 1, 4.
↑ "Poland Welcomes Envoy". New York Times: 11. April 1, 1939.
↑ Eidintas, Alfonsas; Vytautas Žalys; Alfred Erich Senn (September 1999). Ed. Edvardas Tuskenis (ed.). Lithuania in European Politics: The Years of the First Republic, 1918–1940 (Paperbacked.). New York: St. Martin's Press. p.178. ISBN0-312-22458-3.
↑ Eidintas, Alfonsas; Vytautas Žalys; Alfred Erich Senn (September 1999). Ed. Edvardas Tuskenis (ed.). Lithuania in European Politics: The Years of the First Republic, 1918–1940 (Paperbacked.). New York: St. Martin's Press. p.168. ISBN0-312-22458-3.
↑ J.Lee Ready (1995), World War Two. Nation by Nation, London, Cassell, page 191. ISBN1-85409-290-1
↑ I. Žiemele. Baltic Yearbook of International Law, 2001. 2002, Vol.1 p.10
↑ K. Dawisha, B. Parrott. The Consolidation of Democracy in East-Central Europe. 1997 p. 293.
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