In computer security, an access-control list (ACL) is a list of permissions [lower-alpha 1] associated with a system resource (object or facility). An ACL specifies which users or system processes are granted access to resources, as well as what operations are allowed on given resources. [1] Each entry in a typical ACL specifies a subject and an operation. For instance,
Many kinds of operating systems implement ACLs or have a historical implementation; the first implementation of ACLs was in the filesystem of Multics in 1965. [2] [3]
A filesystem ACL is a data structure (usually a table) containing entries that specify individual user or group rights to specific system objects such as programs, processes, or files. These entries are known as access-control entries (ACEs) in the Microsoft Windows NT, [4] OpenVMS, and Unix-like operating systems such as Linux, macOS, and Solaris. Each accessible object contains an identifier to its ACL. The privileges or permissions determine specific access rights, such as whether a user can read from, write to, or execute an object. In some implementations, an ACE can control whether or not a user, or group of users, may alter the ACL on an object.
One of the first operating systems to provide filesystem ACLs was Multics. PRIMOS featured ACLs at least as early as 1984. [5]
In the 1990s the ACL and RBAC models were extensively tested[ by whom? ] and used to administer file permissions.
POSIX 1003.1e/1003.2c working group made an effort to standardize ACLs, resulting in what is now known as "POSIX.1e ACL" or simply "POSIX ACL". [6] The POSIX.1e/POSIX.2c drafts were withdrawn in 1997 due to participants losing interest for funding the project and turning to more powerful alternatives such as NFSv4 ACL. [7] As of December 2019 [update] , no live sources of the draft could be found on the Internet, but it can still be found in the Internet Archive. [8]
Most of the Unix and Unix-like operating systems (e.g. Linux since 2.5.46 or November 2002, [9] FreeBSD, or Solaris) support POSIX.1e ACLs (not necessarily draft 17). ACLs are usually stored in the extended attributes of a file on these systems.
NFSv4 ACLs are much more powerful than POSIX draft ACLs. Unlike draft POSIX ACLs, NFSv4 ACLs are defined by an actually published standard, as part of the Network File System.
NFSv4 ACLs are supported by many Unix and Unix-like operating systems. Examples include AIX, FreeBSD, [10] Mac OS X beginning with version 10.4 ("Tiger"), or Solaris with ZFS filesystem, [11] support NFSv4 ACLs, which are part of the NFSv4 standard. There are two experimental implementations of NFSv4 ACLs for Linux: NFSv4 ACLs support for Ext3 filesystem [12] and the more recent Richacls, which brings NFSv4 ACLs support for Ext4 filesystem. [13] As with POSIX ACLs, NFSv4 ACLs are usually stored as extended attributes on Unix-like systems.
NFSv4 ACLs are organized nearly identically to the Windows NT ACLs used in NTFS. [14] NFSv4.1 ACLs are a superset of both NT ACLs and POSIX draft ACLs. [15] Samba supports saving the NT ACLs of SMB-shared files in many ways, one of which is as NFSv4-encoded ACLs. [16]
Microsoft's Active Directory service implements an LDAP server that store and disseminate configuration information about users and computers in a domain. [17] Active Directory extends the LDAP specification by adding the same type of access-control list mechanism as Windows NT uses for the NTFS filesystem. Windows 2000 then extended the syntax for access-control entries such that they could not only grant or deny access to entire LDAP objects, but also to individual attributes within these objects. [18]
On some types of proprietary computer hardware (in particular, routers and switches), an access-control list provides rules that are applied to port numbers or IP addresses that are available on a host or other layer 3, each with a list of hosts and/or networks permitted to use the service. Although it is additionally possible to configure access-control lists based on network domain names, this is a questionable idea because individual TCP, UDP, and ICMP headers do not contain domain names. Consequently, the device enforcing the access-control list must separately resolve names to numeric addresses. This presents an additional attack surface for an attacker who is seeking to compromise security of the system which the access-control list is protecting. Both individual servers and routers can have network ACLs. Access-control lists can generally be configured to control both inbound and outbound traffic, and in this context they are similar to firewalls. Like firewalls, ACLs could be subject to security regulations and standards such as PCI DSS.
ACL algorithms have been ported to SQL and to relational database systems. Many "modern" (2000s and 2010s) SQL-based systems, like enterprise resource planning and content management systems, have used ACL models in their administration modules.
The main alternative to the ACL model is the role-based access-control (RBAC) model. A "minimal RBAC model", RBACm, can be compared with an ACL mechanism, ACLg, where only groups are permitted as entries in the ACL. Barkley (1997) [19] showed that RBACm and ACLg are equivalent.
In modern SQL implementations, ACLs also manage groups and inheritance in a hierarchy of groups. So "modern ACLs" can express all that RBAC express and are notably powerful (compared to "old ACLs") in their ability to express access-control policy in terms of the way in which administrators view organizations.
For data interchange, and for "high-level comparisons", ACL data can be translated to XACML. [20]
The Portable Operating System Interface is a family of standards specified by the IEEE Computer Society for maintaining compatibility between operating systems. POSIX defines both the system and user-level application programming interfaces (APIs), along with command line shells and utility interfaces, for software compatibility (portability) with variants of Unix and other operating systems. POSIX is also a trademark of the IEEE. POSIX is intended to be used by both application and system developers.
Network File System (NFS) is a distributed file system protocol originally developed by Sun Microsystems (Sun) in 1984, allowing a user on a client computer to access files over a computer network much like local storage is accessed. NFS, like many other protocols, builds on the Open Network Computing Remote Procedure Call system. NFS is an open IETF standard defined in a Request for Comments (RFC), allowing anyone to implement the protocol.
In computing, a symbolic link is a file whose purpose is to point to a file or directory by specifying a path thereto.
The Unix file system (UFS) is a family of file systems supported by many Unix and Unix-like operating systems. It is a distant descendant of the original filesystem used by Version 7 Unix.
In computing, a directory service or name service maps the names of network resources to their respective network addresses. It is a shared information infrastructure for locating, managing, administering and organizing everyday items and network resources, which can include volumes, folders, files, printers, users, groups, devices, telephone numbers and other objects. A directory service is a critical component of a network operating system. A directory server or name server is a server which provides such a service. Each resource on the network is considered an object by the directory server. Information about a particular resource is stored as a collection of attributes associated with that resource or object.
Capability-based security is a concept in the design of secure computing systems, one of the existing security models. A capability is a communicable, unforgeable token of authority. It refers to a value that references an object along with an associated set of access rights. A user program on a capability-based operating system must use a capability to access an object. Capability-based security refers to the principle of designing user programs such that they directly share capabilities with each other according to the principle of least privilege, and to the operating system infrastructure necessary to make such transactions efficient and secure. Capability-based security is to be contrasted with an approach that uses traditional UNIX permissions and Access Control Lists.
pax is an archiving utility available for various operating systems and defined since 1995. Rather than sort out the incompatible options that have crept up between tar and cpio, along with their implementations across various versions of Unix, the IEEE designed a new archive utility pax that could support various archive formats with useful options from both archivers. The pax command is available on Unix and Unix-like operating systems and on IBM i, and Microsoft Windows NT until Windows 2000.
In computer security, mandatory access control (MAC) refers to a type of access control by which a secured environment constrains the ability of a subject or initiator to access or modify on an object or target. In the case of operating systems, the subject is a process or thread, while objects are files, directories, TCP/UDP ports, shared memory segments, or IO devices. Subjects and objects each have a set of security attributes. Whenever a subject attempts to access an object, the operating system kernel examines these security attributes, examines the authorization rules in place, and decides whether to grant access. A database management system, in its access control mechanism, can also apply mandatory access control; in this case, the objects are tables, views, procedures, etc.
In Unix-like systems, multiple users can be put into groups. POSIX and conventional Unix file system permissions are organized into three classes, user, group, and others. The use of groups allows additional abilities to be delegated in an organized fashion, such as access to disks, printers, and other peripherals. This method, among others, also enables the superuser to delegate some administrative tasks to normal users, similar to the Administrators group on Microsoft Windows NT and its derivatives.
Filesystem in Userspace (FUSE) is a software interface for Unix and Unix-like computer operating systems that lets non-privileged users create their own file systems without editing kernel code. This is achieved by running file system code in user space while the FUSE module provides only a bridge to the actual kernel interfaces.
Most file systems include attributes of files and directories that control the ability of users to read, change, navigate, and execute the contents of the file system. In some cases, menu options or functions may be made visible or hidden depending on a user's permission level; this kind of user interface is referred to as permission-driven.
File locking is a mechanism that restricts access to a computer file, or to a region of a file, by allowing only one user or process to modify or delete it at a specific time and to prevent reading of the file while it's being modified or deleted.
Unix-like operating systems identify a user by a value called a user identifier, often abbreviated to user ID or UID. The UID, along with the group identifier (GID) and other access control criteria, is used to determine which system resources a user can access. The password file maps textual user names to UIDs. UIDs are stored in the inodes of the Unix file system, running processes, tar archives, and the now-obsolete Network Information Service. In POSIX-compliant environments, the shell command id gives the current user's UID, as well as more information such as the user name, primary user group and group identifier (GID).
Windows Services for UNIX (SFU) is a discontinued software package produced by Microsoft which provided a Unix environment on Windows NT and some of its immediate successor operating-systems.
Extended file attributes are file system features that enable users to associate computer files with metadata not interpreted by the filesystem, whereas regular attributes have a purpose strictly defined by the filesystem. Unlike forks, which can usually be as large as the maximum file size, extended attributes are usually limited in size to a value significantly smaller than the maximum file size. Typical uses include storing the author of a document, the character encoding of a plain-text document, or a checksum, cryptographic hash or digital certificate, and discretionary access control information.
The following tables compare general and technical information for a number of file systems.
chattr is the command in Linux that allows a user to set certain attributes of a file. lsattr is the command that displays the attributes of a file.
In Unix-like operating systems, a device file, device node, or special file is an interface to a device driver that appears in a file system as if it were an ordinary file. There are also special files in DOS, OS/2, and Windows. These special files allow an application program to interact with a device by using its device driver via standard input/output system calls. Using standard system calls simplifies many programming tasks, and leads to consistent user-space I/O mechanisms regardless of device features and functions.
Richacls is a Linux implementation of the NFSv4 ACLs which has been extended by file masks to more easily fit the proprietary POSIX draft file permission model. Nowadays, they offer the most complex permission model for ext4 file system in Linux. They are even more complex than POSIX draft ACLs, which means it is not possible to convert back from Richacls to Linux' implementation of the POSIX draft ACLs without losing information. One of the most important advantages is that they distinguish between write and append permission, between delete and delete child permissions, and make ACL management access discretionary. They are also designed to support Windows interoperability.
The new version of Gnet-II (revision 3.0) has added a line-security mechanism which is implemented under the Primos ACL subsystem.
EA (Extended Attributes) and ACL (Access Control Lists) functionality is now available for ext3 file systems. In addition, ACL functionality is available for NFS.