An Arizona law providing authority for local law enforcement to enforce immigration law violated the enumerated powers of Congress and is preempted by federal statute. Arizona law enforcement may inquire about a resident's legal status during lawful encounters, but may not implement its own immigration rules. Ninth Circuit affirmed and reversed in part.
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), was a United States Supreme Court case involving Arizona's SB 1070, a state law intended to increase the powers of local law enforcement that wished to enforce federal immigration laws. The issue is whether the law usurps the federal government's authority to regulate immigration laws and enforcement. The Court ruled that sections 3, 5(C), and 6 of S. B. 1070 were preempted by federal law but left other parts of the law intact, including a provision that allowed law enforcement to investigate a person's immigration status.
On April 23, 2010, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer signed into law SB 1070, which supporters dubbed the "Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act".[1] It made it a state misdemeanor crime for an illegal immigrant to be in Arizona without carrying registration documents required by federal law; authorizes state and local law enforcement of federalimmigration laws; and penalized those found to be knowingly sheltering, hiring, and transporting illegal immigrants.[2]
The bill's passage immediately sparked constitutional concerns over potential civil rights violations and encouraging of racial profiling.[3][4][5] Tens of thousands of people demonstrated against the law in over 70 U.S. cities on May 1, 2010 (International Workers' Day).[6][7][8] A rally in Los Angeles, attended by Cardinal Roger Mahony of the Roman Catholic Church, attracted between 50,000 and 60,000 people, with protesters waving Mexican flags and chanting "Sí se puede."[6][7][9] The city had become the national center of protests against the Arizona law.[9] Around 25,000 people were at a protest in Dallas, and more than 5,000 were in Chicago and Milwaukee. Rallies in other cities generally attracted around 1,000 people or so.[7][8] There and in some other locations, demonstrators expressed frustration with what they saw as the administration's lack of action on immigration reform, with signs holding messages such as "Hey Obama! Don't deport my mama."[8]
The case was filed by the United States Justice Department in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona on July 6, 2010,[10] challenging Arizona's Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act as usurping the federal government's authority to regulate immigration laws and enforcement. The plaintiffs also referenced the notion of federal preemption and stated, "The Constitution and the federal immigration laws do not permit the development of a patchwork of state and local immigration policies throughout the country."[11] Additionally, the Justice Department, in its July 6, 2010, motion, requested for the federal courts to issue an injunction to enjoin enforcement of the law before it went into effect.[12] Arizona responded to the motion.[13] The 1976 precedent of De Canas v. Bica was relied upon in Arizona's Motion.
On Wednesday, July 28, 2010, Judge Susan R. Bolton blocked key portions of SB 1070 including "requiring police to check the immigration status of those they arrest or whom they stop and suspect are in the country undocumented would overwhelm the federal government's ability to respond, and could mean legal immigrants are wrongly arrested."[14] Judge Bolton wrote in her ruling:
Federal resources will be taxed and diverted from federal enforcement priorities as a result of the increase in requests for immigration status determination that will flow from Arizona[14]
Governor Brewer promised to appeal the ruling by calling it "a temporary bump in the road."[15]
A group of 81 members of the United States Congress also filed a Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae.[17][18] The brief supported Arizona.
On July 28, 2010, Judge Bolton issued an order denying in part and granting in part the United States' Motion for Preliminary Injunction heard the prior week.[19]
Among the provisions that would go into effect are the following: A.R.S. § 11-1051(A): prohibiting Arizona officials, agencies, and political subdivisions from limiting enforcement of federal immigration laws; A.R.S. § 11-1051(C)-(F): requiring state officials to work with federal officials with regard to undocumented immigrants; and, A.R.S. § 11-1051(G)-(L): allowing legal residents to sue any state official, agency, or political subdivision for adopting a policy of restricting enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the full extent permitted by federal law. See July 28, 2010, Order
An appeal of the US District Court's July 28, 2010, ruling was filed on July 29, 2010. A motion to expedite the normal appeal schedule was also filed. Arizona gave the following reasons for the motion to expedite:[20]
Good cause exists to expedite this appeal under Ninth Circuit Rules 27-12 and 34-3 and 28 U.S.C. § 1657 because it is an appeal of a preliminary injunction enjoining several key provisions of SB 1070 that the Arizona Legislature determined were critical to address serious criminal, environmental, and economic problems Arizona has been suffering as a consequence of undocumented immigration and the lack of effective enforcement activity by the federal government. An expedited briefing schedule will not unreasonably burden the parties because it is consistent with the expedited briefing schedule Plaintiff-Appellee received for the initial ruling on its Motion for Preliminary Injunction, the issues on appeal are narrower than those the district court addressed and have largely been briefed by the parties, and the parties are well represented with sufficient counsel to brief the issues under the schedule Defendants-Appellants have proposed.
Governor Brewer requested the following appeal schedule: opening brief due August 12, 2010, response brief due August 26, 2010, reply brief due September 2, 2010, and oral argument during week of September 13, basically a 30-day schedule, almost twice the schedule allowed for the original motion for preliminary injunction.[21]
On July 30, 2010, the Appeals Court ordered the following appeal schedule:
opening brief due August 26, 2010
response brief due September 23, 2010
reply brief due 14 days after response
oral argument (hearing) during first week of November 2010
Ninth Circuit opinion and way to Supreme Court decision
Recording of oral arguments heard by Ninth Circuit.
On November 1, 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit heard arguments in the case. The three-judge panel was composed of Judges Richard Paez, Carlos Bea, and John T. Noonan.[22] On April 11, 2011, the Ninth Circuit panel upheld the district court's ban on parts of the law taking effect, thus ruling in favor of the Obama administration and against Arizona. Judge Richard Paez gave the majority opinion in which Judge John T. Noonan, Jr. joined, and Judge Carlos Bea dissented in part.[23][24] Paez agreed with the administration's view that the state had intruded upon federal prerogatives. Noonan wrote in his concurrence: "The Arizona statute before us has become a symbol. For those sympathetic to immigrants to the United States, it is a challenge and a chilling foretaste of what other states might attempt."[24]
On May 9, 2011, Governor Brewer announced that Arizona would appeal directly to the U.S. Supreme Court, rather than request a hearing en banc before the Ninth Circuit;[25] the appeal was filed on August 10, 2011.[26] In response, the Justice Department requested the Supreme Court to stay out of the case by saying that the lower courts actions were appropriate.[27] Observers thought it likely that the Supreme Court would take up the matter,[26] but if it declined to step in, the case most likely would be returned to the trial judge in the District Court to review the case on its merits and determine whether the temporary injunction that blocked the law's most controversial provisions should become permanent.[28] The Supreme Court announced in December 2011 that it would review Arizona's Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act,[29][30] and oral arguments took place on April 25, 2012.[31][32]
Supreme Court decision
On December 12, 2011, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case. The court heard oral arguments for the case on April 25, 2012. Justice Elena Kagan recused herself from the case, presumably because during her time as the United States Solicitor General under the Obama administration she had defended the federal government's position in the case.[33]
On June 25, 2012, the Court struck down three of the four provisions of SB 1070. The majority opinion was written by Justice Kennedy and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer, and Justice Sotomayor.[34] Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito all concurred in part and dissented in part in separate opinions that were joined by no other justice.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion held that Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 were preempted by federal law.[34][35][36] The three provisions struck down required legal immigrants to carry registration documents at all times, allowed state police to arrest any individual suspected of being an illegal immigrant, and made it a crime for an illegal immigrant to search for or hold a job in the state.[37][38][39]
All justices agreed to uphold the provision of the law allowing Arizona state police to investigate the immigration status of an individual stopped, detained, or arrested if there is reasonable suspicion that the individual is in the country illegally. However, Justice Kennedy specified in the majority opinion that state police may not detain the individual for a prolonged amount of time for not carrying immigration documents, and that cases of racial profiling may proceed through the courts if such cases arise.[33][40]
Majority opinion
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion identified the question before the Court as "whether federal law preempts and renders invalid four separate provisions of the state law." The four provisions in question were:
Section 3 of S.B. 1070, which made it a state crime to be unlawfully present in the United States and failing to register with the federal government;
Section 5, which made it a misdemeanor state crime to seek work or to work without authorization to do so;
Section 2, which in some circumstances required Arizona state and local officers to verify the citizenship or alien status of people arrested, stopped, or detained; and
Section 6, which authorized warrantless arrests of aliens believed to be removable from the United States based on probable cause.
Kennedy's opinion embraced an expansive view of the United States Government's authority to regulate immigration and aliens, describing it as "broad" and "undoubted". That authority derived from the legislative power of Congress to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization", enumerated in the Constitution,[41] as well as the longstanding interpretation of federal sovereignty in areas pertaining to the control and conduct of relations with foreign nations.[42] In this context, federal discretion as to whether or how immigration laws are enforced is an important component of Congressional authority. At the same time, Justice Kennedy's opinion acknowledged the serious concerns experienced by Arizona citizens and officials in dealing with illegal immigration, noting that signs along highways south of Phoenix, Arizona, discourage travel by the public because of dangerous smuggling activities.
The majority opinion analyzed the four provisions in question within the framework of preemption, derived from the Supremacy Clause, requiring federal law to prevail when state and federal laws conflict. The Court held that "the Federal Government has occupied the field of alien registration" and so all state action and "even complementary state regulation is impermissible."[43] Therefore, the registration provisions of Section 3 were preempted by federal law. In contrast to Section 3, the criminal provisions of Section 5 had no direct counterpart under federal law, which led the Court to apply the "ordinary principles of preemption" rather than the doctrine of field preemption. Under those principles, Section 5 stood as an obstacle to the objectives of Congress of not imposing "criminal penalties on aliens who seek or engage in unauthorized employment". Therefore, Section 5 was also preempted by federal law.
Section 6 of SB 1070 was also found to be preempted by federal law on the basis that it created an "obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of Congress". The Court noted that it is not generally a crime for a removable alien to be present in the United States and that Section 6 would give state officers "even greater authority to arrest aliens on the basis of possible removability than Congress has given to trained federal immigration officers." Furthermore, the removal process is "entrusted to the discretion of the Federal Government."
The majority upheld Section 2 but did so by reading it in a more restrictive manner. The provisions at issue required Arizona officers to make a "reasonable attempt" to determine the immigration status of any person stopped, detained, or arrested on a legitimate basis if "reasonable suspicion" existed that the person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States.[44] Additionally, any arrestee's immigration status would have to have been determined before they could be released.[44] Status checks would have been made through Immigration and Customs Enforcement and their databases. Listing several examples, Justice Kennedy wrote that Section 2(B) "likely would survive preemption" if it is interpreted to require only state officers to conduct a status check "during the course of an authorized, lawful detention or after a detainee has been released." Underlining the cautious approach that the majority took to Section 2(B) were Justice Kennedy's final words on the section: "This opinion does not foreclose other preemption and constitutional challenges to the law as interpreted and applied after it goes into effect."
Dissents
Justice Scalia dissented, and said that he would have upheld all four provisions as a valid exercise of concurrent state sovereignty over immigration.[45] He argued that the statute was valid: "As a sovereign, Arizona has the inherent power to exclude persons from its territory, subject only to those limitations expressed in the Constitution or constitutionally imposed by Congress. That power to exclude has long been recognized as inherent in sovereignty."[46] To support his position, Justice Scalia reviewed several cases from the early history of the Supreme Court's Immigration jurisprudence.[46]
Justice Thomas likewise would have upheld the entire law as not preempted by federal law,[45] but for different reasons. He concluded that none of the challenged sections presented an actual conflict with federal law, and so the preemption doctrine did not apply.[47]
Justice Alito agreed with Justices Scalia and Thomas regarding Sections 5(C) and 6 but joined with the majority in finding Section 3 preempted and that Section 2(B) was not preempted.[45] With respect to Section 5(C) Justice Alito argued that "[t]he Court's holding on §5(C) is inconsistent with De Canas v. Bica, 424 U. S. 351 (1976), which held that employment regulation, even of aliens unlawfully present in the country, is an area of traditional state concern."[48] He also argued that Section 6 was not preempted because "[l]ike §2(B), §6 adds virtually nothing to the authority that Arizona law enforcement officers already exercise. And whatever little authority they have gained is consistent with federal law."[48]
Role of Justice Kagan's recusal
In an article on SCOTUSblog, Stephen Wermiel mentions that Justice Kagan's recusal may have played a role in the 5-3 outcome of the case. Some commentators were surprised by the Chief Justice's vote, and thought that the Chief may have voted with the majority to prevent the case from ending in a 4-4 deadlock.[49]
Legacy
Shortly after retiring as Solicitor General of the United States, Donald B. Verrilli, Jr. said in a 2016 interview that it was a high-profile case in 2012, but its consequences were not fully appreciated. In his view, the problem was not so much the "show me your papers" provision of the law at issue "but that the states are trying to supplant the federal government's role in setting immigration policy, and we can't have fifty different immigration policies."[50] After the Supreme Court ruled on the case, its decision helped to deter other states from establishing and enforcing their own immigration policies. Verrilli concluded that the Court had made "a very consequential decision" which meant that an incipient anti-immigrant movement "got stopped dead in its tracks".[50]
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court limited the scope of the Texas Healthcare Liability Act (THCLA). The effective result of this decision was that the THCLA, which held Case Management and Utilization Review decisions by Managed Care entities like CIGNA and Aetna to a legal duty of care according to the laws of The State of Texas could not be enforced in the case of Health Benefit plans provided through private employers, because the Texas statute allowed compensatory or punitive damages to redress losses or deter future transgressions, which were not available under ERISA § 1132. The ruling still allows the State of Texas to enforce the THCLA in the case of Government-sponsored (Medicare, Medicaid, Federal, State, Municipal Employee, etc., Church-sponsored, or Individual Health Plan Policies, which are saved from preemption by ERISA. The history that allows these Private and Self-Pay Insurance to be saved dates to the "Interstate Commerce" power that was given the federal Government by the Supreme Court. ERISA, enacted in 1974, relied on the "Interstate Commerce" rule to allow federal jurisdiction over private employers, based on the need of private employers to follow a single set of paperwork and rules for pensions and other employee benefit plans where employers had employees in multiple states. Except for private employer plans, insurance can be regulated by the individual states, and Managed Care entities making medical decisions can be held accountable for those decisions if negligence is involved, as allowed by the Texas Healthcare Liability Act.
Brown v. Hotel and Restaurant Employees, 468 U.S. 491 (1984), is a 4-to-3 ruling by the United States Supreme Court which held that a New Jersey state gaming law requiring union leaders to be of good moral character was not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).
Susan Marie Ritchie Bolton is a senior United States district judge of the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.
The Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act is a 2010 legislative Act in the U.S. state of Arizona that was the broadest and strictest anti-illegal immigration law in the United States when passed. It has received international attention and has spurred considerable controversy.
The California foie gras law or Senate Bill 1520 is a California State statute that prohibits the "force feed[ing of] a bird for the purpose of enlarging the bird's liver beyond normal size" as well as the sale of products that are a result of this process (§ 25982). This outlawed the traditional method of producing foie gras in California. The law was enacted in 2004 and went into effect on July 1, 2012. The law has been challenged repeatedly since its enactment. The ninth circuit in 2022 upheld a lower court’s 2020 ruling, which allowed residents to purchase foie gras for their individual use from out-of-state retailers.
Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582 (2011), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that upheld an Arizona state law suspending or revoking business licenses of businesses that hire illegal aliens.
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution of the United States establishes that the Constitution, federal laws made pursuant to it, and treaties made under its authority, constitute the "supreme Law of the Land", and thus take priority over any conflicting state laws. It provides that state courts are bound by, and state constitutions subordinate to, the supreme law. However, federal statutes and treaties must be within the parameters of the Constitution; that is, they must be pursuant to the federal government's enumerated powers, and not violate other constitutional limits on federal power, such as the Bill of Rights—of particular interest is the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states that the federal government has only those powers that are delegated to it by the Constitution.
Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 562 U.S. 323 (2011), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States, in which the Court unanimously held that Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, does not federally preempt state tort lawsuits against auto manufacturers from injuries caused by a defective lack of certain types of seat belts.
Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69 (2013), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court in which a unanimous Court held that federal court abstention under the Younger v. Harris doctrine is not in order simply because a pending state-court proceeding involves the same subject matter. The case involved a dispute between Sprint Corporation and Windstream Communications.
Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876), was a US Supreme Court case that ruled that the powers to set rules surrounding immigration and to manage foreign relations rest with the US federal government, rather than that of the states. The case has been cited in other Supreme Court cases related to government authority on matters relating to immigration policy and immigration enforcement, most recently in Arizona v. United States (2012).
Reyes Mata v. Lynch, 576 U.S. 143 (2015), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that the federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction to review the orders of the Board of Immigration Appeals to reject motions to reopen.
Executive Order 13769 was signed by U.S. President Donald Trump on January 27, 2017, and quickly became the subject of legal challenges in the federal courts of the United States. The order sought to restrict travel from seven Muslim majority countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The plaintiffs challenging the order argued that it contravened the United States Constitution, federal statutes, or both. On March 16, 2017, Executive Order 13769 was superseded by Executive Order 13780, which took legal objections into account and removed Iraq from affected countries. Then on September 24, 2017, Executive Order 13780 was superseded by Presidential Proclamation 9645 which is aimed at more permanently establishing travel restrictions on those countries except Sudan, while adding North Korea and Venezuela which had not previously been included.
State of Washington and State of Minnesota v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, was a lawsuit that challenged the constitutionality of Executive Order 13769, issued by U.S. president Donald Trump.
Executive Order 13780, titled Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States, was an executive order signed by United States President Donald Trump on March 6, 2017. It placed a 90-day restriction on entry to the U.S. by nationals of Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria and Yemen, and barred entry for all refugees who did not possess either a visa or valid travel documents for 120 days. This executive order—sometimes called "Travel Ban 2.0"—revoked and replaced Executive Order 13769 issued on January 27, 2017.
Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, No. 16-476, 584 U.S. ___ (2018), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The issue was whether the U.S. federal government has the right to control state lawmaking. The State of New Jersey, represented here by Governor Philip D. Murphy, sought to have the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) overturned, allowing state-sponsored sports betting. The case, formerly titled Christie v. National Collegiate Athletic Association until Governor Chris Christie left office, was combined with NJ Thoroughbred Horsemen v. NCAA No. 16-477.
Kansas v. Garcia, 589 U.S. ___ (2020), was a case of the United States Supreme Court that was decided, by a 5–4 majority, in 2020. The case concerned whether it was lawful for a State to enforce laws criminalizing the making of fraudulent representations by aliens who were not authorized to work in connection with obtaining a job; the Court held that it was.
The Texas Heartbeat Act, Senate Bill 8, is an act of the Texas Legislature that bans abortion after the detection of embryonic or fetal cardiac activity, which normally occurs after about six weeks of pregnancy. The law took effect on September 1, 2021, after the U.S. Supreme Court denied a request for emergency relief from Texas abortion providers. It is the first time a state has successfully imposed a six-week abortion ban since Roe v. Wade, and the first abortion restriction to rely solely on enforcement by private individuals through civil lawsuits, rather than having state officials enforce the law with criminal or civil penalties. The act authorizes members of the public to sue anyone who performs or facilitates an illegal abortion for a minimum of $10,000 in statutory damages per abortion, plus court costs and attorneys' fees.
Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson, 595 U.S. ___ (2021), was a United States Supreme Court case brought by Texas abortion providers and abortion rights advocates that challenged the constitutionality of the Texas Heartbeat Act, a law that outlaws abortions after six weeks. The Texas Heartbeat Act prohibits state officials from enforcing the ban but authorizes private individuals to enforce the law by suing anyone who performs, aids, or abets an abortion after six weeks. The law was structured this way to evade pre-enforcement judicial review because lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of state statutes are typically brought against state officials who are charged with enforcing the law, as the state itself cannot be sued under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
United States v. Texas, 595 U.S. ___ (2021), was a United States Supreme Court case that involved the Texas Heartbeat Act, also known as Senate Bill 8 or SB8, a state law that bans abortion once a "fetal heartbeat" is detected, typically six weeks into pregnancy. A unique feature of the Act, and challenges to it, is the delegation of enforcement to any and all private individuals who are authorized by the Act to file civil actions against abortion providers who violate it, and aiders and abetters, while state and local officials are prohibited from doing so. Opponents stated that the Act went against the landmark 1973 Supreme Court decision Roe v. Wade, which, prior to its overturn in 2022, banned states from prohibiting abortions during the first trimester of pregnancy in favor of the woman's right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976), was a case decided by the US Supreme Court on February 25, 1976, that challenged Section 2805(a) of the California Labor Code.
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