| Battle of Takellote | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Part of Mali War | |||||||||
| |||||||||
| Belligerents | |||||||||
 GATIA | |||||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
| El Hadj Ag Gamou | Mohamed Ag Najem | ||||||||
| Casualties and losses | |||||||||
| 50 killed, 33 to 39 captured (per CMA and MINUSMA) | 2 killed, 5 injured (per GATIA) 4 killed (per CMA) | ||||||||
On July 26, 2017, clashes broke out between the pro-government GATIA Imghad Tuareg militia and anti-government Idnane Tuareg rebels from the Coordination of Azawad Movements.
In the Algiers Agreement of 2015, most Tuareg groups signed a peace treaty with each other and the Malian government. Despite this, clashes still broke out between the pro-government GATIA, composed of Imghad Tuaregs (considered a vassal clan of Tuaregs), and the Idnane Tuaregs (a higher-ranked clan of Tuareg) armed groups of the coalition Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA). [1] The most notable fighting between the two groups occurred in 2016, and then again in June 2017. The second spate of fighting caused between ten and thirty deaths on both sides, with RFI stating that "assassinations, kidnapping, and even branding ... incidents were increasing." [1] [2] These incidents were in Kidal Region, which is traditionally Idnane Tuareg territory, although the Malian government through GATIA wanted to expand control over the region and dilute CMA control. [3]
On July 6, 2017, clashes between GATIA and the CMA left three people dead near Aguelhok. [4] Renewed fighting broke out in Anefif five days later on July 11, with the CMA capturing the city. [5] [6] Negotiations between GATIA and the CMA restarted, but failed on July 19. GATIA insisted that Anefif should be under control of "neutral forces" like MINUSMA, the French Army, or the Malian Army. The CMA refused this, stating that the Malian army was not a neutral party in the conflict. [7]
A majority of the violence was perpetrated by GATIA against Idnane Tuaregs aligned with the CMA, according to a Jeune Afrique report. The report alleged that the attacks by GATIA occurred during Ramadan, when CMA fighters had left to spend the holy month with their families. When Ramadan was over, the CMA was back at full capacity and had more of a desire to fight GATIA. [8]
Clashes broke out on July 26 in the vicinity of Takellote, about 40 to 45 kilometers south of Kidal. [9] The fighting began early in the morning, when a CMA column headed towards the town. Takellote at the time was a stronghold for GATIA fighters, which the CMA suspected of planning an offensive towards CMA-controlled Kidal. [8] [9] The CMA benefitted from a numerical advantage and the element of surprise during the battle. Shortly before noon, the CMA seized the town, later releasing a statement announcing they "disabled" all GATIA positions around Kidal. [10]
RFI reported that several dozen fighters were killed. [9] AFP reported that GATIA had several dozen fighters killed, and several dozen taken prisoner. On the other hand, the CMA has two deaths and several injured. [10] Oumar Ag Acherif, a CMA spokesperson, stated at least 50 GATIA fighters were killed and 39 were taken prisoner. [10] Another CMA source stated at least thirteen GATIA fighters were killed, and four killed in the CMA, including the second-in-command to the MNLA, Mohamed Ag Najem. [8] A resident of Kidal stated he saw fifty GATIA fighters taken prisoner, and three wounded taken to Kidal hospital. [8] Fahad Ag al-Mahmoud, secretary-general of GATIA, mentioned that GATIA had twenty killed and that the CMA had two killed and five injured. [11]
GATIA released a statement confirming they had fighters killed, some fighters injured that were taken to Gao, and that they had killed some CMA fighters. [8] The CMA stated that they had captured prisoners, and urged the Red Cross to come visit. [9] Wounded from the CMA were treated in Kidal, and wounded from GATIA were treated in Gao. [10]
On August 11, Guillaume Ngefa, the director of human rights of MINUSMA, stated that the CMA had detained thirty-three GATIA fighters in the battle, including eight minors. [12] The minors were returned to MINUSMA that same day. [13]
The CMA attacked GATIA positions in Inafarak, northwest of In Khalil, on July 27. After this, GATIA retreated towards Gao. [8] CMA fighters pushed further south on July 29, entering Ménaka, an Imghad Tuareg stronghold. [14] The CMA faced no resistance from the Malian Army or Movement for the Salvation of Azawad, which controlled the town. [15] The MSA stated that they remained neutral in the conflict between GATIA and the CMA. [16]
The Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies is an armed group in Azawad, Mali. Most of its 500 to 1,000 fighters are Imghad Tuaregs, and the group supports the Malian government.
The Movement for the Salvation of Azawad is a Tuareg political movement and armed group in Azawad, Mali. It was founded on 2 September 2016 by Moussa Ag Acharatoumane.
The Battle of Andéramboukane occurred between 4 and 5 June 2022, during the Ménaka offensive of the Mali War. The pro-government militias Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) and Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA) attempted to retake the Islamic State-held town of Andéramboukane but were unsuccessful.
On January 15, 2019, militants from the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara attacked two villages in Ménaka, Mali, killing at least 40 people. The massacres were targeted against Tuaregs.
The Ménaka offensive was a series of offensives launched by the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara against the Malian Army, Tuareg self-defense groups including the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (MSA) and Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies (GATIA), and the al-Qaeda-aligned Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin. The offensives took place in the Ménaka Cercle, in southeastern Mali.
Hassan Ag Fagaga, born around 1959 or 1966, in Kidal, Mali, was a Malian soldier and a Tuareg rebel.
On December 11 and 12, 2018, Islamic State in the Greater Sahara fighters attacked Daoussahak Tuareg refugee camps in the villages of Tinabaw, Tabangout and Tissalatatene, all in the Ménaka Cercle of Mali. Between 43 and 47 civilians were killed by ISGS.
On April 26 and 27, 2018, militants from the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara attacked two refugee camps near Andéramboukane, Ménaka, Mali, killing forty-seven people, mostly Tuareg civilians.
El Hadj Ag Gamou, born December 31, 1964, in Tidermène, Mali, is an Imghad Tuareg Malian division general. Gamou is currently the governor of Kidal Region since November 22, 2023, and has also been the head of his faction of Imghad Tuareg Self-Defense Group and Allies since the group's foundation. Prior to his governorship, Gamou served in the Malian army, commanding Malian troops against Ansar Dine and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) in the early stages of the Mali War.
The High Council for the Unity of Azawad (HCUA) (French: Haut conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad) is a Tuareg political movement formed on May 2, 2013, during the Mali War. The movement was initially called the High Council of Azawad (HCA) (French: Haut conseil de l'Azawad) before changing its name on May 19, 2013.
On 10 August 2016, clashes broke out between pro-government GATIA militiamen against Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) aligned groups near Adjlal, Kidal Region, Mali.
On July 30, 2016, clashes broke out between GATIA and the Coordination of Azawad Movements in Touzik, Kidal Region, Mali.
The battle of Kidal took place between July 21 and 22, 2016 between GATIA, a pro-government militia consisting of Imghad Tuaregs, against the Coordination of Azawad Movements, consisting of Ifoghas Tuaregs.
The Algiers Accords, officially referred to as the Accord for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali, is a 2015 agreement to end the Mali War. The agreement was signed on May 15 and June 20, 2015, in Bamako, following negotiations in Algiers between the Republic of Mali and Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA). The agreement was eventually terminated by the Malian government on January 25, 2024, amid open conflict with the CMA that sprung from the withdrawal of MINUSMA peacekeepers and presence of Wagner Group forces.
On August 17, 2015, clashes broke out between pro-government GATIA militants and rebels from the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) in the town of Anefis and surrounding areas. The dispute was settled in September.
On January 28 and February 4, 2015, pro-government Imghad Tuareg GATIA fighters attacked a base staffed by Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA) fighters in Tabrichat, Mali.
On October 16, 2014, clashes broke out between the pro-government GATIA miltiia and the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad in N'Tillit, Mali.
Between July 19 and 22, 2014, pro-government rebels from GATIA and other militias clashed with rebels from the MNLA, HCUA, and dissident MAA in Tabankort, rural Gao Region, Mali. Clashes were paused after MINUSMA intervened.
The Kidal offensive was an offensive by the Malian government and Wagner Group mercenaries against the rebel coalition Permanent Strategic Framework for Peace, Security, and Development (CSP-PSD) with the aim of capturing the rebel-held region of Kidal. The offensive was part of a renewed conflict between the Malian junta that took power in 2021 and former Tuareg rebel groups that had signed the Algiers Agreement in 2015, creating a ceasefire and de facto rebel control over the region. The offensive was also an attempt by Malian forces to seize control over MINUSMA camps in Kidal Region after the Malian junta had ordered the mission to leave the country by the end of 2023.
The battle of Kidal took place between November 10 and 14, 2023, during the Kidal offensive in renewed conflict between the CSP-PSD and the Malian Armed Forces and allied Wagner Group mercenaries during the Mali War. The city of Kidal had been under rebel control since 2014, and the 2015 Algiers Agreement enacted a ceasefire and Kidal Region subsequently was de facto controlled by rebel groups. When Malian and Wagner forces captured the city on November 14, it marked the first time in nine years that all Malian regional capitals were fully under Malian government control.
