Agreement between the Government of the Republic of India and the Government of the People's Republic of China on Border Defence Cooperation | |
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Type | Border management Confidence Building Measure [1] |
Context |
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Signed | 23 October 2013 |
Location | Great Hall of the People, Tiananmen Square, Beijing [2] |
Condition | Ratification by China and India |
Parties | |
Citations | Agreement |
Languages | |
Full text | |
India-China Border Agreement 2013 at Wikisource |
The Agreement between India and China on Border Defence Cooperation (BDCA) covers border stability and security, information asymmetry, smuggling, socio-economic reconstruction, environment and disease transmission along the line of actual control. [1] [3] [4] It is an incremental addition to the previous border agreements related to the Sino-Indian border dispute. [5] [6]
BDCA is one of the growing number of defence cooperation agreements being signed between countries worldwide. [7] [ failed verification ]
China proposed the BDCA as early as the 5th India-China annual defence dialogue (ADD) in January 2013. [8] The following months saw negotiations and counter-proposals by India. [8] [9]
In April 2013, India reported a Chinese PLA incursion at the mouth of Depsang Bulge near the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh. [10] [11] This three week face-off was one of the border incidents that took place during the drafting of the agreement. [1] [12] In July 2013, India also saw PLA movement into Chumar and transgressions in Barahoti and Dichu. [13]
In July 2013, the Indian Minister of Defence met his counterpart General Chang Wanquan, as well as Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang and State Councilor Yang Jiechi. In a joint statement, with regard to "peace and tranquility in their border areas" both sides appreciated "that border defence cooperation would make a significant contribution in that regard" and "they agreed on an early conclusion of negotiations for a proposed agreement on border defence cooperation between the two Governments". [14]
The agreement was finalized at a meeting of the Joint Working Group a few weeks before it was finally signed in Beijing in October 2013. [8]
BDCA mentions the "India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity" and four previous border agreements:
BDCA has ten articles. The agreement outlines ways to implement border defence cooperation "on the basis of their respective laws and relevant bilateral agreements". This includes the exchange of information, joint smuggling efforts, assistance in locating trans-border movement, disease transmission or "any other way mutually agreed upon the two sides". The agreement goes on to elaborate on mechanisms for implementing this border defence cooperation including flag meeting, border personal meetings, hotlines and meetings between representatives at various fora. This agreement goes a step further by saying that cooperation can be enhanced through CBMs such as cultural exchanges, "non-contact" sports, military exercises, and "small scale tactical exercises along the line of actual control in the India-China border areas." Military clauses cover tailing patrols, seeking clarification in areas of differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control and practice military restraint in all ways. The agreement clearly stated that the agreement would be honoured irrespective of the alignment of the LAC. The agreement concludes in an elastic nature, "It may be revised, amended or terminated with the consent of the two sides. Any revision or amendment, mutually agreed by the two sides, shall form an integral part of this Agreement'. [15] [16] [4]
The BDCA was met with skepticism from a number of Indian analysts. [17] [18] [19] Monika Chansoria, head of the China-study program Centre for Land Warfare Studies, called the agreement as a Beijing "engineered" with no clear progress or differentiation from previous agreements, adding that the main issue of resolving the border dispute was not part of the BDCA. [17] Jayadeva Ranade pointed out that there was no reference to status quo, ambiguity in the way certain arguments were framed including lines related to infrastructure development. [20] However, D Suba Chandran, director at Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, stated "even the worst critique would not find faults with it [the agreement]". [16]
In a press conference on 24 October 2013, a day after BDCA was signed, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China spokesperson Hua Chunying stated that "Over the past decades, with the concerted efforts of the two countries, negotiations on the boundary question have sustained a sound momentum and the border areas are basically peaceful and tranquil." [21]
During the 2020-21 China-India border skirmishes the BDCA and other border agreements failed in their purpose. [22]
The Sino-Indian War also known as Indo-China War, Indo-China War of 1962 or Sino-Indian War of 1962, took place between China and India from October to November 1962. It was a military escalation of the Sino-Indian border dispute. Fighting occurred along India's border with China, in India's North-East Frontier Agency east of Bhutan, and in Aksai Chin west of Nepal.
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The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are the Chinese government's foreign relations principles first mentioned in the 1954 Sino-Indian Agreement. Also known as Panchsheel, these principles were subsequently adopted in a number of resolutions and statements, including the preamble to the Constitution of the People's Republic of China.
The Line of Actual Control (LAC), in the context of the Sino-Indian border dispute, is a notional demarcation line that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory. The concept was introduced by Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in a 1959 letter to Jawaharlal Nehru as the "line up to which each side exercises actual control", but rejected by Nehru as being incoherent. Subsequently, the term came to refer to the line formed after the 1962 Sino-Indian War.
The People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India established bilateral relations in 1950. India and China have historically maintained peaceful relations for thousands of years of recorded history, but the harmony of their relationship has varied in modern times, after the Chinese Communist Party's victory in the Chinese Civil War in 1949, and especially post the Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China. The two nations have sought economic cooperation with each other, while frequent border disputes and economic nationalism in both countries are a major point of contention.
The Nathu La and Cho La clashes, sometimes referred to as the Sino-Indian War of 1967, Indo-China War of 1967 or Second Sino-Indian War, consisted of a series of border clashes between India and China alongside the border of the Himalayan Kingdom of Sikkim, then an Indian protectorate.
The Sino-Indian border dispute is an ongoing territorial dispute over the sovereignty of two relatively large, and several smaller, separated pieces of territory between China and India. The first of the territories, Aksai Chin, is administered by China as part of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and Tibet Autonomous Region and claimed by India as part of the union territory of Ladakh; it is mostly uninhabited high-altitude wasteland in the larger regions of Kashmir and Tibet and is crossed by the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway, but with some significant pasture lands at the margins. The other disputed territory is south of the McMahon Line, in the area formerly known as the North-East Frontier Agency and now called Arunachal Pradesh which is administered by India. The McMahon Line was part of the 1914 Simla Convention signed between British India and Tibet, without China's agreement. China disowns the agreement, stating that Tibet was never independent when it signed the Simla Convention.
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Tibet–India relations are said to have begun during the spread of Buddhism to Tibet from India during the 7th and 8th centuries AD. In 1959, the Dalai Lama fled to India after the failed 1959 Tibetan uprising. Since then, Tibetans-in-exile have been given asylum in India, with the Indian government accommodating them into 45 residential settlements across 10 states in the country. From around 150,000 Tibetan refugees in 2011, the number fell to 85,000 in 2018, according to government data. Many Tibetans are now leaving India to go back to Tibet and other countries such as United States or Germany. The Government of India, soon after India's independence in 1947, treated Tibet as a de facto independent country. However, more recently India's policy on Tibet has been mindful of Chinese sensibilities, and has recognized Tibet as a part of China.
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The Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement is an agreement signed by China and India in September 1993, agreeing to maintain the status quo on their mutual border pending an eventual boundary settlement. The Agreement on Military Confidence Building Measures, 1996, pursuant to the 1993 agreement, incrementally details the military confidence building measures to be implemented that would ensure no-war. The Protocol for the Implementation of Military Confidence Building Measures, 2005 further discussed modalities to implement the confidence building measures.
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