Cadets take the oath to serve Spain, 1915. 20 years later most of them, many already in senior officer ranks, will have to decide what that means
Breakup of Spanish armed forces of July 1936 was the process of decomposition of military and public order formations into two factions: the one which supported the government (loyalists, later called Republicans) and the one which joined the coup (rebels, later called Nationalists). Theoretically there were some 250,000 men serving in various armed branches. However, in fact this figure was probably much closer to 170,000, of which 90,000 served in the military and 80,000 in public order formations; detailed figures advanced by historians differ.
In historiography the prevailing opinion is that more armed servicemen joined the rebels than the loyalists; the ratio advanced differs from 59:41 to 52:48, yet there are also scholars who claim that only the minority joined the insurgency. It is usually accepted that slightly more peninsular troops and slightly more public order men remained loyal rather than rebelled, but that the so-called Army of Africa, which in its entirety joined the coup, tilted the balance in favor of the Nationalists.
Numerical split of manpower between the two warring sides of the Spanish Civil War is by no means indicative as to division of military and combat potential. This is mostly because in the Republican zone the effectives theoretically available were not taken advantage of; many military units were dissolved as potentially rebellious, many officers were detained, many units with few officers and NCOs left turned into loose undisciplined groupings, many rank-and-file servicemen opted for a wait-and-see stance and many later crossed to the Nationalist zone. Also, in early days following the failed coup the military potential of both sides was to a significant extent defined by civilian volunteers.
The Spanish military forces were falling into 3 major groups: 1) mainland army, stationed in garrisons in peninsular Spain and on the islands; in numerical terms it was composed mostly of conscripts. Most scholars do not hold these troops in high regard, suggesting poor quality of training, low morale, outdated equipment and officers who often have never seen combat, resembling bureaucrats in uniforms rather than military commanders. These troops were organised into 8 so-called organic divisions, each corresponding to one military region; their theoretical strength is quoted as 110,000-120,000, but in July 1936 there were no more than 70,000 actually in the barracks; 2) army stationed in Africa. It consisted of heterogeneous formations, but mostly of indigenous Moroccan troops and the Foreign Legion, both composed of volunteers. Most of its officers and NCOs saw combat during Rif Wars. African troops were widely considered the best part of the Spanish army; they numbered some 24,500 men in actual service; 3) the navy. In terms of manpower there were some 12,000 people serving in its ranks; the fleet was composed of rather obsolete larger warships and numerous newer destroyers, with some modern cruisers near completion in shipyards. Peninsular and African troops were governed by the Ministry of War; the fleet was governed by the Ministry of Marine. Air force, which technically formed a separate branch, in terms of manpower grouped no more than few thousand men.[1]
Quesada claims that on paper, there were 120,000 men on the continent and islands in total;[2]Beevor opts for a similar figure of some 110,000.[3] Clifford adheres to the theoretical figure of 120,000, but notes that only 80,000 were actually available.[4] These figures stand no comparison to calculations of military historians, who claim that de facto there were some 65,000 troops in all peninsular garrisons;[5] retrospective analysis of the Francoist staff claimed 60,000.[6] Fairly recent analysis of the Republican army during the civil war, written by Alpert, claims that the total number of troops actually in the barracks in July 1936 was some 65,000.[7] How this mass was split between the Republicans and the Nationalists is unclear, e.g. at times totals advanced by various authors do not match their own sub-totals.[8]Cierva claimed 32,000 Republicans and 19,000 Nationalists (63:37),[9] Nationalist staff had 36,500 Republicans and 23,500 Nationalists (61:39),[10] Quesada claims 33,000 Republicans and 24,000 Nationalists (58:42)[11] and exactly the same figures are given by Turnbull,[12] Beevor settles for 57,000 Republicans and 50,000 Nationalists (53:47),[13]Romero Salvado opts for 35,000 Republicans and 32,000 Nationalists (52:48)[14] and almost exactly the same figures are advanced by Alpert, 34,000 Republicans and 32,000 Nationalists (52:48),[15] while Payne maintains that “less than half” of “fewer than 90,000” rebelled[16] (47,000 Republicans, 38,000 Nationalists?). Some scholars, who accept the figure of 66,000 troops actually in the barracks on the peninsula, settle for general remark that they were “spread roughly equally”.[17] In structural terms, out of 8 divisional commands 3 were controlled by the Republicans (I: Madrid, III: Valencia, IV: Barcelona) and 5 by the Nationalists (II: Sevilla, V: Zaragoza, VI: Burgos, VII: Valladolid, VIII: La Coruña).
Some earlier works, e.g. Salas, claimed that the Army of Africa consisted of some 47,000 troops;[18] also some recent books advance similar figures, e.g. Beevor[19] and Casanova[20] refer to 40,000. However, there was no homogeneous formation known as “Army of Africa” and Spanish Morocco was garrisoned by at least 4 different formations: 1) Foreign Legion, 2) indigenous troops in Spanish service, so-called Regulares, both infantry and cavalry, 3) indigenous troops in service of the sultan and 4) Carabineros, plus 5) minor figures related to navy, air force and policing formations. Already some older studies claimed that there were merely 24.5 thousand troops available to the Nationalists in Morocco,[21] and the figure of 24,741 is advanced also by the recent military analysis.[22] The difference, apart from usual issues related to leaves and outdated documentation, is due to some categories, especially troops in sultan's service, formally not having been under Spanish command and not having been available for shift towards the peninsula. All sources agree, however, that troops brought to Spain from Morocco were the best units in the army, battle-hardened during the Rif Wars, well-equipped and with high combative spirit. Almost all of these 25 thousand men joined the Nationalists, with the exception of some 300 men on leave on the peninsula.[23]
Navy
Spanish navy crew (1931)
Though in terms of land forces the potential of Spanish army was rather limited and in numerical terms it was smaller e.g. than the armies of Poland,[24] Romania[25] and Czechoslovakia,[26] its navy still ranked as a powerful force to be reckoned with. In Europe it ranked far behind the British and French fleets, but until the early 1930s it was still comparable to the Soviet navy (Europe), German Reichsmarine/Kriegsmarine and the Italian Regia Marina, outclassed only when the latter three embarked on massive investment program. Salas estimated total naval personnel at 20,000,[27] yet contemporary military historians reduce this figure to some 12,000 men.[28] One source claims that 7,000 joined the rebels (with no info either on total or how many remained loyal),[29] the information difficult to reconcile with breakup of the vessels. This, however, is of limited importance; what mattered was the split of warships available. In terms of tonnage, the Republican fleet was double the size of the Nationalist one (some 60,000 tons vs. some 30,000 tons), which was mostly thanks to Nationalist control over 1 battleship (16,000 tons). In terms of the number of warships the Republican advantage was massive: they operated 1 battleship, 3 light cruisers, 14 destroyers and 12 submarines, while the Nationalists operated 1 battleship, 1 light cruiser, 1 destroyer and no submarine. The Republicans controlled all ports along the Bay of Biscay and on the Mediterranean (some 80% of all coastline), while the Nationalists controlled ports in Galicia and on the Atlantic coast of Andalusia.[30]
Total military
Officers on maneuvers (1936)
Almost no author provides overall military figures (peninsula + Africa + navy) and in most cases, their suggestions must be ascertained by means of adding sub-totals or applying partial ratio calculations. For Romero Salvado it is 35,000 Republicans vs. 66,000 Nationalists (35:65),[31] for Beevor it is 57,000 Republicans vs. 100,000 Nationalists (36:64),[32] for Quesada it is 33,000 Republicans vs. 53,000 Nationalists (38:62),[33] and for Turnbull it is 33,000 Republicans vs. 48,000 Nationalists (41:59).[34] The narrative by Payne implicitly suggests the same ratio, but somewhat higher figures, namely 47,000 Republicans vs. 68,000 Nationalists (41:59).[35] The officer corps got split fairly evenly; recent military estimates suggest that out of 17,000 officers in total (inc. retired etc.), 8,000 found themselves in the Republican zone and 9,000 in the Nationalist one (47:53). However, in fact only 4,000 supported the loyalists and 13,000 opted for the rebels.[36] Another author claims that out of officers active and in service, 2,000 opted for the Republicans[37] and more than 4,600 for the Nationalists.[38] For NCOs the numbers were 7,500 in the Republican zone and 8,000 in the Nationalist one.
Apart from regular military, there were 3 other major uniformed and armed formations. None of them was formatted as combat troops, intended to take part in tactical warfare operations. However, they consisted of disciplined men in structured, barracks-based units, trained to perform policing role and to use firearms. The traditional constabulary, operational mostly in rural areas, was Guardia Civil (some 34,000 men). Another traditional service was Carabineros (formally Instituto de Carabineros), operating mostly along the frontiers to prevent smuggling (sources provide figures ranging from 14,000 to 16,000). Relatively new service was Guardia de Asalto (formally Cuerpo de Seguridad y Asalto), set up by the Republic (some 18,000). The Civiles and the Asaltos were subordinated to the Ministry of Interior; the Carabineros formed part of the Ministry of Finance structures. There was no service named “police”. However, there were some specialized armed services, e.g. traffic rules were enforced by Cuerpo de Vigilantes de Caminos.[39] There were also various armed policing services subordinated to local authorities, be it regional or province-specific. Strength of these other units is highly unclear, though they might have amounted to 14,000.[40] Total number of servicemen in all security formations was about 80,000.
By far the largest security formation in Spain was Guardia Civil; in sources its strength is quoted as 32,458,[41] 32,477,[42] 32,860,[43] or 34,320.[44] Its units were scattered evenly across all of the country, though with higher saturation in rural areas and small towns rather than in large urban centres. Its commander, general Sebastián Pozas Perea, was a loyal though not particularly vocal republican. The Civiles had a long-standing reputation of heavy-handed service, and were despised by left-wing supporters as an instrument of reactionary politics. Some sources claim that most of the servicemen joined the rebels; Beevor maintains that merely 40% (which would translate to 13,000-14,000 men) remained loyal.[45] However, academic scholars tend to disagree; according to Tusell some 51% sided with the government,[46] the popular Osprey series by Quesada suggested rather 53%[47] while earlier Osprey work by Turnbull suggested 59%;[48] also the Nationalist staff quoted by Payne estimated the ratio of 59% (20,100).[49] Depending upon the ratio estimated and overall strength assumed, in absolute terms these percentages would translate to some 16,000-20,000 Civiles in the Republican ranks and 13,000-16,000 in the Nationalist ones. There is abundant evidence of Guardia Civil taking part in combat during the July coup, either on the rebel or on the loyalist side. There seems to be no particular pattern emerging, and even in one area local garrisons might have adopted a different stand, e.g. in the Seville province some rebelled (in Ecija),[50] some suppressed the rebellion (in Carmona)[51] and some assumed a wait-and-see position (Osuna).[52]
Sources tend to agree that the Asaltos numbered some 17.5 thousand servicemen (with detailed figure of 17,660 quoted).[53] Since the formation was set up during the early Republic days – at the time it numbered some 4,000 men[54] – it was intended not only as urban police, but also as sort of republican guard, which translated into specific recruitment and vetting procedures. It was partially formatted as riot police, supposed to deal also with urban unrest; the Asaltos were even equipped with armoured vehicles. They were deployed mostly in major urban centres; 6,000 (34% of the total) served in Madrid and Barcelona. All authors agree that Guardia de Asalto remained mostly loyal to the government, either because of republican preferences of its servicemen, or because in large cities the rebels remained hesitant, which prompted these vacillating to side with the prevailing party. Tusell,[55] Payne and other sources[56] agree that some 70% of the Asaltos sided with the loyalists,[57] which in absolute figures would translate to some 12,000 in Republican ranks and some 5,000 in the Nationalist ones. Also Quesada claims 12,000 for the Republicans.[58] Beevor claims that as much as 40% sided with the rebels,[59] which would rather suggest the figures of 11,000 for the Republicans and 7,000 for the Nationalists.
In literature there is some discrepancy as to the number of Carabineros: some authors claim 14,113[60] and others claim 16,096.[61] Like in case of Guardia de Asalto, their geographical distribution was highly uneven, this time conditioned not by urbanisation, but by location of Spanish frontiers; they were deployed mostly along the coastline, in northern provinces along the Pyrenean border with France and in western provinces along the border with Portugal. The general inspector of the formation was Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, one of chief military conspirators and later rebel leaders, yet there is no evidence he developed a plot structured in ranks of the service. It rather seems that their choices were conditioned by circumstances; in regions where rebels prevailed (Navarre, Leon)[62] they sided with the Nationalists, in regions with loyalist domination (Catalonia, Extremadura) they supported the government. Payne, Turnbull and Tusell agree that in overall terms most of the Carabineros remained in Republican ranks, though they give the percentage as 65%[63] (some 10,000 men, the figure also explicitly advanced by Quesada[64]), 60%[65] (some 9,000 men) or 59% (also 9,000),[66] which leaves some 4,000-5,000 for the Nationalists. Entirely different split is suggested by Beevor, who maintains that “about two-thirds” opted for rebellion (hence, some 5,000 for the Republicans and some 10,000 for the Nationalists).[67]
Almost all historiographic works ignore minor, local and specialized armed services, and almost none provides any approximation as to their numerical strength.[68] However, when in 1937 the Nationalist general staff estimated composition of both sides back in July 1936, they included the position of “Guardia de Asalto y policía armada”, with the total of 31,200 men.[69] As the number of the Asaltos was 17.6 thousand, this leaves some 13,600 to all other minor specialized formations, like Cuerpo de Vigilantes de Caminos, forest rangers, or prison guards; this figure covers also local policing services, be it regional (Mossos d’Esquadra in Catalonia),[70] provincial (Miqueletes in Gipuzkoa or Miñones in Alava) or municipal (in some cities municipal guards carried firearms). It is not clear how many of them sided with the loyalists and how many joined the rebels. If the Nationalist estimates are considered as point of departure and if the number of Asaltos is accepted as discussed earlier, it seems that some 10,000 remained loyal and some 4,000 opted for insurgency. There is little anecdotic evidence available to provide some examples, yet it is known that some of these servicemen initially took part in combat; e.g. Mossos d'Esquadra protected governmental buildings in Barcelona[71] and Miqueletes engaged against advancing Carlistrequetés in defence of their control posts at the border between Gipuzkoa and Navarre.[72]
Total security formations
Carabineros with smuggled goods
All security formations in total are usually estimated to be between some 65,000[73] and 70,000 men,[74] though these computations do not include local and specialized policing services; when included, the figure might be around 80,000.[75] Totals for both warring factions, which emerge from aggregating specific estimates coming from various authors and related to particular services might differ widely, ranging between 39,000 and 52,000 for the Republicans and between 27,000 and 41,000 for the Nationalists. However, in few cases some authors provide their suggestions for all security services in total, not necessarily in line with their detailed estimates. Beevor claims there were 33,000 for the Republicans[76] and 30,000 for the Nationalists;[77] Payne suggests rather 37,000 vs. 30,000,[78] Quesada maintains 40,000 vs. 30,000,[79] Turnbull 32,000 vs. 21,000,[80] and the Nationalist general staff estimated in 1937 that the figures were 51,000 vs. 29,000.[81] The overall percentage split of security forces which emerges from different sources is (Republicans vs. Nationalists): 64:36 (Nationalist staff, 1937), 61:39 (Turnbull), 60:40 (Tusell), 57:43 (Quesada), 55:45 (Payne) and 52:48 (Beevor).
Armed forces in total
Army officer, Guardia Civil Commander and Prime minister during a local ceremony, 1935
In theory in July 1936 there were some 250,000 men in all Spanish armed forces, both the military and the security formations. On paper, i.e. counting theoretical staff figures related to specific garrisons, some 110,000 were in the Republican zone and 140,000 in the Nationalist one (44:56).[82] Beevor maintains that proportionate advantage of the rebels was even larger and gives the totals of 90,000 in Republican zone and 130,000 in the Nationalist one (41:59).[83] However, some synthetic works might claim the reverse proportion, e.g. according to Casanova out of 250,000 in total, 120,000 opted for the rebels (which implies that 130,000 remained loyal, 52:48).[84] The discrepancy is of little importance, since 250,000 was a largely theoretical figure and the actual number of men under arms was much lower, mostly due to outdated staff documentation, recruitment in progress, and leaves in midst of the summer season.
Recent study of military historians claims that the figure of “los efectivos realmente operativos” was probably about 167,000,[85] though earlier figures provided by some authors added up even to the record low total of 133,000.[86] The Nationalist general staff estimated in 1937 that with the total of 165,000, the split was 88,000 for the loyalists and 77,000 for the rebels (53:47),[87] which is the unique (along Casanova) statistics claiming the Republicans held numerical advantage. Various sub-totals calculated by Quesada point to the similar total of 158,000, but with exactly the opposite split: 74,000 for the Republicans[88] and 84,000 for the Nationalists (47:53).[89] One eminent historian also claims Nationalist numerical advantage; he opts for the total of 184,000 and for the split of 88,000 vs. 96,000 (48:52).[90] In his later work he is somewhat more vague, but with the similar total of 182,000 and the similar – though implied, not explicitly stated – split of 84,000 Republicans and 98,000 Nationalists (46:54).[91] The smallest overall difference in strength is suggested by Turnbull: 65,000 Republicans and 68,000 Nationalists (49:51).[92]
Tabular summary
The below table summarises all numerical estimates found in the sources consulted and discussed above. The numbers are in thousands. In most cases there are 2 figures in a cell; one is for the lowest figure identified, and one is for the highest figure identified. Given the discrepancies, it is hardly possible to suggest a "prevailing" figure for every category. Also, an attempt to produce an arithmetic "average" figure does not seem feasible, given one single extreme estimate might distort the calculation; e.g. five sources[93] give the number of peninsular troops loyal to the government in the range of 32,000—36,000, but there is another one[94] which comes out with the figure of 57,000.
↑ there were some 250 military pilots in service, Hugh Thomas, Historia de la guerra civil española, Barcelona 1977, ISBN 9788422608745, p. 360; the rest were mechanics, other ground specialists and contracted civilians
↑ Alejandro de Quesada, The Spanish Civil War 1936–1939 (1). Nationalist Forces, London 2014, ISBN 978-1-78200-782-1 [Men-at-Arms series by Osprey], p. 9
↑ „The Peninsula Army had around 8,500 officers and 112,000 enlisted men, almost all poorly trained conscripts, 40,000 of whom were on leave”, Alexander Clifford, The People's Army in the Spanish Civil War. A Military History of the Republic and International Brigades, 1936–1939, London 2020, ISBN 978-1-5267-6093-7, p. 66
↑ Lucas Molina Franco, Pablo Sagarra Renedo, Óscar González López, El factor humano. Organización y liderazgo para ganar una guerra. La Jefatura de Movilización, Instrucción y Recuperación en la Guerra Civil española, Madrid 2021, ISBN 9788490916100, p. 52
↑ Michael Alpert, The Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939, Cambridge 2013, ISBN 978-1-107-02873-9, p. 19
↑ Quesada claims that on paper there were 120,000 in the peninsular army, but 40,000 enjoyed leave, which leaves 80,000 in the barrackes. However, when doing detailed calculations for warring parties, he arrives at the peninsular total of only 47,000, compare Quesada 2014, p. 9, and Alejandro de Quesada, The Spanish Civil War 1936–1939 (2). Republican Forces, London 2015, ISBN 978-1-78200-785-2 [Men-at-Arms series by Osprey], p. 11
↑ Ricardo de la Cierva, Historia de la guerra civil española, Madrid 1969, vol. 1, p. 69
↑ in 1936 the Polish land forces were 278,851 men, Historia Polski w liczbach, Warszawa 2003, ISBN 8370273149, p. 308
↑ throughout most of the interwar period the Romanian army was almost 200,000 men, to grow to almost 300,000 in the very late 1930s, Istoria Militară a Poporului Român, Vol. VI, București 1989, pp. 227-228
↑ Czechoslovak army was composed of 12 infantry divisions, some 150,000 men in total
↑ Ramón Salas, Historia del Ejército Popular, Tomo I, Madrid 1974, pp. 260, 855
↑ Jacinto Contreras Vázquez, La agrupación de tráfico de la Guardia Civil, [in:] VIII Congreso virtual sobre Historia de las Vías de Comunicación, s.l. 2020, pp. 75
↑ detailed report of Nationalist general staff of 1937 evaluated the balance of forces in July 1936; the table contained a position “Guardia de Asalto y policía armada” (31,200 men). Since Guardia de Asalto numbered 17,600 men, this leaves some 13,600 to all other minor formations, data referred aftyer Payne 1970, p. 315
↑ Gerard Blaney Jr, The Civil Guard and the Spanish Second Republic, 1931–1936 [PhD thesis LSE], London 2007, p. 155
↑ Francisco Javier Gavira Gil, Verano de 1936. La toma de Marchena, triunfo del golpe de estado y su terrorifíca implantación represora, [in:] Actas de las IX Jornadas sobre Historia de Marchena: Marchena en el siglo XX, Marchena 2005, ISBN 9788493407025, p. 101
↑ Antonio Lería, Golpe de estado y guerra civil en Carmona, [in:] La Guerra Civil en Carmona, Carmona 2008, p. 11
↑ Felix J. Montero Gómez, Osuna, 20 de julio 1936: consecuencias de la rebelión militar, Osuna 2012, p. 19
↑ Alpert 2013, p. 19, Molina, Sagarra, González 2021, p. 50
↑ Alejandro Vargas González, La guardia de asalto, policía de la república, [in:] Cuadernos republicanos 53 (2003), p. 45
↑ the exception is Quesada 2015, p. 36, who includes a separate sub-chapter on Mossos d'Esquadra. He claims that during the war the Mossos grew from 300 to 1,000 men
↑ e.g. the Catalan Mossos d’Esquadra, see Mossos d’Esquadra entry, [in:] official Catalan government service
↑ Vanessa Gómez Hernández, Els mossos d’esquadra durant la segona república (1931–1939), [in:] Judit Vidal Bonavila, Jaume Camps Girona, José Luis Trapero Álvarez (eds), Els Mossos d'Esquadra, història i evolució d'una institució tricentenària, Barcelona 2022, ISBN 9788484249276, pp. 222-223
↑ “Perhaps 33,000 men of the pre-war Army remained loyal, together with about 18,000 of the Guardia Civil rural gendarmerie, 12,000 of the urban Cuerpo de Seguridad y Asalto, and 10,000 Carabineros border guards. In July 1936 about 2,000 loyalist officers remained at their posts; perhaps 1,500 recently retired officers also returned to the colours”, Quesada 2015, p. 11
↑ “it would probably be accurate to raise the figure for the latter [i.e. the Nationalists] by 25 percent”, Payne 1970, p. 315
↑ the paragraph in question is typical for many historiographic accounts, based on cautious vague statements with few detailed figures. The author claims that the peninsular army was “fewer than 90,000 men under arms in the barracks” (85,000?). “Less than half of these” (45%?) joined the revolt. Forces of public order were “approximately 67,000”, of which “more than half” (55?) remained loyal. The strength of the Army of Africa is stated as 30,000, Payne 2012, p. 77. The calculation which emerges for the Nationalists is 85,000x0.45 + 67,000x0.45 + 30,000 = 98,400
Michael Alpert, The Republican Army in the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939, Cambridge 2013, ISBN 978-1-107-02873-9
Alexander Clifford, The People's Army in the Spanish Civil War. A Military History of the Republic and International Brigades, 1936–1939, London 2020, ISBN 978-1-5267-6093-7
Lucas Molina Franco, Pablo Sagarra Renedo, Óscar González López, El factor humano. Organización y liderazgo para ganar una guerra. La Jefatura de Movilización, Instrucción y Recuperación en la Guerra Civil española, Madrid 2021, ISBN 9788490916100
Patrick Turnbull, The Spanish Civil War, London 1995, ISBN 0-85045-282-1
Alejandro de Quesada, The Spanish Civil War 1936–1939 (1). Nationalist Forces, London 2014, ISBN 978-1-78200-782-1
Alejandro de Quesada, The Spanish Civil War 1936–1939 (2). Republican Forces, London 2015, ISBN 978-1-78200-785-2
The Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) broke out with a military uprising in Morocco on July 17, triggered by events in Madrid. Within days, Spain was divided in two: a "Republican" or "Loyalist" Spain consisting of the Second Spanish Republic, and a "Nationalist" Spain under the insurgent generals, and, eventually, under the leadership of General Francisco Franco.
The Battle of Mérida saw Republican militia twice fail to halt the Spanish Army of Africa near the historic town of Mérida early in the Spanish Civil War.
The Spanish Republic, commonly known as the Second Spanish Republic, was the form of government in Spain from 1931 to 1939. The Republic was proclaimed on 14 April 1931 after the deposition of King Alfonso XIII. It was dissolved on 1 April 1939 after surrendering in the Spanish Civil War to the Nationalists led by General Francisco Franco.
The siege of Madrid was a two-and-a-half-year siege of the Republican-controlled Spanish capital city of Madrid by the Nationalist armies, under General Francisco Franco, during the Spanish Civil War (1936–1939). The city, besieged from October 1936, fell to the Nationalist armies on 28 March 1939. The Battle of Madrid in November 1936 saw the most intense fighting in and around the city when the Nationalists made their most determined attempt to take the Republican capital.
The Cuerpo de Seguridad y Asalto was the heavy reserve force of the blue-uniformed urban police force of Spain under the Spanish Second Republic. The Assault Guards were special paramilitary units created by the Spanish Republic in 1931 to deal with urban and political violence. Most of the recruits in the Assault Guards were ex-military personnel, many of which were veterans. They would later on be reformed and utilized in the Spanish Civil War as army infantry divisions.
The international response to the Spanish Civil War included many non-Spaniards participating in combat and advisory positions. The governments of Italy, Germany and, to a lesser extent, Portugal contributed money, munitions, manpower and support to the Nationalist forces, led by Francisco Franco. Some nations that declared neutrality favored the nationalists indirectly. The governments of the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, France and Mexico, aided the Republicans, also called Loyalists, of the Second Spanish Republic. The aid came even after all the European powers had signed a Non-Intervention Agreement in 1936. Although individual sympathy for the plight of the Spanish Republic was widespread in the liberal democracies, pacifism and the fear of a second world war prevented them from selling or giving arms. However, Nationalist pleas were answered within days by Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini and António de Oliveira Salazar. Tens of thousands of individual foreign volunteers travelled to Spain to fight, the majority for the Republican side.
The Carabineros was an armed carabiniers force of Spain under both the monarchy and the Second Republic. The formal mission of this paramilitary gendarmerie was to patrol the coasts and borders of the country, operating against fraud and smuggling. As such the Carabineros performed the dual roles of frontier guards and customs officials.
The Spanish Civil War was a military conflict fought from 1936 to 1939 between the Republicans and the Nationalists. Republicans were loyal to the left-leaning Popular Front government of the Second Spanish Republic, and consisted of various socialist, communist, separatist, anarchist, and republican parties, some of which had opposed the government in the pre-war period. The opposing Nationalists were an alliance of Falangists, monarchists, conservatives, and traditionalists led by a military junta among whom General Francisco Franco quickly achieved a preponderant role. Due to the international political climate at the time, the war had many facets and was variously viewed as class struggle, a religious struggle, a struggle between dictatorship and republican democracy, between revolution and counterrevolution, and between fascism and communism. According to Claude Bowers, U.S. ambassador to Spain during the war, it was the "dress rehearsal" for World War II. The Nationalists won the war, which ended in early 1939, and ruled Spain until Franco's death in November 1975.
The Asturian miners' strike of 1934 was a major strike action undertaken by miners in Asturias against the new CEDA-led government, from October 4-19. The strike and subsequent demonstrations eventually developed into a violent revolutionary uprising in an attempt to overthrow the conservative regime. The revolutionaries took over Asturias by force, killing many of the province's police and religious leaders. Armed with dynamite, rifles, and machine guns, they destroyed religious buildings, such as churches and convents. The rebels officially declared a Proletarian Revolution and instituted a local government in the territory. The rebellion was crushed by the Spanish Navy and the Spanish Republican Army, the latter using mainly colonial troops from Spanish Morocco.
The Nationalist faction or Rebel faction was a major faction in the Spanish Civil War of 1936 to 1939. It was composed of a variety of right-leaning political groups that supported the Spanish Coup of July 1936 against the Second Spanish Republic and Republican faction and sought to depose Manuel Azaña, including the Falange, the CEDA, and two rival monarchist claimants: the Alfonsist Renovación Española and the Carlist Traditionalist Communion. In 1937, all the groups were merged into the FET y de las JONS. After the death of the faction's early leaders, General Francisco Franco, one of the members of the 1936 coup, headed the Nationalists throughout most of the war, and emerged as the dictator of Spain until his death in 1975.
The Republican faction, also known as the Loyalist faction or the Government faction, was the side in the Spanish Civil War of 1936 to 1939 that supported the government of the Second Spanish Republic against the Nationalist faction of the military rebellion. The name Republicans was mainly used by its members and supporters, while its opponents used the term Rojos (Reds) to refer to this faction due to its left-leaning ideology, including far-left communist and anarchist groups, and the support it received from the Soviet Union. At the beginning of the war, the Republicans outnumbered the Nationalists by ten-to-one, but by January 1937 that advantage had dropped to four-to-one.
The Spanish coup of July 1936 was a nationalist and military uprising that was intended to overthrow the Spanish Second Republic but precipitated the Spanish Civil War; Nationalists fought against Republicans for control of Spain. The coup was organized for 18 July 1936, although it started the previous day in Spanish Morocco, and resulted in a split of the Spanish military and territorial control, rather than a prompt transfer of power. The resulting war, Western neutrality, and active Axis support ultimately led to the establishment of a nationalist regime under Francisco Franco, who became ruler of Spain as caudillo.
The Biscay Campaign was an offensive of the Spanish Civil War which lasted from 31 March to 1 July 1937. 50,000 men of the Eusko Gudarostea met 65,000 men of the insurgent forces. After heavy combats the Nationalist forces with a crushing material superiority managed to occupy the city of Bilbao and the Biscay province.
The July 1936 military uprising in Seville was part of a nationwide coup d'état in Spain, launched by part of the Spanish army. It was supposed to topple local Republican administrations in Seville and western Andalusia. The uprising commenced on 18 July 1936, led by general Gonzalo Queipo de Llano. The rebels overpowered regional military command and some key units without a shot being fired, but were offered resistance by Guardia de Asalto, subordinated to the civil governor José María Varela; it was overcome later in the day. The days of 19–22 July were mostly about seizing the districts of Triana, Macarena and San Julián; they were controlled by revolutionary trade unions and radical left-wing militias. On 23 July Queipo was fully in control. The successful coup in Seville proved of vital importance for the rebels nationwide; the insurgent pocket in south-western Andalusia enabled the shift of the Army of Africa to the peninsula, and then its rapid advance towards Madrid.
The July 1936 military uprising in Barcelona was a military uprising in Barcelona, the capital and largest city of Catalonia, Spain on 19 July 1936 which contributed to the start of the Spanish Civil War. Most of the Spanish Army officers in the city supported the coup, but the Civil Guard, the Assault Guard and the Mossos d'Esquadra remained loyal to the Republican government. Furthermore, Barcelona was one of the strongholds of the anarchist union, the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT). The rebel troops were defeated after one day of bloody combat.
The Extremadura campaign was a campaign in Extremadura, Spain during the Spanish Civil War. It culminated in the Battle of Badajoz in August 1936, from which the troops of the Army of Africa under the command of Francisco Franco moved quickly to begin the march to Madrid.
The Convoy de la Victoria was a Spanish naval battle on 5 August 1936 in the Strait of Gibraltar during the Spanish Civil War, between the escort of a Nationalist convoy and the Republican Navy destroyer Alcalá Galiano.
Gonzalo Queipo de Llano y Sierra was a Spanish Army general. He distinguished himself quickly in his career, fighting in Cuba and Morocco, later becoming outspoken about military and political figures which led to his imprisonment, removal from posts and involvement in plots against Spanish governments. He was a Nationalist military leader during the Spanish Civil War under Francisco Franco, gaining the soubriquet "El general de la radio" ["radio" or "broadcasting general" in English media] for his threats and explicitness on air. Under his control of southern Spain, tens of thousands of Spaniards perished as part of the Nationalists' White Terror. In his post-war roles he was effectively sidelined by Franco.
The 1936 coup in the Albacete province was part of a nationwide military-civilian revolt. On July 19–20 the rebels easily gained control of the entire province, but it remained an isolated island of insurgency surrounded by areas controlled by the loyalists. On July 21 loyalist troops advancing from the Levantine coast made first incursions into the province and with little combat they advanced West during the next few days. Following a few hours of urban fighting, on July 25 the rebels surrendered in Albacete and soon the entire province fell back under the government control.
The Spanish airlift of 1936 was a military operation, carried out by the Nationalists during the early phase of the Spanish Civil War. It did not have any specific code name. Its objective was to bypass the Republican naval blockade of the Strait of Gibraltar and transport by air the soldiers stationed in the Spanish Morocco to the rebel-controlled part of Andalusia. The undertaking was hugely successful; during 85 days between July 19 and October 11 the Nationalists transported at least 14,000 men and at least 270 tons of war materiel. The success was possible thanks to German and Italian assistance, as aircraft sent by Hitler and Mussolini carried most of the troops and equipment. The operation is viewed as innovative, as it was the first ever large-scale military transport by air. Since there was no major Republican counter-action, the airlift was a challenge in terms of logistics and technology rather than combat. The opinion prevailing in historiography is that the airlift was vital for the Nationalists and helped to turn the failed coup into a long-lasting civil war.
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