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The following activities are supposed to have been done by the Central Intelligence Agency in Peru.
| | This article needs additional citations for verification .(July 2021) |
The following activities are supposed to have been done by the Central Intelligence Agency in Peru.
A NIE addressed the "prospect for an elected civil government" and the problems it would face. The first conclusion was that pressures for change, in a society going through urbanization and industrialization, would take many years to relieve.
Peru is now under a junta that seized power in July 1962, to prevent the Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (APRA), a left populist but anti-Communist party established in 1924. APRA was originally revolutionary but now seeks to participate in the political process. The junta has failed to create a coalition that would be sure to defeat APRA, in the election it committed to have in June 1963.
Since the military can control the outcome, they would do whatever they considered necessary to prevent leftists such as APRA, or Communist groups, taking power. The security apparatus is capable of dealing with anything short of a major uprising or guerilla war.
"In the past, Peruvian Governments have been unwilling to make the sacrifices or to risk the political liabilities of programs aimed at bringing about fundamental social and economic change. Now, however, Peru faces a situation in which political stability is becoming more and more dependent on the ability and disposition of governments to respond effectively to popular demands for economic well-being and security. This situation augurs a breakup of the existing structure of the Peruvian society and economy. Unless the forces of moderation are able to bring about orderly change, radical leadership will probably get the chance to try its method." [1]
As early as 1997, the State Department annual human rights report's chapter about Peru described the massive power SIN had acquired under Vladimiro Montesinos, head of the Peruvian National Intelligence Service's (Spanish: Servicio de Inteligencia Nacional or SIN) direction and its use against domestic political opponents. Despite those concerns, arms sales to the Fujimori regime by the U.S. government and U.S.-licensed companies nearly quadrupled in 1998 to $4.42 million, compared to $1.17 million in 1997. [2]
Also in 1997, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research alerted the intelligence community to growing concerns about Montesinos, who very close to President Alberto Fujimori. "But in 1996 Fujimori began a slow decline in popularity as his constituency among the rural and urban poor started to tire of austerity measures that seemed to yield no appreciable benefits. Opposition grew in other sectors as well, questioning such heavy-handed tactics as the Fujimori-controlled congress's constitutional interpretation allowing the president to run for a third term in 2000, the refusal to allow an investigation into narcocorruption charges against powerful national security adviser Valdimiro Montesinos, and a botched kidnapping by intelligence agents of a dissident retired general...These latest incidents conform to a pattern of arrogant, authoritarian behavior evident in Montesinos's large and unexplained income, continuous harassment of opposition figures and journalists, and the grisly murder of an army intelligence agent and the torture of another by their own organization [3]
According to a New York Times report, Jordanian officials asked the CIA station chief in Amman, United States object if Jordan sold 50,000 surplus AK-47 assault rifles to the Peruvian military. After checking with embassy diplomatic and military personnel, CIA headquarters, but not with the State Department, the Jordanians were told that the US had no objections to the transaction. Subsequently, however, CIA told the Clinton Administration that the surplus rifles did not go to Peru, but to guerillas in Colombia. Peru has had a long-standing border dispute with Ecuador, and US sources said that Peruvian arms purchases, due to that conflict, which involved open warfare in 1995, should have been closely monitored. [4] The CIA station in Lima, Peru had been notified, but the matter was not discussed with Peruvian security officials on the basis of respecting the Jordanian confidence.
On the Peruvian side, the transaction was arranged by Montesinos, working through an arms broker, Sarkis Soghanalian, who said he did not know the guns were going other than to Peru, and he had received End user certificate (EUC) for them. [4]
The CIA suspected that Montesinos was involved in some illegal activities and was not surprised when informed of the diversion of funds, the U.S. sources said. Even though the agency had its suspicions about Montesinos, it continued doing business with him "because he solved problems, including problems he created himself," one source said. The U.S. Embassy has provided Peru's anti-corruption prosecutor with detailed information about the CIA's payments to Montesinos in response to the Peruvian government's wide-ranging investigations into Montesinos' malfeasance. The prosecutor, Ana Cecilia Magallanes, has told U.S. officials that she has documents showing the diversion of SIN money, including the CIA payments, toward illegal activities. Sources would not elaborate on what those activities included, but the prosecutor said it did not appear that those monies were diverted into Montesinos' personal accounts.Montesinos had founded and personally controlled a counter-drug unit within SIN. According to U.S. Embassy officials in Lima, interviewed by ICIJ, the SINs narcotics intelligence unit was funded and assisted by both the CIA and the State Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. The State Department's share included $36,000 in 1996, $150,000 in 1997 and $25,000 in 1998, according to U.S. embassy officials. It was to that Narcotics Intelligence Division (DIN), U.S. officials told ICIJ, that the CIA directed at least $10 million in cash payments from 1990 until September 2000. Most of the money was to finance intelligence activities in the drug war, though officials acknowledged a small part went to antiterrorist activities. The CIA knew the money was going directly to Montesinos and had receipts for the payments, the sources said. "It was an agency-to-agency relationship," one U.S. official in Lima told ICIJ, "with Vladimiro Montesinos as the intermediary... Montesinos had the money under his control." [2]
State Department sources, according to the Times, were unhappy with the CIA role in the matter, "We don't know for sure that he [Montesinos] was involved, but there's a lot of smoke coming from his direction, We do know that we should have had a lot of the information a lot earlier than we got it." Their concern touched on the constant question of how closely US intelligence organizations can work with people accused of human rights violations and other criminal activities. They cited officials including the Undersecretary of State, Thomas R. Pickering, as being dissatisfied with the flow of information from the agency, both about its own early role in the case and about the possible involvement of Peruvian officials. According to the State personnel, "Every time you asked a question, it would take a few days to get an answer, and every time, their story would change a little. It was like pulling teeth." [4]
CIA personnel, speaking on condition of anonymity, said that while they had been slow to discover the diversion of the rifles, once they were aware of it, they reported it immediately, when guns found in the field were traced back to Jordan. They said that they had made regular reports on his alleged illicit actions, while they also worked with him in covert anti-terrorism and counter-drug programs.
Montesinos fled to Panama on September 24, 2000, after the disclosure of a videotape that showed him bribing an opposition legislator. The Times article said that while the US and the Organization of American States (OAS) had urged Panama to grant him asylum, Panama refused and Montesinos flew back to hide in Peru on October 23, 2000. [4]
Switzerland informed Peru of five bank accounts, containing US$50 million, belonging to Montesinos, and Peru said they would try to prosecute him for corruption. The scope of his arms trading was apparently unknown to the CIA. CIA personnel said that there was no reason to suspect the Jordanian offer, which was of the flavor of "Would it upset our relationship with you if we sold these weapons to the Peruvian government?" The officials said the Jordanians were under no obligation to obtain US permission.
Soghanalian, who was awaiting unrelated criminal charges in Los Angeles, said the Peruvians sought from the start to establish a discreet relationship they might use to buy more sophisticated weapons. He had been introduced to Montesinos, who was introduced to him as "the boss."
Peruvian officials presented Soghanalian with "a shopping list of more than $70 million worth of hardware that he thought could have been meant only for a regular army: antiaircraft weapons, communications gear and equipment to upgrade tanks. The broker said there were some strange aspects to the arrangement: The Peruvians asked to pay for the future purchases in cash and offered him $22 million as a down payment. They insisted on air-dropping the AK-47's to their troops. The first of the cargoes was also turned back in the Amazon basin for reasons that were never clear, and the shipments were finally aborted in August 1999 after 9,540 of the rifles had been sent...he did not think much of the fact that the Peruvians also wanted to buy a large quantity of Russian" shoulder-fired surface to air missiles, which would change the balance of power in Colombia if obtained by the Colombian rebels.
According to the Times, Many military analysts have expected the Colombian guerillas to search for arms purchases to counter a $1.3 billion package of American aid that includes almost $400 million for new helicopters for the Colombian security forces. "The retired Peruvian Army lieutenant who arranged for the Jordanian shipment with Soghanalian, Jose Luis Aybar, has also identified Mr. Montesinos as the official who oversaw the arms deal. But Mr. Aybar said he was unaware that the Jordanian cargo consisted of assault rifles, a claim that Mr. Soghanalian and others contradicted." [4]
See Colombia 1999 for CIA's action after some rifles were seized in mid-1999. The report of the arms transfer led to an August 21, 1999 press conference at which Fujimori and Montesinos took credit for detecting an arms smuggling ring. CIA personnel said that the statements of Soghanalian and Aybar, did not confirm Montesinos was involved in the diversion to Colombia. "We don't have any illusions about his [Montesinos'] background...We do not have intelligence information -- other than the statements of a couple of individuals -- that ties him to it." [2]
In 1999, State withheld aid to the SIN because of congressional anger about reports that Montesinos was using the unit to conduct intelligence against the regime's political opponents. [2]
According to the Center for Public Integrity, Soghanalian in 2000, cooperated in the investigation of questionable practices under Fujimori and Montesinos. The Peruvian prosecutor, José Carlos Ugaz, who is investigating wrongdoings by the Fujimori regime said "What Sarkis Soghanalian knew is fundamental to demonstrate that Montesinos controlled arms purchases during the Fujimori administration, at least since the conflict with Ecuador in 1995," Ugaz told the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ). ICIJ is the investigative arm of the Center for Public Integrity. [2]
Gen. Julio Salazar Monroe, Rozas' predecessor at SIN from 1991 to 1998, and the last head of SIN, Rear Adm. Humberto Rozas Bonuccelli, both said, according to the Center for Public Integrity, "they ran the National Intelligence Service in name only and that Montesinos was its de facto chief. Montesinos had Fujimori's authority to manage his own state funds and personnel without any oversight, Rozas said. '"Montesinos had a very independent way of working and it was compartmentalized. He had his own private revenues...had a group of people that worked exclusively for him, even though no one knew how many they were or who they were.'Rozas said he discovered Montesinos' role in the arms sale to the FARC with the help of unspecified 'American' intelligence agents, who provided him with photocopies of documents concerning the transaction. The Americans, Rozas said in court testimony, "wanted an investigation to be carried out to determine if the Peruvian army had bought these arms.' U.S. Embassy officials told ICIJ that it was the CIA that provided documents about the arms deal to Rozas."
Rozas first met with CIA personnel, with respect to the arms sale, on Aug. 10, 2000. Eleven days later, after he had begun an investigation, Fujimori and Montesinos announced they had uncovered arms smuggling on August 21, declaring "that a serious blow against an arms trafficking ring had taken place, 'in which not one Peruvian intelligence agent is compromised' The Organization of American States was pressuring Peru to restructure and reform the duties of the SIN at the time, which may be why Fujimori attributed the 'notable success' of the operation to the SIN and Montesinos. 'After they received the documents, they rushed to publicize the case. This was a political decision,' testified Rozas. The Peruvian judge hearing the case asked Rozas, 'What would have happened if the documents from the American intelligence agents had not been delivered to you, but instead only to Vladimiro Montesinos? Would the arms trafficking have been uncovered?' The ex-SIN head replied, 'Most likely, no.'" [2]
"Angered by cuts in U.S. aid ordered by Congress in response to reports of abuses by the SIN, Fujimori called the sting operation "Plan Siberia" and said it was much smaller, yet more effective than Washingtons $1.3 billion Plan Colombia.
In 2001, while the CIA was assisting the Peruvian Air Force in the War on Drugs, the CIA incorrectly assessed that a small plane was involved in the drug trade, leading to the death of a U.S. Christian missionary, Roni Bowers, and her daughter. The U.S. Government paid compensation of $8 million to the Bowers family and the pilot. [5]
Montesinos' first of 60 trials started in 2004. [2] His defense, [6] according to BBC correspondent Hannah Hennessy, he is already serving nine years in a high security naval base near Lima after being convicted for lesser offences and has yet to face other charges including alleged involvement in death squad killings. Henesssy called him "The right hand man of former President Alberto Fujimori, Montesinos effectively ran Peru from the shadows throughout the 1990s"
The CIA's activities within Peru increased as they began to support Keiko Fujimori. The CIA allegedly funneled money covertly into parties opposing then-President Pedro Castillo, motivating regime change in order to overthrow Castillo, of whom the CIA saw as a potential ally to Cuba. The United States supported the Castillo's removal after he attempted to dissolve Congress, and later began supporting the succeeding administration of Dina Boluarte. The CIA funded the government amid unrest and human rights violations, allegedly funneling weapons to Boluarte's government. However, the misuse of weapons, especially in massacre, has created some tension between the two. [7]
The Peruvian Armed Forces are the military services of Peru, comprising independent Army, Navy and Air Force components. Their primary mission is to safeguard the country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity against any threat. As a secondary mission they participate in economic and social development as well as in civil defense tasks.
Alberto Kenya Fujimori Inomoto is a Peruvian former politician, professor and engineer who served as President of Peru from 28 July 1990 until 22 November 2000, though de facto leadership was reportedly held by head of the National Intelligence Service, Vladimiro Montesinos. Frequently described as a dictator, he remains a controversial figure in Peruvian politics. He is currently in prison, serving a 25-year sentence for human rights abuses during his presidency.
Vladimiro Lenin Ilich Montesinos Torres is a Peruvian former intelligence officer who was the long-standing head of Peru's National Intelligence Service (SIN) and was reportedly the de facto leader of Peru while President Alberto Fujimori served as a figurehead leader. Montesinos had strong connections with the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for over 25 years and was said to have received $10 million from the agency for his government's anti-terrorist activities, with international bank accounts possessed by Montesinos reportedly holding at least $270 million. The United States reportedly supported the candidacy of Fujimori during 1990 Peruvian general election due to his links to Montesinos and ignored human rights abuses performed under Montesinos during the 1990s. In 2000, the infamous "Vladi-videos" came to light when they were broadcast on the news. They were secret videos recorded by Montesinos that showed him bribing elected congressmen into leaving the opposition and joining the pro-Fujimori group of the Congress. The ensuing scandal caused Montesinos to flee the country and prompted Fujimori's resignation.
Susana Shizuko Higuchi Miyagawa was a Peruvian politician and engineer. She served as First Lady of Peru from 1990 to 1994 as the wife of President Alberto Fujimori. In 1994 she described her husband as a corrupt tyrant and divorced him in 1995.
Valentín Toribio Demetrio Agustin Paniagua Corazao was a Peruvian lawyer and politician who briefly served as President of Peru from 2000 to 2001. Elected President of Congress on 16 November 2000, he ascended to the presidency as incumbent Alberto Fujimori and both his Vice Presidents resigned by 22 November 2000.
The Barrios Altos massacre occurred on 3 November 1991 in the Barrios Altos neighborhood of Lima, Peru. Members of Grupo Colina, a death squad comprising Peruvian Armed Forces personnel, were later identified as the assailants who killed fifteen individuals, including an eight-year-old child, and injured four others. The victims were reportedly partygoers associated with the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist group Shining Path. Nevertheless, judicial authorities found that they were not terrorists.
La Cantuta massacre took place in Peru on 18 July 1992, during the presidency of Alberto Fujimori. Supposed members of Shining Path, including a university professor and nine students from Lima's La Cantuta University, were abducted, tortured, and killed by Grupo Colina, a military death squad. The incident occurred two days after the Shining Path's Tarata bombing, which killed over 40 people in Lima Province.
The Japanese embassy hostage crisis began on 17 December 1996 in Lima, Peru, when 14 members of the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) took hostage hundreds of high-level diplomats, government and military officials and business executives. They were attending a party at the official residence of the Japanese ambassador to Peru, Morihisa Aoki, in celebration of Emperor Akihito's 63rd birthday. Although the crisis took place at the ambassadorial residence in San Isidro rather than at the embassy proper, it is often referred to as the "Japanese embassy" hostage crisis.
Yanacocha is a gold mine in the Cajamarca region of the Northern Highlands of Peru. Considered to be the fourth largest gold mine in the world, it produced 0.97 million ounces of gold in 2014. The 251-square kilometer open pit mine is situated about 30 kilometers north of Cajamarca, in high pampa, straddling the watershed. The operation is a joint venture between Newmont Goldcorp, Compañia de Minas Buenaventura (43.65%) and the International Finance Corporation (5%).
A self-coup, sometimes known as the Fujimorazo, was performed in Peru in 1992 after President Alberto Fujimori dissolved the Congress as well as the judiciary and assumed full legislative and judicial powers. With the collaboration of the military, the Fujimori government subsequently began to implement objectives of the Green Plan following the coup.
The Grupo Colina was a military anti-communist right wing death squad created in Peru that was active from 1990 until 1994, during the administration of president Alberto Fujimori. The group committed several human rights abuses, including an eight-month period of 1991–1992 that saw a total of 34 people killed in the Barrios Altos massacre, the Santa massacre, the Pativilca massacre, and the La Cantuta massacre.
Luis Fernando Olivera Vega is a Peruvian politician and leader of Independent Moralizing Front (FIM), a Peruvian political party.
Ollanta Moisés Humala Tasso is a Peruvian politician and former military officer who served as President of Peru from 2011 to 2016. Originally a socialist and left-wing nationalist, he is considered to have shifted towards neoliberalism and the political centre during his presidency.
Óscar Ramírez Durán, commonly known as Comrade Feliciano, is a Peruvian convicted terrorist and former political leader who led the Shining Path, a Marxist–Leninist–Maoist terrorist group in Peru, in the 1990s.
The National Intelligence Service was an intelligence agency of the Government of Peru that existed from 1960 to 2000.
Sarkis Garabet Soghanalian, nicknamed the Merchant of Death, was a Syrian- Lebanese-Armenian international private arms dealer who gained fame for being the "Cold War's largest arms merchant" and the lead seller of firearms and weaponry to the former government of Iraq under Saddam Hussein during the 1980s.
Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori was arrested, tried, and convicted for a number of crimes related to corruption and human rights abuses that occurred during his government. Fujimori was president from 1990 to 2000. His presidency ended when he fled the country in the midst of a scandal involving corruption and human rights violations.
On Transparency International's 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index, Peru scored 36 on a scale from 0 to 100. When ranked by score, Peru ranked 101st among the 180 countries in the Index, where the country ranked first is perceived to have the most honest public sector. For comparison with worldwide scores, the best score was 90, the average score was 43, and the worst score was 12. For comparison with regional scores, the highest score among the countries of the Americas was 74, the average score was 43 and the lowest score was 14.
Censorship in Peru has been prevalent throughout its history. There have been multiple shifts in the level of freedom of the press in Peru, starting in the late 1900s when the country was oppressed, to the early 2000s when the country experienced more freedom; only recently has the country been ranked as partly free. After the neoliberal economic policies implemented in the 1990s stabilized the national economy and led it to an economic boom in the 21st century, usage of TV and access to internet has vastly increased, leading to more spaces of expression.
Plan Verde was a clandestine military operation developed by the armed forces of Peru during the internal conflict in Peru; it involved the genocide of impoverished and indigenous Peruvians, the control or censorship of media in the nation and the establishment of a neoliberal economy controlled by a military junta in Peru. Initially drafted in October 1989 in preparations for a coup d'état to overthrow President Alan García, the operation was extended into the 1990 Peruvian general election and was reported to be subsequently executed under the government of newly elected president Alberto Fujimori following the 1992 Peruvian coup d'état. Shortly after the coup, Plan Verde was first leaked to the public by Peruvian magazine Oiga, with a small number of other media outlets also reporting access to the plan's documents.
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