Cost overrun

Last updated

A cost overrun, also known as a cost increase or budget overrun, involves unexpected incurred costs. When these costs are in excess of budgeted amounts due to a value engineering underestimation of the actual cost during budgeting, they are known by these terms.

Contents

Cost overruns are common in infrastructure, building, and technology projects. For IT projects, a 2004 industry study by the Standish Group found an average cost overrun of 43 percent; 71 percent of projects came in over budget, exceeded time estimates, and had estimated too narrow a scope; and total waste was estimated at $55 billion per year in the US alone. [1]

Many major construction projects have incurred cost overruns; cost estimates used to decide whether important transportation infrastructure should be built can mislead grossly and systematically. [2]

Cost overrun is distinguished from cost escalation, which is an anticipated growth in a budgeted cost due to factors such as inflation.

Causes

Recent works by Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith suggests an alternative to what is traditionally seen as an overrun in the construction field. [3] They attempt to make a distinction between the often conflated causes of construction cost underestimation and eventual cost overruns. Critical to their argument is the point of reference for measuring cost overruns. Whereas some measure the size of cost overruns as the difference between cost at the time of decision to build and final completion costs, others measure the size of overruns as the difference between cost at contract award and final completion cost. This leads to a wide range in the size of overruns reported in different studies.

Four types of explanation for cost overrun exist: technical, psychological, political-economic, value engineering. Technical explanations account for cost overrun in terms of imperfect forecasting techniques, inadequate data, etc. Psychological explanations account for overrun in terms of optimism bias with forecasters. Scope creep, where the requirements or targets rises during the project, is common. Finally, political-economic explanations see overrun as the result of strategic misrepresentation of scope or budgets. Historically, political explanations for cost overrun have been seen to be the most dominant. [4] In the USA, the architectural firm Home Architects has attributed this to a human trait they call "Psychology of Construction Cost Denial", regarding the cost inflation of custom homes. [5]

A less explored possible cause of cost overruns on construction project is the escalation of commitment to a course of action. This theory, grounded in social psychology and organisation behaviour, suggests the tendency of people and organisations to become locked-in and entrapped in a particular course of action and thereby 'throw good money after bad' to make the venture succeed. This defies conventional rationality behind subjective expected utility theory. Ahiaga-Dagbui and Smith explore the effects of escalation of commitment on project delivery in construction using the case of the Scottish Parliament project. [6] Also, a recent study has suggested that principles of chaos theory can be employed to understand how cost overruns emerge in megaprojects. [7] This paper seeks to reclassify megaprojects as chaotic systems that are nonlinear and therefore difficult to predict. Using cases of cost overruns in oil and gas megaprojects, this study makes strong argument that chaos theory can indeed be a silver bullet in finding solutions to the recurring problem of cost overruns in megaprojects.

A newly discovered possible cause of cost overruns is value engineering, and an approach to correct value engineering cost overruns known as value-driven-design.

Prevention and mitigation

In response to problem of cost overruns on major projects, the UK Government set up a Major Projects Authority to provide project assurance to HM Treasury and other Government departments undertaking major projects. [8] Independent review of the financial effectiveness of project assurance in reducing cost overruns found the project assurance process to be effective in reducing cost overruns and recommended an expansion of the process to cover most of the Government's project portfolio. [9] Project assurance is now also being used by private sector companies undertaking major projects.

Describing

Cost overrun can be described in multiple ways.

For example, consider a bridge with a construction budget of $100 million where the actual cost was $150 million. This scenario could be truthfully represented by the following statement

The final example is the most commonly used as it specifically describes the cost overruns exclusively whereas the other two describe the overrun as an aspect of the total expense. In any case care should be taken to accurately describe what is meant by the chosen percentage so as to avoid ambiguity.

List of projects with large cost overruns

Australia

Canada

United Kingdom

United States

Germany

Finland

Russia

See also

Related Research Articles

Project planning is part of project management, which relates to the use of schedules such as Gantt charts to plan and subsequently report progress within the project environment. Project planning can be done manually or by the use of project management software.

In economics and business decision-making, a sunk cost is a cost that has already been incurred and cannot be recovered. Sunk costs are contrasted with prospective costs, which are future costs that may be avoided if action is taken. In other words, a sunk cost is a sum paid in the past that is no longer relevant to decisions about the future. Even though economists argue that sunk costs are no longer relevant to future rational decision-making, people in everyday life often take previous expenditures in situations, such as repairing a car or house, into their future decisions regarding those properties.

Space elevator economics compares the cost of sending a payload into Earth orbit via a space elevator with the cost of doing so with alternatives, like rockets.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Planning fallacy</span> Cognitive bias of underestimating time needed

The planning fallacy is a phenomenon in which predictions about how much time will be needed to complete a future task display an optimism bias and underestimate the time needed. This phenomenon sometimes occurs regardless of the individual's knowledge that past tasks of a similar nature have taken longer to complete than generally planned. The bias affects predictions only about one's own tasks. On the other hand, when outside observers predict task completion times, they tend to exhibit a pessimistic bias, overestimating the time needed. The planning fallacy involves estimates of task completion times more optimistic than those encountered in similar projects in the past.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Alaskan Way Seawall</span> Seawall in Seattle, Washington

The Alaskan Way Seawall is a seawall which runs for approximately 7,166 feet (2,184 m) along the Elliott Bay waterfront southwest of downtown Seattle from Bay Street to S. Washington Street. The seawall is being rebuilt in the 2010s as part of a waterfront redevelopment megaproject estimated to cost over $1 billion.

Escalation of commitment is a human behavior pattern in which an individual or group facing increasingly negative outcomes from a decision, action, or investment nevertheless continue the behavior instead of altering course. The actor maintains behaviors that are irrational, but align with previous decisions and actions.

A cost estimate is the approximation of the cost of a program, project, or operation. The cost estimate is the product of the cost estimating process. The cost estimate has a single total value and may have identifiable component values.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Megaproject</span> Extremely large-scale investment project

A megaproject is an extremely large-scale investment project. According to the Oxford Handbook of Megaproject Management, "Megaprojects are large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost $1 billion or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of people". However, $1 billion is not a constraint in defining megaprojects; in some contexts a relative approach is needed, such as in developing countries, where a much smaller project could constitute a megaproject. Therefore, a more general definition is "Megaprojects are temporary endeavours characterised by: large investment commitment, vast complexity, and long-lasting impact on the economy, the environment, and society".

Bent Flyvbjerg is a Danish economic geographer. He was the First BT Professor and Inaugural Chair of Major Programme Management at Oxford University's Saïd Business School and is the Villum Kann Rasmussen Professor and Chair of Major Program Management at the IT University of Copenhagen. He was previously Professor of Planning at Aalborg University, Denmark and Chair of Infrastructure Policy and Planning at Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands. He is a fellow of St Anne's College, Oxford.

A boondoggle is a project that is considered a waste of both time and money, yet is often continued due to extraneous policy or political motivations.

The Flamanville Nuclear Power Plant is located at Flamanville, Manche, France on the Cotentin Peninsula. The power plant houses two pressurized water reactors (PWRs) that produce 1.3 GWe each and came into service in 1986 and 1987, respectively. It produced 18.9 TWh in 2005, which amounted to 4% of the electricity production in France. In 2006 this figure was about 3.3%. At the time, there were 671 workers regularly working at the plant.

Cost engineering is "the engineering practice devoted to the management of project cost, involving such activities as estimating, cost control, cost forecasting, investment appraisal and risk analysis". "Cost Engineers budget, plan and monitor investment projects. They seek the optimum balance between cost, quality and time requirements."

When estimating the cost for a project, product or other item or investment, there is always uncertainty as to the precise content of all items in the estimate, how work will be performed, what work conditions will be like when the project is executed and so on. These uncertainties are risks to the project. Some refer to these risks as "known-unknowns" because the estimator is aware of them, and based on past experience, can even estimate their probable costs. The estimated costs of the known-unknowns is referred to by cost estimators as cost contingency.

Reference class forecasting or comparison class forecasting is a method of predicting the future by looking at similar past situations and their outcomes. The theories behind reference class forecasting were developed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky. The theoretical work helped Kahneman win the Nobel Prize in Economics.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Olmsted Locks and Dam</span> Dam in Illinois / Ballard County, Kentucky United States

The Olmsted Locks and Dam is a locks and wicket dam on the Ohio River at river mile 964.4. The project is intended to reduce tow and barge delays by replacing the existing older, and frequently congested, locks and dams Number 52 and Number 53. The locks are located about 17 miles upstream from the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi rivers at Olmsted, Illinois.

A glossary of terms relating to project management and consulting.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Project management triangle</span> Model of the constraints of project management

The project management triangle is a model of the constraints of project management. While its origins are unclear, it has been used since at least the 1950s. It contends that:

  1. The quality of work is constrained by the project's budget, deadlines and scope (features).
  2. The project manager can trade between constraints.
  3. Changes in one constraint necessitate changes in others to compensate or quality will suffer.
<i>Megaprojects and Risk</i>

Megaprojects and Risk: An Anatomy of Ambition is a 2003 book by Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius, and Werner Rothengatter, published by Cambridge University Press. According to chief economist and director of transportation policy at Infrastructure Management Group, Inc., Porter K. Wheeler, "this book makes an important contribution to understanding the infrastructure development process worldwide, with focus on megaprojects." The New Scientist wrote upon publication, "Love them or loathe them, megaprojects capture the imagination. [This] damning analysis concentrates on a series of financial nightmares that should bring even the most casual reader out in a sweat."

The Deep Underground Neutrino Experiment (DUNE) is a neutrino experiment under construction, with a near detector at Fermilab and a far detector at the Sanford Underground Research Facility that will observe neutrinos produced at Fermilab. An intense beam of trillions of neutrinos from the production facility at Fermilab will be sent over a distance of 1,300 kilometers (810 mi) with the goal of understanding the role of neutrinos in the universe. More than 1,000 collaborators work on the project. The experiment is designed for a 20-year period of data collection.

The hiding hand principle is a theory that offers a framework to examine how ignorance intersects with rational choice to undertake a project; the intersection is seen to provoke creative success over the obstacles through the deduction that it is too late to abandon the project. The term was coined by economist Albert O. Hirschman.

References

  1. Standish Group (2004). CHAOS Report (Report). West Yarmouth, Massachusetts: Standish Group.
  2. Flyvbjerg, Bent; Holm, Mette K. Skamris; Buhl, Søren L. (2002). "Underestimating Costs in Public Works Projects: Error or Lie?". Journal of the American Planning Association. 68 (3): 279–295. arXiv: 1303.6604 . Bibcode:2013arXiv1303.6604F. doi:10.1080/01944360208976273. S2CID   5807225. SSRN   2278415.
  3. Ahiaga-Dagbui, Dominic D.; Smith, Simon D. (2014). "Dealing with construction cost overruns using data mining". Construction Management and Economics. 32 (7–8): 682. doi:10.1080/01446193.2014.933854. hdl: 10059/1307 . S2CID   58922802.
  4. Cantarelli, Chantal C.; Flybjerg, Bent; Molin, Eric J. E.; van Wee, Bert (2010). "Cost Overruns in Large-Scale Transportation Infrastructure Projects: Explanations and Their Theoretical Embeddedness". European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research. 10 (1): 5–18. arXiv: 1307.2176 . Bibcode:2013arXiv1307.2176C. SSRN   2237990.
  5. "Psychology of Construction Cost Denial - Mountain Home Architects, Timber Frame Architect, Custom Homes".
  6. 1 2 Ahiaga-Dagbui, Dominic; Smith, Simon (2014). "Exploring escalation of commitment in construction project management: Case study of the Scottish parliament project". Proceedings 30th Annual ARCOM Conference. Association of Researchers in Construction Management: 753–762. hdl:10059/1303. ISBN   9780955239083.
  7. Olaniran, O.J.; Love, P.E.D.; Edwards, D.J.; Olatunji, O. (2017). "Chaos Theory: Implications for Cost Overrun Research in Hydrocarbon Megaprojects". Journal of Construction Engineering and Management. 143 (2). doi:10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0001227 . Retrieved 29 August 2020.
  8. "Major Projects Authority - GOV.UK".
  9. "Assurance for major projects - National Audit Office (NAO)". 2 May 2012.
  10. "Feds say no more funding for Trans Mountain expansion as project costs nearly double". 18 February 2022.
  11. Syal, Rajeev (18 September 2013). "Abandoned NHS IT system has cost £10bn so far". The Guardian.
  12. Harari, Yuval Noah (2017). Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow. New York: Harper. p. 305.