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Naval historians such as Evan Mawdsley, Richard Overy, and Craig Symonds concluded that World War II's decisive victories on land could not have been won without decisive victories at sea. [1] [2] [3] Naval battles to keep shipping lanes open for combatant's movement of troops, guns, ammunition, tanks, warships, aircraft, raw materials, and food largely determined the outcome of land battles. Without the Allied victory in keeping shipping lanes open during the Battle of the Atlantic, Britain could not have fed her people or withstood Axis offensives in Europe and North Africa. [4] [ failed verification ] Without Britain's survival and without Allied shipments of materiel, food and industrial equipment to the Soviet Union, [a] her military and economic power would likely not have rebounded in time for the Red Army to prevail at Stalingrad and Kursk. [5] [6] [7] [ unreliable source? ] [8] [9]
Without victories at sea in the Pacific theater, the Allies could not have mounted amphibious assaults on or maintained land forces on Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Saipan, The Philippines, Iwo Jima, or Okinawa. Allied operations in the Atlantic and Pacific war theaters were interconnected because they frequently competed for scarce naval resources for everything from aircraft carriers to transports and landing craft. [10] Effective transport of troops and military supplies between the two war theaters required naval protection for shipping routes around the Cape of Good Hope, through the Suez canal, and through the Panama Canal. In both theaters, maritime dominance enabled combatants to use the sea for their own purposes and deprive its use by adversaries. As naval historian Admiral Herbert Richmond stated, "Sea power did not win the war itself: it enabled the war to be won". [11]
Aircraft carriers played a major role in winning decisive naval battles, [12] supporting key amphibious landings, and keeping critical merchant shipping lanes open for transporting military personnel and their equipment to land battle zones.
Aircraft carrier design involved trade-offs between offensive striking power and defensive survivability. The more carrier tonnage allocated to guns and armor for protection, the less was available for carrying and launching aircraft, the warship's principal weapon. Combatant nations of World War II placed varying emphasis on these factors depending upon conditions in their principal operating theater, their preferred operating tactics, and their industrial capability. Experts continue to debate whether increasing carrier survivability through increased anti-aircraft armament and armored flight decks was optimal during World War II since adding the weight to do so necessitated reductions in the number of carrier aircraft available to inflict damage upon the enemy. For example, would designing the USS Yorktown so that it was more likely to survive the punishment it took at the Battle of Midway have been desirable if its carrying a smaller air group resulted in fewer Japanese carriers being sunk? [13]
Aircraft carrier design prior to the outbreak of World War II had been constrained by limitations of international agreements among the major naval powers which were intended to avoid an arms race over capital ships. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 limited individual carrier displacement for the five parties to 27,000 long tons, except that each could convert up to two existing battleship hulls to carriers with displacements up to 33,000 tons. Armament for carriers was limited to a maximum of ten guns with a maximum caliber of 8 inches (203 mm). Aircraft carriers were defined as having displacements of at least 10,000 tons and used exclusively for launching and landing aircraft. The total tonnage limit for carriers was 135,000 tons for UK and America, 81,000 for Japan, and 60,000 tons for Italy and France. [14] Any carrier built could not be replaced for twenty years but carriers already built were deemed "experimental" and could be replaced at any time. Carriers under 10,000 tons were not included in the definition. . [15]
Only four aircraft carriers were in service or under construction at the time the Washington Naval Treaty was agreed to. These four were considered "experimental" and not included as part of the treaty's overall tonnage limitations. They were relatively small in size and carried a relatively small number of aircraft. These were HMS Argus (the first full deck aircraft carrier), USS Langley (a converted collier), IJN Hōshō (the first purpose built carrier to enter service), and HMS Hermes (the first purpose designed carrier). [b]
The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) emphasized offensive capability consistent with their strategic vision of orchestrating and winning a single, decisive battle. Limited by treaties to having fewer capital ships than the US and UK, Japan's planning emphasized ways to degrade enemy fleets before they arrived at battle by extending the capability of IJN weapon systems. Aircraft as well as torpedoes had longer ranges than American or British counterparts.
The following table shows some key performance parameters for Japanese aircraft carriers. Carriers are listed in order of commissioning date within each carrier type (fleet, light, escort).
Commission date [d] | Class | Standard displacement [e] | Length (ft) | Speed (kn) | Range (nmi) [f] | Crew | Operational aircraft [g] | Reserve aircraft | Lost to | ||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Fleet carriers | |||||||||||
1 | Akagi | 25-May-27 | Akagi | 36,500 | 855 | 31 | 8,200 | 1,630 | 66 | 15 | 1 bomb [h] |
2 | Kaga | 30-Nov-29 | Kaga | 38,200 | 812 | 28 | 10,000 | 1,708 | 72 | 18 | 4 bombs |
3 | Soryu | 29-Sep-37 | Soryu | 15,900 | 746 | 34 | 7,750 | 1,103 | 63 | 8 | 3 bombs |
4 | Hiryu | 05-Jul-39 | Soryu | 17,300 | 746 | 34 | 10,330 | 1,103 | 57 | 16 | 4 bombs |
5 | Shokaku | 08-Aug-41 | Shokaku | 26,675 | 845 | 34 | 9,700 | 1,660 | 72 | 12 | 4 torpedoes |
6 | Zuikaku | 25-Sep-41 | Shokaku | 29,800 | 845 | 34 | -- | 1,660 | 72 | 12 | 9 bombs+7 torp |
7 | Junyo | 03-May-42 | Hiyo | 24,100 | 718 | 25.5 | 10,000 | 1,224 | 48 | 5 | -- |
8 | Hiyo | 31-Jul-42 | Hiyo | 26,949 | 718 | 25.5 | 10,000 | 1,224 | 48 | 5 | 2 torpedoes |
9 | Taiho | 07-Mar-44 | Taiho | 29,300 | 855 | 33 | 10,000 | 1,751 | 75 | 0 | 1 sub. torpedo |
10 | Unryu | 06-Aug-44 | Unryu | 17,150 | 742 | 34 | 8,000 | 1,595 | 57 | 6 | 2 sub. torpedoes |
11 | Amagi | 10-Aug-44 | Unryu | 17,460 | 742 | 34 | 9,700 | 1,595 | 57 | 6 | many bombs |
12 | Katsuragi | 15-Oct-44 | Unryu | 17,260 | 742 | 33 | 9,700 | 1,595 | 57 | 6 | -- |
13 | Shinano | 19-Nov-44 | Shinano | 64,800 | 873 | 27 | 10,000 | 2,400 | 47 | 0 | 4 sub. Torpedoes |
Light carriers | |||||||||||
1 | Hosho | 27-Dec-22 | Hosho | 7,470 | 551 | 25 | 8,680 | 550 | 21 | 0 | -- |
2 | Ryujo | 09-May-33 | Ryujo | 12,732 | 590 | 29 | 10,000 | 924 | 48 | 0 | 4 bm+1 torp |
3 | Zuiho | 27-Dec-40 | Zuiho | 11,262 | 712 | 28 | 9,236 | 785 | 30 | 0 | many bm +2 torp |
4 | Shoho | 30-Nov-41 | Zuiho | 11,262 | 674 | 28 | 9,236 | 785 | 30 | 0 | 13 bm+7 torp |
5 | Ryuho | 28-Nov-42 | Ryuho | 13,360 | 707 | 26 | 8,000 | 989 | 30 | 0 | -- |
6 | Chitose | 01-Nov-43 | Chitose | 11,190 | 631 | 29 | 11,000 | 1,500 | 30 | 0 | 3 torpedoes |
7 | Chiyoda | 21-Dec-43 | Chitose | 11,190 | 631 | 29 | 11,810 | 1,500 | 30 | 0 | 4 bombs + gunfire |
Escort carriers | |||||||||||
1 | Taiyo | 15-Sep-41 | Taiyo | 17,830 | 591 | 21 | 8,500 | 850 | 23 | 4 | 1 sub. torpedo |
2 | Unyo | 31-May-42 | Taiyo | 17,830 | 649 | 21 | 8,500 | 850 | 30 | 0 | 1 sub. torpedo |
3 | Chuyo | 25-Nov-42 | Taiyo | 17,830 | 591 | 21 | 8,500 | 850 | 30 | 0 | 2 sub. Torpedoes |
4 | Shinyo | 15-Nov-43 | Shinyo | 17,500 | 651 | 22 | 8,000 | 948 | 27 | 6 | 4 sub. Torpedoes |
5 | Kaiyo | 23-Nov-43 | Kaiyo | 13,600 | 546 | 23 | 7,000 | 587 | 24 | 0 | bombs |
RANGES | |||||||||||
Fleet | |||||||||||
Low | 15,900 | 718 | 26 | 7,750 | 1,103 | 48 | 0 | ||||
High | 64,800 | 873 | 34 | 10,000 | 2,400 | 75 | 18 | ||||
Light | |||||||||||
Low | 7,470 | 551 | 25 | 8,000 | 550 | 21 | 0 | ||||
High | 13,360 | 712 | 29 | 11,810 | 1,500 | 48 | 0 | ||||
Escort | |||||||||||
Low | 13,600 | 546 | 21 | 7,000 | 587 | 23 | 0 | ||||
High | 17,830 | 651 | 23 | 8,500 | 948 | 30 | 6 | ||||
Notes:
Americans perceived their principal operating theater would be the Pacific, where immense distances between refueling bases placed a premium on carrier speed and range. Threats were likely to come from other warships, either as enemy aircraft or ship's guns, rather than from land-based planes or batteries. Carrier-launched strikes would involve fewer aircraft and each would carry less of a payload, consisting of 250 lb and 500 lb bombs, compared to land-based aircraft. Also, war-games indicated the ability to strike first and decisively was important for success. Strong first strikes against enemy carriers were expected to reduce or eliminate their ability to counter-attack, reducing the need for strong defensive measures. As a result of these considerations, Americans placed greater emphasis on aircraft striking power than upon survivability when attacked. Accordingly, carriers were designed to carry more aircraft and aircraft components at the expense of more anti-aircraft guns and flight deck armor. To further increase the number of aircraft carried, large numbers of them were kept on the flight deck in addition to those kept below in hangars. In the Pacific, storms that could toss or wash deck-park aircraft overboard were uncommon and could theoretically be navigated around. Finally, within a year of the beginning of the Pacific War, America's industrial capacity enabled them to rapidly make good their carrier losses, enabling them to take greater risks with their carriers to achieve greater success. [13]
The British also operated in the Pacific but, for most of the war, their principal areas of carrier operation were the coastal Atlantic, Mediterranean, and North Sea. In these areas, there were no enemy carriers. The threat was from land-based, potentially multi-engine, heavy bombers in potentially overwhelming numbers that could deliver heavy payloads consisting of 1,000 lb bombs or more and be protected by equally large numbers of fighter aircraft. Unlike with relatively few and small enemy attacking aircraft in the Pacific, it was almost assured that some attacking aircraft would penetrate a fighter and anti-aircraft screen. Further, attacks from land bases could be sustained after airfield repairs, unlike in the Pacific where the launch platform could be sunk or sufficiently damaged to require an immediate return to dry-dock facilities. Accordingly, emphasis was placed on surviving an attack such that a counter-attack could be launched. Survivability was enhanced with more anti-aircraft guns and flight deck armor at the expense of larger aircraft groups on board. Additional anti-aircraft armament also made carriers more self-sufficient for defense and less reliant upon other warships for screening. Finally, heavy weather was more common and less avoidable in the Atlantic theater than in the Pacific. and deck-parking to increase aircraft group size was less common. [13]
The table below shows the specifications and capabilities for aircraft carriers of all combatants as they evolved over time. During the war, warships received modifications and upgrades, including increasing anti-aircraft guns. There were other aircraft carrier designs built during the war which only entered service just prior to or after the end of hostilities such as the British Light Fleet Carrier, or the US Midway-class. There were also cancelled carriers such as the French Joffre-class, British Malta-class, the German "Aircraft carrier II" or Jade-class.
Carrier | Date commissioned | Carrier class | Country | Standard displacement (t) | Full displacement (t) | Length w/l (ft) | Length o/a (ft) | Beam o/a (ft) | Draft (ft) | Speed (kn) | Range (nmi) | H. AA | L. AA | Belt Arm. | Deck Arm. | Aircraft | Crew |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
HMS Argus | 1918 | UK | 14,680 | 16,028 | 565 | 68 | 23 | 20 | 3,600 | 6 | 15-18 | 495 | |||||
USS Langley | 1922 | Langley | US | 12,900 | 14,100 | 542 | 65 | 25 | 16 | 3,500 | 4 | 36 | 631 | ||||
IJN Hōshō CVL | 1922 | Japan | 7,590 | 9,646 | 552 | 59 | 20 | 25 | 8,680 | 6 | 15 | 512 | |||||
HMS Hermes CVL | 1923 | UK | 11,020 | 13,900 | 600 | 70 | 23 | 25 | 5,600 | 9 | 3 | 1 | 20 | 566 | |||
HMS Eagle | 1924 | converted battleship | UK | 22,200 | 668 | 115 | 27 | 24 | 4,800 | 14 | 4.5 | 1-1.5 | 25-30 | 791 | |||
HMS Furious | 1925 | modified Courageous | UK | 22,900 | 26,000 | 787 | 88 | 25 | 30 | 7,480 | 16 | 2-3 | .8-3 | 36 | 795 | ||
IJN Akagi | 1927 | Japan | 37,100 | 42,000 | 855 | 103 | 29 | 32 | 10,000 | 12 | 14 | 6 | 3.1 | 66 | 1,630 | ||
USS Saratoga | 1927 | Lexington | US | 37,000 | 43,746 | 888 | 106 | 30 | 33 | 10,000 | 20 | 5-7 | .8-2 | 78 | 2,791 | ||
USS Lexington | 1927 | Lexington | US | 37,000 | 48,500 | 888 | 108 | 33 | 33 | 10,000 | 20 | 5-7 | .8-2 | 78 | 2,791 | ||
Béarn | 1927 | France | 22,501 | 29,000 | 599 | 116 | 31 | 22 | 7,000 | 14 | 16 | 3.1 | 1 | 35-40 | 865 | ||
HMS Courageous | 1928 | Courageous | UK | 24,600 | 27,420 | 735 | 786 | 91 | 28 | 30 | 6,630 | 16 | 2-3 | .8-3 | 48 | 1,217 | |
IJN Kaga | 1929 | Japan | 38,813 | 812 | 33 | 31 | 28 | 10,000 | 26 | 22 | 6 | 1.5 | 90 | 1,708 | |||
HMS Glorious | 1930 | Courageous-class | UK | 25,370 | 27,859 | 735 | 787 | 91 | 28 | 30 | 5,860 | 16 | 2-3 | .8-1 | 48 | 1,283 | |
IJN Ryujo CVL | 1933 | Japan | 7,900 | 9,990 | 590 | 67 | 18 | 29 | 10,000 | 12 | 24 | 48 | 600 | ||||
USS Ranger | 1934 | US | 14,810 | 17,859 | 730 | 769 | 109 | 22 | 29 | 10,000 | 8 | 40 | 2 | 1* | 86 | 2,461 | |
IJN Sōryū | 1937 | Japan | 16,200 | 19,100 | 748 | 70 | 25 | 34 | 7,750 | 6 | 14 | 63+9 | 1,100 | ||||
USS Yorktown | 1937 | Yorktown | US | 20,100 | 25,900 | 825 | 109 | 26 | 33 | 12,500 | 8 | 40 | 2.5-4 | 80-90 | 2,217 | ||
USS Enterprise | 1938 | Yorktown | US | 19,800 | 25,500 | 770 | 825 | 110 | 26 | 33 | 12,500 | 8 | 40 | 2.5-4 | 90 | 2,217 | |
HMS Ark Royal | 1938 | UK | 22,000 | 28,160 | 722 | 800 | 95 | 28 | 30 | 7,600 | 16 | 64 | 4.5 | .8-3.5 | 50-60 | 1,580 | |
IJN Hiryū | 1939 | Japan | 17,600 | 29,570 | 746 | 73 | 26 | 34 | 10,330 | 12 | 21 | 3.5-6 | 1-2.2 | 64+9 | 1,100 | ||
USS Wasp | 1940 | Wasp | US | 14,900 | 19,423 | 688 | 741 | 109 | 20 | 30 | 12,000 | 8 | 30 | 3.5 | 100 | 2,167 | |
HMS Illustrious | 1940 | Illustrious | UK | 23,369 | 710 | 740 | 96 | 29 | 30 | 10,700 | 16 | 48 | 4.5 | 3.0 | 36-57 | 1,299 | |
HMS Formidable | 1940 | Illustrious | UK | 23,369 | 710 | 740 | 96 | 29 | 30 | 10,700 | 16 | 48 | 4.5 | 3.0 | 36-57 | 1,299 | |
IJN Shōkaku | 1941 | Shōkaku | Japan | 26,087 | 32,620 | 845 | 85 | 34 | 9,700 | 16 | 32 | 72 | 1,660 | ||||
USS Essex | 1942 | Essex | US | 27,500 | 36,960 | 872 | 148 | 33 | 20,000 | 12 | 78 | 3-4 | 1.5 | 95 | 2,600 | ||
HMS Implacable | 1944 | Implacable | UK | 32,630 | 767 | 96 | 33 | 6,720 | 16 | 104 | 4.5 | 3.0 | 48-81 | 2,300 |
SELECTED ESCORT CARRIERS
Long Island aircraft: 16 hangar + 46 flight deck Audacity: no hangar; aircraft stored on flight deck
Carrier Name | Date Comm. | Carrier Class | Std. Displ | Full Displ | Length f/d | Length o/a | Beam o/a | Draft | Speed (kn) | Range (nmi) | H. AA | L. AA | Belt Arm. | Deck Arm. | Air- craft | Men | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
USS Long Island | June 1941 | Long Island | 404 | 492 | 70 | 25 | 17 | 10,000 | 62 | 856 | |||||||
HMS Audacity | June 1941 | converted cargo liner | 12,000 | 450 | 467 | 56 | 28 | 15 | 1 | 9 | 6+8 | 480 | |||||
IJN Taiyō | Sep 1941 | Taiyō | 18,116 | 20,321 | 591 | 73 | 25 | 21 | 8,500 | 8 | 14 | 27-30 | 850 | ||||
IJN Un'yō | May 1942 | Taiyō | 18,116 | 20,321 | 591 | 73 | 25 | 21 | 8 | 8 | 30 | 850 | |||||
USS Sangamon | August 1942 | Sangamon | 11,600 | 24,665 | 553 | 114 | 32 | 18 | 2 | 20 | 25 | 830 | |||||
USS Bogue | September 1942 | Bogue [i] | 9,800 | 496 | 112 | 26 | 18 | 2 | 24 | 890 | |||||||
IJN Chūyō | November 1942 | Taiyō | 18,116 | 591 | 73 | 25 | 21 | 8,500 | 8 | 8 | 30 | 850 | |||||
USS Casablanca | Jul 1943 | Casablanca | 7,900 | 11,077 | 490 w/l | 498 | 65-108 | 22 | 19 | 10,240 | 1 | 20 | 27 | 916 | |||
HMS Pretoria Castle | July 1943 [j] | converted liner | 23,450 | 594 | 76 | 29 | 18 | 21 | |||||||||
IJN Shin'yō | November 1943 | converted liner | 17,500 | 20,586 | 621 | 26 | 26 | 22 | 8 | 30 | 27+6 | 942 | |||||
IJN Kaiyō | November 1943 | 13,600 | 16,483 | 546 | 71 | 26 | 23 | 7,000 | 8 | 24 | 24 | 829 | |||||
HMS Vindex | December 1943 | Nairana | 13,671 | 524 | 68 | 21 | 17 | 2 | 32 | 15-20 | 700 | ||||||
HMS Nairana | Dec 1943 | Nairana | 14,280 | 529 | 69 | 21 | 17 | 2 | 32 | 15-20 | 728 | ||||||
USS Commencement Bay | Nov 1944 | Commencement Bay | 11,100 | 557 | 75 | 31 | 2 | 36 | 34 | 1,066 | |||||||
Kaga was an aircraft carrier built for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). Originally intended to be one of two Tosa-class battleships, Kaga was converted under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty to an aircraft carrier as the replacement for the battlecruiser Amagi, which had been irreparably damaged during the 1923 Great Kantō earthquake. Kaga was rebuilt in 1933–1935, increasing her top speed, improving her exhaust systems, and adapting her flight decks to accommodate more modern, heavier aircraft.
Shōkaku was the lead ship of her class of two aircraft carriers built for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) shortly before the Pacific War. Along with her sister ship Zuikaku, she took part in several key naval battles during the war, including the attack on Pearl Harbor, the Battle of the Coral Sea, and the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands, before being torpedoed and sunk by the U.S. submarine USS Cavalla at the Battle of the Philippine Sea.
Akagi was an aircraft carrier built for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). Though she was laid down as an Amagi-class battlecruiser, Akagi was converted to an aircraft carrier while still under construction to comply with the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty. The ship was rebuilt from 1935 to 1938 with her original three flight decks consolidated into a single enlarged flight deck and an island superstructure. The second Japanese aircraft carrier to enter service, and the first large or "fleet" carrier, Akagi and the related Kaga figured prominently in the development of the IJN's new carrier striking force doctrine that grouped carriers together, concentrating their air power. This doctrine enabled Japan to attain its strategic goals during the early stages of the Pacific War from December 1941 until mid-1942.
The Casablanca-class escort carrier was a series of escort carriers constructed for the United States Navy during World War II. They are the most numerous class of aircraft carriers ever built. Fifty were laid down, launched and commissioned within the space of less than two years – 3 November 1942 through to 8 July 1944. Despite their numbers, and the preservation of more famous and larger carriers as museums, none of these modest ships survive today. Five were lost to enemy action during World War II and the remainder were scrapped.
The Imperial Japanese Navy was the navy of the Empire of Japan from 1868 to 1945, when it was dissolved following Japan's surrender in World War II. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) was formed between 1952 and 1954 after the dissolution of the IJN.
Hōshō was the world's first commissioned ship that was built as an aircraft carrier, and the first aircraft carrier of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN). Commissioned in 1922, the ship was used for testing carrier aircraft operations equipment, techniques, such as take-offs and landings, and carrier aircraft operational methods and tactics. The ship provided valuable lessons and experience for the IJN in early carrier air operations. Hōshō's superstructure and other obstructions to the flight deck were removed in 1924 on the advice of experienced aircrews.
Shinano was an aircraft carrier built by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) during World War II, the largest such built up to that time. Laid down in May 1940 as the third of the Yamato-class battleships, Shinano's partially complete hull was ordered to be converted to an aircraft carrier following Japan's disastrous loss of four of its original six fleet carriers at the Battle of Midway in mid-1942. The advanced state of her construction prevented her conversion into a fleet carrier, so the IJN decided to convert her into a carrier that supported other carriers.
Naval aviation / Aeronaval is the application of military air power by navies, whether from warships that embark aircraft, or land bases. It often involves navalised aircraft, specifically designed for naval use. Seaborne aviation encompasses similar activities not restricted to navies, including marines and coast guards, such as in U.S. naval aviators.
Myōkō (妙高) was the lead ship of the four-member Myōkō class of heavy cruisers of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), which were active in World War II. She was named after Mount Myōkō in Niigata Prefecture. The other ships of the class were Nachi, Ashigara, and Haguro.
Ryūjō was a light aircraft carrier built for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) during the early 1930s. Small and lightly built in an attempt to exploit a loophole in the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, she proved to be top-heavy and only marginally stable and was back in the shipyard for modifications to address those issues within a year of completion. With her stability improved, Ryūjō returned to service and was employed in operations during the Second Sino-Japanese War. During World War II, she provided air support for operations in the Philippines, Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies, where her aircraft participated in the Second Battle of the Java Sea. During the Indian Ocean raid in April 1942, the carrier attacked British merchant shipping with her guns and aircraft. Ryūjō next participated in the Battle of Dutch Harbor, the opening battle of the Aleutian Islands campaign, in June 1942. She was sunk by American carrier-based aircraft in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons on 24 August 1942.
During World War II, at the beginning of the Pacific War in December 1941, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was the third most powerful navy in the world, and Japan's naval air service was one of the most potent air forces in the world. During the first six months of the war, the IJN enjoyed spectacular success, inflicting heavy defeats on Allied forces while remaining undefeated in battle. The attack on Pearl Harbor crippled the battleship arm of the US Pacific Fleet, while Allied navies were devastated during Japan's conquest of Southeast Asia. Land-based IJN aircraft were also responsible for the sinkings of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, the first time in history that capital ships were sunk by aerial attack while underway. In April 1942, the Indian Ocean raid drove the Royal Navy from South East Asia. After these successes, the Japanese concentrated on the elimination and neutralization of strategic points from which the Allies could launch counteroffensives against Japan's conquests. However, at Coral Sea the Japanese were forced to abandon their attempts to isolate Australia, while the defeat at Midway forced them onto the defensive. The campaign in the Solomon Islands, during which the Japanese lost a months-long battle of attrition, was a decisive defeat for the IJN; they had failed to commit sufficient forces in time to overcome the growing Allied strength in the Solomons.
The Ise-class battleships were a pair of dreadnought battleships built for the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) during World War I. Both ships carried supplies for the survivors of the Great Kantō earthquake in 1923. They were modernized in 1934–1937 with improvements to their armour and machinery and a rebuilt superstructure in the pagoda mast style. Afterwards they played a minor role in the Second Sino-Japanese War.
Design B-65 was a class of cruisers planned by the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) before and during World War II. The IJN referred to this design as a 'Super Type A' cruiser; It was larger than most heavy cruisers but smaller than most battlecruisers, and as such, has been variously described as a 'super-heavy cruiser,' a 'super cruiser,' or as a 'cruiser-killer.' As envisioned by the IJN, the cruisers were to play a key role in the Night Battle Force portion of the "Decisive battle" strategy which Japan hoped, in the event of war, to employ against the United States Navy.
An armoured flight deck is an aircraft carrier flight deck that incorporates substantial armour in its design.
The United States Navy grew rapidly during its involvement in World War II from 1941–45, and played a central role in the Pacific War against Imperial Japan. It also assisted the British Royal Navy in the naval war against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The U.S. Navy grew slowly in the years prior to World War II, due in part to international limitations on naval construction in the 1920s. Battleship production restarted in 1937, commencing with the USS North Carolina. The US Navy was able to add to its fleets during the early years of the war while the US was still neutral, increasing production of vessels both large and small, deploying a navy of nearly 350 major combatant ships by December 1941 and having an equal number under construction.
At the start of World War II, the Royal Navy was the strongest navy in the world, with the largest number of warships built and with naval bases across the globe. It had over 15 battleships and battlecruisers, 7 aircraft carriers, 66 cruisers, 164 destroyers and 66 submarines. With a massive merchant navy, about a third of the world total, it also dominated shipping. The Royal Navy fought in every theatre from the Atlantic, Mediterranean, freezing Northern routes to Russia and the Pacific Ocean.
This article discusses aircraft carrier operations during World War II.
World War II was the first war where naval aviation took a major part in the hostilities. Aircraft carriers were used from the start of the war in Europe looking for German merchant raiders and escorting convoys. Offensive operations began with the Norwegian campaign where British carriers supported the fighting on land.
Naval historians such as Evan Mawdsley, Richard Overy, and Craig Symonds concluded that World War II's decisive victories on land could not have been won without decisive victories at sea. Naval battles to keep shipping lanes open for combatant's movement of troops, guns, ammunition, tanks, warships, aircraft, raw materials, and food largely determined the outcome of land battles. Without the Allied victory in keeping shipping lanes open during the Battle of the Atlantic, Britain could not have fed her people or withstood Axis offensives in Europe and North Africa. Without Britain's survival and without Allied shipments of food and industrial equipment to the Soviet Union, her military and economic power would likely not have rebounded in time for Russian soldiers to prevail at Stalingrad and Kursk.