The capture of Saipan pierced the Japanese inner defense perimeter and left Japan vulnerable to strategic bombing. It forced the Japanese government to inform its citizens for the first time that the war was not going well. The battle claimed more than 46,000 military casualties and at least 8,000 civilian deaths. The high percentage of casualties suffered during the battle influenced American planning for future assaults, including the projected invasion of Japan.
As early as the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, King presented the case to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for an amphibious offensive in the Central Pacific– including the Marshall Islands and Truk– that would capture the Mariana Islands. He stated that the occupation of the Marianas– specifically Saipan, Tinian and Guam– would cut the sea and air route from the Japanese home islands to the western Pacific,[12] but the Combined Chiefs of Staff made no commitment at the time.[13] General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in the Southwest Pacific Area, objected to King's proposed Central Pacific offensive.[14] He argued that it would be costly and time-consuming and would pull resources away from his drive in the Southwest Pacific toward the Philippines.[15]
At the Quebec Conference in August 1943, King continued to advocate for including the Marianas in a Central Pacific offensive,[16] He suggested that the strategic importance of the Marianas could draw the main Japanese fleet out for a major naval battle.[17] King's advocacy gained support from General Henry H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Forces, who wanted to use the newly-developed B-29 bomber.[18] The Marianas could provide secure airfields to sustain a strategic bombing offensive as the islands put much of Japan's population centers and industrial areas in the B-29's which typically had a 1,600mi (1,400nmi; 2,600km) mile combat radius.[19] At the Cairo Conference in November 1943, the Combined Chiefs of Staff supported both MacArthur's offensive in the Southwest Pacific and King's in the Central Pacific,[20] adding the Marianas as an objective for the Central Pacific offensive and setting 1 October 1944 as the date for their invasion.[21]
Map of Saipan showing the progress of the battle
Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas led the Central Pacific offensive.[22] In January–February 1944, the Marshal Islands were quickly captured and a massive American carrier-based air attack on Truk demonstrated that it could be neutralized and bypassed.[23] On 12 March 1944, the Joint Chiefs of Staff moved the date of the invasion up to 15 June with the goal of creating airfields for B-29s and developing secondary naval bases.[24] Nimitz updated the plans for the Central Pacific offense, codenamed Granite II, and set the invasion of the Marianas, codenamed Forager,[25] as its initial objective.[18] Saipan would be the first assault.[25]
Japanese strategic plan
The Japanese Imperial War Council established the "Absolute National Defense Zone[jp]", Zettai Kokubōken) in September 1943, which was bounded by the Kuril Islands, Bonin Islands, the Marianas, Western New Guinea, Malaya, and Burma.[26] This line to be held at all costs if Japan was to win the war.[27] The Marianas were considered particularly important asset to protect as their capture would put Japan within bombing range of the B-29 bomber[28] and allow the Americans to interdict the supply routes between the Japanese home islands and the western Pacific.[29]
The Imperial Japanese Navy planned to hold the defense line by defeating the United States fleet in a single decisive battle,[30] after which, the Americans were expected to negotiate for peace.[31] The Japanese Submarine Fleet (6th Fleet), commanded by Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi whose headquarters was on Saipan,[32] would screen the line.[33] Any American attempt to breach this line was to serve as the trigger to start the battle.[34] The defense forces in the attacked area would attempt to hold their positions while the Japanese Combined Fleet struck the Americans, sinking their carriers with land-based aircraft and finishing the fleet off with surface ships. [35]. As part of this plan the Japanese could deploy over 500 land-based planes– 147 of them immediately in the Marianas– that made up the 1st Air Fleet under the command of Vice Admiral Kakuji Kakuta whose headquarters was on Tinian.[36]
LVTs heading for shore on 15 June 1944. Birmingham in foreground; the cruiser firing in the distance is Indianapolis
Nimitz assigned Admiral Raymond Spruance, commander of the Fifth Fleet, to oversee the operation. Vice AdmiralRichmond K. Turner, Commander, Joint Amphibious Forces (Task Force 51) oversaw the overall organization of the amphibious landings of Forager; he also oversaw the tactical command of the landing on Saipan as Commander, Northern Attack Force (TF 52).[37] Once the amphibious landings were completed, Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, Commanding General, Expeditionary Troops (Task Force 56), would oversee the ground forces for all of Forager; he would also oversee the ground combat on Saipan as Commander, Northern Troops and Landing Force.[38]
The invasion fleet, consisting of over 500 ships and 300,000 men,[lower-alpha 2] got underway days before the Allied forces in Europe invaded France in Operation Overlord on 6 June 1944.[43] It was launched from Hawaii, briefly stopping at Eniwetok and Kwajalein before heading for Saipan. The Marine divisions left Pearl harbor on 19–31 May and rendezvoused at Eniwetok on 7–8 June; the 27th Infantry Division left Pearl Harbor on 25 May and arrived at Kwajalein on 9 June.[44] The fifteen aircraft carriers of the Fast Carrier Task Force (Task Force 58) commanded by Vice AdmiralMarc A. Mitscher,[45] which would provide support for the invasion, left Majuro for Saipan on 6 June.[46]
Japanese defense preparations
Japanese 6-inch (152 mm) coastal defense gun found on Saipan after the battle
American intelligence had estimated that there would be between 15,000 and 18,000 Japanese troops on Saipan at the time of the invasion.[47] In actuality, there were double that number.[48] Nearly 32,000 Japanese military personnel were on the island, including 6,000 naval troops.[29] The two major army units defending the island were the 43rd Division commanded by Lieutenant General Yoshitsugu Saitō and the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade commanded by Colonel Yoshira Oka.[49]
The Japanese hurriedly reinforced the island before the invasion, but many of the troop transports were sunk by U. S. submarines.[50] For example, five of seven ships transporting the 43rd Division were sunk.[51] Most of the troops were saved, but most of their equipment–including hats and shoes–was lost, which reduced their effectiveness.[52] Many soldiers were stranded survivors of sunken ships headed to other islands.[53] There were also about 80 tanks on the island, substantially more than the Americans had encountered in previous battles with the Japanese.[54]
The Japanese defenses were set up to defeat an invading force at the beaches, where the invading troops were most vulnerable.[55] These defenses focused on the most likely invasion locations, the western beaches south of Garapan. [56] This made the defenses brittle. If an invading force broke through the beach defenses, there was no organized fallback position: the Japanese troops would have to rely on Saipan's rough terrain, especially its caves, for protection.[57] The original plans called for a defense in depth that fortified the entire island[58] if time allowed,[59] but the Japanese were unable to complete their defenses by the time of the invasion. Much of the building material sent to Saipan, such as concrete and steel, had been sunk in transit by American submarines,[60] and the timing of the invasion surprised the Japanese, who thought they had until November to complete their defense.[57] As of June, many fortifications remained incomplete, available building materials were left unused, and many artillery guns were not properly deployed.[61]
Japanese leadership on the island suffered from poor command coordination.[62] Although Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, Commander of the Central Pacific Area Fleet, had nominal oversight of the defenses in the Central Pacific, Obata refused to subordinate his army command to a naval officer.[63] Because Obata was not on the island when the invasion started, command of Saipan's army units fell to Saitō, who was the senior army officer on the island.[64] But Obata's chief of staff, Major General Keiji Igeta, maintained a separate headquarters that was often out of touch with Saitō.[65]
Saipan and the other Mariana Islands were claimed as Spanish possessions by the conquistadorMiguel López de Legazpi in 1565.[66] After Spain's defeat in the Spanish-American War, Saipan was sold to Germany in 1899.[67] The island was occupied by the Japanese in 1914 during World War I, who made it the administrative center for the Mariana Islands– Saipan, Tinian and Rota– that were part of Japan's South Seas Mandate.[68]
Saipan has a tropical marine climate with a mean annual temperature of 85° in the lowlands and 78° in the highlands. Though the island has a mean rainfall between 81 and 91 inches per year, the rainy season doe not begin until July.[69] Unlike the small, flat coral atolls of the Gilberts and Marshalls,[60] Saipan is a volcanic island with diverse terrain well suited for defense.[70] It is approximately 47sqmi (122km2),[71][lower-alpha 3] and has a volcanic core surrounded by limestone.[73] In the center of the island is Mount Tapotchau, which rises to 1,554ft (474m). From the mountain, a high ridge ran northward about seven miles to Mount Marpi.[74] This area was filled with caves and ravines concealed by forest and brush,[75] and the mountainous terrain would force tanks to stay on the island's few roads, which were poorly constructed.[76]
The southern half of the island was where the principal airfield of the Marianas, Aslito Field, was located.[77] It served as a repair stop and transit hub for Japanese aircraft headed toward other parts of the Pacific.[78] This half of the island was flatter but covered with sugar cane fields[79] because the island's economy became focused on sugar production after the Japanese government had taken over Saipan from Germany in 1914.[80] Seventy percent of Saipan's acreage was dedicated to sugar cane.[68] It was so plentiful that a narrow-gauge railway was built around the perimeter of the island to facilitate its transportation.[81] These cane fields were an obstacle to attackers: they were difficult to maneuver in and provided concealment for the defenders.[82]
Saipan was the first island during the Pacific War where the United States forces encountered a substantial Japanese civilian population,[83] and the first where U. S. Marines fought around urban areas.[84] Approximately 26,000[6] to 28,000[7] civilians lived on the island, primarily serving the sugar industry.[68] The majority of them were Japanese subjects, most of whom were from Okinawa and Korea; a minority were Chamorro people.[81] The largest towns on the island–the administrative center of Garapan with its population of 10,000, Charan Kanoa, and Tanapag– were on the western coast of the island, which was where the best landing beaches for an invasion were.[82]
On 11 June, over 200 F6F Hellcats from the Fast Carrier Task Force launched a surprise attack on Japanese airfields in Saipan and Tinian,[85] putting approximately 130 Japanese aircraft out of operation[86] at the cost of 11 American aircraft.[87] The attack took out most of the 1st Air Fleet's land-based planes that had been deployed to defend the Marianas,[88] and gave the Americans air superiority over Saipan.[89] Planes from the task force continued their attacks until 14 June,[90] harassing fields, bombing military targets, and burning cane fields on the southern half of Saipan.[91] By end of the week, the 1st Air Fleet had been reduced to about 100 aircraft.[88]
On 13 June, seven fast battleships and 11 destroyers under Vice Admiral Willis Lee began the naval bombardment of Saipan.[92] The bombardment damaged much of Garapan and Charan Kanoa,[93] but was relatively ineffective at destroying the island's defenses because most of the battleship crews had not been trained in shore bombardment and the ships fired from more than 5.5mi (8.9km) to avoid potential minefields.[93] The following day, seven older battleships, 11 cruisers, and 26 destroyers[94] commanded by Rear Admiral Jesse B. Oldendorf took over the attack.[95] The crews were trained in shore bombardment, [96] and moved closer to shore because the sea was found to be free of mines.[97] The attacks destroyed many emplaced anti-aircraft positions,[98] but most of the beach defenses remained intact.[99]
15 June: D-Day
American amphibious landing
Soldiers and equipment from the 2nd Marine Division on Red Beach at 13:00 on 15 June.
15 June was D-Day for the amphibious landing,[100] which began around 08:40.[101] Naval and aerial bombardments in preparation for the landings began earlier in the morning,[102] disrupting the Japanese communications network.[103] The guns of the warships would provide supporting fire continued throughout the day.[102]
The V Amphibious Corps landed on the southwest beaches of Saipan.[104] The 2nd Marine Division landed on two beaches, named Red and Green, of Charan Kanoa, and the 4th Marine Division landed on the beaches, named Blue and Yellow, south of the town.[105] Approximately 700 Amphibious vehicles participated in the assault,[106] including 393 amphibious tractors (LVTs) and 140 amphibious tanks.[107] Within 20 minutes, there were 8000 men on the beaches.[108]
The beaches were fortified by trenches and a few pillboxes,[109] but the landings were mainly contested by constant and intensive fire by Japanese artillery, mortars,[110] and machine guns.[29] The Japanese had concentrated at least 50 large artillery pieces on the high ground and reversed slopes around the invasion beaches,[111] and had placed pennants on the beach for accurate ranging.[112] The Americans suffered over 2,000 casualties,[113][lower-alpha 4] the majority were due to the artillery and mortar fire.[115] Additionally, 164 amphibious tractors and amphibious tanks, about 40% of those engaged during the day, had been destroyed or damaged.[116]
American beachheads on Saipan at the end of 15 June
By the end of the day, the Marines managed to establish a bridgehead about 5.5mi (9km) along the beach and 0.5mi (1km) inland,[117] and had unloaded artillery and tanks.[118] But the bridgehead was only about two-thirds the size of the planned objective,[119] the two Marine divisions were separated by a wide gap just north of Charan Kanoa,[120] and the Japanese artillery remained intact on the high ground surrounding the beach.[121]
When darkness fell, Saito launched a series of night attacks to push the Americans back into the sea.[122] Japanese launched repeated counterattacks during the night and the early hours of the following morning,[123] mostly by poorly coordinated small units.[124] All the attacks were repulsed,[125] partly by the firepower provided by the tanks and artillery that had been during the day as well as by American warships that illuminated the combat areas with star shells.[126]
16–20 June: Southern Saipan
Japanese tank attack and the capture of Aslito field
On 16 June, Holland Smith committed his reserves to reinforce the beachhead, ordering two of the three regiments of the 27th Infantry Division to land,[127], temporarily attaching one of the landed regiments to the 4th Marine division.[128] He also proposed to indefinitely postpone the 18 June invasion of Guam.[129] The two Marine divisions on Saipan spent most of the day consolidating the beachhead.[130] The 2nd Marine Division began to close the gap between the two divisions north of Charan Kanoa, and the 4th Marine Division cleared the area around Aginan point on the southwest of the Island.[131]
In the following days, the 2nd Marine Division on the northern half of the bridgehead cleared the area around Lake Susupe[137] and reached the objectives for the first day of the invasion,[138] and slowly moved north toward Garapan and Mount Tapotchou.[139] In the southern half of the bridgehead, the 4th Marine Division began their advance on Aslito Field. On 18 June, the two regiments of the 27th Infantry Division, which was now fighting as a unit,[140] captured the field[141] as the Japanese withdrew to Nafutan Point in the southeast of the island.[142] The 4th Marine Division had reached the island's eastern coast, cutting off the Japanese troops at Nafutan Point from the north.[143] During this time, Saitō was falsely rumored to have been killed.[144] Igeta erroneously reported Saitō's death to Tokyo, though he corrected the report the later.[145]
Holland Smith ordered the 27th Infantry Division to quickly capture Nafutan Point but it was unable to do so.[146] Intelligence had estimated that there were no more than 300 Japanese soldiers in the area, but there were more than 1,000 defending the rough terrain.[147] The battle for the point would continue for over a week.[148]
By 19 June, the Japanese forces on the island had been reduced by about half.[149] Saitō began withdrawing his troops to a new defensive line in the center of the island.[150] By this time, the Americans had suffered over 6,000 casualties.[151] The Marine divisions headed north toward the new Japanese defenses,[152] and Holland Smith called for the final reserve of the Expeditionary Forces, ordering the last regiment of the 27th infantry Division to land on Saipan on 20 June.[153]
Once Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, was certain that Saipan was the target of an invasion, he initiated his response.[154] Less than a half hour after the start of the amphibious invasion,[155] he announced the implementation of Operation A-Go,[156] the Japanese Navy's current plan to destroy the American fleet.[157] He then sent a message to the entire fleet that repeated Admiral Heihachirō Tōgō's before Japan's decisive naval battle against Russia at Tsushima in 1905, which in turn echoed Horatio Nelson's signal at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805:[155] "The fate of the Empire rests upon this single battle. Every man is expected to do his utmost."[158]
Originally, the Japanese Navy sought to have the battle take place in the Palaus or Western Carolines,[159] and MacArthur's invasion of Biak had led them to believe that they could lure the American fleet there.[160] After the preinvasion bombardment of Saipan, Toyoda guessed Saipan was the target and ordered Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki who commanded the super battleships Yamato and Musashi to rendezvous with Vice Admiral Jisaburō Ozawa, commander of the 1st Mobile Fleet and to rendezvous in the Philippine Sea to attack the American fleet around Saipan.[161] The Japanese fleet, which had 9 aircraft carriers, 5 battleships, and nearly 500 airplanes was outnumbered by the American fleet,[162] which had 16 aircraft carriers, 7 battleships, and almost 1,000 airplanes.[163] But the longer range of the Japanese planes allowed them the opportunity to strike the Americans without fear of immediate retaliation,[163] the availability of airbases on the Marianas gave the carrier planes a place to land and quickly rearm for additional strikes.[164] Also, Kakuta was incorrectly assumed to have 500 land-based planes available for the battle.[165]
The American transports continued to unload supplies and reinforcements throughout 17 June. The following day, the transports sailed east the toward safety while the warships set off for battle with the Japanese fleet. On on 19–20 June, the fleets fought an aircraft carrier battle.[166] The Japanese struck first,[167] launching four large air attacks on the American fleet,[168] But the Japanese aviators were inexperienced and outnumbered: Very few of the anticipated land-based planes were available,[169] and those that were had little effect.[170]
The Japanese lost almost 500 planes[171] and almost all their aviators;[172] their carrier forces were left with only 35 operable aircraft.[173] The Americans lost about 130 planes[171] and 76 aviators.[172] An American counterstrike sank a Japanese carrier, and American submarines sank two others, including Ozawa's flagship Taihō.[174] The Japanese submarine fleet also failed to play a significant role. The invasion forced Takagi to move his headquarters from Garapan into the mountains of Saipan, making his command ineffective.[175] Out of 25 submarines deployed for the battle, 17 were sunk.[176] The battle sealed the fate for the Japanese forces defending Saipan. Though they did not know it, they could not expect expect further assistance.[177] Although the Japanese command was determined to fight to the last person,[178] it was doomed to lose a battle of attrition.[179]
21-24 June: Central Saipan, initial attack
Marines confronting rough terrain with a limestone cave typical of central and north Saipan
Saitō's new defense line stretched from Garapan on the west coast to the southern slopes of Mount Tapachou across to Magicienne Bay on the east coast.[180] It held most of the island's high ground, which allowed the Japanese to observe American movements, and the rough terrain was filled with caves concealed by brush.[181]
The American forces prepared for a frontal assault on Saitō's line using all three divisions.[182] The attack began on 22 June. The 2nd Marine Division was on the western coast moved toward Garapan and Mount Tapotchau; the 4th Marine Division advanced along the eastern coast,[183] which created gaps in the lines in the hilly ground between the two divisions.[184] That evening, the 27th Infantry Divison, less the regiment left to reduce Nafutan point,[185] was ordered to move up into the difficult terrain between the two Marine divisions.[186]
The next day, the Marine divisions on the flanks made progress, but the 27th Infantry Division, which started its attack late, stalled in its assault on a valley surrounding a low lying ridge that was defended by about 4,000 Japanese soldiers.[187] The battle around these features, which American soldiers nicknamed these "Death Valley" and "Purple Heart Ridge",[188] beginning to bend the line of the American advance into a horseshoe,[189] creating gaps in the Marine divisions flanks and forcing them to halt.[190]
Frustrated by what he saw as lack of progress by the 27th Division, Holland Smith relieved its commander, Major General Ralph Smith, and temporarily replaced him another Army officer, Major General Sanderford Jarman.[191] The debate over the appropriateness of Holland's Smith action–a Marine general dismissing an Army general–immediately created an inter-service controversy.[192][lower-alpha 6] Despite the replacement of the 27th Infantry Division's commander, it would take six more days for the valley to be captured.[194]
By 24 June, the American warships that had returned from the Battle of Philippine sea were once more available to provide fire support.[201] These ships, which were well supplied with star shells, provided illumination over the island during the night disrupting Japanese night attacks, which had been successful in previous campaigns.[202] This naval support, which played an important role in breaking up Japanese resistance,[203] was often facilitated by joint assault signal companies that directed both naval and aerial firepower to where it was needed by the ground forces.[204]
The Americans had other assets as well. Over 150 tanks–over 100 of which were M4 medium tanks–had been committed to the invasion.[205] The M4 medium tank was superior to the Japanese Type 97 tank.[206] It was primarily used to support infantry and was considered one of the most effective weapons for destroying enemy emplacements.[207] Flame throwers were extensively used. Smith had seen the need for motorized flamethrowers and had requested that the Army's Chemical Warfare Service (CWS) in Hawaii install them in M3 light tanks. Seabees with the CWS had 24 of the vehicles, dubbed "Satans", available in time for the invasion. They were very effective for destroying pillboxes, cave defenses. buildings, canefields, and brush.[208] In the hills, soldiers relied on personal flamethrowers, particularly in locations where the motorized flamethrowers could not reach.[209] The Americans gradually developed tactics for effectively reducing caves, using a combination of flamethrowers and demolition charges to clear them, or sometimes using demolitions to seal them off.[210]
On 27 June, Igeta's 31st Army Headquarters sent a telegram from the island stating the Japanese would not be able to hold due to the American preponderance in artillery, sea and air power, as well of a lack of equipment and supplies, including food and water.[211] Saito singled out naval gunfire undermining the Japanese' ability to fight successfully against the Americans.[212] The lack of water was a major problem, especially in the limestone caves the Japanese soldiers used for defense.[213] Igeta reported that some soldiers hadn't had water for three days and were surviving on snails and tree leaves.[214] Japanese communications were so disrupted that at one point during the week, Igeta could only account for 950 of the Japanese soldiers.[215]
American advance and Japanese break out at Nafutan Point
American advance in central Saipan between 20-24 June
On 25 June, the 27th Infantry Division was not able to make much headway in their fight for Death Valley. But the 2nd Marine Division to the west gained control of Mount Tapotchau, the key artillery observation posts in Central Saipan.[216] On the east coast, the 4th Marine Division quickly occupied most of the Kagman peninsula, meeting little organized resistance[217] because the Japanese had evacuated the peninsula.[218] Between 26 June and 30 June, the 2nd Marine Division and the 27th Infantry Division had made little progress. The second Marines remained south of Garapan and were slowly fighting their way north of Mount Topatchau. The 4th Marine Division was able to advance up the eastern coast to a line just north of the village of Hashigoru.[219]
About 500 Japanese soldiers broke out of Nafutan point on the night of 26 June. They headed toward Aslito field, destroying one P-47 and damaging two others.[220] They then ran into a unit of Marines who were in reserve and a unit of Marine artillery. Almost all the Japanese soldiers were killed in the ensuing firefight.[221] The next day, the elements of the 27th Infantry Division that had been fighting at the point moved in to occupy the area, no survivors were found.[222]
Army Major General George Griner, who had been sent for from Hawaii, took over from command of the 27th Infantry Division on 28 June. Jarman, whose command had been temporary, returned to his assign role as garrison commander of the island.[223] On 30 June, the 27th Infantry Division captured Death Valley and Purple Heart Ridge, and advance far enough to reestablish contact with the two Marine divisions on their flanks. The Saitō's main line of defense in Central Saipan had been breached;[224] and the Japanese began their retreat north to their final defensive line.[225] To date, American casualties were about 11,000.[226]
1–6 July: Pursuit into northern Saipan
Marines advancing through the ruins of Garapan on 3 July
Saitō intended to form a new line northern Saipan that was anchored on Tanapag on the west, went southeast to a village called Tarahoho, through to the east coast.[227] But his army's cohesion was disintegrating. Some of the remaining forces moved north, others holed up in whatever caves they could find and put up sporadic, disorganized resistance.[228] During 2–4 July, the 2nd Marine Division took the ruins of Garapan and its harbor.[229] The 4th Marine Division quickly moved north on the west coast in the face of light resistance.[230] As Saitō's attempt to form the defense line collapsed,[231] he eventually moved his final headquarters near Makunsha village on the west coast north of Tanapag.[232]
On 4 July, the 27th Infantry Division and 4th Marine Division headed northwest. The 27th division reached the east coast at Flores Point, south of Tanapag,[233] cutting off any Japanese retreating from Garapan.[234] The 2nd Marine Division no longer faced organized resistance, and went into reserve. The 27th Infantry Division was to move up the east coast toward Tanapag, and the 4th Marine Division would advance northwest.[235] On 5 July, the 27th Infantry Division encountered strong resistance in a narrow canyon on the east coast north of Tanapag that they dubbed "Harikari Gulch", which expanded into a two-day battle.[236]
American advance between 30 June–6 June, showing 7 July gyokusai assault
The 4th Marine Division continued to make rapid progress north during 4–5 July,[237] and on 6 July, Holland Smith ordered them to head toward the eastern coast near Makunsha to cut off the Japanese forces fighting the 27th Infantry Division,[238] then the Marines would complete the occupation of the rest of northern Saipan on their own.[239] In the evening, the Marines had taken Mount Petosukara, one of the last mountains before reaching the northern tip of the island,[240] but the units that turned toward Makunsha encountered too much resistance to reach the eastern coast.[241]
Saitō realized he could not create a final defensive line. His headquarters, which had been under constant artillery attack for days, was now in the range of American machine guns.[242] What was left of his command was trapped in a northern corner of the island, almost out of food and water, and slowly being destroyed by overwhelming American firepower.[243] On 6 July, Saitō decided the situation was hopeless and sent out orders for the remainder of his forces to perform gyokusai, one final suicide attack to destroy as many of the enemy as possible.[244] He set the attack for the following day to give the troops a chance to concentrate what was left of his forces and put his divisional chief of Staff, Colonel Takuji Suzuki,[245] in charge. That night, Saitō ate a last meal and committed seppuku, and Nagumo killed himself around the same time,[lower-alpha 7] Takagi stated he would die attacking the enemy.[250]
Saitō realized he could not create a final defensive line. His headquarters, which had been under constant artillery attack for days, was now in the range of American machine guns.[242] What was left of his command was trapped in a northern corner of the island, almost out of food and water, and slowly being destroyed by overwhelming American firepower.[243] On 6 July, Saitō decided the situation was hopeless and sent out orders for the remainder of his forces to perform gyokusai, one final suicide attack to destroy as many of the enemy as possible.[244] He set the attack for the following day to give the troops a chance to concentrate what was left of his forces and put his divisional chief of Staff, Colonel Takuji Suzuki,[245] in charge. That night, Saitō ate a last meal and committed seppuku, and Nagumo killed himself around the same time,[lower-alpha 8] Takagi stated he would die attacking the enemy.[250]
At least 3,000 Japanese combatants participated in the gyokusai attack.[251][lower-alpha 9] They assembled near Makunsha. The force included naval personnel,[257] support troops, civilians,[258] and the walking wounded.[259] It included three tanks,[260] supporting mortars, and machine guns,[261] but some troops were only armed with sticks with bayonets, knives, or grenades tied to poles.[257] It would be the largest gyokusai attack of the Pacific War.[239]
At around 04:00, Suzuki's force advanced south along the western coastal area,[262] called the Tanapag plain,[263] toward where his reconnaissance patrols had found a weak spot in the American line near Tanapag village:[264] two battalions of the 105 Infantry Regiment of the 27th Infantry Division were isolated from the other American forces.[253] The main force struck the two battalions at about 04:45, overrunning both and inflicting 80% casualties,[265] it overran two batteries of Marine artillery. The charge continued toward Tanapag village, but was halted in the late morning [266] by a hastily-formed American line around the village.[267] The fighting continued throughout the day, as American soldiers struggled against scattered elements of the gyokusai attack and recaptured lost ground.[268]
On 8 July, most of the 27th Infantry Division, which had suffered high losses in the gyokusai attack, were placed into reserve. The 2nd Marine Division advanced up the Tanapag plain, looking for Japanese stragglers.[269] The 4th Marine Division reached the Western coast north of Makunsha and headed toward, Marpi point, near the island's northern-most tip.[270] As they advanced, they saw hundreds of Japanese civilians die on inland and coastal cliffs.[271] Some threw themselves off, others were thrown or pushed off.[272] By the evening of 9 July, the 4th Marine Division had reached the northern end of the Island and Turner declared the island secure.[273] On the second day of the battle, he had estimated that the Saipan would be captured in a week;[102] it had taken 24 days.[274] On 11 July, the Americans found general Saitō's body. He was buried on 13 July with full military honors in a coffin draped with the Japanese flag.[275]
Though the island was declared secured, the fighting and suicides would continue. Clearing the hundreds of scattered Japanese soldiers hiding in caves would take many more months,[276] though the responsibilities were handed over to the Army Garrison Force.[271] One group of about 50 Japanese men–soldiers and civilians–was led by Captain Sakae Ōba, who survived the last banzai charge.[277] His group evaded capture and conducted guerrilla-style attacks, raiding American camps for supplies.[278] Oba's resistance earned him the nickname "the Fox".[277] His men held out for approximately 16 months before surrendering on 1 December 1945, three months after the official surrender of Japan.[279]
Casualties
First Lieutenant Robert Sheeks talks a woman with children and a dog into leaving a hillside cave on 21 June
Almost the entire Japanese garrison–approximately 30,000 military personnel– were killed in the battle. Eventually 1700, about half of whom were Korean workers, were taken prisoner.[271] American forces suffered about 16,500 casualties–3,100 killed and 13,000 wounded–[280] out of 71,000 who were part of the assault force.[281] The casualty rate was over 20%,[282] which was comparable to Tarawa.[280] It was the Americans most costly battle in the Pacific up to that time.[283]
Approximately 40% of the civilians on Saipan were killed. Around 14,000 survived and were interned,[284] but an estimated 8,000[6] to 10,000[7] died during the fighting or shortly afterwards. Many civilians died from the bombing, shelling and cross-fire.[285] Others died because they hid in caves and shelters that were indistinguishable from Japanese combat positions, which the Marines typically destroyed with explosives, grenades and flamethrowers.[286] Though many civilians were able to surrender early in the battle,[287] surrender became more difficult as the battle moved into the northern mountains. Obscuring terrain made it hard to distinguish combatants and surrendering civilians, who risked being killed by both sides.[288] Many refused to surrender because they believed rumors that the Japanese fleet was coming to rescue them.[289] Others refused because of the fear spread by Japanese propaganda that Americans would rape, torture and kill them; others were coerced.[290] Around 1,000 civilians committed suicide during the final days of the battle,[291] some after 9 July when the island had been declared secure.[292] Many died by throwing themselves off cliffs at places that would become known as "Suicide Cliff" and "Banzai Cliff".[293]
The American forces brought their supplies with the invasion fleet,[294] carrying was over one ton of supplies per soldier:[295] 32 days of rations, 30 days of medical supplies, 20 days of maintenance supplies, seven days of ammunition for ground weapons, and ten days of anti-aircraft ammunition.[296] Mobile reserves[297] and an ammunition resupply train,[298] as well as regular resupply shipments, came from depots at Eniwetok,[299] which was 1,017mi (1,637km) from Saipan.[294]
During the days of the invasion, LVT's dumped boxes of rations, water, ammunition on the beaches.[300] Heavy swells on the first days forced many of the supplies to be loaded on only one beach,[294] and LVTs were required to get over reefs that restricted access.[301] Constant Japanese mortar and artillery fire interfered with organizing these supplies for the first three days. Unloading became haphazard, and some units had difficulty finding their equipment.[302] Additionally, the withdrawal of the transports for five days during the Battle of the Philippine Sea slowed down the delivery of supplies.[303]
The 27th Infantry division particularly suffered from this initial disorganization. No plans had been made for its landing and it did not have an assigned unloading area. Its equipment was mixed up with the Marine divisions' and its artillery ammunition was misplaced.[304] Because it arrived on Saipan after the Marine divisions, the 27th Infantry Division had less time to unload its supplies before the transports temporarily headed east on 18 July. Initially, the division only had enough infantry ammunition for four days. Food and artillery ammunition had to be borrowed from the Marines, and water had to be supplemented from cisterns captured at Aslito Field.[305]
Later in the campaign, Mortar ammunition ran low as planners had underestimated how frequently they would be used, and there were shortages of motorized transportation, which was used for getting supplies from the beach to the frontline. Naval ships ran low on star shells due to their high demand, and their use had to be rationed. Despite these issues, the overall supply situation during the battle was good: Americans had an abundance of materiel.[306]
The Japanese troops had no chance of reinforcement.[307] From January to June, the Japanese had tried to ship men and supplies to Saipan,[308] but many ships around the island were torpedoed by American submarines. The Japanese government reported that one ship out of three sent to the Marianas were sunk and another was damaged.[309] Though many of the men survived, almost all the materiel was lost.[308] For example, on 25 May two freighters from Saipan to Palau were torpedoed, destroying 2,956 tons of food, 5,300 cans of aviation fuel, 2,500 cubic meters of ammunition, and 500 tons of cement.[310]
At the beginning of the battle, the Americans had six times the tanks, five times the artillery, three times as many small arms, and two times as many machine guns available as the Japanese. The Americans also much more ammunition.[311] The U. S. Navy fired 11,000 tons of ordnance on Saipan, including over 14,000 rounds of 5-inch ammunition.[298] Unlike the Americans, who could replenish their supplies, the Japanese could not. They had to fight with what was available when the invasion started, and when it ran out they were expected to die honorably, resisting until the end.[312]
Aftermath
The invasion of Saipan and the invasion of France in Operation Overlord demonstrated the dominance of American industrial power. Both were massive amphibious invasions–the two largest up to that time–and they were launched almost simultaneously on separate halves of the globe.[313] Together, they were the greatest deployment of military resources by the United States at one time.[314] Because the Battle of Saipan began just over a week after the 6 June landings for Overlord, its importance has often been overlooked. But just as Overlord was a major step in contributing to the fall of the Third Reich, Saipan marked a major step in the collapse of the Empire of Japan.[315]
The availability of Saipan as an American airbase opened a new phase in the Pacific War, in which strategic bombing would play a major role.[316] The 15 June invasion of the island had been synchronized bombing of the Yawata Steel Works by B-29s in China. It was the first bombing of the Japan home islands by B-29s, signaling the beginning of a campaign that could strike deep into Japan's Absolute National Defense Zone.[316]
The Army Air Force was confident that strategic bombing could destroy Japan's military production and that the Marianas provided excellent airbases for doing so because they were 1,200mi (1,000nmi; 1,900km) miles from the Japanese home islands. This put almost all of Japan's industrial cities in within striking distance of the B-29 bomber,[317] and they were easy to defend and supply.[318]
Saipan was the first island to base the B-29s. Construction of an aerodrome for B-29s began on Isely Field– the renamed Aslito Field– on 24 June,[319] before the island was declared secure. The first runway was complete by 19 October and the second by 15 December.[320] The 73rd Bombardment Wing began arriving on 12 October. On 24 November,[321] 111 B-29s set out for Tokyo in the first strategic bombing mission against Japan from the Marianas.[322]
The casualties on Saipan were used by American planners to predict American losses in future engagements.[323] This "Saipan ratio"–one killed American and several wounded for every seven Japanese soldier killed– became one of the justifications for American planners to increase conscription, projecting an increased need for replacements in the war on Japan.[324] Its prediction of high casualties was part of the reason that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not approve an invasion of Taiwan.[325] The Saipan ratio guided the initial estimate that the invasion of Japan would cost up 2,000,000 American casualties,[326] including 500,000 killed.[327] Though these estimates would be revised downward later, they would still influence politicians' thinking about the war well into 1945.[328]
Impact on Japanese politics and morale
Woman holds a baby as she returns to an internment camp in Saipan, June 1944
Saipan's loss had a greater impact in Japan than all its previous defeats.[329] The Emperor of Japan, Hirohito, recognized that American control of the island would result in Tokyo being bombed. After the Japanese defeat at the Battle of Philippine sea, he demanded that the Japanese General Staff plan another naval attack to prevent its fall.[330] Hirohito only accepted Saipan's eventual fall on 25 June when his advisors told him all was lost.[331] The defeat brought the collapse of Prime Minister of JapanHideki Tōjō's government. Disappointed with the progress of the war, Hirohito withdrew his support of Tōjō, who resigned as prime minister on 18 July.[332] He was replaced by former General Kuniaki Koiso,[333] who was a less capable leader.[334]
Saipan's fall led the Japanese government's war reporting to admit for the first time that the war was going poorly. In July, Imperial General Headquarters published a statement providing a summary of the battle and the loss of the island. The government also allowed a translation of a Time magazine article, which included the civilian suicides on the last days of the battle, to be published in The Asahi Shimbun, Japan's largest newspaper, while the battle was in progress.[335] Before the battle had ended, the Japanese government issued the "Outline for the Evacuation of Schoolchildren" in June, anticipating of the bombing of Japan's cities.[336]This evacuation, the only compulsory one enacted during the war,[336] separated more than 350,000 third- through sixth-graders who lived in major cities from their families and sent them into the countryside.[337]
The capture of Saipan pierced the Absolute National Defense Zone,[338] leading the Japanese leadership to reconsider the outcomes they could expect for the war.[339] In July, the Chief of the War Guidance department of Imperial General Headquarters Colonel Sei Matsutani,[340] drafted a report stating that the conquest of Saipan destroyed all hope of winning the war,[341] After the war, many Japanese military and political leaders stated that Saipan was a turning point as well.[342] For example, Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Miwa stated "Our war was lost with the loss of Saipan,"[343] and Fleet Admiral Osami Nagano acknowledged the battle's importance, saying "When we lost Saipan, Hell is on us."[344]
Memorials
Suicide Cliff and Banzai Cliff, along with surviving isolated Japanese fortifications, are recognized as historic sites on the U.S. National Register of Historic Places. The cliffs are also part of the National Historic Landmark DistrictLanding Beaches; Aslito/Isley Field; & Marpi Point, Saipan Island, which also includes the American landing beaches, the B-29 runways of Isley Field, and the surviving Japanese infrastructure of the Aslito and Marpi Point airfields.[345] The Maritime Heritage Trail has a series of dive sites with submerged, ships, planes, and tanks from the battle.[346] The American Memorial Park commemorates the American and Mariana people who died during the Mariana Islands campaign,[347] and The Central Pacific War Memorial Monument is dedicated to the memory of the Japanese soldiers and civilians who died.[348]
↑ Morison 1981, pp.160–162 puts the number of ships at 535 and mentions that the four and a half divisions of ground combat troups numbered 127,571; Toll 2015, p.457 puts the number of ships at 600 and the number of men at 600,000, which may include naval personnel.
↑ McManus 2021, p.350 estimates 2,500, Heinrichs & Gallicchio 2017, p.95 put the estimate near 3,500. In his after battle report, Major General Harry Schmidt, Commander of the 4th Marine Division, put the casualties for the first two days at 3500, which is about 20% of the casualties suffered during the entire battle.[114]
↑ The controversy continues to be debated in the 21st century.[193] See Crowl 1993, pp.191–201 for a detailed discussion; see Lacey 2013, pp.157–161 and McManus 2021, pp.363–371 for more recent discussions.
↑ Whether Saitō died with Nagumo or Igeta is unclear. Many sources derive their story from Major Takashi Hirakushi,[246] a captured public relations officer.[247] who initially claimed to be Major Kiyoshi Yoshida, an intelligence officer who actually died in combat.[248] (cf.,Goldberg 2007, p.173 who describes the testimony of "Kiyoshi Yoshida"). Hallas 2019, p.514, fn44 points out that in early accounts, Saitō commits suicide alone (e.g.,see the early account in Hoffman 1950, Appendix IX:The Last Days of General Saitō, pp.283–284), and a different Japanese survivor states that Nagumo committed suicide elsewhere.[249]Toland 2003, p.511–512, bases his account, in which Saitō, Nagumo, and Igeta die together on a much later interview with Hirakushi.[246]
↑ Whether Saitō died with Nagumo or Igeta is unclear. Many sources derive their story from Major Takashi Hirakushi,[246] a captured public relations officer.[247] who initially claimed to be Major Kiyoshi Yoshida, an intelligence officer who actually died in combat.[248] (cf.,Goldberg 2007, p.173 who describes the testimony of "Kiyoshi Yoshida"). Hallas 2019, p.514, fn44 points out that in early accounts, Saitō commits suicide alone (e.g.,see the early account in Hoffman 1950, Appendix IX:The Last Days of General Saitō, pp.283–284), and a different Japanese survivor states that Nagumo committed suicide elsewhere.[249]Toland 2003, p.511–512, bases his account, in which Saitō, Nagumo, and Igeta die together on a much later interview with Hirakushi.[246]
↑ The number of Japanese in the attack is unclear. During the attack, Smith underestimated, stating that only 300–400 were participating.[252] Hirakushi (at that time known as Major Yoshida), who was part of the attack, claimed during his interrogation after being captured that about 1,500 participated.[253] After the fighting, General Griner of the 27th infantry Division counted 4,311 Japanese bodies in the area of the attack,[254] but it was disputed whether all of them had died in the attack.[255] A later commission ordered by Spruance put the number between 1,500–3,000, arguing that many of the bodies were from people who died before the attack. Smith eventually agreed with Spruance's report.[256]
↑ Report of Capture of Marianas 1944, Annex 2, Enclosure N: Quartermaster's reports for the 2nd Marine Division's, 4th Marine Division's, and 27th Infantry Division's total to 101 medium tanks, 57 light tanks, 24 light mechanized flamethrowers, and 6 medium tanks with bulldozers.
The Guadalcanal campaign, also known as the Battle of Guadalcanal and codenamed Operation Watchtower by American forces, was a military campaign fought between 7 August 1942 and 9 February 1943 on and around the island of Guadalcanal in the Pacific theater of World War II. It was the first major land offensive by Allied forces against the Empire of Japan.
The Mariana and Palau Islands campaign, also known as Campaign Plan Granite II, was an offensive launched by United States forces against Imperial Japanese forces in the Pacific Ocean between June and November 1944 during the Pacific War. The campaign consisted of Operation Forager, which captured the Mariana Islands, and Operation Statemate, which captured Palau. Operation Causeway, the invasion of Taiwan was also planned but not executed. The offensive, under the overall command of Chester W. Nimitz, followed the Gilbert and Marshall Islands campaign and was intended to neutralize Japanese bases in the central Pacific, support the Allied drive to retake the Philippines, and provide bases for a strategic bombing campaign against Japan.
The Battle of the Philippine Sea was a major naval battle of World War II on 19–20 June 1944 that eliminated the Imperial Japanese Navy's ability to conduct large-scale carrier actions. It took place during the United States' amphibious invasion of the Mariana Islands during the Pacific War. The battle was the last of five major "carrier-versus-carrier" engagements between American and Japanese naval forces, and pitted elements of the United States Navy's Fifth Fleet against ships and aircraft of the Imperial Japanese Navy's Mobile Fleet and nearby island garrisons. This was the largest carrier-to-carrier battle in history, involving 24 aircraft carriers, deploying roughly 1,350 carrier-based aircraft.
The Battle of Tinian was part of the Pacific campaign of World War II. It was fought between the United States and Japan on the island of Tinian in the Mariana Islands from 24 July until 1 August 1944. The Mariana Islands were targeted because of their location astride the Japanese line of communications. Tinian lay too close to Saipan to allow it to be bypassed and remain in Japanese hands. The 9,000-strong Japanese garrison was eliminated, and the island joined Saipan and Guam as a base for Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers.
The Battle of Guam was the American recapture of the Japanese-held island of Guam, a U.S. territory in the Mariana Islands captured by the Japanese from the United States in the First Battle of Guam in 1941 during the Pacific campaign of World War II. The battle was a critical component of Operation Forager. The recapture of Guam and the broader Mariana and Palau Islands campaign resulted in the destruction of much of Japan's naval air power and allowed the United States to establish large airbases from which it could bomb the Japanese home islands with its new strategic bomber, the Boeing B-29 Superfortress.
Yoshitsugu Saitō was a lieutenant general in the Imperial Japanese Army during World War II. He commanded Japanese forces during the Battle of Saipan and killed himself during the battle.
On 15 June 1944, United States Marine forces landed on the southwest coast of the island of Saipan in the central Marianas chain; these were followed a day later by US Army forces. This invasion was part of Operation Forager, an effort to recapture the entire Marianas chain from the Empire of Japan.
Major General Ralph Corbett Smith was a senior officer of the United States Army. After receiving early training as a pilot from Orville Wright he served Brigadier General John J. Pershing's army against Pancho Villa, was decorated for bravery in World War I and commanded the 27th Infantry Division in combat in the Pacific War in World War II. At his death Smith was the oldest surviving general officer of the Army.
The New Georgia counterattack was a counterattack on 17–18 July 1943 by mainly Imperial Japanese Army troops against United States Army forces during the New Georgia campaign in the Solomon Islands. The U.S. and its allies were attempting to capture an airfield constructed by the Japanese at Munda Point on New Georgia with which to support further advances towards the main Japanese base around Rabaul as part of Operation Cartwheel.
The Battle of Munda Point was a battle from 22 July – 5 August 1943 between primarily United States Army and Imperial Japanese Army forces during the New Georgia campaign in the Solomon Islands in the Pacific War. The battle took place following a landing by U.S. troops on the western coast of New Georgia from Rendova Island, as part of an effort to capture the Japanese airfield that had been constructed at Munda Point. This advance had become bogged down, and while the Allies brought forward reinforcements and supplies, the Japanese had launched a counterattack on 17–18 July. This effort was ultimately unsuccessful, and afterwards U.S. forces launched a corps-level assault to reinvigorate their effort to capture the airfield. Against this drive, Japanese defenders from three infantry regiments offered stubborn resistance but were ultimately forced to withdraw, allowing U.S. forces to capture the airfield on 5 August. The airfield later played an important role in supporting the Allied campaign on Bougainville in late 1943.
East Field is a former World War II airfield on Saipan in the Mariana Islands, part of Naval Advance Base Saipan.
The Landing on Emirau was the last of the series of operations that made up Operation Cartwheel, General Douglas MacArthur's strategy for the encirclement of the major Japanese base at Rabaul. A force of nearly 4,000 United States Marines landed on the island of Emirau on 20 March 1944. The island was not occupied by the Japanese and there was no fighting. It was developed into an airbase which formed the final link in the chain of bases surrounding Rabaul. The isolation of Rabaul permitted MacArthur to turn his attention westward and commence his drive along the north coast of New Guinea toward the Philippines.
During World War II, a series of Japanese air attacks on the Mariana Islands took place between November 1944 and January 1945. These raids targeted United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) bases and sought to disrupt the bombing of Japan by Boeing B-29 Superfortress heavy bombers operating from the islands. The Japanese lost 37 aircraft during this operation, but destroyed 11 B-29s and damaged a further 43. Preparations were also made for commando raids on the bases in early and mid-1945 but these did not go ahead.
The Battle of Arundel Island was fought from 27 August – 21 September 1943, primarily between United States Army and Imperial Japanese Army forces on Arundel Island during the New Georgia campaign in the Pacific War. The battle took place towards the end of the campaign after the capture of Munda airfield and mopping up operations in western New Georgia had resulted in the Japanese evacuation of mainland New Georgia. The US high command decided to occupy the island so that it could be used as a base for artillery to fire on the main Japanese troop concentration on Kolombangara.
History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II is the official history of the Corps during the war. Its five volumes were published beginning in 1958.
Tinian Naval Advanced Base was a major United States Navy sea and air base on Tinian Island, part of the Northern Mariana Islands on the east side of the Philippine Sea in the Pacific Ocean. The base was built during World War II to support bombers and patrol aircraft in the Pacific War. The main port was built at the city and port of San Jose, also called Tinian Harbor. All construction was carried out by the Navy's Seabees 6th Naval Construction Brigade, including the main two airfields: West Field and North FieldUnited States Army Air Forces's long-range Boeing B-29 Superfortress bombers. The Navy disestablished the Tinian Naval Advanced Base on 1 December 1946.
The following is a list of resources related to the Battle of Saipan. It includes studies focused on the battle, as well as general works about the Marianas Campaign and the Pacific War that discuss the battle in depth.
Arthur McKinley Harper was a United States Army general. During World War II he commanded the XXIV Corps Artillery in the Battle of Saipan and Battle of Tinian during the Mariana Islands campaign. After the war he served as deputy commander of the American Mission to Greece during the Greek Civil War and as commandant of the United States Army Field Artillery School at Fort Sill.
Paul James Halloran was a United States Navy admiral. During World War II he was the construction officer with the V Amphibious Corps in the Battle of Saipan and Battle of Tinian during the Mariana Islands campaign. He designed a vehicle called a "Doodlebug" that allowed the marines to scale low cliffs. After the battle he was in charge of the development of air bases on Tinian.
Astroth, Alexander (2019). Mass Suicides on Saipan and Tinian, 1944: An Examination of the Civilian Deaths in Historical Context. McFarland. ISBN9781476674568. OCLC1049791315.
Bishop, Chris, ed. (2014). The Illustrated Encyclopedia of Weapons of World War II:A Comprehensives Guide to the Weapons Systems. Including Tanks, Small Arms, Warplanes, Artillery, Ships, and Submarines. Metro books. ISBN9781782743880. OCLC1310751361.
Crowl, Philip A. (1993) [1960]. Campaign in the Marianas. United States Army in World War II, The War in the Pacific. Vol.9. Center of Military History, United States Army. OCLC1049152860.
Dod, Karl C. (1987) [1966]. The Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan. Center of Military History, United States Army. OCLC17765223.
Dower, John W. (2010). Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor, Hiroshima, 9-11, Iraq. New York: Norton New Press. ISBN978-0-393-06150-5. OCLC601094136.
Frank, Richard B. (1999). Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire. Random House. ISBN9780679414247. OCLC40783799.
Gailey, Harry A. (1986). Howlin' Mad Vs. the Army: Conflict in Command, Saipan 1944. Presidio Press. ISBN0-89141-242-5. OCLC13124368.
Garand, George W.; Strobridge, Truman R. (1989) [1971]. "Part V. Marine Aviation in the Western Pacific: 2. Marine Aviation in the Marianas, Carolines, and at Iwo Jima". Western Pacific Operations. History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II. Vol.4. Historical Branch, G–3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps. pp.422–442. OCLC1046596050.
Goldberg, Harold J. (2007). D-Day in the Pacific: The Battle of Saipan. Indiana University Press, 2007. ISBN978-0-253-34869-2. OCLC73742593.
Hallas, James H. (2019). Saipan: The Battle That Doomed Japan in World War II. Stackpole. ISBN9780811768436. OCLC1052877312.
Havens, Thomas R. (1978). Valley of Darkness: The Japanese People and World War Two. Norton. ISBN9780393056563. OCLC1035086075.
Heinrichs, Waldo H.; Gallicchio, Marc (2017). "The Marianas Campaign, June–August 1944". Implacable Foes: War in the Pacific, 1944–1945. Oxford University Press. ISBN9780190616755. OCLC962442415.
Miller, Edward S. (1991), War Plan Orange: The U. S. strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897–1945, Naval Institute Press, ISBN9780870217593, OCLC23463775
Meehl, Gerald A. (2012). One Marine's War: A Combat Interpreter's Quest for Humanity in the Pacific. Naval Institute Press. ISBN9781612510927. OCLC811408315.
Morison, Samuel Eliot (1981) [1953]. New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944–August 1944. History of United States Naval Operations in World War II. Vol.8. Little Brown. ISBN9780316583084. OCLC10926173.
Olson, James C.; Mortensen, Bernhardt L. (1983) [1950]. "The Marianas". In Craven, Wesley F.; Cate, James L. (eds.). The Pacific: Gauadalcanal to Saipan, August 1942 to July 1944. The Army Air Forces in World War II. Vol.4. pp.671–696. ISBN9780912799032. OCLC9828710.
Shaw, Henry I. Jr.; Nalty, Bernard C.; Turnbladh, Edwin T. (1989) [1966]. Central Pacific Drive. History of U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II. Vol.3. Historical Branch, G–3 Division, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps. ISBN9780898391947. OCLC927428034.
Smith, Douglas V. (2006). Carrier Battles: Command Decision in Harm's Way. Naval Institute Press. ISBN1591147948. OCLC1301788691.
Smith, Robert R (1996) [1953]. The Approach to the Philippines. United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific. Center of Military History, United States Army. OCLC35911873.
Symonds, Craig L. (2022). Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay. Oxford University Press. ISBN9780190062361. OCLC1268206579.
Tanaka, Yuki (2023). "Asia-Pacific War". In Hein, Laura E. (ed.). The Modern Japanese Nation and Empire c. 1868 to the Twenty-First Century (eBook). The New Cambridge History of Japan. Vol.III. Cambridge University Press. pp.138–167. doi:10.1017/9781108164535.007. ISBN9781108164535. OCLC1382587192.
Toll, Ian W. (2015). The Conquering Tide: War in the Pacific Islands, 1942–1944. W. W. Norton. ISBN978-0393080643. OCLC902661305.
United States War Department Historical Division (1991) [1946]. "The Fight on Tanapag Plain: 27th Division, 6 July 1944". Small Unit Actions– France: 2d Ranger Battalion at Pointe du Hoe; Saipan: 27th Division on Tanapag Plain; Italy: 351st Infantry at Santa Maria Infante; France: 4th Armored Division at Singling. War Department, Historical Division. pp.69–113. OCLC519761473.
Wetzler, Peter (2020). Imperial Japan and Defeat in the Second World War: The Collapse of an Empire. Bloomsbury Academic. ISBN9781350120815. OCLC1113926749.
Winton, John (1993). Ultra in the Pacific: How Breaking Japanese Codes and Cphers Afffected naval Operations Against Japan 1941–1945. Naval Institute Press. ISBN9781557508560. OCLC29918990.
Y'Blood, William T. (1981). Red Sun Setting: The Battle of the Philippine Sea. Naval Institute Press. ISBN9780870215322. OCLC7178031.
Allen, William B. (2012). Sacked at Saipan (Monograph). School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command an General Staff College – via Defense Technical Information Center.
Giangreco, D. M. (2003). "A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas: President Truman and casualty estimates for the invasion of Japan". Pacific Historical Review. 72 (1): 93–132. doi:10.1525/phr.2003.72.1.93. JSTOR10.1525/phr.2003.72.1.93.
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![Map showing strategic implication of Saipan's fall: Japanese Absolute National Defense Zone [jp] would be pierced and the Japanese home islands would be within the 1,600 mi (2,600 km) range of the B-29 bomber Map of B-29 range from Saipan.svg](http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/e/e3/Map_of_B-29_range_from_Saipan.svg/330px-Map_of_B-29_range_from_Saipan.svg.png)
Cenotaphs near Banzai Cliff
Banzai Cliff, with cenotaphs visible in the upper left corner
United States 
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