Dioscuri (World War I)

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The Dioscuri: Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, 23 September 1916 Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1970-073-47, Paul v. Hindenburg, Erich Ludendorff.jpg
The Dioscuri: Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, 23 September 1916

During World War I, the term Dioscuri was used to refer to the OHL duo of Erich Ludendorff and Paul von Hindenburg, after the Dioscuri of Greek mythology. These two soldiers, emboldened by their success against the Russians, exercised full military power in the Reich from 1916. The dismissal of Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg on 19 July 1917 marked a milestone in the rise of the two soldiers, who gradually imposed their vision of managing the conflict on Kaiser Wilhelm II, forcing him to establish a military dictatorship disguised by the institutions of the Reich. [Notes 1]

Contents

Circumstances surrounding the duo's creation

Success on the Eastern Front

By the end of 1915, the two leaders of the Eastern Front had emerged as credible successors to Erich von Falkenhayn as Chief of the General Staff of the Kaiserliche Heer. [1] Indeed, their victories in 1914 gave them the prestige of "saviors of the nation". [2]

However, the relationship between Hindenburg and Ludendorff, who was then in charge of the Eastern Front, and the Chief of the General Staff, Erich von Falkenhayn, soon soured. The two commanders of the Eastern Front saw it as the main front of conflict for the Central Powers, but Falkenhayn believed that German victory could only come from a decision to confront France. Applying his ideas to the personnel on the field, he allocated to the Eastern Front only what was strictly necessary to hold the positions he won. [3]

Allied offensive, summer 1916

The Allies planned concerted offensives against the Central Powers in Galicia, France, and Italy [4] at the Chantilly Conference in late 1915. The first, launched on the Eastern Front on 4 June 1916, produced significant results against Austro-Hungarian troops, who were quickly overwhelmed, but it was halted at the edge of the Carpathian Mountains [5] for lack of sufficient air power.

This offensive was followed by the Franco-British push on the Somme, launched on a German front weakened by the retreats from the Eastern Front and on the verge of being torn apart. This gigantic battle of attrition robbed the German army of its most experienced cadres. [6]

These two offensives were supported by an Italian attack on Asiago, launched on 6 August 1916, which broke through the Austro-Hungarian front on 9 August but failed in its exploitation phase, failing to turn the pursuit of the Austro-Hungarian units [7] into a rout.

The reaction of the central powers

In the face of this concerted offensive, the German military reiterated its desire for a reorganization of command on the Eastern front. On 26 July 1916 the Northern Front was placed under the responsibility of Hindenburg, assisted by Ludendorff, and the Southern Front was nominally entrusted to the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince Charles. [8]

Nomination

Erich von Falkenhayn's position became increasingly precarious with the worrisome military situation of the Central Powers in midsummer 1916. His strategic decisions were questioned, and his advocacy of social measures for industrial workers led industrialists to criticize his munitions policy. These grievances led the emperor to question the position of his Chief of Staff and to focus on the two German leaders of the Eastern Front: Paul von Hindenburg and his second-in-command, Erich Ludendorff. [9]

On 29 August 1916 Wilhelm II asked them to come to Pless, which was then the headquarters of the General Staff. Erich von Falkenhayn, who had not been informed of this invitation by his sovereign, felt disgraced and, drawing the consequences, asked to be relieved of his duties. [9]

Action during the conflict

Immediately after their appointment, the two soldiers set to work and quickly became the top commanders of the Quadruplice for Wilhelm II.

People responsible for OHL

Wilhelm II appointed Hindenburg Chief of the General Staff and Ludendorff First Quartermaster General, a title created for the occasion, [10] due to their popularity with the German people.

The coordination of offensive actions by the central powers

As soon as they were appointed, the Dioscuri began negotiations with the civilian and military leaders of the Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Ottoman Empires to gain effective command of the armies of the Quadruplice.

Thus, on 6 September 1916, Wilhelm II was appointed commander-in-chief of the German and Austro-Hungarian armies under an agreement ratified by Franz Joseph in consultation with the Austro-Hungarian Chief of Staff, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf. [11] However, this military agreement was not met with enthusiasm, as Conrad, supported by Crown Prince Charles, expressed his reservations, about the language barrier [Notes 2] and the contempt the Germans had for the troops of the Dual Monarchy. These reservations enabled him to negotiate the place of the Austro-Hungarian Armeeoberkommando in the planning and execution of the Quadruplice Offensive. [12]

Shortly thereafter, the provisions of this agreement were extended to Bulgarian units campaigning in the Balkans and to Ottoman armies fighting the Russians, Serbs, French, and British. [13]

The political role of the Reich and its allies

Quickly becoming indispensable to the Empire, the two military men forming the Dioscuri pair became increasingly influential in German politics.

Their appointment led to a decline in the emperor's influence in imperial politics. Already sidelined from the military management of the conflict, Wilhelm II tried to influence the policy of the warring Reich. However, he was briefed daily on military developments by the Dioscuri, both of whom were respectful to the emperor but limited to the role of figuration and validation of decisions already made. [14]

Not content with imposing their decisions on the emperor, Hindenburg, and Ludendorff constituted a significant pole of influence in the political life of the Reich. This influence was first evident in their choice of ministers. On 28 November 1916, shortly after their appointment, Ludendorff obtained from Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg [Notes 3] the dismissal of the Prussian Minister of War, Adolf Wild von Hohenborn, a little-known but essential player in the management of the war in the Reich during the first two years of the conflict. [15]

The dissolution of the association

The defeat in 1918

On 28 September 1918, with the military situation of the Reich and its allies of the Quadruplice deteriorating by the hour, the Dioscuri met and concluded that the Reich needed to enter into negotiations with the Allies as soon as possible to cease hostilities. [16]

Once this decision was made, it was imposed on the Reich's political leaders, who met with the military the next day. The Spa Conference was supposed to result in implementing a clear political line for a rapid end to the conflict. It was mainly an opportunity to impose the civilian government's demand for an armistice on a defeated Reich. [17]

The resignation of Ludendorff

Ludendorff multiplied his false accusations against government members once the idea of an armistice with the Allies and the principle of reforming the political organization of the Reich had been accepted.

First, he blamed the Bulgarians who, by withdrawing from the conflict, had forced the Germans to urgently build up an army in Serbia to stop the Allied armies. [18]

Second, he attacked the supporters of a compromise peace with the Allies-the Socialists, Catholics, and Progressives who had formed a parliamentary coalition with a majority in the Reichstag [19] since 1917.

Notes

  1. Between the proclamation of the German Empire in 1871 and its dissolution in 1945, the official name of the German state was Deutsches Reich, the legal term for the Reich.
  2. Officers of the dual monarchy commanded their men in their own language and communicated with each other in German.
  3. On this occasion, the Chancellor and the Chief Quartermaster General joined forces against the Prussian Minister of War.

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The Spa conference of September 29, 1918 is the last important conference between the main political and military leaders of the Reich, then engaged in the First World War. Held in the last weeks of the conflict, it is intended to draw the political and military conclusions of the Bulgarian defection. Indeed, after the failures encountered by the central powers in Italy and on the Western Front, the leaders of the Reich can only acknowledge the strategic impasse in which they have found themselves since the month of August 1918. The Allied successes against the Bulgarians, followed by the withdrawal of Bulgaria and the rapid Allied rise towards the Danube, forced those responsible for the Central Powers, mainly Germans, to draw the consequences of their failures. However, kept in ignorance of the reality of the military situation, the members of the Reich government initially remained incredulous in the face of the military's declarations. During the month of September, the latter are urging the government to begin talks with a view to suspending the conflict. The conference constitutes the opportunity to announce this desire for policy change. The conference brought together in Spa, then the headquarters of the Oberste Heeresleitung, the main military leaders of the Reich, the chancellor and his vice-chancellor around Kaiser Wilhelm II. All agreed on the need to request an armistice to limit the demands of the Allies, as well as on political reforms to be implemented to democratize the Reich, which was then to be transformed into a parliamentary monarchy.

The Bingen Conference was a German governmental meeting convened by the new Reich Chancellor Georg Michaelis at the initiative of Wilhelm II to define German policy in the Baltic territories occupied by the German Army since its successes in 1915. This conference was the first opportunity for the new Chancellor, Georg Michaelis, to meet the Dioscuri, Paul von Hindenburg, and Erich Ludendorff. Having come to power after a political crisis caused by differences between his predecessor, Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, the Reichstag, and the Dioscuri, Georg Michaelis not only had to come to terms with the two actors in his predecessor's downfall but also had to define the war aims of the Reich government under the Oberste Heeresleitung.

References

  1. Laparra & Hesse (2011 , p. 80)
  2. Laparra & Hesse (2011 , p. 95)
  3. Laparra & Hesse (2011 , p. 84)
  4. Renouvin (1948 , p. 367)
  5. Renouvin (1948 , p. 368)
  6. Renouvin (1948 , p. 370)
  7. Renouvin (1948 , p. 371)
  8. Schiavon (2011 , p. 143)
  9. 1 2 Laparra & Hesse (2011 , p. 93)
  10. Bogdan (2014 , p. 204)
  11. Ortholan (2021 , p. 484)
  12. Schiavon (2011 , p. 144)
  13. Ortholan (2021 , p. 485)
  14. Bogdan (2014 , p. 205)
  15. Laparra & Hesse (2011 , p. 194)
  16. Le Naour (2016 , p. 328)
  17. Le Naour (2016 , p. 329)
  18. Le Naour (2016 , p. 330)
  19. Le Naour (2016 , p. 331)

See also

Bibliography