Foster v. Chatman

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Foster v. Chatman
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued November 2, 2015
Decided May 23, 2016
Full case nameTimothy Tyrone Foster, Petitioner v. Bruce Chatman, Warden
Docket no. 14-8349
Citations578 U.S. ___ ( more )
136 S. Ct. 1737; 195 L. Ed. 2d 1
Argument Oral argument
Opinion announcement Opinion announcement
Case history
Prior
  • Defendant found guilty in Floyd County Superior Court; Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, 258 Ga. 736, 374 S.E.2d 188 (1988); cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1085(1989).
  • State court habeas petition denied; appeal denied by Supreme Court of Georgia; cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2349 (2015).
Holding
The Court has jurisdiction to review the judgment of the Georgia Supreme Court denying Foster a Certificate of Probable Cause on his Batson claim. The decision that Foster failed to show purposeful discrimination was clearly erroneous under the three-step process established by Batson. Supreme Court of Georgia reversed and remanded.
Court membership
Chief Justice
John Roberts
Associate Justices
Anthony Kennedy  · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg  · Stephen Breyer
Samuel Alito  · Sonia Sotomayor
Elena Kagan
Case opinions
MajorityRoberts, joined by Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan
ConcurrenceAlito (in judgment)
DissentThomas
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. XIV

Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the state law doctrine of res judicata does not preclude a Batson challenge against peremptory challenges if new evidence has emerged. The Court held the state courts' Batson analysis was subject to federal jurisdiction because "[w]hen application of a state law bar 'depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state-law prong of the court’s holding is not independent of federal law, and our jurisdiction is not precluded,'" under Ake v. Oklahoma . [1]

Contents

It held that the petitioner, Timothy Foster, had established purposeful discrimination, and that as a result, the state habeas court and Supreme Court of Georgia had erred in denying his Batson claim that black jurors were struck from his jury pool on the basis of race. In concluding its opinion, the Court noted that "[t]wo peremptory strikes on the basis of race are two more than the Constitution allows." [2] The court frequently cited Snyder v. Louisiana in its decision.

Background

In 1986 Timothy Foster, a black 18-year-old, was accused of killing Queen Madge White, a 79-year-old white woman and retired schoolteacher in Georgia. She had been sexually assaulted and murdered in her home, which was ransacked. A month later, law enforcement officers were called to a domestic disturbance at the home of Lisa Stubbs. She told the officers that her boyfriend, Foster, had killed White and given items stolen from White's house to her and various family members. Foster was arrested, admitted to the crime, and some of the stolen items from White's house were recovered from Foster's residence. [3] [4]

During jury selection, the prosecutors used peremptory strikes to remove all four black prospective jurors from the jury pool, resulting in an all-white jury. Foster challenged these strikes, arguing that they were racially motivated in violation of Batson v. Kentucky . The trial judge dismissed the challenge and empaneled the jury, which convicted Foster of the murder and sentenced him to death. After sentencing, Foster filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds that the jury selection violated the US Supreme Court's Batson decision. The trial court denied the motion, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. [5]

Foster raised a habeas corpus challenge in the state court. [3] During the habeas proceedings, Foster submitted a freedom of information request, under the Georgia Open Records Act, to obtain the prosecution's file for his trial. Among the documents produced by the request were numerous documents which the prosecution used during the jury selection process. The prosecutors had made notes on these:

The prosecutors had also drafted an affidavit for the trial judge in response to Foster's motion for a new trial. It contained the statement: "If it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors, [this one] might be okay. This is solely my opinion .... Upon picking of the jury after listening to all of the jurors we had to pick, if we had to pick a black juror I recommend that [this juror] be one of the jurors." [7] The statement was crossed-out by hand and was omitted in the affidavit filed with the court. [7]

Despite this new evidence, the state court rejected Foster's habeas petition stating that the new evidence did not present "purposeful discrimination" and so did not provide sufficient reason to go against the doctrine of res judicata. [8] The Georgia Supreme Court denied a "Certificate of Probable Cause" necessary, under state law, to appeal the habeas decision, determining that the case had no "arguable merit" [9] The Georgia Supreme Court's decision in its entirety said: "Upon the consideration of the Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to appeal the denial of habeas corpus, it is ordered that it be hereby denied. All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who dissents." Since the petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was appealing the Georgia Supreme Court's order, it was unclear whether the order "rests on an adequate and independent state law ground," which would preclude the U.S. Supreme Court's jurisdiction over Foster's federal claim. [1]

Oral arguments

In an unusual turn of events, the US Supreme Court notified the attorneys for both sides that the justices may pose questions regarding the jurisdiction of the Court to hear the case. [10] Advocating for Foster, Stephen B. Bright started his arguments with a criticism of the prosecutors' alleged racial motives coming into jury selection, but he was soon interrupted by Chief Justice Roberts asking for Bright to address the jurisdictional issues. Much of his speaking time was spent answering these procedural questions. [10]

Getting to the merits, Bright argued that the race-neutral reasons for the strikes were contradicted by the prosecution's actions and the documents Foster obtained. In response to a question by Chief Justice Roberts, Bright pointed out that, despite the prosecution claiming they struck the black prospective jurors because they were women, the prosecution accepted other non-black women onto the jury. [lower-alpha 1] [12]

Opinion of the Court

In a 7–1 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court held that it did have jurisdiction to review the case and held that Foster did indeed show significant purposeful racial discrimination in the jury selection. Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment to describe the state law on the matter, while Justice Thomas dissented. Both Justice Alito's concurrence and Justice Thomas's dissent pointed out that, under Georgia state law, Foster's murder conviction and death sentence may not be nullified by the decision. [13] [14]

Majority

As a threshold matter, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the lower court's habeas decision was not independent of federal issues and therefore does not bar review by the U.S. Supreme Court. [15] Both parties agreed that Foster brought a prima facie case and that the prosecutors offered race-neutral explanations for striking the black prospective jurors, the first two prongs of the three-prong test in Batson. [16] The court examined the reasons for striking two of the black prospective jurors—Garrett and Hood—and found the reasons did not withstand scrutiny, [17] concluding that:

As we explained in Miller-El v. Dretke, "if a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack [panelist] who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination." 545 U.S. 231, 241 (2005). With respect to Garrett and Hood, such evidence is compelling. But that is not all. There is also the shifting explanations, the misrepresentations of the record, and the persistent focus on race in the prosecution's file. Considering all of the circumstantial evidence that "bear[s] upon the issue of racial animosity," we are left with the firm conviction that the strikes of Garrett and Hood were "motivated in substantial part by discriminatory intent." Snyder , 552 U.S., at 478, 485.

— Foster, slip op. at 23

Justice Alito's opinion concurring in the judgment

Justice Alito wrote separately "to explain [his] understanding of the role of state law in the proceedings that must be held on remand." [4] Justice Alito explained that the lower court's habeas decision noted that Foster's Batson claim was based on new evidence discovered after Foster's original trial and therefore the order of the Georgia Supreme Court "held ... that Foster's Batson claim, as presented in his state habeas petition, lacked arguable merit." [4] Justice Alito noted that many states do not permit relitigation of previously-argued claims and that "[s]tates are under no obligation to permit collateral attacks on convictions that have become final." [18] Justice Alito concurred that the correct decision in this case was "to decide the question of federal law and then to remand the case to the state court so that it can reassess its decision on the state-law question in light of [the U.S. Supreme Court's] decision on the underlying federal issue." [19] He agreed in the court's finding that the prosecutor's striking of the black prospective jurors was a Batson violation. [19]

Justice Thomas' dissenting opinion

Justice Thomas dissented. Justice Thomas criticized the court's determination of jurisdiction, arguing that "[t]he far more likely explanation for the [Georgia Supreme Court's] denial of habeas relief is that Foster's claim is procedurally barred ...[,] a question of state law that [the U.S. Supreme Court] is powerless to review." [20] Justice Thomas notes that historically the Supreme Court would vacate and remand for clarification before proceeding to the merits of a case like this and "refuse[d] to presume that the unexplained denial of relief by the Supreme Court of Georgia presents a federal question." [21] Justice Thomas then proceeded to reject the court's analysis of the Batson claim. [22]

Notes

  1. ↑ The protections of Batson were not extended to gender until J.E.B. v. Alabama eight years later. [11]

Related Research Articles

Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court ruling that a prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge in a criminal case—the dismissal of jurors without stating a valid cause for doing so—may not be used to exclude jurors based solely on their race. The Court ruled that this practice violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case gave rise to the term Batson challenge, an objection to a peremptory challenge based on the standard established by the Supreme Court's decision in this case. Subsequent jurisprudence has resulted in the extension of Batson to civil cases and cases where jurors are excluded on the basis of sex.

In American and Australian law, the right of peremptory challenge is a right in jury selection for the attorneys to reject a certain number of potential jurors without stating a reason. Other potential jurors may be challenged for cause, i.e. by giving a good reason why they might be unable to reach a fair verdict, but the challenge will be considered by the presiding judge and may be denied. A peremptory challenge can be a major part of voir dire. A peremptory challenge also allows attorneys to veto a potential juror on a "hunch".

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The Supreme Court of the United States handed down sixteen per curiam opinions during its 2005 term, which lasted from October 3, 2005, until October 1, 2006.

Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1 (2007), was a case dealing with jury selection in capital cases in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that appeals courts must defer to a trial judge’s decision on whether a potential juror would be able to overcome demur about capital punishment and be open to voting to impose a death sentence.

Racial discrimination in jury selection is specifically prohibited by law in many jurisdictions throughout the world. In the United States, it has been defined through a series of judicial decisions. However, juries composed solely of one racial group are legal in the United States and other countries. While the racial composition of juries is not dictated by law, racial discrimination in the selection of jurors is specifically prohibited. Depending on context, the phrases "all-white jury" or "all-black jury" can raise the expectation that deliberations may be unfair.

Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333 (2006), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States regarding a prosecutor's use of a peremptory challenge to remove a young African American woman, Juror 16, from a defendant's drug trial jury in a California court case, based on her youth and on her alleged "eye rolling" in answer to a question. The defendant, Steven Martell Collins, challenged the striking of Juror 16, saying her exclusion was based on race, but the trial judge agreed that the prosecutor's reasons were race-neutral. The California Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's ruling, and the Federal District Court dismissed Collins' habeas corpus petition with prejudice. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, stating that the dismissal was unreasonable based, among other reasons, on the lack of evidence that the eye rolling had occurred.

J. E. B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States holding that peremptory challenges based solely on a prospective juror's sex are unconstitutional. J.E.B. extended the court's existing precedent in Batson v. Kentucky (1986), which found race-based peremptory challenges in criminal trials unconstitutional, and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company (1991), which extended that principle to civil trials. As in Batson, the court found that sex-based challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause.

Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that, because of the doctrine of "dual sovereignty", the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution does not prohibit one state from prosecuting and punishing somebody for an act of which they had already been convicted of and sentenced for in another state.

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that a prosecutor may dismiss jurors who are bilingual in Spanish and English from juries that will consider Spanish-language testimony.

Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), was a United States Supreme Court case dealing with the application of newly announced rules of law in habeas corpus proceedings. This case addresses the Federal Court's threshold standard of deciding whether Constitutional claims will be heard. Application of the "Teague test" at the most basic level limits habeas corpus.

Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472 (2008), was a United States Supreme Court case about racial issues in jury selection in death penalty cases. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for the 7–2 majority, ruled that the prosecutor's use of peremptory strikes to remove African American jurors violated the Court's earlier holding in Batson v. Kentucky. Justice Clarence Thomas dissented.

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Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257 (2015), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States upheld a death sentence of a Hispanic defendant despite the fact that all Blacks and Hispanics were rejected from the jury during the defendant's trial. The case involved a habeas corpus petition submitted by Hector Ayala, who was arrested and tried in the late 1980s for the alleged murder of three individuals during an attempted robbery of an automobile body shop in San Diego, California in April 1985. At trial, the prosecution used peremptory challenges to strike all Black and Hispanic jurors who were available for jury service. The trial court judge allowed the prosecution to explain the basis for the peremptory challenges outside the presence of Ayala's counsel, "so as not to disclose trial strategy". Ayala was ultimately sentenced to death, but he filed several appeals challenging the constitutionality of the trial court's decision to exclude his counsel from the hearings.

Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411 (2016), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously vacated a Massachusetts conviction of a woman who carried a stun gun for self-defense.

Ocasio v. United States, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court clarified whether the Hobbs Act's definition of conspiracy to commit extortion only includes attempts to acquire property from someone who is not a member of the conspiracy. The case arose when Samuel Ocasio, a former Baltimore, Maryland police officer, was indicted for participating in a kickback scheme with an automobile repair shop where officers would refer drivers of damaged vehicles to the shop in exchange for cash payments. Ocasio argued that he should not be found guilty of conspiring to commit extortion because the only property that was exchanged in the scheme was transferred from one member of the conspiracy to another, and an individual cannot be found guilty of conspiring to extort a co-conspirator.

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Flowers v. Mississippi, No. 17–9572, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), was a United States Supreme Court case regarding the use of peremptory challenges to remove black jurors during a series of Mississippi criminal trials for Curtis Flowers, a black man convicted on murder charges. The Supreme Court held in Batson v. Kentucky that the use of peremptory challenges solely on the basis of race is unconstitutional. This case examined whether the Mississippi Supreme Court erred in how it applied Batson to this case. The Supreme Court ruled that Flowers' case fell under Batson and that the state inappropriately removed most of the potential black jurors during the trials.

Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. ___ (2020), was a United States Supreme Court case involving whether the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, which limits habeas corpus judicial review of the decisions of immigration officers, violates the Suspension Clause of Article One of the U.S. Constitution. In the 7–2 opinion, the Court ruled that the law does not violate the Suspension Clause.

Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991), was a United States Supreme Court case that re-examined the Batson Challenge. Established by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Batson Challenge prohibits jury selectors from using peremptory challenges on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, and sex. Powers expanded the jurisdictions of this principle, allowing all parties within a case, defendants especially, to question preemptory challenges during a jury selection, regardless of race. This holding was protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

References

  1. 1 2 Foster v. Chatman,No. 14-8349 , 578 U.S. ___, slip op. at 7 (2016).
  2. ↑ Foster, slip op. at 25
  3. 1 2 Foster, slip op. at 1.
  4. 1 2 3 Foster, slip op. at 1 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
  5. 1 2 3 Foster, slip op. at 3.
  6. 1 2 Foster, slip op. at 5.
  7. 1 2 3 Foster, slip op. at 4.
  8. ↑ Foster, slip op. at 6.
  9. ↑ Foster, slip op. at 6 (citing Ga. Code Ann. §9–14–52 (2014) and Ga. Sup. Ct. Rule 36 (2014))
  10. 1 2 Lyle Denniston,  Argument analysis: To decide, or not — that is the question , SCOTUSblog (Nov. 2, 2015, 4:16 PM).
  11. ↑ J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. , 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
  12. ↑ Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___ (2016)(No. 14-8349)
  13. ↑ Lyle Denniston,  Opinion analysis: Telltale files on race-based jury selection , SCOTUSblog (May 23rd, 2016 2:22 pm).
  14. ↑ See Foster, slip op. at 9–10 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment)("On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court is bound to accept [our] evaluation of the federal question [that Batson was violated], but whether that conclusion justifies relief under state res judicata law is a matter for that court to decide.") and Foster, slip op. at 6 (Thomas, J. dissenting)("Nothing in the reported decisions of the Supreme Court of Georgia suggests that federal law figures in how Georgia applies its res judicata procedural bar.[...]But it is for the Supreme Court of Georgia—not this Court—to decide what new facts suffice...")
  15. ↑ Foster, slip op. at 8–9 (citing Ake v. Oklahoma , 470 U.S. 68, 75 (1985)).
  16. ↑ Foster, slip op. at 9–10
  17. ↑ Foster, slip op. at 11–23.
  18. ↑ Foster, slip op. at 7 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment)
  19. 1 2 Foster, slip op. at 9 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
  20. ↑ Foster, slip op. at 2 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
  21. ↑ Foster, slip op. at 5, 7 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
  22. ↑ Foster, slip op. at 8–15 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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