United States v. Armstrong | |
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Argued February 26, 1996 Decided May 13, 1996 | |
Full case name | United States v. Armstrong et al. |
Citations | 517 U.S. 456 ( more ) 116 S. Ct. 1480; 134 L. Ed. 2d 687 |
Case history | |
Prior | |
Holding | |
The burden of proof for selective prosecution rests with the defendant, who must show the government declined to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg; Breyer (in part) |
Concurrence | Souter |
Concurrence | Ginsburg |
Concurrence | Breyer (in part and in judgment) |
Dissent | Stevens |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. V |
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), was a case heard by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the court held that the burden of proof for selective prosecution rests with the defendant, who must show the government declined to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other races.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss their indictment for "crack" cocaine and other federal charges, alleging they were selected for prosecution based on their race. The motion was granted by the District Court and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit en banc, which ruled the proof requirements do not compel the defendant to demonstrate the Government has failed to prosecute others who are similarly situated.
The Supreme Court held that:
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, 8–1. Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote the opinion of the court, and was joined by Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, David Souter, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Justice Stephen Breyer joined the majority opinion in part and also wrote a separate concurring opinion. Justice John P. Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion.
Justice Antonin Scalia quoted United States v. Armstrong to hold in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee that an "alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation" because subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decision making to outside inquiry would "chill law enforcement":
What will be involved in deportation cases is not merely the disclosure of normal domestic law enforcement priorities and techniques, but often the disclosure of foreign-policy objectives and (as in this case) foreign-intelligence products and techniques. The Executive should not have to disclose its "real" reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat―or indeed for simply wishing to antagonize a particular foreign country by focusing on that country's nationals.
There is ongoing uncertainty about the precedential value of this portion of Reno which most legal experts believe should be limited to its facts. [1] In 2018, the reliance of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on this part of Reno v. ADC was challenged in Ragbir v. Homon. [2] In Ragbir's case ICE took a broad view that Reno v. ADC applied to protected first amendment activity. [3]