Global arrogance

Last updated

Global arrogance is a term used colloquially to describe the cultural and economic hegemony of the United States over other countries. It differs from the concept of imperialism, in which one country physically occupies another. [1] [2]

Contents

Thomas Friedman remarked in 1999 that global arrogance is "when your culture and economic clout are so powerful and widely diffused that you do not need to occupy other people to influence their lives". [3]

Origin and uses

In 1999, Thomas Friedman wrote an editorial in The New York Times Magazine stating that he had noticed the Iranian government had begun calling the United States "the capital of global arrogance" instead of the "Great Satan." [3] [lower-alpha 1] Friedman remarked that global arrogance is "when your culture and economic clout are so powerful and widely diffused that you do not need to occupy other people to influence their lives". [3] He further stated the Iranians were not the only ones, writing "The French, Germans, Japanese, Indonesians, Indians and Russians also call [the United States] that now." [3] Other academics and writers have commented on Friedman's remarks. [5] [6] [1]

In her 2005 book, Charting Transnational Democracy: Beyond Global Arrogance, Janie Leatherman wrote that the United States was first described as "the Capital of Global Arrogance" by Iranian students. [7] Iran continues to celebrate the anniversary of the 1979 capture of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran as a "National Day of Campaign against Global arrogance", [8] [9] and the term continues to be used in Iranian newspapers to denounce US foreign policy. [10] The stereotype of the West as arrogant is mainly used in conservative newspapers; it is less frequent in reformist newspapers. [11] After the 2003–2011 Iraq War, accusations of arrogance against the US increased. [12] The United States has historically faced accusations of arrogance including during the Vietnam War. [13] Leatherman says the concept of global arrogance is not limited to supposed American arrogance but encompass a full range of elites of the global political and economic system. They are embedded, Leatherman writes, in the networks and layers of the global governance system–from key institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the World Trade Organization, the G-7, leading countries, and the major northern NGOs of global civil society. Leatherman says global arrogance, like power, moves and flows through this system, making it is difficult to identify the source of arrogance. [14] According to Weber, arrogance refers to politics rather than people; he says others should listen, understand, agree and act in a way that policies show; and that it is a problem because it is a "disposition [that is] counterproductive to competing effectively in this 21-century global market of ideas". [15]

About the US' supposed global arrogance, Diana Zoelle [lower-alpha 2] and Jyl J. Josephson [lower-alpha 3] write arrogance is usually conceived in the context of foreign policy but US domestic poverty policies could be a sign of a failed hegemony and a government that is unable to provide basic resources in terms of jobs and social services for a large part of its population. According to Zoelle and Josephson, the costs of the Global War on Terrorism are used to justify the reduction of social spending at home. [18]

In 2021, Foreign Policy accused the People's Republic of China (PRC) of global arrogance, arguing the PRC government is repeating American mistakes. [19]

The term "World Series Syndrome" refers to the arrogance of the American domestic baseball championship being called the World Series despite only US teams taking part, until 1969, when the Canadian Montreal Expos were admitted. [20] [21]

Arguments

According to Daniel E. Price, globalization is considered in many countries of the Islamic world as a tool for American domination that must be resisted. [6] In her book, The Soul of Justice, Cynthia Willett writes:

We fear Islamic fundamentalists because they threaten violence in the name of unyielding principles. We refuse, however, to understand how economic and cultural forces of powerful nations may damage citizens of weaker nations by destroying their culture and livelihood, and by rendering their nations dependent upon foreign powers.

Willett quotes Thomas Friedman, whom she says provides insight into anti-Western sentiment by pointing to the zeal behind Western discourse, as saying: [1]

"We Americans are the apostles of the Fast World, the prophets of the free market, and high priests of high tech. We want the 'enlargement' of both our values and our Pizza Huts. We want the world to follow our lead and become democratic and capitalistic, with a Web site in every pot, a Pepsi on every lip, [and] Microsoft Windows in every computer." Is it clear who "fundamentalists" are? I am not so sure. The journalist continues: "No wonder, therefore, that resentment of America is on the rise globally." Sometimes we tend to see exaggerated in the Other what we most deny in ourselves. [1]

According to Thomas Friedman, globalization leads to global arrogance based on soft power (culture, technology and economy) rather than occupation and imperialism. US efforts to avoid international scrutiny and refuse to sign international treaties on global warming or the International Criminal Court, according to Barber, are viewed as signs of arrogance and imperialist intentions. [6] Yusuf al-Qaradawi, an Islamist scholar, argues that "globalization means the imposition of US hegemony. Any state that rebels or sings to a different tune must be punished by blockades, military threats, or direct attack as happened with Sudan, Iraq, Iran and Libya." The imposition involves a US culture "based on materialism, self-interest and unrestrained freedoms." Thus, US-led globalization is driven by the "unjustified arrogance and conceit" of the Pharaoh, persecuting humanity to benefit a tiny minority." [22]

Ali Farazmand believes current global stereotypes against Islam by the United States government, and the media and corporate organizations, which are predominantly Christian, have created a global image of Muslims as terrorists and the people of the Middle East as fanatics who should be enlightened by Judaeo-Christianity. Farazmand says this ideological, global, political propaganda against Islam serves only global arrogance, global religious divisions, and enmity between nations, and "promotes the global arrogance of self-declared Christian superiority". [23]

In Iran, people's perception of the United States as a "land of milk and honey" has long been associated with another image of hostility and arrogance. [11] According to the Iranian journalist and lecturer Ehsan Bakhshandeh, most Iranians hate the West not because they reject Western values but because they have suffered from hostile Western policies. He says the use of the term "global arrogance" to portray the West can be attributed to the history of Iran-West relations, especially the way Americans have treated Iranians. [11]

Carlos A. Parodi [lower-alpha 4] said the dissolution of the Soviet Union gave the United States greater freedom to use military force to defend its interests. He quotes Noam Chomsky, who said; "It should have surprised no one that George Bush celebrated the symbolic end of the Cold War, the fall of the Berlin Wall, by immediately invading Panama and announcing loud and clear that the United States would subvert Nicaragua's election by maintaining its economic stranglehold and military attack unless 'our side' won". [25]

Criticism also came from outside the US; Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah spoke of the "incessant struggle between the international forces of arrogance and oppression (represented by the United States, Western powers and Israel) and the oppressed nations, which comprise the Arab and Muslim Worlds and more generally the Global South", and said international arrogance does its best to weaken Muslims so Islam does not become a powerful force in the world and to "sow discord among Muslims". [26] Ali Khamenei, in a speech in November 1994, said: "when a government does not look up to [the US] and refuses to consider them as superpower, then they cannot stand it any longer". [27]

According to Leatherman, Iranian Ayatollahs Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei saw the West as a source of colonial and neo-colonial domination whose supremacy was to the detriment of Third World countries. [28] Benjamin Barber said US efforts to ensure domestic prosperity seem like a justification for repressing and exploiting others. [6] According to Price, the United States military invasion of the Islamic world–two invasions of Iraq, one of Afghanistan–along with supporting the kings and dictators of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Yemen, Egypt, and Tunisia, are efforts to control the value of the region's natural resources such as oil for its own benefit. [6]

Footnotes

  1. ↑ Ruhollah Khomeini, the clerical founder of Islamic Republic of Iran, for example, referred to the West in general and the United States in particular as "estekbar", roughly translated to "arrogance" in English. [4]
  2. ↑ She is the author of Globalizing Concern for Women's Human Rights (St. Martin' Press, 2000), and other articles and reviews on gender and international human rights. [16]
  3. ↑ She is associate professor of political science and Director of Women's Studies at Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Newark campus. [17]
  4. ↑ He is associate professor and teaches in the Department of Politics and Government of Illinois State University. His most recent book is The Politics of South American Boundaries (Praeger, 2001) [24]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ruhollah Khomeini</span> Supreme Leader of Iran from 1979 to 1989

Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini was an Iranian Islamic revolutionary, politician, and religious leader who served as the first Supreme Leader of Iran from 1979 until his death in 1989. He was the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the main leader of the Iranian Revolution, which overthrew Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and ended the Iranian monarchy.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Politics of Iran</span>

The politics of Iran takes place in the framework of an Islamic theocracy which was formed following the overthrow of Iran's millennia-long monarchy by the 1979 Revolution.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Foreign relations of Iran</span>

Geography is an important factor in informing Iran's foreign policy. Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the newly formed Islamic Republic, under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini, dramatically reversed the pro-American foreign policy of the last Shah of Iran Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Since the country's policies then oscillated between the two opposing tendencies of revolutionary ardour to eliminate non-Muslim Western influences while promoting the Islamic revolution abroad, and pragmatism, which would advance economic development and normalization of relations, bilateral dealings can be confused and contradictory.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Iranian Revolution</span> Revolution in Iran from 1978 to 1979

The Iranian Revolution, also known as the 1979 Revolution, or the Islamic Revolution of 1979, was a series of events that culminated in the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979. The revolution led to the replacement of the Imperial State of Iran by the present-day Islamic Republic of Iran, as the monarchical government of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was superseded by the theocratic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a religious cleric who had headed one of the rebel factions. The ousting of Pahlavi, the last Shah of Iran, formally marked the end of Iran's historical monarchy.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Akbar Rafsanjani</span> President of Iran from 1989 to 1997

Ali Akbar Hashimi Bahramani Rafsanjani was an Iranian politician and writer who served as the fourth president of Iran from 1989 to 1997. One of the founding fathers of the Islamic Republic, Rafsanjani was the head of the Assembly of Experts from 2007 until 2011 when he decided not to nominate himself for the post. He was also the chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council.

<i>Hegemony or Survival</i> Book by Noam Chomsky

Hegemony or Survival: America's Quest for Global Dominance is a book about the United States and its foreign policy written by American political activist and linguist Noam Chomsky. It was first published in the United States in November 2003 by Metropolitan Books and then in the United Kingdom by Penguin Books. It was republished by Haymarket Books in January 2024.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">1987 Mecca incident</span> Clash between Shia pilgrims and Saudi Arabian security forces

On 31 July 1987, during the Hajj in Mecca, a clash between Shia pilgrim demonstrators and the Saudi Arabian security forces resulted in the death of more than 400 people. The event has been variously described as a "riot" or a "massacre". It developed from increasing tensions between Shia Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia since the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Since 1981, Iranian pilgrims have held a political demonstration against Israel and the United States every year at Hajj, but in 1987, a cordon of Saudi police and the Saudi Arabian National Guard sealed part of the planned demonstration route, resulting in a confrontation between them and the pilgrims. This escalated into a violent clash, followed by a deadly stampede.

Hegemonic stability theory (HST) is a theory of international relations, rooted in research from the fields of political science, economics, and history. HST indicates that the international system is more likely to remain stable when a single state is the dominant world power, or hegemon. Thus, the end of hegemony diminishes the stability of the international system. As evidence for the stability of hegemony, proponents of HST frequently point to the Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, as well as the instability prior to World War I and the instability of the interwar period.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Death to America</span> Anti-American political slogan

Death to America is an anti-American political slogan widely used in North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Pakistan. Originally used by North Korea since the Korean War, Ruhollah Khomeini, the first supreme leader of Iran, popularized the term. He opposed the chant for radio and television, but not for protests and other occasions.

The Kensington Welfare Rights Union (KRWU) is a progressive social justice, political action, and advocacy group of, by, and for the poor and homeless operating out of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The group was founded by six women, Alexis Baptist, Sandy Brennan, Diane Coyett, Cheri Honkala, Louis Mayberry, and Debra Witzman, and formed in Philadelphia's Kensington neighborhood in April 1991.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Shia crescent</span> Region in the Middle East

The Shia Crescent is the notionally crescent-shaped region of the Middle East where the majority population is Shia or where there is a strong Shia minority in the population.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Islamic fundamentalism in Iran</span>

Traditionally, the thought and practice of Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism in the nation of Iran has referred to various forms of Shi'i Islamic religious revivalism that seek a return to the original texts and the inspiration of the original believers of Islam. Issues of importance to the movement include the elimination of foreign, non-Islamic ideas and practices from Iran's society, economy and political system. It is often contrasted with other strains of Islamic thought, such as traditionalism, quietism and modernism. In Iran, Islamic fundamentalism and Islamism is primarily associated with the thought and practice of the leader of the Islamic Revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ("Khomeinism"), but may also involve figures such as Fazlullah Nouri, Navvab Safavi, and successors of Khomeini.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">History of the Islamic Republic of Iran</span> History of Iran after the 1979 revolution

One of the most dramatic changes in government in Iran's history was seen with the 1979 Iranian Revolution where Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was overthrown and replaced by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. The authoritarian monarchy was replaced by a long-lasting Shiite Islamic republic based on the principle of guardianship of Islamic jurists,, where Shiite jurists serve as head of state and in many powerful governmental roles. A pro-Western, pro-American foreign policy was exchanged for one of "neither east nor west", said to rest on the three "pillars" of mandatory veil (hijab) for women, and opposition to the United States and Israel. A rapidly modernizing capitalist economy was replaced by a populist and Islamic economy and culture.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United States foreign policy in the Middle East</span> Activities and objectives of the United States in the Middle East

United States foreign policy in the Middle East has its roots in the early 19th-century Tripolitan War that occurred shortly after the 1776 establishment of the United States as an independent sovereign state, but became much more expansive in the aftermath of World War II. With the goal of preventing the Soviet Union from gaining influence in the region during the Cold War, American foreign policy saw the deliverance of extensive support in various forms to anti-communist and anti-Soviet regimes; among the top priorities for the U.S. with regards to this goal was its support for the State of Israel against its Soviet-backed neighbouring Arab countries during the peak of the Arab–Israeli conflict. The U.S. also came to replace the United Kingdom as the main security patron for Saudi Arabia as well as the other Arab states of the Persian Gulf in the 1960s and 1970s in order to ensure, among other goals, a stable flow of oil from the Persian Gulf. As of 2023, the U.S. has diplomatic relations with every country in the Middle East except for Iran, with whom relations were severed after the 1979 Islamic Revolution, and Syria, with whom relations were suspended in 2012 following the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Khomeinism</span> Ideology of Ruhollah Khomeini and the Islamic Republic of Iran

Khomeinism refers to the religious and political ideas of the leader of the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution, Ruhollah Khomeini. In addition, Khomeinism may also refer to the ideology of the clerical class which has ruled the Islamic Republic of Iran, founded by Khomeini. It can also be used to refer to the "radicalization" of segments of the Twelver Shia populations of Iran, Iraq, and Lebanon, and the Iranian government's "recruitment" of Shia minorities in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Africa. The words Khomeinist and Khomeinists, derived from Khomeinism, can also be used to describe members of Iran's clerical rulers and attempt to differentiate them from "regular" Shia Muslim clerics.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Mohammad Reza Pahlavi</span> Shah of Iran from 1941 to 1979

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, commonly referred to in the Western world as Mohammad Reza Shah, or just simply the Shah, was the last monarch of Iran. He began ruling the Imperial State of Iran after succeeding his father, Reza Shah, in 1941 and remained in power until he was overthrown by the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which abolished the country's monarchy and established the Islamic Republic of Iran. In 1967, he took up the title Shahanshah and held several others, including Aryamehr and Bozorg Arteshtaran.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Presidency of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani</span>

Presidency of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was the 5th and 6th government of Iran after Iranian Revolution. At that time, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was the president.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Anti-Sunnism</span> Prejudice towards Sunni Muslims

Anti-Sunnism is hatred of, prejudice against, discrimination against, persecution of, and violence against Sunni Muslims.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Ali Khamenei's fatwa against nuclear weapons</span> Statement of Iranian policy

A fatwa by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran, against the acquisition, development and use of nuclear weapons dates back to the mid-1990s. The first public announcement is reported to have occurred in October 2003, followed by an official statement at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna in August 2005.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">The policy of exporting the Islamic Revolution</span> One of the foreign policy strategies in the Islamic Republic of Iran

The policy of exporting the Islamic Revolution is a strategy in Iran's foreign policy that believes in exporting the teachings of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 to achieve similar examples in Islamic and even non-Islamic countries. This policy has been explicitly and at various times announced by Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran. One of the basic slogans of the Islamic Revolution of Iran is the export of the revolution. Accordingly, the purpose is exporting the revolution as a culture, ideology and an intellectual and epistemological method.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 Willett, Cynthia (2001). The Soul of Justice: Social Bonds and Racial Hubris. Cornell University Press. pp. 9–10. ISBN   9781501711633.
  2. ↑ Veseth, Michael (2002). The Rise of the Global Economy. Taylor & Francis. p. 41. ISBN   9781579583699.
  3. 1 2 3 4 Friedman, Thomas (28 March 1999). "A Manifesto for the Fast World". The New York Times Magazine. Retrieved 4 September 2022. A short time later, I noticed that Iran's mullahs had begun calling America something other than the "Great Satan." They had begun calling it "the capital of global arrogance.." The Iranian leadership had grasped the important distinction between "global arrogance" and old-fashioned notions of imperialism, when one country physically occupies another. Global arrogance is when your culture and economic clout are so powerful and widely diffused that you don't need to occupy other people to influence their lives. Well, guess what? The Iranians aren't the only ones talking about America as "the capital of global arrogance." The French, Germans, Japanese, Indonesians, Indians and Russians also call us that now.
  4. ↑ Arshin, Adib-Moghaddam (2014). A Critical Introduction to Khomeini. USA: Cambridge. p. 157.
  5. ↑ Ellwood, David (2016). The Shock of America: Europe and the Challenge of the Century. Oxford University Press. p. 455-456. ISBN   978-0-19-162679-1.
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 Price, Daniel E. (2012). Sacred Terror: How Faith Becomes Lethal. Praeger. p. 90. ISBN   9780313386381.
  7. ↑ Leatherman 2005 , p. 6
  8. ↑ Leatherman 2005 , p. 6
  9. ↑ Soltani, Khosrow (2013). "Chant 'Death to America', but talk to America". Aljazeera.
  10. ↑ Nilou Mobasser (2007-10-23). "Not in our name either". Index on Censorship . 32: 58-63. doi:10.1080/03064220308537173. S2CID   143604306.
  11. 1 2 3 Ehsan Bakhshandeh (2014-08-26). "How mainstream Iranian newspapers portray the West: the influence of anti-Westernism and anti-Americanism". The Journal of International Communication . 20 (2): 184–199. doi:10.1080/13216597.2014.948034. S2CID   143716460.
  12. ↑ Leatherman 2005 , p. 6
  13. ↑ Leatherman 2005 , p. 6
  14. ↑ Leatherman 2005 , p. 7
  15. ↑ Weber, Steven (2010). The End of Arrogance: America in the Global Competition of Ideas. Harvard University Press. p. x. ISBN   978-0674058187.
  16. ↑ Leatherman 2005, p. xvii
  17. ↑ Leatherman 2005, p. xiv
  18. ↑ Zoelle & Josephson 2005 , p. 71-72
  19. ↑ "China Is Repeating U.S. Mistakes With Its Own Global Arrogance". Foreign Policy . 2021-08-13.
  20. ↑ Dear America: you can't be world champions if no one else takes part
  21. ↑ Campigotto, Jesse (Apr 12, 2024). "Remembering the Montreal Expos' first game". CBC. Retrieved September 28, 2024.
  22. ↑ E. Baroudi, Sami (June 2010). "In the Shadow of the Qur'an: Recent Islamist Discourse on the United States and US Foreign Policy". Middle Eastern Studies: 574, 579 – via ResearchGate, JSTOR.
  23. ↑ Farazmand, Ali; Carter, Rosalyn, eds. (2004). Sound Governance: Policy and Administrative Innovations. Praeger; Illustrated edition. p. 92. ISBN   9780275965143.
  24. ↑ Leatherman 2005, p. xv
  25. ↑ Parodi 2005 , pp. 115–116
  26. ↑ Baroudi, Sami E. (2013). "Islamist Perspectives on International Relations: The Discourse of Sayyid Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah (1935–2010)". Middle Eastern Studies. 49 (1): 115–117. doi:10.1080/00263206.2012.743887. JSTOR   23470905. S2CID   145790289.
  27. ↑ Murden, Simon (2002). Islam, the Middle East, and the New Global Hegemony. Lynne Rienner Pub. p. 66. ISBN   9781588260888.
  28. ↑ Leatherman 2005 , p. 6

Sources

This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.