Part of the Politics series |
Voting |
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In political science, social choice, and game theory, insincere voting is the practice of casting a vote that provides more support to a worse outcome than a better one, i.e. one that involves voters lying about whether they prefer candidate A or B. [1] It is sometimes called misaligned, deceptive, or dishonest voting. For example, in a first-past-the-post election, a sincere voter would support the single candidate they think is best, whereas an insincere voter would oppose such a candidate. The design of many voting methods incentivizes voters to be dishonest when expressing their opinions. [2]
First-preference methods like first-past-the-post and ranked-choice runoff voting (RCV) are well-known for incentivizing voters to give the highest rank to the lesser of two evils, i.e. to lie about who their favorite candidate is. If the voter's most preferred candidate is unlikely to win the election, the voter is instead incentivized to support the "least bad" of the candidates they consider viable.
By contrast, systems that satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives (such as score, approval, and highest medians) tend to exhibit very low rates of insincere voting, and can even satisfy the sincere favorite criterion (which means voters are never forced to choose between the lesser of two evils).
Approval voting is a single-winner electoral system in which voters mark all the candidates they support, instead of just choosing one. The candidate with the highest approval rating is elected.
Plurality voting refers to electoral systems in which the candidate in an electoral district who poll more than any other are elected.
Score voting, sometimes called range voting, is an electoral system for single-seat elections. Voters give each candidate a numerical score, and the candidate with the highest average score is elected. Score voting includes the well-known approval voting, but also lets voters give partial (in-between) approval ratings to candidates.
Strategic or tactical voting is voting in consideration of possible ballots cast by other voters in order to maximize one's satisfaction with the election's results. For example, in plurality or instant-runoff, a voter may recognize their favorite candidate is unlikely to win and so instead support a candidate they think is more likely to win.
A Condorcet method is an election method that elects the candidate who wins a majority of the vote in every head-to-head election against each of the other candidates, whenever there is such a candidate. A candidate with this property, the pairwise champion or beats-all winner, is formally called the Condorcet winner. The head-to-head elections need not be done separately; a voter's choice within any given pair can be determined from the ranking.
The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem is a theorem in voting theory. It was first conjectured by the philosopher Michael Dummett and the mathematician Robin Farquharson in 1961 and then proved independently by the philosopher Allan Gibbard in 1973 and economist Mark Satterthwaite in 1975. It deals with deterministic ordinal electoral systems that choose a single winner, and shows that for every voting rule of this form, at least one of the following three things must hold:
In an election, a candidate is called a majority winner or majority-preferred candidate if more than half of all voters would support them in a one-on-one race against any one of their opponents. Voting systems where a majority winner will always win are said to satisfy the majority-rule principle, because they extend the principle of majority rule to elections with multiple candidates.
The majority favorite criterion is a voting system criterion that says that, if a candidate would win more than half the vote in a first-preference plurality election, that candidate should win. Equivalently, if only one candidate is ranked first by a over 50% of voters, that candidate must win. It is occasionally referred to simply as the "majority criterion", but this term is more often used to refer to Condorcet's majority-rule principle.
Bullet, single-shot, or plump voting is when a voter supports only a single candidate, typically to show strong support for a single favorite.
The Kemeny–Young method is an electoral system that uses ranked ballots and pairwise comparison counts to identify the most popular choices in an election. It is a Condorcet method because if there is a Condorcet winner, it will always be ranked as the most popular choice.
Later-no-harm is a property of some ranked-choice voting systems, first described by Douglas Woodall. In later-no-harm systems, increasing the rating or rank of a candidate ranked below the winner of an election cannot cause a higher-ranked candidate to lose.
In social choice theory, the independence of clones criterion says that adding a clone, i.e. a new candidate very similar to an already-existing candidate, should not spoil the results. It can be considered a very weak form of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) criterion.
The Borda count is a family of positional voting rules which gives each candidate, for each ballot, a number of points corresponding to the number of candidates ranked lower. In the original variant, the lowest-ranked candidate gets 0 points, the next-lowest gets 1 point, etc., and the highest-ranked candidate gets n − 1 points, where n is the number of candidates. Once all votes have been counted, the option or candidate with the most points is the winner. The Borda count is intended to elect broadly acceptable options or candidates, rather than those preferred by a majority, and so is often described as a consensus-based voting system rather than a majoritarian one.
Instant-runoff voting (IRV), also known as ranked-choice voting or the alternative vote (AV), combines ranked voting together with a system for choosing winners from these rankings by repeatedly eliminating the candidate with the fewest first-place votes and reassigning their votes until only one candidate is left. It can be seen as a modified form of a runoff election or exhaustive ballot in which, after eliminating some candidates, the choice among the rest is made from already-given voter rankings rather than from a separate election. Many sources conflate this system of choosing winners with ranked-choice voting more generally, for which several other systems of choosing winners have also been used.
In game theory and political science, Poisson games are a class of games often used to model the behavior of large populations. One common application is determining the strategic behavior of voters with imperfect information about each others' preferences. Poisson games are most often used to model strategic voting in large electorates with secret and simultaneous voting.
A major branch of social choice theory is devoted to the comparison of electoral systems, otherwise known as social choice functions. Viewed from the perspective of political science, electoral systems are rules for conducting elections and determining winners from the ballots cast. From the perspective of economics, mathematics, and philosophy, a social choice function is a mathematical function that determines how a society should make choices, given a collection of individual preferences.
STAR voting is an electoral system for single-seat elections. The name stands for "Score then Automatic Runoff", referring to the fact that this system is a combination of score voting, to pick two finalists with the highest total scores, followed by an "automatic runoff" in which the finalist who is preferred on more ballots wins. It is a type of cardinal voting electoral system.
The Tideman Alternative method, also called Alternative-Smithvoting, is a voting rule developed by Nicolaus Tideman which selects a single winner using ranked ballots. This method is Smith-efficient, making it a kind of Condorcet method, and uses the alternative vote (RCV) to resolve any cyclic ties.
The sincere favorite or no favorite-betrayal criterion is a property of some voting systems, that says voters should have no incentive to vote for someone else over their favorite. It protects voters from having to engage in a kind of strategy called lesser evil voting or decapitation.
The highest median voting rules are a class of graded voting rules where the candidate with the highest median rating is elected.