Israeli Special Forces' Operations in 2006

Last updated

IDF Special Operations
Part of the 2006 Lebanon War
DateJuly 12, 2006 – August 19, 2006
Location
Lebanon
Result

Israeli failure

    Belligerents
    Flag of Israel.svg Israel InfoboxHez.PNG Hezbollah
    Units involved
    Casualties and losses
    Two senior officers and five soldiers were killed

    Israeli Special Forces Operations in 2006 were part of the Second Lebanon War. Several commando units of the Israel Defence Forces launched dozens of operations against Hizbullah targets in Lebanon. [1] Most of these were never publicized and many may have consisted of intelligence-gathering probes into Lebanese territory.

    Contents

    Occupation of Maroun al-Ras

    An 18-man Maglan commando unit was ordered to attack a Hizbullah position on a hill near Maroun al-Ras. A further 76 Maglan soldiers were kept in reserve. The target was a recoil-less gun positioned near a former IDF outpost called Shaked, that had been firing at the Israeli military base at Avivim. The Maglan fighters climbed the hill before dawn and started to search for the Hizbullah position. Suddenly the Israeli soldiers realized that they had walked into a "Nature Reserve", a defensive system of bunkers, tunnels, concealed firing positions and CCTV surveyance.

    The Maglan force, of 18 soldiers, was surrounded and in the ensuing clashes, two Maglan fighters were killed, and nine others were wounded. The others, including the commanding officer, froze in panic. Maj. Amit Ze'evi, who took part in the mission as an outsider, took over command, slapping several soldiers into action. Reinforcements were quickly dispatched from the Maglan forces held in reserve. [2] [3] [4] [5]

    Further reinforcements were sent in quick succession. The paratroopers brigade was called in, but it in turn appeared to get into trouble. The Egoz special force unit was ordered to relieve the paratroopers. Tank regiments from several brigades were called in, to help evacuate the dead and the wounded and were attacked by Sagger missiles, injuring several tank crew members. By the end of the day thousands of Israeli soldiers were operating inside Lebanon. [6]

    After a week of fighting, the IDF had gained control of most of the village. By then eight Israeli soldiers had been killed, seven of whom belonged to special forces units (Maglan and Egoz). After the battle of Maroun al-Ras, strict rules were implemented. No vehicles were allowed into Lebanon, except heavy tanks (such as Merkava) or heavy Armoured Personnel Carriers (such as Achzarit). Israeli troops were not allowed to advance in daylight. Israeli forces were also forbidden from attacking Hizbullah Nature Reserves.

    First Baalbek operation

    Operation Sharp and Smooth was a joint operation between Sayeret Matkal, the commando unit of the General Staff and the Shaldag, the commando unit of the Israeli Air Force. During the night 1-2 August a combined force of 200 IDF commandos landed outside the city of Baalbek in eastern Lebanon. One force occupied a local hospital, Dar al-Hikma, believed by IDF to have contained an Hizbullah headquarter. The other force searched al-Usaira neighbourhood and conducted some arrests. The whole operation was completed within 4 – 6 hours. Many sources claim that the actual target of the raid was the capture or killing of senior Hizbullah leaders, but this was never officially clarified.

    The IDF initially claimed to have killed 10 Hizbullah operatives and taken another five Hizbullah prisoners. Israel later admitted that the five prisoners were civilians and released them three weeks later. [7] [8] According to Human Rights Watch 10 Lebanese civilians (including a whole family of Kurdish migrant workers) and four armed combatants (two from Hizbullah and two from the Lebanese Communist Party), were killed in the Israeli attack. [9] According to an official report of the Lebanese Internal Security Forces, 16 Lebanese were killed (two of whom from Hizbullah) and 13 were injured. [10]

    First Tyre Operation

    During the night between 4 – 5 August, a force from Shayetet 13, the commando force of the Israeli Navy, landed on a beach north of the city of Tyre in south Lebanon. The Israeli force attacked a second-floor apartment in an apartment building in the outskirts of the city. The Israeli force met violent resistance from the building and surrounding areas. According to statements from the IDF between six and ten Hizbullah fighters were killed, [11] [12] while Hizbullah only conceded one fatality. [13] Ten Israeli soldiers were wounded in the firefight.

    The target was a local Hizbullah leader, in charge of the launching of missiles. IDF initially claimed to have killed the leader, but later acknowledged that he got away. [14] [15] Hezbollah resumed rocket launching from the site within hours of the raid. [16]

    Second Tyre Operation

    Three days later, 40 IDF commandos launched another attack in the Tyre area of south Lebanon. This time the target was the coastal hill-top village of al-Bayyada, south of Tyre. The target seems to have been Hizbullah rocket launchers. The attack led to a firefight but no further details of this raid has been released by the IDF. [17] [18] According to Petrelli the commandos came from Shayetet 13. [19]

    Ten years after the Second Lebanon War, right-wing Israeli news site Walla! published a story about a Maglan operation called "Operation Beach Boys". It was based on interviews with three anonymous commanding officers of the Maglan unit. According to this report, dozens of Maglan soldiers were airlifted, early August, into South Lebanon, by helicopter. After hiding from a passing Hezbollah squad, the soldiers began calling in airstrikes against Hezbollah rocket launchers, [20] as well as headquarters, trucks, ammunition dumps, and other military infrastructure. According to an opinion piece in Jerusalem Post by Gal Perl Finkel a total of 150 Hezbollah targets, including 40 rocket launchers, were destroyed. The operation lasted 11 days before the soldiers were withdrawn, as a ceasefire came into effect. [21]

    Second Baalbek operation

    Sayeret Matkal commandos launched a second operation in the Baalbek region, about a week after the declaration of the cease fire in Lebanon. On 19 August, a force dressed up in Lebanese army uniforms was landed by helicopter close to the town of Bodai. The Israelis were confronted by Hizbullah forces and forced to abandon the mission and evacuate its forces.

    The commander of the IDF unit, Lt. Col. Emmanuel Moreno, was killed in the firefight, while two of his soldiers were wounded. Three Hizbullah fighters were also killed in the clash. Israel claimed that the aim of the operation was to prevent arms smuggling into Lebanon. Lebanese sources suggested that the target of the operation was Mohammad Yazbek, a senior Hizbullah leader who had his office in the town.

    Evaluation

    Prof. Kober (2006) maintains that the IDF operated under a number of false assumptions and beliefs that led to the failure of IDF to achieve its aims. Among them was the belief that the air force and special forces, together could "control" the territory of south Lebanon. There would be no need to conquer it. This would prove fatal, since there was no possibility to stop short range rockets without actually occupying the territory and destroying Hizbullah’s firing positions. [22]

    Winograd Commission’s report discussing "special operations" was mostly classified. Only a page and half were published in the official report. Its conclusions, however, are clear. Among senior levels of both Israeli politicians and military, there were exaggerated expectations that special operations would play a decisive role in the outcome of the war. This perception may have "contributed to the indecision at the political level". The decentralized organization of IDF's units of special forces also prevented their efficient use in the war. The Winograd commission characterized the relatively limited use of special forces to suppress Hizbullah rocket fire as "astonishing". [23]

    According to Israeli missile expert Uzi Rubin, Israeli special operations "[o]bviously… neither stopped the rocket fire nor slowed it down" but may have contributed, among other factors, to a shift of launching sites, away from the western sector. [24] However, looking at the numbers, Rubin finds no such effect. [25]

    Petrelli writes that the special operations' "tactical and strategic impact on the outcome of the conflict was negligible".The main aim of the special operations seems to have been the capture of senior Hezballah leaders. [26] In this regard the operations failed. As far is known, no Hizbullah commander was captured or killed by special forces' operations. The three highest ranking Hizbullah commanders killed in the war (Khalid Bazzi, Muhammad Qanso and Muhammad Surour) were all killed by air strikes. (See Hezbollah Commanders). No Hizbullah fighter was captured by special forces during the war. In fact, only four Hizbullah fighters were captured by IDF forces during the whole war. They were all captured by regular IDF forces during the battles of Ayta ash-Shaab, Shihin and al-Ghandouriya. [27]

    Leslau writes thar while "the SOF [Special Operations Forces] conducted impressive operations… which demonstrated the weakness of Hezbollah’s rear, they had no strategic utility and did not affect the progress or outcome of the war. They did not reduce the number of rockets fired against Israel, or weaken significantly the strength of Hezbollah’s military force". [28] The then-Chief of Staff Dan Halutz admitted that the "efficacy of the use made thereof was mediocre". [29] Prof. Kober writes that "The cumulative effect of the special units… and their contribution to the war effort was very limited." [30]

    Stratfor concluded in an analysis of the raid in Baalbek that Israel took large risks and allotted huge military resources in carrying out the raid "well in excess of its achievements." [31] Former chief of staff Moshe Ya'alon, a sharp critic of IDF conduct during the Lebanon war, questioned whether the raid on Baalbek was "justified in terms of risk, cost and benefit" and whether it was not simply "an adventure." [32]

    A recently retired member of the IDF General Staff characterized more than half of the wartime special missions as "feel good" operations marginally relevant or even counterproductive to the overall campaign. [33]

    Israeli historian and politician Michael Bar-Zohar and journalist Nissim Mishal wrote a book about the feats of Israeli special forces’ operations, titled "No Mission Is Impossible - The Death-Defying Missions of the Israeli Special Forces", published in 2015. Not a single operation in the Second Lebanon war was mentioned in the book. [34]

    IDF fatalities in Special Operations in 2006

    Maglan fighters killed 19 July 2006 in Maroun al-Ras

    Egoz fighters killed 20 July 2006 in Maroun al-Ras

    Sayeret Matkal officer killed 19 August 2006 in Buday, Baalbek

    Sources

    Related Research Articles

    This is a timeline of events related to the 2006 Lebanon War.

    Military operations of the 2006 Lebanon War refer to armed engagements initiated by Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah during the 2006 conflict.

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">South Lebanon conflict (1985–2000)</span> Conflict between Israel and Lebanon-based militant groups

    The South Lebanon conflict was an armed conflict that took place in Israeli-occupied southern Lebanon from 1982 or 1985 until Israel's withdrawal in 2000. Hezbollah, along with other Shia Muslim and left-wing guerrillas, fought against Israel and its ally, the Catholic Christian-dominated South Lebanon Army (SLA). The SLA was supported militarily and logistically by the Israel Defense Forces and operated under the jurisdiction of the Israeli-backed South Lebanon provisional administration, which succeeded the earlier Israeli-backed Free Lebanon State. Israel officially names the conflict the Security Zone in Lebanon Campaign and deems it to have begun on 30 September 1982, after the end of its "Operation Peace for Galilee". It can also be seen as an extension of the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990).

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Bint Jbeil</span> Key engagement in the 2006 Lebanon War

    The Battle of Bint Jbeil was one of the main battles of the 2006 Lebanon War. Bint Jbeil is a major town of some 20,000 inhabitants in Southern Lebanon. Although Brig.-Gen. Gal Hirsch announced on 25 July that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had "complete control" of Bint Jbeil, this statement was later discredited. In spite of three sustained attempts by the IDF to conquer the town, it remained in the hands of Hezbollah until the end of the war. The town was the scene of some of the fiercest fighting of the war, with both sides taking heavy losses. Three senior Israeli officers, including Major Roi Klein, were killed in the battle. Hezbollah similarly lost several commanders, most notably Khalid Bazzi, commander of the Bint Jbeil area.

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Maroun al-Ras (2006)</span> Engagement in the 2006 Lebanon War

    The Battle of Maroun al-Ras was a battle of the 2006 Lebanon War that took place in Maroun al-Ras, a small village in southern Lebanon on the border with Israel, and Jall ad-Dayr, a nearby Hezbollah stronghold. This battle was the first serious ground battle in the 2006 Lebanon war. It was fought to a large extent by elite forces on both sides and would have huge consequences for the future of the war. Although Israeli forces captured most of the town, they did not fully secure it.

    During the 2006 Lebanon War, Operation Sharp and Smooth, also known as the Baalbek operation, was an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raid on a hospital in the city of Baalbek, which was being used as a Hezbollah headquarters, and a neighbourhood of the city. The precise objectives of the raid remain classified, but it is known that a number of Lebanese, including Hezbollah and armed Lebanese Communist Party members, were killed, and five Lebanese civilians were arrested and detained in Israel as suspected Hezbollah members, but released after three weeks. The casualty figures for the raid vary. According to inquiries by Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Lebanese authorities 16 Lebanese residents, most of them civilians, were killed. According to IDF ten Hezbollah militants were killed in the attack.

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">Tyre raid</span> Israeli operation in the 2006 Lebanon War

    The Tyre raid was a night mission by the Israel Defense Forces naval commando unit, Shayetet 13, in Tyre, South Lebanon, on August 5, 2006. The target was an apartment building, allegedly housing Hezbollah leaders responsible for the rocket attack on Hadera a day earlier. The entire operation lasted 1 hour and 45 minutes.

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">2006 Hezbollah cross-border raid</span> Attack in the 2006 Lebanon War

    The 2006 Hezbollah cross-border raid was a cross-border attack carried out by Lebanon-based Hezbollah militants on an Israeli military patrol on 12 July 2006 on Israeli territory.

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">2006 Lebanon War</span> Armed conflict primarily between Israel and Hezbollah

    The 2006 Lebanon War, also called the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah War and known in Lebanon as the July War and in Israel as the Second Lebanon War, was a 34-day armed conflict in Lebanon, northern Israel and the Golan Heights. The principal parties were Hezbollah paramilitary forces and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The conflict started on 12 July 2006, and continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect in the morning on 14 August 2006, though it formally ended on 8 September 2006 when Israel lifted its naval blockade of Lebanon.

    The Battle of Ayta ash-Sha'b took place during the 2006 Lebanon War, when the Israel Defense Forces and the Islamic Resistance, the armed wing of Hezbollah, fought over the town of Ayta ash-Sha'b in southern Lebanon. Fighting in the general area took place throughout the war, starting with the 2006 Hezbollah cross-border raid. The town was subjected to two and a half weeks of intense bombardment by air and artillery, and fighting also took place in nearby towns. The battle for the Ayta ash-Sha'b itself lasted about two weeks, from late July to mid-August. The IDF deployed five brigades. The Hezbollah force in the town was estimated to consist of little more than half a company. Still the IDF failed to capture the town and suffered relatively heavy casualties in the process.

    The Operation Change of Direction 11 was the final offensive operation by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during the 2006 Lebanon War that began on August 11, 2006, and ended three days later when the ceasefire came into effect. It involved a tripling of Israeli forces inside Lebanon and aimed at encircling Hizbullah forces in south Lebanon. The plan was to advance westwards along the Litani River from the Galilee Panhandle, combined with helicopter landings behind enemy lines, intended to be the largest in IDF history, and simultaneous advances northwards in the central sector and along the Mediterranean coast. The plan was to follow up the offensive by several weeks of mopping-up operations in the surrounded territories, eliminating Hizbullah infrastructure, especially in the launching areas of Katyusha rockets.

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">2000–2006 Shebaa Farms conflict</span> Low-level conflict between Hezbollah and Israel

    The 2000–2006 Shebaa Farms conflict was a low-level border conflict between Israel and Hezbollah for control of Shebaa Farms, a disputed territory located on the Golan Heights–Lebanon border. Fighting between the two sides primarily consisted of Hezbollah rocket and mortar attacks on Israel and Israeli artillery barrages and airstrikes on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Clashes began a few months after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, which Hezbollah viewed as incomplete due to the presence of the Israel Defense Forces in Shebaa Farms. The conflict culminated in the 2006 Lebanon War; Israel retains control over the territory.

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">Shayetet 13</span> Special operations unit of the Israeli Navy

    Shayetet 13 is a unit of the Israeli Navy and one of the primary reconnaissance units of the Israel Defense Forces. Shayetet 13 specializes in sea-to-land incursions, counter-terrorism, sabotage, maritime intelligence gathering, maritime hostage rescue, and boarding. The unit is trained for sea, air and land actions. The unit has taken part in almost all of Israel's major wars, as well as other actions.

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">2005 Hezbollah cross-border raid</span>

    The 2005 Hezbollah cross-border raid was a failed attempt by Hezbollah to abduct Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers. It was the largest operation of this type mounted prior to the 2006 Lebanon War.

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">Maglan</span> Israeli commando and special forces unit

    Maglan is a sayeret (reconnaissance) unit of the Israeli Defense Forces, which specializes in operating behind enemy lines and deep in enemy territory using advanced technologies and weaponry. Maglan is part of the IDF's Commando Brigade, each commando unit goes through basic training with an infantry brigade, Maglan operators join the Paratroopers Brigade for basic training, and then go through an additional in-unit bootcamp and advanced training.

    Hezbollah Nature Reserves were a system of Hezbollah strongholds built in southern Lebanon between the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon 2000 and the 2006 Lebanon war. The term "Nature Reserve" was originally IDF slang and refer to the fact that they were primarily placed in the countryside away from habitation and were declared off-limits to the IDF during the war, due to fear of high casualties.

    Khalid Ahmad Bazzi was a Lebanese military commander who was the commander of Hezbollah's military wing, the Islamic Resistance in Lebanon. In the 2006 Lebanon War, he was commanding officer in the battles of Maroun ar-Ras and Bint Jbeil. The heavy Israeli casualties and lack of progress of its army in these two battles is widely seen as the main cause of the Israeli failure in the war.

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">Second Tyre Operation</span> Israeli raid on hezbollah base in 2006

    The Second Tyre Operation was an Israeli military operation, carried out by the Maglan unit of the Israeli Defense Forces during the 2006 Lebanon War, on August 3–15, 2006. The unit destroyed about 150 targets, including about 40 rocket launchers, in the western sector of southern Lebanon. According to Niccolò Petrelli, the commandos came from Maglan unit.

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">2024 Israeli invasion of Lebanon</span> Ongoing Israeli military operation against Lebanon

    On 1 October 2024, Israel began an invasion of southern Lebanon in an escalation of the ongoing Israel–Hezbollah conflict, a result of the spillover of the Israel–Hamas war. It followed a series of major attacks on Hezbollah in September that degraded its capabilities and devastated its leadership; beginning with the explosions of its communication devices, followed by a series of Israeli airstrikes targeting Hezbollah throughout Lebanon, and culminating in the 27 September assassination of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Some Israeli sources have called it the Third Lebanon War.

    <span class="mw-page-title-main">Battle of Maroun al-Ras (2024)</span> Israel-Hezbollah engagement

    The battle of Maroun al-Ras is an ongoing battle taking place during the 2024 Israeli invasion of Lebanon as part of the 2024 Israel–Hezbollah war. The battle began on 2 October 2024, when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) attempted to enter Maroun al-Ras in southern Lebanon, before being repelled by Hezbollah.

    References

    1. ↑ Petrelli (2012) p. 64
    2. ↑ Murphy (2010), p. 51
    3. ↑ Matthews (2006), p.43
    4. ↑ Harel and Issacharoff, p.132"
    5. ↑ Amos Harel and Amiram Barkat (2006-08-29). "The Battles in Lebanon / Maroun A-Ras / IDF ground operations in Lebanon began after 'unintentional' capture of Maroun A-Ras" . Retrieved Dec 4, 2011.
    6. ↑ Haaretz Staff and News Agencies (2006-07-20). "Thousands of IDF troops operating in S. Lebanon" . Retrieved Dec 4, 2011.
    7. ↑ KIFNER, John (August 23, 2006). "What's in a Name? Not, It Seems, a Leader of Hezbollah in Lebanon". The New York Times . Retrieved 2006-08-23.
    8. ↑ HRW, pp. 128-130
    9. ↑ HRW, pp. 126-127
    10. ↑ "تقرير أمني يقدّم المعلومات الرسمية عن إنزال بعلبك (A security report presents official information on the Ba'lbak landing)". al-Mustaqbal. Aug 3, 2006. Archived from the original on 16 December 2017. Retrieved Dec 28, 2011.
    11. ↑ Amos Harel (6 August 2006). "Commando raid in Tyre kills senior Hezbollah operatives". Haaretz. Retrieved 23 January 2012.
    12. ↑ Efrat Weiss (8 May 2006). "Tyre raid 'heroic operation'". Yedioth Ahronoth. Retrieved 18 January 2012.
    13. ↑ Blanford (2011) p.394
    14. ↑ Pedahzur, Ami, The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism, Columbia University Press, 2010, p. 132
    15. ↑ Amos Harel (1 June 2010). "Elite Shayetet unit often carries army's heaviest, most secretive burdens" . Retrieved 23 January 2012.
    16. ↑ Blanford (2011), pp. 393-94
    17. ↑ YAAKOV KATZ, AP, JPost.com staff (7 August 2006). "IDF commandos operate south of Tyre". Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 2 May 2021.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
    18. ↑ Nicholas Blanford (7 August 2006). "Viewing the War from a U.N. Relief Convoy". Time. Retrieved 25 May 2021.
    19. ↑ Petrelli (2012) p. 64
    20. ↑ "לשתק את משגרי חיזבאללה ולחמוק: מבצע "נערי החוף" של מגלן נחשף - וואלה! חדשות". News.walla.co.il. 2016-07-14. Retrieved 2016-07-24.
    21. ↑ Gal Perl Finkel, Don’t throw out the baby with the bath water, The Jerusalem Post, August 09, 2018.
    22. ↑ Kober (2006)
    23. ↑ Winograd Commission Final Report, p. 357-358
    24. ↑ Rubin (2007), p.19
    25. ↑ Rubin (2007), p.25
    26. ↑ Petrelli (2012) p. 64
    27. ↑ Aryeh Dayan (27 March 2007). "POWs or illegal combatants?" . Retrieved 5 June 2021.
    28. ↑ Leslau (2010)
    29. ↑ Leslau (2010)
    30. ↑ Kober, Avi (2008)
    31. ↑ "Lebanon: Israel's Strategic Raid on Baalbek". Stratfor. Aug 2, 2006. Retrieved June 1, 2012.
    32. ↑ Ari Shavit (2006-09-14). "No way to go to war". Haaretz. Retrieved Jun 4, 2010.
    33. ↑ "Hoisted by its own PR - Israel's gamble on high-risk ops hastened self-defeat in Lebanon". Armed Forces Journal. 1 April 2008. Retrieved 25 May 2021.
    34. ↑ Bar-Zohar, Michael and Nissim Mishal, No Mission Is Impossible - The Death-Defying Missions of the Israeli Special Forces, Ecco (2015)
    35. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Israel Ministry of foreign affairs. "Israel-Hizbullah conflict: Victims of rocket attacks and IDF casualties" . Retrieved 2011-11-10.
    This page is based on this Wikipedia article
    Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
    Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.