Using rockets fired on several Israeli towns as a diversion, Hezbollah militants crossed from Lebanon into Israel[3] and ambushed two Israeli Army vehicles, killing three soldiers and capturing two other soldiers. Another five soldiers were killed inside Lebanese territory in a failed rescue attempt. Hezbollah demanded the release of Lebanese prisoners held by Israel in exchange for the release of the captured soldiers. Israel refused and launched a large-scale ground and air campaign across Lebanon in response to the Hezbollah raid. This marked the start of the 2006 Lebanon War and the end of the 2000–2006 Shebaa Farms conflict. Two years later, on 16 July 2008, the bodies of the two captured soldiers were returned to Israel by Hezbollah in exchange for Samir Kuntar and four Hezbollah prisoners.
Hezbollah originally named the cross-border operation "Freedom for Samir Al-Quntar and his brothers", but eventually shortened it to "Operation Truthful Promise" (Arabic: عملية الوعد الصادق).[4]
In 2000 Israel suddenly reversed its policy towards Lebanon and after 18 years of occupation it withdrew from the southern part of the country. Hezbollah considered this a great victory. Between 2000–2006 Hezbollah built up an extensive network of advanced and sophisticated underground bunkers and tunnels in Southern Lebanon. It also acquired more advanced guided rockets and missiles during that time from Iran and Syria.[5]
According to Hezbollah Israel still occupied Lebanese territory. It did not recognize the "blue line" drawn by the United Nations. Most importantly it claimed the area of the so-called Shebaa farms which was occupied by Israel in 1967 in the war against Syria but according to Lebanon the area had been Lebanese. Later studies conducted by the United Nations has confirmed that the area in fact was Lebanese.[6]
In a landmark prisoner exchange via German mediation in January 2004, 450 Lebanese prisoners held in Israeli jails were exchanged for the bodies of three IDF soldiers in a 2000 raid and a captured IDF colonel. The long-time Lebanese prisoner Samir al-Quntar was excluded from the deal. The government of Israel, however, had agreed to a "further arrangement", whereby Israel would release Samir al-Quntar if it was supplied with "tangible information on the fate of captive navigator Ron Arad".[7]
According to Harel and Issacharoff the second phase of the prisoner exchange deal was only a "legal gimmick". Israel was not at all satisfied with the information provided by Hezbollah and refused to release Samir al-Quntar. "Cynics may well ask whether it was worth getting entangled in the Second Lebanon War just to keep Kuntar (…) in prison for an extra few years."[8]
The intelligence war between Hezbollah and Israel was heating up. Top Hezbollah official Ghaleb Awali was assassinated in a car bomb attack in the Dahiya in Beirut in July 2004. Israel was the main suspect. As Zvi Bar'el commented; "Awali's killing sends a new message: Israel can get to Hezbollah anywhere in Lebanon".[9] Hezbollah retaliated with sniper fire from Ayta ash-Sha'b which killed two Israeli soldiers at the Nurit post just across the border.[10]
In January 2005 Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah confirmed that "all options are open" concerning the means to get al-Quntar and the remaining prisoners back. The Lebanese government also demanded that Israel return all Lebanese prisoners and bodies to Lebanon.[11]
A third issue was Israel's systematic violations of Lebanese territory since its withdrawal in 2000. According to the speaker of the Lebanese parliament, Nabih Berri the Lebanese had violated the Blue Line less than 100 times between 2000 and 2006, while "the number of Israeli violations was 11,782 times, by air, sea and land" during the same time.[12]
On 21 November 2005, in a failed raid, Hezbollah sent in a team of its "Special Force" fighters using motorcycles and ATVs to either kill IDF soldiers or capture them alive. The fighters attacked a military outpost in the border village of Ghajar in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, manned by Israeli soldiers. The unit's marksman, 20-year-old Corporal David Markovitch, shot a rocket-propelled grenade being carried by the Hezbollah fighters, killing three, then shot and killed two more. Israel launched airstrikes on Southern Lebanon. During the brief clash, Hezbollah also fired katushya rockets at towns in northern Israel.[13][14]
On 28 May 2006, less than two months before the Lebanon War began, Hezbollah fired rockets into northern Israel in response to the killing in Lebanon of Mahmoud al-Majzoub, a top Palestinian Islamic Jihad leader. Israel retaliated by launching air strikes on Hezbollah bases in Lebanon and firing artillery across the border. The fighting was described as the most intense since the Israeli withdrawal in 2000, though it was over quickly due to a UN-sponsored cease fire.[15]
The IDF wanted to an avoid all out war with Hezbollah but was frustrated by the lack of action on the political and diplomatic level. It knew that Hezbollah was not interested in hitting Israeli civilian targets. It adopted a policy of "zero targets" implying that IDF presence was reduced to a minimum whenever the risk of Hezbollah kidnapping attempts was deemed to be high. Ironically, during alerts, the "red zones" along the border became off-limit to military personnel but were open to civilian traffic.[16] A few days before the abduction (8 July), Udi Adam, the head of Northern Command, out of uniform even took his wife for a drive in a civilian car in one of the red zones.[17]
The head of Northern Command Maj. Gen. Adam warned, only a day before the abduction, in a meeting with Prime Minister Olmert, Defence Minister Peretz Chief-of-Staff Halutz and some generals: "We’re on the verge of another crisis on the Lebanese border…It’s a stagnant swamp down there. If we don’t progress on the Shaba’a Farms issue and the Lebanese prisoners, this story will blow up and turn into a catastrophe. "[18]
In the months leading up to 12 July attack, Brigadier General Ishai Efroni reported seeing increased movement across the border fence, including more armed Hezbollah patrols. He had repeatedly seen burden-laden donkeys, which he had believed were being led by innocent farmers, but after the incident suspected were laden with arms and equipment. After the 28 May rocket attack, the general, who at 41 had spent much of his career along the northern border, "got the feeling something had changed big time."[19]
Hezbollah had created a deep underground bunker amongst the underbrush, just above the IDF armoured patrol track. The "camp was stocked with food, water, radios, ak-47 rifles, antitank missiles and diagrams detailing the insignia and size of Israeli military units."[19]
Israeli military intelligence was certain that Hezbollah was planning an attack, and correctly suspected that it would take place at a portion of the border known as Milepost 105, where the road that ran along the border dipped into a wadi, where IDF troops and humvees would be out of sight of nearby IDF observation posts and dug-in tanks, creating a "dead zone". On 27 June 2006, the IDF issued a high alert at Milepost 105, and stationed a team from the Egoz Reconnaissance Unit in ambush positions to intercept any Hezbollah raid. By 2 July, after no attack had come, the Egoz team withdrew.[20]
On the night of 11 July, IDF soldiers noted several reports of contact along the electric fence near Milepost 105, and an Israeli patrol spotted 20 Hezbollah fighters near the location, but this information never filtered down to IDF reserve units due to patrol the area on 12 July.[21]
The attack
The site of the cross-border raid
On the early morning of 12 July 2006, a ground contingent of Hezbollah fighters crossed the border into northern Israel, and used wire cutters and explosives to break the fence.[22] They hid in ambush in the wadi of Milepost 105. Another squad of Hezbollah fighters positioned itself in thick undergrowth on the Lebanese side of the border. At 2:20 AM, the IDF noted a "red touch", meaning that someone or something had touched the electric border fence, in the area adjacent to Milepost 105. An Israeli patrol scanned the area but did not spot the Hezbollah fighters who had crossed into Israel.[23]
At around 9:00a.m. local time (06:00 UTC), on 12 July 2006, the attack began. Hezbollah initiated diversionaryKatyusha rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli military positions and border villages, including Zar'it and Shlomi. Two civilians were wounded.[2][22][24][25][26][27][28] Simultaneously, Hezbollah fighters fired on seven army posts, knocking out surveillance cameras and command communications.
At about same time, the Hezbollah fighters in ambush positions at Milepost 105 attacked two Israeli armored Humvees carrying out a routine patrol in the area. Prior to the attack, one of the Hezbollah fighters, who was hiding among weeds with an anti-tank missile, had been spotted from a nearby IDF observation tower, but the tower was apparently unable to relay this information due to communication problems.[29] The two Humvees were manned by reservist soldiers. The lead Humvee, codenamed 4, contained four soldiers. The overall commander of the patrol, Ehud Goldwasser, sat in the commander's seat, next to the driver, Razak Muadi, while Eldad Regev and Tomer Weinberg sat in the back. The second Humvee, codenamed 4A, had three soldiers instead of the usual four. Shani Turgeman commanded the Humvee, while Wassim Nazal drove it and combat soldier Eyal Benin sat in the back. As the Humvees passed, the Hezbollah fighters waited for them to drive around the bend until they were completely exposed. As the trailing Humvee passed the highest point and began descending downward, the first Hezbollah squad on the Lebanese side of the border attacked the convoy by launching anti-tank missiles and heavy machine gun fire, which destroyed the second IDF Humvee. Nazal was killed when the Humvee was destroyed by anti-tank fire, while Turgeman and Benin survived the initial volley and were shot dead while attempting to escape from the burning vehicle. The Hezbollah squad on the Israeli side of the border shot two RPGs at the first Humvee from a short range. Goldwasser was killed and Regev and Weinberg were seriously wounded, while Muadi was slightly wounded. Muadi dragged Weinberg out and they managed to escape the vehicle and hide in nearby bushes. The second Hezbollah squad headed towards the first IDF Humvee and killed Regev and took Goldwasser and Regev's bodies, and escaped back into Lebanon in a waiting car and drove off through olive orchards to the Lebanese border village of Aita al-Shaab.[19][30] The entire incident took no more than 10minutes.[22]
During the incident, the command and communications room at the Zar'it military camp received reports of IDF units taking fire, and the explosions from Hezbollah rocket attacks in the Zar'it area were heard in the camp. IDF personnel were initially scrambling for information. The first Israeli soldier to understand what was happening was a Sergeant-Major who heard the report "4, 4A, collision" over the communications network. He then informed his company commander. As Milepost 105 was a known potential weak point, eight soldiers and officers set out towards that spot. Meanwhile, communications with units in the area were checked, which took time as the area was under fire and not all commanders could immediately respond. However, even before the check was completed, it was clear that Humvees 4 and 4A were not responding. About 45 minutes after the attack, eight soldiers and officers finally arrived at Milepost 105, just as Muadi had managed to report the attack to another soldier on his cell phone. After reaching the scene, the patrol encountered Muadi and Weinberg and the two destroyed Humvees, along with two bodies lying next to one of the Humvees with a third body visible inside. A quick count of the dead and wounded verified the fears of an abduction.[31]
The Hannibal Directive is an IDF order stating that abductions of Israeli soldiers must be prevented by all means, including shooting at or shelling a get-away car, thereby risking the lives of the captives. The Hannibal Directive was invoked and this triggered an instant aerial surveillance and airstrikes inside Lebanon to limit Hezbollah's ability to move the soldiers it had seized. "If we had found them, we would have hit them, even if it meant killing the soldiers," a senior Israeli official said.[32] Lt. Col. Ishai Efroni, deputy commander of the Baram Brigade, sent a Merkava Mark II tank, an armored personnel carrier and a helicopter in pursuit.[19] Crossing into Lebanon,[33] they headed down a dirt track lined with Lebanese border defenses.[19] However, they veered onto a road near a known Hezbollah outpost along the border. The tank was destroyed by an IED with an estimated 200–300 kilograms of explosives, killing the crew of four.[19][34] One soldier was killed and two were lightly wounded by mortar fire as they attempted to recover the bodies.
Originally Israel assumed that both captives were alive. In the end of July Vice Premier Shimon Peres assured the families of the captured that both were "alive and well".[35]
On 2 August, Israeli special forces raided the Dar al-Hikma hospital in Baalbek in the Bekaa valley, believed to be "the place where kidnapped soldiers... were treated after they were abducted". The soldiers were not found at the place.[36] The Lebanese minister Ali Hassan Khalil refers in his memoirs to a conversation he had with Hussein al-Khalil, a senior adviser to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in the beginning of August 2006. al-Khalil told him that the two soldiers both survived the capture but were killed weeks later by Israeli bombardment. There were however no suggestions that Israel deliberately had targeted the two prisoners. According to al-Khalil it was Hezbollah's use of heavy rockets and Israel's response by expanding the area of bombardment that led to the two Israelis' death. The IDF dismissed these claims as "blatant fabrications" and psychological warfare.[37] An examination of the bodies of Goldwasser and Regev later determined that the two reservists were killed during the initial cross-border attack and not in captivity. Goldwasser was killed by injuries to the chest sustained in the rocket-propelled grenade attack on his Humvee. Regev was shot in the head, possibly while he was trying to escape.[38]
The IDF confirmed the capture of the two Israeli soldiers on 13 July. They were both reservists on their last day of operational duty.[39]
Hezbollah released a statement saying "Implementing our promise to free Arab prisoners in Israeli jails, our strugglers have captured two Israeli soldiers in southern Lebanon."[40] Later on, Hassan Nasrallah declared that "No military operation will return them…[t]he prisoners will not be returned except through one way: indirect negotiations and a trade of prisoners."[41]
The incident prompted the start of the 2006 Lebanon War. Israel responded with airstrikes and artillery shelling of Hezbollah targets, and a naval blockade against Lebanon, followed by a ground invasion. During the war, the Hezbollah commander who organized the raid, Khalid Bazzi, was killed in an Israeli drone strike during the Battle of Bint Jbeil. After 34 days of fighting, a cease-fire came into effect. During the war, Israeli forces took four Hezbollah fighters prisoners, and captured the bodies of ten more.[42]
On 6 August the IDF announced one of the Hezbollah participants was captured in a commando operation.[43]
On 27 August 2006, Nasrallah denied in an interview with New TV that the capture of the two soldiers was the cause of the war. It only advanced a long planned war for a few months. But he added: "If there was even a 1 percent chance that the July 11 capturing operation would have led to a war like the one that happened, would you have done it? I would say no, absolutely not, for humanitarian, moral, social, security, military, and political reasons. […] What happened is not an issue of a reaction to a capturing operation… what happened was already planned for. The fact that it happened in July has averted a situation that would have been a lot worse, had the war been launched in October."[44]
On the other side, however; Israeli P.M. Ehud Olmert testified before the Winograd Commission that he had fully planned for an intensive war upon an abduction as early as March.[45]
Nasrallah stated on 31 October 2006 that indirect talks with Israel on hostage return had begun.[46]
Haaretz reported in March 2007 that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert testified to the Winograd Commission that several meetings regarding Hezbollah were held upon his taking office, and that in response to the likely scenario of soldiers again being abducted, he chose one of several plans of action instead of having to make a snap-judgement if and when such a scenario occurred.[47]
On 6 December 2006, a previously classified report released by Israel stated that the two soldiers were seriously wounded during the abduction.[1][48][49][50]
On 29 June 2008, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert declared the two captured soldiers dead. On 16 July 2008 Hezbollah swapped the bodies of Ehud and Eldad for Samir Kuntar, four Hezbollah fighters captured during the 2006 Lebanon war, and the bodies of 200 killed PLO and Hezbollah fighters, eight of whom were captured in the 2006 war.
IDF fatalities
Sgt.-Maj.(res.) Eyal Benin (5th Infantry Brigade), 22, of Beersheba
Sgt.-Maj.(res.) Shani Turgeman (5th Infantry Brigade), 24, of Beit Shean
Sgt.-Maj. Wassim Nizal (5th Infantry Brigade), 26, of Yanuah
St.-Sgt. Alexei Kushnirski (7th Armored Brigade), 21, of Nes Ziona
St.-Sgt. Yaniv Bar-On (7th Armored Brigade), 20, of Maccabim
Sgt. Gadi Mosayev (7th Armored Brigade), 20, of Akko
Sgt. Shlomi Yirmiyahu (7th Armored Brigade), 20, of Rishon Lezion
Sgt. Nimrod Cohen (Nahal Infantry Brigade), 19, of Mitzpe Shalem
IDF prisoners
Sgt Ehud Goldwasser (5th Infantry Brigade), 30, of Nahariya,
Sgt. Eldad Regev (5th Infantry Brigade), from Kiryat Mozkin
Ehud "Udi" Goldwasser was an Israeli soldier who was abducted in Israel by Hezbollah along with Eldad Regev on 12 July 2006, sparking the 2006 Lebanon War. His rank was First Sergeant.
Eldad Regev was an Israeli soldier captured by Hezbollah fighters along with Ehud Goldwasser on 12 July 2006 in Israel near the Lebanese border, sparking the 2006 Lebanon War. His rank was Sergeant First Class.
This is a timeline of events related to the 2006 Lebanon War.
The South Lebanon conflict, designated by Israel as the Security Zone in Lebanon Campaign, was a protracted armed conflict that took place in southern Lebanon from 1985 to 2000. It saw fighting between Israel and the Catholic Christian-dominated South Lebanon Army (SLA) against Hezbollah-led Shia Muslim and left-wing guerillas within the Israeli-occupied "Security Zone"; the SLA had military and logistical support from the Israel Defense Forces over the course of the conflict and operated under the jurisdiction of the Israeli-backed South Lebanon provisional administration, which succeeded the earlier Israeli-backed State of Free Lebanon. It can also refer to the continuation of the earlier conflict in this region involving the growing Palestinian insurgency in South Lebanon against Israel following the expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from Jordan after Black September. Historical tensions between Palestinian refugees and Lebanese factions contributed another layer to the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), which saw the Maronite-led Lebanese Front and the Shia Amal Movement at war with the PLO. Hence, the South Lebanon conflict can partly be seen as an extension of the civil war that ended in 1990.
The Battle of Bint Jbeil was one of the main battles of the 2006 Lebanon War. Bint Jbeil is a major town of some 20,000 inhabitants in Southern Lebanon. Although Brig.-Gen. Gal Hirsch announced on 25 July that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) had "complete control" of Bint Jbeil, this statement was later discredited. In spite of three sustained attempts by the IDF to conquer the town, it remained in the hands of Hezbollah until the end of the war. The town was the scene of some of the fiercest fighting of the war, with both sides taking heavy losses. Three senior Israeli officers, including Major Roi Klein, were killed in the battle. Hezbollah similarly lost several commanders, most notably Khalid Bazzi, commander of the Bint Jbeil area.
The Battle of Maroun al-Ras was a battle of the 2006 Lebanon War that took place in Maroun ar-Ras, a small village in southern Lebanon on the border with Israel, and Jall ad-Dayr, a nearby Hizbullah stronghold. This battle was the first serious ground battle in the 2006 Lebanon war. It was fought to a large extent by elite forces on both sides and would have huge consequences for the future of the war. Although Israeli forces captured most of the town, they did not fully secure it.
During the 2006 Lebanon War, Operation Sharp and Smooth, also known as the Baalbek operation, was an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) raid on a hospital in the city of Baalbek, which was being used as a Hezbollah headquarters, and a neighbourhood of the city. The precise objectives of the raid remain classified, but it is known that a number of Lebanese, including Hezbollah and armed Lebanese Communist Party members, were killed, and five Lebanese civilians were arrested and detained in Israel as suspected Hezbollah members, but released after three weeks. The casualty figures for the raid vary. According to inquiries by Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Lebanese authorities 16 Lebanese residents, most of them civilians, were killed. According to IDF ten Hezbollah militants were killed in the attack.
The 2006 Lebanon War, also called the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah War and known in Lebanon as the July War and in Israel as the Second Lebanon War, was a 34-day military conflict in Lebanon, northern Israel and the Golan Heights. The principal parties were Hezbollah paramilitary forces and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). The conflict started on 12 July 2006, and continued until a United Nations-brokered ceasefire went into effect in the morning on 14 August 2006, though it formally ended on 8 September 2006 when Israel lifted its naval blockade of Lebanon. Due to unprecedented Iranian military support to Hezbollah before and during the war, some consider it the first round of the Iran–Israel proxy conflict, rather than a continuation of the Arab–Israeli conflict.
The Battle of Ayta ash-Sha'b took place during the 2006 Lebanon War, when the Israel Defense Forces and the Islamic Resistance, the armed wing of Hezbollah, fought a 33 days battle for the town of Ayta ash-Sha'b and the neighboring villages of Ramiya, al-Qawzah and Dibil in southern Lebanon. The initial phase of the battle consisted of two and a half weeks of intense bombardment by air and artillery, followed by more than two weeks of intensive fighting in and around the town. The IDF deployed five brigades against an Hizbullah force consisting of litte more than half a company. Still the IDF failed to capture the town and suffered relatively heavy casualties in the process.
The Operation Change of Direction 11 was the final offensive operation by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during the 2006 Lebanon War that began on August 11, 2006, and ended three days later when the ceasefire came into effect. It involved a tripling of Israeli forces inside Lebanon and aimed at encircling Hizbullah forces in south Lebanon. The plan was to advance westwards along the Litani River from the Galilee Panhandle, combined with helicopter landings behind enemy lines, intended to be the largest in IDF history, and simultaneous advances northwards in the central sector and along the Mediterranean coast. The plan was to follow up the offensive by several weeks of mopping-up operations in the surrounded territories, eliminating Hizbullah infrastructure, especially in the launching areas of Katyusha rockets.
The 2000–2006 Shebaa Farms conflict was a low-level border conflict between Israel and Hezbollah for control of Shebaa Farms, a disputed territory located on the Golan Heights–Lebanon border. Fighting between the two sides primarily consisted of Hezbollah rocket and mortar attacks on Israel and Israeli artillery barrages and airstrikes on Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Clashes began a few months after the 2000 Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, which Hezbollah viewed as incomplete due to the presence of the Israel Defense Forces in Shebaa Farms. The conflict culminated in the 2006 Lebanon War; Israel retains control over the territory.
The 2008 Israel–Hezbollah prisoner exchange took place on 16 July 2008 when Hezbollah transferred the coffins of two Israeli soldiers in exchange for 5 Lebanese militants held by Israel as well as the bodies of 199 militants captured in Lebanon or Israel.
The 2000 Hezbollah cross-border raid occurred at the boundary between Lebanon and the Golan Heights on October 7. Hezbollah militants captured three Israeli soldiers while they were patrolling the security fence, and subsequently took them into Lebanon. While the time and circumstances of the three soldiers' deaths remain unknown, their bodies were returned to Israel in a prisoner exchange on 29 January 2004.
Samir Kuntar was a Lebanese Druze member of the Palestine Liberation Front and Hezbollah. He was convicted of terrorism and murder by an Israeli court. After his release from prison as part of the 2008 Israel–Hezbollah prisoner exchange, he received Syria's highest medal, was honored by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and was designated a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the US government.
The 2005 Hezbollah cross-border raid was a failed attempt by Hezbollah to abduct Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers. It was the largest operation of this type mounted prior to the 2006 Lebanon War.
Events in the year 2006 in Israel.
The Hannibal Directive is the name of a controversial procedure that was used by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) until 2016 to prevent the capture of Israeli soldiers by enemy forces. According to one version, it says that "the kidnapping must be stopped by all means, even at the price of striking and harming our own forces." It was introduced in 1986, after a number of abductions of IDF soldiers in Lebanon and subsequent controversial prisoner exchanges. The full text of the directive was never published, and until 2003, Israeli military censorship forbade any discussion of the subject in the press. The directive has been changed several times, until it was officially revoked in 2016 by IDF chief of staff Gadi Eizenkot. The Directive's replacement has not been published.
Hezbollah Nature Reserves were a system of Hezbollah strongholds built in southern Lebanon between the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon 2000 and the 2006 Lebanon war. The term "Nature Reserve" was originally IDF slang and refer to the fact that they were primarily placed in the countryside away from habitation and were declared off-limits to the IDF during the war, due to fear of high casualties.
Israeli Special Forces Operations in 2006 were part of the Second Lebanon War. Several commando units of the Israel Defence Forces launched dozens of operations against Hizbullah targets in Lebanon. Most of these were never publicized and many may have consisted of intelligence-gathering probes into Lebanese territory.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply. Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.
Israel 
Hezbollah 
