![]() A store in Chesterfield County running low on bottled water due to the outage. | |
Date | January 6–11, 2025 |
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Location | Greater Richmond Region |
In January 2025, the city of Richmond, Virginia and its surrounding localities suffered water distribution outages due to a blizzard which impacted much of the United States. [1] The issues started on the morning of Monday, January 6, and were mostly resolved by Saturday, January 11. The localities' water systems are interconnected, meaning that problems in Richmond City led to problems across the region. Richmond was the most impacted, followed by Henrico to the immediate north. Henrico is bordered on the north by Hanover County and on the east by Goochland County, which also faced some impacts. Chesterfield County, to the south of Richmond, was impacted very little, as they were able to effectively switch water sources and have very few customers who directly receive water from the city.
The event was preceded by many years of flooding at the plant and followed by multiple issues, including an over-application of fluoride in April; another instance of low water pressure, this time due to raw water intake filters getting clogged, in May; and a major water main break that impacted service in Henrico County and lead to the declaration of a state of emergency.
During the crisis itself, boil-water advisories were issued for all of Richmond and Henrico, parts of Hanover and Goochland, and for 27 people in Chesterfield. These regional partners had to adapt by shutting off their own water supply from Richmond, which caused impacts there, particularly in Henrico County.
Communication issues between the city and Henrico County, and between the city and its water customers, contributed to response difficulties. Impacts were widely felt, with hospitals, schools, and sporting events being among those facing cancellations and service interruptions. Cooperation among localities and between localities and the private sector helped to mitigate some of the issues.
The event had political implications, because the Virginia General Assembly had to recess until Monday, January 13; they had originally been scheduled to start their session on Wednesday. Governor Glenn Youngkin activated the Virginia National Guard, which was made easier because of the state of emergency that had been declared earlier in the week. He called for an after-action review to more fully understand the crisis. Further, Jason Miyares, the Attorney General of Virginia, said that he would aggressively prosecute price gouging. The outage happened roughly a week into newly elected mayor Danny Avula's administration, and multiple commentators discussed his performance.
Full water service was returned by Thursday and Friday, January 9 and 10, but the boil-water advisory was not lifted until the afternoon of Saturday, January 11 due to testing requirements mandated by the Virginia Department of Health's (VDH) Office of Drinking Water (ODW). These were also required for Henrico County. [2]
Multiple state regulators and outside reviewers pointed to a lack of speedy information-sharing as contributing to the crisis, and the crisis put the issue at the head of legislators' minds, although people had brought up the issue beforehand. [3]
Multiple internal and external investigations were held to determine the causes of the crisis and the next steps for the affected localities, the region as a whole, and the state. Richmond's audit identified infrastructure, communication, and planning struggles as the main cause of the crisis. The reports of Hanover and Henrico focused on how communication failures from the city hampered their ability to respond.
The City of Richmond had declared a State of Emergency in preparation for the storm, [4] as had the Commonwealth of Virginia. [5]
Reports vary as to the exact nature of failures at the plant. The variation especially depends on the sources' publication date, as new information has continued to come to light. The timeline is somewhat unclear.
During previous crises, workers with specialized expertise in electrical and control systems had been assigned to the plant for overnight shifts, but this did not happen on the night before the crisis. Two maintenance staff were assigned to overnight snow removal, but one went home early. [6] Bingham had been on vacation from December 20th to January 3. [7]
At 4:25 am on Monday, January 6, a power bump was experienced at Richmond city's water treatment plant on Douglasdale Road, which was related to the larger power issues experienced across the region as a result of the January 5–6, 2025 blizzard across the United States. A work order was sent in for this issue at 4:42 am. The work order stated that the "VFDs" would restart, reach 20% speed, shut off, and then start the cycle again. [8]
At 5:45 [6] or 5:50 am, [9] a full power outage occurred. [10] The bus tie and switchgear failed in their task of transferring to the other power source; the switchgear had a faulty coil. [11] [12] An employee's email noted that there was no power at the plant, and that battery power was low. [8] An electrical supervisor was called in, but there was no one at the plant with electrical expertise. However, a plant electrician arrived early for their 6:00 am shift, but it was unclear if that electrician was trained in manually starting the generators or switching between power feeds. [6]
By 5:55 am, the plant was flooded. [7] Filter gallery valves became stuck, allowing water to flood into the basement where the electrical and computer equipment was located. [10] A later report said that water reached a depth of up to 12 to 13 feet in some areas in less than 12 minutes. [13]
At 6:30 am, an employee sent an email stating that "effluent flow" was going over; where it was going over is unclear, as the email had been partially redacted. [8]
At 6:50 am, Dominion Energy was notified that power had gone out. [14] At 6:55 am, Bingham was contacted by the plant's superintendent to say that the plant had lost power, and thus its water-production capabilities, and that crews were responding to assess and repair the damage. The superintendent headed in, with an ETA less than 30 minutes. Bingham reached out to the counties to cut back on demand. [8]
When power was lost, a process at the plant failed as it tried to transfer to a secondary Dominion Energy source. A plant electrician chose to manually complete this process, rather than activating backup generators. [9] [13] The HNTB report said that this would have been the correct decision, had the staff member been trained correctly; [13] employees were fearful that further damage might be caused to electrical equipment if the generators were turned on while the Dominion feed was still active. [12] In a press briefing, Avula stated that he didn't know when the plant electrician had arrived. [9] Further, only 3 operators were present at the plant at the time of the outage, [15] none of them electrical employees. [13]
At around 7:00 am, Bingham directed a staffer to not post anything about the plant's issues. [16]
At 7:05 am, power was restored by the electrical supervisor. [6] At 7:09 am, the water plant superintendent sent a text to Bingham stating that the generators were on, the surrounding counties had been notified, and that additional time would be needed to assess the situation and respond to it. [17]
At 7:16 am, power had been restored, but the plant's maintenance engineer said that they were dealing with a flooding issue. [8]
The plant's IT system did not reconnect to servers after a reboot, which was crucial for plan operations. Earlier reports indicated that this is when critical damage was caused to the IT system, [10] [18] called SCADA. [14] The system had battery backup power, called an Uninterruptible power supply (UPS), but, concurrently with the manual switch to the power system, that went offline before full power was restored. [9] An RVAMag report said that the IT battery backup system ran out too quickly, [19] after about an hour into the two-hour power loss. [14] Also at this time, a Chesterfield County official reached out to Bingham to see if the city needed assistance in working with Dominion Energy to prioritize issues at the plant; she stated that electricians were at the plant and that backup generators were functioning. This contradicts what Avula said later about the generators not being turned on; yhe Richmonder reports that his explanation was correct and that it was unclear why the texts incorrectly reported the situation; city officials declined to answer questions relating to this inconsistency. [17]
Early reports indicated that backup generators turned on, but a separate battery backup and a redundant system both failed. [10] [1] Also, two other backup batteries were offline at the time. [20] Additional reports indicated that the generators were intended as replacements for the battery, and had to be manually activated; Richmond officials declined to answer when asked by CBS 6 News the length of time between the backup batteries failing and the generators being turned on. Further, Mayor Avula said that a failure in a redundant system caused the plant to flood, damaging equipment. [14]
Avula reported that workers were in the basement and trying to pump water out. [10] He said that there was a delay of a couple of hours between the power outage to the time that water started building up in the facility. [14] Water was flowing into the basement at a rate of around 42,000 gallons per minute, whereas the city's dewatering pumps could each only handle 1,700 gallons per minute. [12]
Not all plant employees had radios, leading to confusion during repairs as to which employees were where. Further, power restorations were done haphazardly, without workers being notified. [6] The division between operations and maintenance staff led to communications issues, as operations staff felt helpless and that the best course of action would be to let the maintenance staff handle the situation. The after-action report notes that the decision to transfer the power source from the primary to the secondary was correct and would have been effective, had trained staff been at the plant. [6]
Bingham arrived at the facility around 8:00 am. [7]
Chesterfield County reported that its Utilities Department was notified at approximately 7 am on Monday, January 6 of the situation and asked to limit water usage from the city. The county began the process of transitioning off of that supply to help the city maintain its water pressure, which is a standard response by the department in these types of situations. It augmented its supply by pulling more water from the Appomattox River Water Authority. [21]
Avula stresses that initial communication happened at around 9:00 am, but the HNTB report says that this was only to notify them of a temporary power loss and not the actual dire nature of the situation at the plant. [6]
As of 9:39 am, power had been restored to the plant. The surrounding counties of Hanover, [22] Henrico, and Chesterfield chose to disconnect themselves from the city's water system in order to help preserve water for the city. [10] [22]
At 10 am, Bingham was told by an employee that a boil-water advisory would be necessary. [7]
For the next several hours, crews focused on getting the plant's computer and mechanical systems back in operation. Water consumption increased and the city's reservoir dropped noticeably. Some city residents began to notice major issues with water pressure. City officials chose to not issue a boil-water advisory at this time because they hoped that it would not be necessary. [10]
At 11:51 am, Bingham sent a text about a possible water-boil notice, but said that she was hopeful that the city could refill its reservoir and avoid further issues by restoring service at the plant. Avula and his team seemed unaware of the importance of the situation at the plant until later on this day. [17]
A regional telephone call occurred at around 2:45 pm in which surrounding localities were made aware of the extreme nature of the situation: that the water plant remained offline and that city water tank reserves were continuing to decline. [21] Henrico County officials urged the city to notify the public as soon as possible; [16] some Richmond residents reported lower or no water pressure before the official announcement of problems at the plant. [23] Chesterfield County isolated its water distribution system from the city's supply by shutting down all three interconnection points between its water supply and the city's. The process was completed by 4:00 pm. [21]
The VDH reached out to the city around 2:50 pm, after hearing about the situation from a third party. [3]
At around 3:00 pm, as Avula and his team became more aware of the situation, he sent a text to a state health official to ask for assistance with mass communication specifically to the restaurant community. [17]
Safe water continued to flow to water customers until around 4:30. [24] At 4:26 pm, the city announced an immediate boil-water advisory, [25] which had not happened in the city since Hurricane Isabel in 2003. City residents were also asked to try and conserve as much water as possible. [10] [22] According to Mayor Avula, the communication delay came from a desire to contact regional stakeholders before informing city residents and to give people accurate information. [24] Bingham said in the press release that her team was working to bring the water system back online, along with the support of others. [22] 230,000 people had been reported to have been experiencing very low water pressure before the city was placed on the advisory. [1] Multiple officials inquired to Bingham about rumors circulating on social media about low water pressure. [17] The first water-crisis-related post to WebEOC was made around this time. [16]
At 5:15 pm, Mayor Avula held an emergency news conference. He announced that they had cleared out the facility's flooding and that eight filters were operational. He also announced his intention to resume producing water later that evening and restore pressure by 10:00 pm. [10]
At 5:30 pm, a VDH official arrived at the plant; the city had not reported its issues to the state office, which had learned about the crisis from a "third party." The official was not able to make contact with anyone at the plant or gain access until 6:50 pm. [6]
At 8:30 pm, Bingham texted interim city Chief Administrative Officer Sabrina Joy-Hogg that she had contacted the neighboring counties requesting assistance with the SCADA system and that she was losing confidence in their SCADA contractor. [17]
On Monday evening, John Littel, Governor Youngkin's chief of staff, informed Avula that Youngkin was calling the chairman of General Electric (GE) after Avula reported that a GE subsidiary, GE Vernova, had made the software. Both GE and Dominion offered assistance with the SCADA system. [17] Also on Monday evening, the county managers of both Chesterfield and Henrico, along with former mayor Levar Stoney, texted Avula offering assistance with the situation. [17]
At 10:52 pm, Bingham texted Joy-Hogg once more that no progress had yet been made with the SCADA system. [17]
Before midnight, the city provided an update, saying that the issues still had not been fixed and that Mayor Avula was going to spend the night at the water plant to oversee restoration efforts. [10]
On the evening of Monday, January 6, the Chesterfield Utilities Department delivered by hand 27 notifications to customers near the Chesterfield-Richmond line that received water directly from the city's water distribution system. These customers were informed to follow the boil-water and conservation advisories issued by the city. They were unable to be supplied by the county's water distribution system because of geographic constraints and pressure concerns. [26]
Henrico's quick rerouting of water services from the city's water facility [27] worked briefly [28] until an overnight Sandston water main break, [29] took pressure from the water lines in eastern Henrico, especially in the Sandston and White Oak areas. [27] The break was located near the Antioch Recreational Community Pool and occurred overnight. [30] Essentially, leaks in the system were caused as water rushed the system towards open valves leading to Richmond, which cut off water service to large parts of northern and eastern Henrico. [28]
At the same time the crisis was unfolding on Monday morning, DPU was also facing issues with its call center. Given that the city had closed its offices on Monday for the snowstorm, the DPU offices should have activated their outgoing call message. Yet, text message and email evidence shows that, while the issue was brought up with DPU and Department of Information Technology (DIT) officials around 7pm on Saturday, the issue was not fixed until 8:40 am Monday. [31]
Additionally, optimism among officials regarding their ability to return the plant to operational status, along with not immediately grasping the magnitude of the problem, led to a slowness in communicating water issues to residents, although the city began receiving calls and emails around 3pm. Call center officials were soon told to stop scheduling service orders due to the plant's failure. [31]
On Tuesday, January 7, 24 hours after the failure of the city water plant, Hanover County's storage tanks, which were supplying Mechanicsville, ran out. Meanwhile, Ashland's demands increased and the Doswell plant was unable to provide additional water, despite maximizing its production. [32]
At 8:15 am, the mayor reported that they had had the most positive step of the last 12 hours [10] which was the fact that two pumps had started actively running and that one of the tanks was actively being filled; [10] additionally, computer systems had been restored. [33] However, water service was still not restored for much of the city. [10]
At 12:33 pm, the city announced that water production had been restored, [10] [1] but that it would be several hours before pressure returned to normal levels, [10] and that the boil-water advisory would remain in effect. [1]
At 6:20 pm, city officials reported that the plant experienced an electrical failure, which extended the timeline for the restoration of water service. [10] [1] The failure forced a system reset. [24] Initially, engineers employed by the city believed that the malfunction would not cause significant delays, but further analysis revealed the presence of a more complex issue, requiring additional time and resources. [33]
In a statement, Avula said that service teams remained on duty 24/7 to re-pressurize the water system and restore water distribution throughout the city. [33]
Hanover County officials placed those portions of the county east of Interstate 95 under a boil water advisory. However, residents in Doswell were exempt. [26] Residents west of the interstate are also asked to continue to conserve water; [34] residents of the Town of Ashland were also asked to continue conserving water. [35] Officials said that the order was a precaution due to low water pressure. According to the county, the order was to remain in effect until 48 hours after Richmond's water service is fully restored. [34]
Residents on Aqua Virginia systems were encouraged to contact them for updates. [26]
Pressure was expected to be restored to eastern and northern the afternoon of Tuesday, January 7. [27] [23] However, this was not the case.
In the afternoon, Henrico workers were able to repair the Sandston break, but realized shortly after that a number of valves in the county water system would need to be closed or reversed to allow water to flow in a new direction before the system could be re-energized. According to County Manager John Vithoulkas, that process had to be extremely slow, because going too fast puts the pipe at risk of exploding. [30]
On the night of January 7, Henrico crews finished closing two large valves to push water from Western to eastern Henrico, which did succeed in pushing more water to the eastern end of the county, but was still insufficient in providing full water service to eastern residents. [27]
Many of the Henrico workers involved had been working for 14 or 15 hours, spending most of that time in freezing temperatures. [30]
January 7 and 8 were the peaks of Henrico's water issues, with roughly 24,000 customers being without water. [36]
At 9:30 am on Wednesday, January 8, Avula reported that 3 pumps were up and running, 12 filters had become operational, and that water was starting to fill the reservoir. [10] [1] He said that a return to partial pressure was possible as the day went on. [10] The city's plant then began to fill the Church Hill water tank; one of its roles is to serve eastern Henrico's Elko region. [28]
Hanover County reported, given the filling of the reservoir, which provides water service to the affected Mechanicsville area, their hope that water service would be returned by late afternoon into early evening. [37]
In an afternoon press conference, Mayor Avula said that the plant was producing 69 million gallons per day. He said that once water levels and the city's main reservoir were able to stay above 10 feet, testing could begin to ensure that the water was safe for human consumption. Regulations require the water system to pass two rounds of 24-hour testing at least 16 hours apart before the boil-water advisory can be lifted. He repeated the request to Richmonders to use their water sparingly. [26] He said that 5 pumps and 15 filters were then operational. [38] The city conducted its first bacteriological test of water in the water plant, which came back clean. [2]
At 5:45 pm, Hanover County reported that they were optimistic that water service would be fully restored to areas east of Interstate 95 by Thursday, January 9. According to Matt Longshore, Hanover Director of Public Utilities, water pressure began returning to affected Hanover homes on this day and that progress would continue throughout the night and into the next day as pipelines were refilled. [32]
At 8:30 pm, Hanover's water pumps were turned on. [39]
The water service of about 6,000 Henrico customers had been restored since January 6, but roughly another 23,000 remained without service. Chan indicated that customers could expect to hear gurgling, see discoloration or frothy and aerated water, or experience mineralization, which he said was normal and not something to be alarmed by; he said that customers experiencing this should flush their faucets by running them for a few minutes. [40]
VDH issued a boil-water advisory in Eastern Henrico as residents started getting water again after the pressure drop, which county officials extended to all of its water customers due to the interconnected nature of its systems. [41] At the Tuckahoe Area Library, [40] county manager John Vithoulkas said in a press conference that the VDH did not realize that once water is in their system, there would be no way to prevent water in Eastern Henrico from going to Western Henrico." [26] The department expected advisories region-wide to be in effect through January 9. [1]
Public utilities director Bentley Chan said that the boil water advisory was a precaution for anything that may come through the "first push" of water. [40] He said that Henrico is not required to conduct the same tests within Its distribution system as the city's water plant, but may choose to do so. [40]
A boil-water advisory was issued for residents of Goochland County's eastern end, an area that receives its water from Henrico County. This includes residents in the James River Estates and Pagebrook subdivisions in its Eastern End, who are customers of Aqua Virginia. [41]
Further, some customers of Aqua Virginia in Hanover County, who connect to County water, were encouraged to boil their water; this includes the Holly Ridge, Mayfield Farms, and Burnside subdivisions; it is unclear when these recommendations were made. [32]
Throughout the morning, Henrico crews blocked off any remaining interconnects between the city of Richmond and Henrico. While there was no risk of contaminated water coming into the Henrico system from those valves previously, since the county was now attempting to restore pressure in its own water system, it had been losing water through those valves into the city. [27]
It was believed that Henrico customers would be able to have access to water by the morning, but this turned out to be untrue. After crews finished closing the remaining large water valves, they realized that 14 other, smaller interconnect valves along the Henrico-Richmond line had to be closed as well. These valves will eventually have to be returned to their normal state one at a time, but this will not impact service. [42]
Once the Richmond-Henrico interconnect valves were closed, Henrico Public Utilities crews began working on filling up the Laburnum/Azalea pressure zone with water from the Greater Hermitage Zone. Once that is complete, water will be fed from there into the Greater Eubank Zone. However, the process may be lengthy, because there has never before been the need to send this level of water from western to eastern Henrico. [27]
However, the process was tedious, and water was slow in refilling the affected areas." [28] Thus, the county returned to its strategy of getting water from the city. [28]
At 5:45 am on Thursday, January 9, the city announced that it would provide an update on water issues at 9:30 am, but later rescheduled this press conference for noon. [43]
Just before 9:00 am, city officials reported that the city reservoir was almost full, [28] at 17 feet, [44] and that 8 out of 9 water zones were back in service; 9 water zones is the target.They announced that testing will commence when the ninth zone reaches its desired threshold. [28]
Much of Henrico's Route 5 corridor near the city line, along with Highland Springs and Sandston near Richmond International Airport, remained without water, although some Highland Springs residents did report a slow trickle of water. Customers living farther east along Route 5 near I-295 reported at least low water pressure. Additionally, residents along South Laburnum Avenue near Nine Mile Road, in the Central Gardens community, and in the Glen Lea area reported having low or full water pressure. [28]
At 9:55 am, Hanover county officials said that the water system was almost back to normal, but that a boil-water advisory was expected to last until early in the weekend. Water testing began this day and it was expected to take up to 48 hours for the advisory to be lifted. [43]
In the morning, Henrico's Varina District Supervisor, Tyrone Nelson, posted a video to social media announcing that the 23,000 customers in Eastern and Northern Henrico could be receiving water on this day unless something unforeseen happened. [28] He said that water had begun reaching many affected communities in eastern and northern Henrico on the night of January 8. He further stated that those county residents previously without water would see their water returning on this day. Residents may experience trickles of water flow gurgling in the pipes, or air pressure. He said that in twelve hours, the county would be in a much better place than it was now. [28] The boil-water advisory was planned to remain for all of Thursday. [28]
Also in the morning, VDH called the affected localities and shortened its required waiting period between water system tests from 24 hours to 16 hours for the city and surrounding localities. [2]
Before noon, officials in Hanover reported that water services had been restored to residents east of Interstate 95. Their boil-water advisory stayed in effect for those east of I-95 and is planned to remain so for the next 48 hours. Hanover Director of Public Utilities Matt Longshore said that any water discoloration noticed by residents is normal. To solve discoloration, Longshore recommended that customers flush their service line with an outside faucet, then flushing each indoor fixture with cold water, one at a time, until it ran clear. Residents were encouraged to continue to conserve water as full pressure was restored. [39]
Between 11 am and 12 pm, tests of water within the city's distribution center were conducted. If those tests, along with tests conducted 16 hours later, were clean, the city planned to lift its boil-water advisory sometime Friday, January 10. [2]
At noon, city officials said that water pressure had been fully restored [43] and that the city reservoir had filled to its maximum of 18 feet. He announced that additional personnel would be at the plant to prepare for the winter storm that was expected for January 10, including technicians, mechanics, electricians, and engineers; battery backups and generators were also tested at the plant ahead of the winter storm. Avula also announced that officials had decided to postpone billing for water services in January. [44]
The news of Richmond's restored water pressure news meant that Henrico was closer to an end to the crisis. Henrico Public Utilities Director Bentley Chan said that the city was supplying 6 million gallons of water per day to the county, which is about half of its normal rate. While the water was lower in terms of pressure and flow, it was moving at a higher rate of speed than expected. [2]
Early in the afternoon, the first Hanover water sample was sent to a state-certified laboratory once water service was restored. The next round of testing was set for early afternoon on January 10. [39]
The water service of many Henrico residents' water was restored by this day. [28]
It was announced that the Henrico boil-water advisory was likely to extend to Saturday, January 11 because Henrico planned to conduct its own tests on the water system, primarily in the areas served by the city's water supply. The second test, a bacteriological one, is planned to be undertaken January 10, [2] while the first was done on this day; [45] pipes were tested for both chlorine and bacteria. [46] Officials said that residents should see water flow return throughout the day, although they encouraged residents to remain patient and limit water use to mitigate possible high demand. [45] Six locations in Eastern Henrico and one in the West End were tested for chlorine. [46]
Late in the evening, Henrico's first round of chlorine tests came back clean. Bacteriological tests require a 24 hour waiting period in the laboratory; [46] samples are incubated to see if any bacterial growth occurs; if none occurs, the sample, and thus the water, is identified as safe. [47] The incubation involves emptying a packet of Colisure reagent into a vial of water and placing it in an incubation machine at 95 °F (35 °C) for 24 hours; the mixture will be identified as safe if the mixture turns bright yellow. The water-quality tests were being conducted in coordination with VDH. [48]
2 additional water main pipes burst in Henrico County on this day, bringing the total over the week to 3.
At 9:27 am, an article was published by NBC 12 describing how a water main break closed part of westbound Monument Avenue at the intersection with Bremo Road. It was unclear whether this issue was related to the broader water outage. Officials were unable to provide an estimated time of repair at the time of publishing. [49] Traffic was closed on westbound Monument between Bremo and Devers Roads. Roughly 40 customers were impacted, but not nearby St. Mary's Hospital, which has water. The Henrico Citizen published that the break should be repaired by the evening of this day. [50]
Officials also reported a break at Thalbro and Staples Mill Road. It was unclear if this break was related to the outage. [51] Officials completed repairs on the night of Thursday, January 9. It was indicated that the cold temperatures of the week, possibly in concert with efforts to move water to eastern Henrico, led to the break. The break was longitudinal in nature, requiring workers to cut an entire section out and replace it. [52]
Overnight, Henrico's Public Utilities department filled its above-ground water storage tanks, a move intended to provide a buffer against pressure losses due to expected surges in water use. [46]
At 10 am on Friday, January 10, Henrico conducted its second set of bacteriological tests. Officials said that all customers' water pressure should return to normal on this day. [46] Henrico's boil-water advisory was planned to be lifted Saturday, January 10. Hanover and Richmond also reported that their initial water tests found no harmful contaminants, although the boil-water advisory remains in effect due to the need to complete additional testing 16 hours after the first round. [53]
At 11:15 am, Henrico began its final water test. [48]
At 2pm, city officials closed City Hall due to an unexpected drop in water pressure, although they said that it was not indicative of larger water distribution system issues. [54]
Late into the day, clean results from Henrico's water bacteria tests became available. [48]
On Saturday, January 11, officials from all the affected counties announced an end to the boil-water advisory due to testing showing clean results on all VDH-regulated indicators. Mayor Avula said that water coming out of faucets might still be cloudy due to air bubbles trapped in the distribution system, but that the water was still safe to drink. [47]
At 2:10 pm, Goochland was made aware of issues with water pressure in its eastern end and announced its intention to investigate. At 4:25, it was found that residents' flushing of their lines caused massive water pressure issues. Water conservation in the area was encouraged. [55]
As of Monday, January 13, 68 water mains had broken across the region, due to cold temperatures and the stress imposed on the water system because of the crisis. Hanover experienced 1 break, the city experienced 22, and Henrico experienced 45. In Henrico's case, the return of warmer water to the cold pipes shocked them, which, in combination with air bubbles, created a "water hammer" effect, which significantly damaged the pipes. The large number of breaks in the county was due to the county's rerouting of water. [56]
Around 3 pm on Tuesday, January 14, the city reported that its reservoir was at normal operating levels. [57]
At 8:30 pm, the city released a statement saying that a "finish water pump" had failed, but that three main finish pumps and two auxiliary pumps were still working. The plant was producing 68 million gallons of water, which was higher than normal for the time of year. Another auxiliary pump was being sent to the plant to support operations. Additionally, another UPS system had been installed and tested at the plant. [57]
Hanover and Henrico said that they were "monitoring" the plant's operations. [57]
Henrico officials said that the cloudy water that some residents were reporting was not cause for concern, as their flushing of the water system created extra pressure, leading to air bubbles that could flow to customers and cause cloudiness. [58]
The city's fluoridation system was damaged due to the crisis; it had been non-operational since. [59] A new fluoride pump was installed on Wednesday, April 23. This installation led to a temporarily higher level of fluoride in the water for roughly 5 hours, [60] due to a fluoride overfeed of nearly 5,900 gallons.Valves were left open during the pump's installation, which allowed water to flood into the fluoride storage tank and then back into the main supply through the pump that was being installed. [59] An employee at the plant called Chesterfield Police and claimed that the city had poisoned the water with fluoride. The police department called the county's department of public utilities, who contacted both VDH and the water plant. VDH contacted Henrico, who contacted Avula via a text from Vithoulkas. Avula texted plant staff and Joy-Hogg on Monday morning, asking why he hadn't been told; they said that they had just learned of the issue on Sunday evening and were going to contact the counties that morning. [61]
The city tested system-wide and found that fluoride levels were all elevated; the city actively flushed those lines where the secondary limit of 2.0 mg/L was reached. [60] The incident was considered an acute exposure, and the city said water remained safe to drink, [60] with which VDH concurred, saying that no public health risk was identified by the state toxicologist. [59] However, they did say that city staff's lack of knowledge on how to conduct additional fluoride tests [59] —the samples would have been needed to be diluted to bring them within the range measurable by the instrument, and the instruments needed to be recalibrated after the water crisis [62] —might have meant that the concentration was higher than reported at some points. [59] Chesterfield issued a statement that its water remained safe, [63] but found that its fluoride levels peaked at 3.86 mg/L at one connection point, [59] which was closer to the Maximum Contaminant Level than the high levels reported by other tests. While the city stopped adding fluoride to the water after the dump, they returned the system to full operational status as of Tuesday, May 20. The city returned to full compliance and planned to gradually increase the level of fluoride to recommended levels. [59]
Avula apologized for the failure. [61] Henrico and Hanover counties criticized the city's failure to alert them; [60] [64] they were only alerted by VDEM on Sunday night. [63] Chesterfield was alerted by local emergency staff. [59] The VDH was also not notified within the required 24-hour period. Avula apologized for the city's failure to communicate, [60] and Abubaker echoed the sentiment. While she called on the Communications department to be better, she said that Avula was doing his best and relying on people who were invested in city government staying the same. [63] The Virginia Department of Health issued the city an additional Notice of Alleged Violation, which contained 3 detailed notices of violation: allowing the discharge to occur, not responding effectively after it occurred, and failing to notify state regulators in a timely manner. [62] The city said that its Standard Operating Procedures for communications had not yet been updated. [59] The state said that better communication between maintenance and operations staff could have prevented the situation. [59]
The city's notifications, released the following Monday, April 28, recommended that children under 9 not drink the water and that alternate sources should be considered for people in that age group. [63] The state said that Richmond should reissue its press releases to notify customers that fluoride levels may have been higher than measured, [59] a recommendation that was not addressed by the city. [62]
The city began collecting daily fluoride samples, replacing and recalibrating equipment, and making sure that operations staff are able to collect readings correctly. [62]
Henrico used the occasion to further its calls for a regional water authority. [64]
On Tuesday, May 27, filters at the water plant became clogged due to high levels of turbidity. [65] This caused water production to be reduced, [66] which caused the water pressure in neighborhoods served by the Ginter Park tank to drop. [66]
The city initially said at around 9:00 am Tuesday that a boil-water advisory wouldn't be needed, but issued one at around 11:30 am.
Henrico County was notified around midnight of the issue, and was able to close its water tanks by 7:30 am out of an abundance of caution. In the wake of the water crisis, the county had ensured that its water tanks in the North and West would always be filled to capacity, and had conducted drills to be able to respond to emergencies such as this. The county plans to serve its customers with water from those tanks until the city is able to test its water per VDH requirements, and did not foresee the need to issue a boil-water advisory. [67]
Henrico worked closely with Hanover, which was also impacted. Chesterfield was not impacted, as it was able to stop pulling water from the city at around 2 am. Neither Henrico, Hanover, nor Chesterfield went under a boil-water advisory. [66]
The advisory was lifted as of 2:30 on Thursday. [68]
On the night of Thursday, May 29, a water main break was experienced on Canal Street in Richmond that seriously impacted Henrico County's ability to provide water to its customers, leading the county to declare a state of emergency. [69]
As of early Tuesday, January 7, state agencies had trucked in 70 pallets of bottled water to the city for distribution, with an additional 350 pallets scheduled for delivery. [33] The city itself provided more than 37,000 liters of water as of January 7 to distribution sites and "high priority areas". [18]
On January 7, various city departments and humanitarian organizations, including the American Red Cross, along with the Richmond Sheriff's Office, partnered to distribute water in high-priority areas, such as homeless shelters, public housing, and elderly housing. [33]
City water distribution sites included multiple community centers and librarures. [33]
RVA Community Fridges shared other resources where people might obtain water, including at multiple local breweries and at the Wayside Spring, which is a natural spring in the city. [26]
The city offered water delivery starting at 10:30 am via by calling 311. 311 and the Richmond Police Department will work together to deliver water to older adults and to individuals with mobility challenges; because of high demand, requests made after 2:30 pm would likely be delivered the next day. [26]
Richmond's public housing authority said that residents at its Creighton, Fairfield, Gilpin, Hillside, Mosby, and Whitcomb Court developments were able to receive bottled water at their communities' respective maintenance shops. [26]
Officials continued water distribution on Friday, January 10, and Saturday, January 11. [44]
On January 7, from 3 pm to 7 pm, and January 8, from 12 pm to 7 pm, [34] [32] [70] water was distributed at Atlee High School and Cold Harbor Elementary School. [34] As of 4:30 pm on Wednesday, January 8, the county had distributed 3200 cases of bottled water and 9000 gallons of potable water; the potable water was distributed at the Bass Pro Shop at 11550 Lakeridge Parkway and the Hanover County Government Complex. The county planned to continue distributing water Thursday, January 9. [32]
Residents with even numbered addresses would be able to shower at Liberty Middle School, while residents with odd numbered addresses would be able to shower at Patrick Henry High School. Both locations will be open on January 9 between 9:00 am and 7:00pm. Showers were planned to be available in 10-minute increments and residents were expected to bring their own toiletries and towels. [32]
Hanover residents were asked to call a hotline if they had extreme medical needs or were shut-in to report their issues. [26]
A potable water fill-up station was made available at the former Winn-Dixie shopping center in Mechanicsville. [71]
The county made sites available for the distribution of bottled water, as well as water from tanker trucks. Starting Tuesday, January 7, the Varina Area Library and the Sandston Branch Library had bottled water available until 9pm. The Eastern Government Center had bottled water around the clock. The Eastern Henrico Recreation center had bottled water and a tanker truck available around the clock. [27]
On the evening of January 8, the county made showers and bathroom facilities available to residents. Brookland Middle School, J.R. Tucker High School, and Douglas L. Wilder Middle School were all open from 8am to 8pm. The Henrico Sports & Events Center will be open around the clock to provide showers. [27] [45] The schools also provided bottled water. [27]
Just before 11:00 am on Thursday, January 9, officials said that "temporary gaps" were being experienced in their supply of bottled water due to high demand. Thus, the six locations where bottled water was being delivered on Thursday may not have had it continuously available. Officials requested residents who need water to use the tanker trucks where possible, but that residents must bring their own containers. [28]
Sentara Health and Newview Connects were planning a joint bottled water distribution event January 8 from 10 am to noon, or while supplies lasted. [30]
CBS 6 reported that the bottled water distribution at Tucker High School was 30 minutes late on January 9, and that the resources were limited; the first truck was almost empty by 9 am. [45]
The county closed all six sites at 8pm on Friday, January 10. [46]
The county distributed 153,000 cases of water to residents, made 120,000 gallons of potable water available, and answered almost 8,000 calls at their call center during the crisis. [36]
The Henrico NAACP unanimously passed an emergency resolution on the night of January 7 that expressed concern over the racial disparity gap in the county. They said that it was historically rooted in disregard for equitable outcomes for the Black community and other vulnerable county communities. They pointed out the racial disparities in the infrastructure failures and lack of clean water across the county. [30]
The organization criticized the two-hour wait times on the designated water related concerns hotline. It called for an independent investigation into the Richmond facility's operational failure and into the dependence of the county on the Richmond facility. [30]
Henrico supervisor Tyrone Nelson expressed his sorrow over the situation and said that the county was doing as much as it could. [30]
Bottled water was provided by the County of Chesterfield to the 27 residents impacted by the City's water plant outage, and the county indicated that it was going to continue supporting these residents throughout the duration of the event. [26]
The lack of potable water severely affected operations at area health care centers. [26] Governor Youngkin expressed concern that area hospitals were going to have to divert patients and perhaps even evacuate some. [72]
According to Julian Walker of the Virginia Hospital and Healthcare Association, area hospitals used every outside resource available, including bringing in water tanker trucks to maintain water resources. Many area hospitals went on diversion and discharged as many patients as appropriate; this includes some that have gone on EMS diversion. [73] Diversion is a legal status created by EMTALA, where incoming patients may be rerouted to other facilities because the hospital did not have the staff or facilities to accept any additional emergency patients. [74] [ better source needed ]
State agencies worked overnight on January 6 to organize tanker trucks to deliver water to area hospitals. [33]
Chesterfield Fire and EMS sent a crew to Chippenham Hospital, which, along with VCU Medical Center, is one of the two Level I Trauma Centers in the region, with a 2500 gallon water tender to help with continued operation of the hospital's boilers and other systems that were affected by low incoming water pressure. [21] The hospital became operational less than 24 hours after the water supply ended because of that and other water tankers arriving and pumping water into the hospital's water system. [72]
Retreat Doctor's Hospital in The Fan, owned by HCA Healthcare, was without water and on diversion status since the night of January 6 at the latest. [75] [72]
The Patient First in Carytown was closed due to the city's water crisis, [75] as was the location in Mechanicsville. [26]
Several Richmond-area locations of VCU Health were closed for water- and storm-related reasons, [76] including the main hospital, the Adult Outpatient Pavilion, and the Children's Hospital. These downtown facilities had no regular water supply for their steam boiler, plumbing fixtures, or sterilization of equipment. The steam boiler failure meant that the hospital complex had no heat, and temperatures outside were often below 40 degrees, but the campus never lost heat. [72] VCU Medical Center, the largest hospital in the region, is one of the area's two Level I Trauma Centers and is the only hospital in the region to provide services like organ transplantation. The facility often operates at greater than 90% capacity, which would have complicated mass discharges and patient moves. [72]
Procedures at multiple VCU Health facilities, including all endoscopies, outpatient diagnostic testing, and imaging, were canceled, and clinics were closed, on January 9. [75]
The hospital went on EMS diversion, including for patients who needed to transfer from other hospitals. Some outpatient procedures moved to its Short Pump facility, which extended its hours into the nights and weekend to handle the increased patient load. At the medical center, bucket brigades were established to flush toilets and used wipes to clean patients in their beds. Wound cleaning was not effected, as the hospital uses medical-grade sterile water that remained in supply. [72]
Sterilization of Medical Center equipment took place at the Community Memorial Hospital in South Hill; over 500 trays of equipment were sterilized and then delivered to the hospital. Some of the facility's medical imaging equipment is cooled by water and may have been damaged in the crisis. [72]
Henrico officials gave water to the emergency department at VCU Medical Center, [75] in addition to a tanker from the Goochland Fire Department. The facility spent about $220,000 on 2.5 million gallons of water, and received it from as far as North Carolina. [72] Additionally, the hospital bought thousands of pallets of bottled water for patient and staff consumption. [72]
The hospital began accepting ambulances and patients on January 12. [72] Officials have decided to install 3 non-potable water tanks, which can each hold 20,000 gallons of water, for future preparedness. [72]
Although the hospital had backup plans for electricity and cell service failures, it did not have backup water systems, given the unprecedented nature of the crisis. The hospital's emergency plan did identify sources of potable, bottled water and bulk water, and the system has negotiated plans for water resupply in the event of an outage. Yet, the plan notes that the medical center's water supply is entirely dependent on the city and that patient evacuation should be considered in the event of extended water outages. Officials are studying changes to the hospital's plan. [72]
On January 10, officials stated that over 20,000 appointments had to be rescheduled due to water issues [77] but most ended up being rescheduled. 500 elective surgeries were also cancelled. Dr. Marlon Levy, CEO of VCU Health, said that no patients suffered adverse outcomes, but that the crisis costed the system around $20 million in revenue. That represents less than 1% of the system's yearly earnings, and some of that revenue may have come back as patients rescheduled appointments. [72]
Bon Secours Richmond implemented an incident command structure. As of January 8, all Richmond-area facilities implemented water conservation efforts.
Bon Secours Memorial Regional Medical Center in Hanover County [43] and Bon Secours Richmond Community Hospital went under emergency operations protocol due to water service suspension; both facilities' Medical Office Buildings were closed. The Richmond Community Hospital sourced a temporary external water solution, [78] [75] went on diversion, stopped transfers, facilitated appropriate transfers, and giving water bottles to persons at the facility. [75] The Memorial Regional Medical Center has postponed elected cases. [78]
Bon Secours St. Mary's Hospital was experiencing low water pressure on the afternoon of January 6 [78] but normal operations quickly resumed. [75] Henrico officials provided water to the hospital. [75] While the hospital went on diversion early in the crisis, VCU later diverted patients there, and at one point, almost every emergency room bed was full, with a line of ambulances waiting outside. [72]
As of 9:57 am on Thursday, January 9, Memorial Regional Medical Center was off of diversion. [43]
As of January 10, Bon Secours announced that the only remaining effect of the crisis was the need for patients to call in to the facilities where they had appointments. [79]
The water outage all state office buildings in Richmond and in Hanover County to close. House of Delegates clerk Paul Nardo said that even when water service was restored, it would take 16–18 hours to restore full system stability in the Capitol, and that officials had requested the conservation of water to help with system pressure even after the return of water. Nardo recommended that lawmakers return to their districts. [33]
The Virginia Senate and House of Delegates announced their plans to convene at noon on Wednesday, January 8 to start the session, handle a few items, then recess until Monday, January 13. [80] The state constitution required their presence in the Capitol on Wednesday, and some infrastructure was set up to support them, including port-a-potties being placed around the State Capitol. [81] The items to be addressed in the House included, according to Nardo, two procedural resolutions, HJ 429 and HJ 430, followed by "the traditional salaries and contingencies resolution;" [82] the Senate also met briefly to address similar items. [82] Then, they recessed until 9 am on Monday, January 13. [82] [80]
Legislative aides, interns, and most support staff were instructed to not work on the week of January 6–10. House chamber staff were to be present on the day to manage the abbreviated session. Legislative pages had already been sent home. [33]
Governor Youngkin's State of the Commonwealth was postponed to the morning of January 13 [80] at 10 am. [33]
The Capitol and General Assembly buildings were to be closed through Sunday, January 12. [82]
The Virginia Department of Human Resource Management issued an alert in the evening of January 8 that state offices in Richmond would plan to open at 10:00 am Thursday, January 9, and that any changes would be posted to its website by 7:30 am. [26]
Although Danny Avula became mayor on January 1, his inauguration was scheduled for January 11. However, that has been postponed due to the water outage, as Avula worked to get city services back in operation. [83]
On January 9, Mayor Avula announced in an Instagram post that all of Saturday's inaugural events were to be cancelled. [84]
The school board in Henrico County canceled its meeting, scheduled to take place at the New Bridge Learning Center on Thursday, January 9 at 3 pm. In its place, the board decided to hold a special meeting on January 9 at 3 pm at 1910 E Parham Road. [85] The location was moved because of the New Bridge Learning Center being impacted by the water outage. The agenda of the meeting did not change. [86]
Significant disruptions were felt at Richmond International Airport. The airport's emergency operations center was activated and tankers had to deliver non-potable water to support essential operations, including aircraft de-icing. Portable restrooms for staff and drinking stations in both concourses were brought in. Despite these accommodations, passengers still faced considerable inconvenience due to the closure of restrooms and restaurants in the airport. No timeline was provided regarding the return of water service at the airport. [87]
As of 10:30 am on Thursday, January 9, the airport remained without water pressure. [28]
Most school divisions in the region remained closed the entire week of January 6–10, although Chesterfield County opened all but one school on Thursday. [26]
Richmond Public Schools (RPS) remained closed through the end of the week. [26] [53] According to RPS superintendent Jason Kamras, essential school infrastructure, like boilers and plumbing, all had to be tested and possibly repaired, which has to take place after the VDH-mandated city water testing period. [88] Kamras said that at least 10 buildings were inoperable because they relied on boiler heat, which depends on water. [89]
In an email sent to the families of district students, Kamras said that meals and resources for families were his biggest concern. He said that those in need of meal assistance should reach out to the school system. [26]
The school system worked with FeedMore to distribute food to students via sites at Cardinal and Henry Marsh Elementary Schools, [26] [88] a plan which was developed early in the week. [89] Renesha Parks, the district's chief wellness officer, said that roughly 65% of the district's students relied on its school breakfast and lunch programs. [89] The organization and the district worked together from 11am to 1pm January 8 to distribute no-prep meals, non-perishable food, and cases of water. [88] The district provided meals that didn't require water and reached out to families with histories of food insecurity. David Waidelick, FeedMore's chief programs and collaborations officers, said that the organization would balance continuing support and maintaining inventory. [89]
Both Kamras and city council member Katherine Jordan helped to distribute food and water. [88]
Kamras announced that lunch would be provided January 9 and 10 to the families of any RPS students at 6 accessible locations throughout the city; these locations were Brown Middle School, Cardinal Elementary School, Carver Elementary School, Henderson Middle School, Martin Luther King, Jr., Middle School, and Richmond High School for the Arts. [88]
The district announced that it had had to modify its calendar; it converted two professional development/planning days into regular school days to make up for lost time. [90]
The district also announced that difficulties from the water crisis, along with issues with a new payroll system and human error, had let to taxes being over-withheld on about 1300 employees' paychecks. The district also announced their plan to compensate hourly staff for the work that was missed. [91]
The school district advised anyone experiencing food insecurity to contact FeedMore and that it was working with them to provide food to families identified as in-need. [45]
Over 1,000 meals were handed out on January 9. Meals were handed out in a drive-through format and included shelf stable or ready-to-eat foods to cover two breakfasts, lunches, and dinners for one child or teenager. [46]
The schools were closed the entire week of the incident due to the snowy weather and water outages. The district was able to avoid adding additional school days onto the calendar because time had been built into the instructional year for that purpose, but stated that any more school closures would likely require an extension of the academic calendar in some way. Other timeframes, such as for report card distribution, testing, and course registration, were extended. [46]
Hanover County Public Schools remained closed the entire week of Jan 6–10. [53]
VCU Men's Basketball decided that its Wednesday, January 8 night game against Fordham University would be held without spectators due to the water outage. In a statement, athletic director Ed McLaughlin said that they had tried to avoid taking this step for as long as possible, but that eventually they had no choice. He remarked on the impact that the closure would have on the department's finances and the student-athlete experience. [92]
University of Richmond Women's Basketball also said that fans would not be allowed to attend its 6pm match on the same night against George Mason University; tickets would be honored at any remaining Spider Women's Basketball game this season. [92]
Multiple YMCAs in the region provided showers and community spaces. [27] Other locations had to close down due to unavailability of water. [27] The Weinstein Jewish Community Center (JCC) on Monument Avenue also opened its doors to Richmond residents. [26]
Henrico's Emergency Operations Center became active and actively dispatched resources. [27] The county declared a local state of emergency after the pressure drop, [29] which allowed them to purchase water and other supplies immediately, without having to go through normal government purchasing channels. [30]
On the evening of Monday, January 6, requested resources from the Central Virginia Incident Management Team, composed of members of many local emergency response organizations, to help coordinate the response and restore its municipal water supply system. [21]
Youngkin, VDH, and the Virginia Department of Emergency Management (DEM) remained in contact with Avula's administration throughout the day on January 7; both departments provided technical support and emergency supplies. [33]
Youngkin activated the Virginia National Guard to help with the state's emergency response efforts; he was able to do this because of the State of Emergency that he had declared. He said that hospitals were among the top priorities in the state. He was able to send 29 water tankers, including 6 from the National Guard, to help with the situation. Additionally, 1300 pallets were being sent and were planned to arrive on the night of Wednesday, January 8. [93]
Chesterfield County Utilities offered its staff's technical expertise to the city as well as the contact information of contractors who may have been able to help with repairs. [21]
Henrico's Department of Public Utilities said that it provided as many resources as possible to help restore normal operations in the City. [27]
Richmond established an Emergency Operations Center at the Main Library. [7]
County officials told the Henrico Citizen that rumors circulating social media of a possible cutoff to western Henrico water service were false. [94]
Governor Glenn Youngkin addressed price gouging in a press conference on Wednesday, January 8. Due to the state of emergency that had been declared statewide, it had been made illegal for stores to charge inflated prices for necessity items. However, a convenience store in Henrico County, Rocketts Market Cafe, was found charging up to $20 for cases of water, which normally cost between $4 and $7. Management at the store denied that they were increasing the prices of water cases. [95]
On April 11, the Federal Emergency Management Agency cancelled a $12 million grant to the plant that had been selected for further review by FEMA [96] before the crisis [97] in May 2023 under the Building Resilient Infrastructure and Communities (BRIC) grant program. [98] The grant was entitled "Feeder Channel Retaining Wall Restoration and Pre-Sedimentation Berm Improvement." [97] The barrier between areas was too short and narrow and that water flowed over during high-level periods. The project will continue regardless, and the area will be rehabilitated using money from rate increases. [99]
The money received would have been budgeted to stop a future water rate increase, separate from the 5.75% increase passed in 2025. Richmond had not been promised the money, so had not included it in the budget. [99]
The Virginia Department of Emergency Management said in an email to city officials that the cancellation was part of the Trump administration's broader move to shut the program down and cancel all grants that had not yet been disbursed. The money will be given to Congress to re-appropriate. [98]
Avula said that he was disappointed in the cancellation, but that none of the plant's immediate operations or the work being done to recover from the crisis were to be affected. He said that he would work with Richmond's representatives on the federal level to urge the administration to reissue the grants. Representative Jennifer McClellan also criticized the cancellation and said that prevention was much cheaper than response, and signed a letter with other Virginia federal legislators, including Mark Warner, Tim Kaine, and Bobby Scott to Kristi Noem urging the decision to be reversed. [97] [100]
Youngkin said that the U.S. Small Business Administration would be making Economic Injury Disaster Loans available to help cover ongoing operational costs faced as a result of the crisis. [101] The loans were announced April 16. As of April 30, around 30 area businesses had applied online or at one of two "recovery centers," which were located at two libraries, one each in Henrico and Richmond. The loans were available by virtue of a disaster area being declared on April 9 and Goochland, Henrico, Hanover, and Richmond being declared as primary affected localities. Other localities, including all of those in the PlanRVA region, were designated as secondarily-affected localities. The loans are for terms of 30 years and carry low interest rates. Applications were to be open until January 9, 2026; the recovery centers closed in early May. [102]
Youngkin, whose Executive Mansion relies on city water, spoke with House and Senate leadership to call for an after-action report to examine the failure; he said that lawmakers should prioritize fixing the issue. [81] In his Monday State of the Commonwealth Address, Youngkin said that the state had launched its own investigation into the crisis. Although he said that he would be waiting for the results of the investigation, he expressed his belief that operational, equipment, and technical challenges had played a part in the failure. [103] Avula expressed that Richmond's water issues could push lawmakers at all levels to invest in infrastructure upgrades, [103] but that the state's assertion that the crisis was completely preventable was an overstatement. He said that some things were unavoidable, while stating that other issues were city failures in planning and response. [104]
The proposed House budget included money for Richmond to help defray the costs of the crisis, while the Senate budget would authorize a $25 million grant program in which the VDH would be allowed to disburse money for localities to upgrade their drinking water infrastructure; a 25% match would be required by the localities. Additionally, the Senate budget would remove $50 million that had been budgeted for the replacement of the city's combined sewer overflow (CSO) system, while the House budget would maintain the funding. Avula suggested that the lack of major new funding in the budget could have come from the fact that reviews of the crisis hadn't yet been completed. [105]
State Senator Louise Lucas of Portsmouth, chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee, said that federal resources would be key in addressing long-term infrastructure challenges., although state lawmakers could also help localities like Richmond address infrastructure needs. [103]
Virginia Republicans were considering a bill that would require all water utility directors to have earned a professional certification, which would probably mean an engineering degree. [106]
A water-crisis reporting bill had initially been filed because of an issue in 2024 where the Rapidan Water Service Authority told Orange County residents to not use their water because of an unusual smell. A state investigation found that the water authority hadn't reported that two pumps failed and caused mineral oil to leak into the water. However, after the crisis, the issue became more important to legislators, especially because the legislature had been closed due to the crisis. A state water official had recommended "quicker more proactive notification" as a needed change during an idea session held during the crisis. Requirements during the crisis were for the state to be notified within 24 hours. The VDH hadn't been notified until about 9 hours into the crisis, and even then it was from a third party, not the city. Legislators wanted the ODW to be notified earlier to prevent small crises turning into major public-health emergencies. [3]
Multiple similar bills were filed by lawmakers. The General Assembly approved a bill that would require the Virginia Department of Health to be notified within 6 hours of a waterworks "critical equipment failure or malfunction" or a contaminant release. Non-critical equipment failures and malfunctions would also have to be reported to the state on a monthly basis if they had the potential to disrupt water service. While the bill doesn't specify enforcement mechanisms, the ODW is permitted to take a variety of actions, including revoking waterworks permits, against operators that didn't follow state rules. Youngkin, who would have to approve the bill, recommended a tighter window of 2 hours, a recommendation that the General Assembly was to take up on April 2, when it returned to Richmond to deal with the governor's actions. [3]
In a report released on Thursday, January 23, the Virginia Department of Health said that better training and preparation could have prevented the situation. [107] The situation was said to be "completely avoidable". [108] It identified parts of the state's regulations on water systems and the Virginia Public Water Supplies Law that the city may have violated. VDH issued a Notice of Alleged Violation to the City as part of the collaborative corrective action plan that was being formed. The city was given 30 days from the notice to provide the ODW with necessary information and could face fines and administrative orders for failing to return the water system to compliance in a timely manner. [107]
The department's final report was issued on Wednesday, April 16, included a second formal notice of violation, and demanded a full corrective action plan. [101] An initial letter regarding the report was sent by State Health Commissioner Karen Shelton on April 15 to both Youngkin and Avula. [109] The final report was 314 pages long and based on a 60-day-long independent investigation completed by the engineering firm Short Elliott Hendrickson (SEH), which spent more than 1,500 hours investigating. [101] The report, and Shelton, implied that the state's report was more thorough and detailed that that of the city. [12] The report cost $358,000. [12]
12 significant deficiencies were identified by the state health department, which must be repaired as part of a corrective action plan; this included maintenance issues, corroded pipes, and detritus found in a finished water basin. [110] The report found that the long chain of failures at the plant were all preventable, and included neglected maintenance, faulty backup systems, poor emergency planning, and risky decisions that left the plant vulnerable. [101] Single points of failure and not taking advantage of possible automation opportunities were identified as broad issues. [12] It specifically cited the decision to operate the plant in Winter Mode as a failure, said that the battery backups were beyond their design life and thus weren't able to respond effectively to flooding events, and argued that the city's reliance on manual plant operation created far too many opportunities for issues to arise. [109] The failure of the backup systems was attributed to neglected maintenance and a lack of testing. While DPU staff were found to be committed and technically knowledgeable, the system as a whole failed in its goal of providing reliable water service. [101]
The city's failure to test and verify the UPS system was identified as the direct cause of the crisis, given that they were the last line of defense against a crisis. The report said that the valves failed to close because of the immediate loss of battery power, which was a stronger claim than made by HNTB. The city did not keep good records of battery replacement, leading to difficulties identifying the time when the batteries were last replaced; and only used the health monitors that came with the batteries, which was not sufficient to monitor battery health. [12]
The report stated that the crisis could have been prevented with better operational decisions, and that the state would be ensuring that quick and effective corrective actions would be taken. It recommended relocating vulnerable electrical equipment, installing automated transfer switches, and updating design elements that had been exempted from state water regulations. State officials would be working closely with officials from the city government to enact necessary changes. [101]
In a press conference on April 17, Roadcap said that the DPU did not do its job. Roadcap said that, had the state been notified within two hours, many issues could have been avoided, including more rapid alerts to businesses and healthcare facilities, which he said did not receive a lot of notice. [109] Roadcap identified a culture of complacency about flooding at the plant and about facility maintenance, without which the crisis could have been prevented, but also said that the state should have been more proactive in regulating the plant. He specifically said that the state could have taken the opportunity to review the plant after it approved greater water-drawing capacity in the early 1990s, and said that state rules could be made more strict to require dated facilities like the city's to be updated to modern design standards. [110]
Governor Youngkin indicated that he agreed with the report's conclusions and called on city officials to "step up for their citizens;" [101] he said that the crisis should never happen again, calling the crisis preventable. [110] Avula said that the city would consider the report's findings and that the HNTB report had a lot of overlap with the state's report. [109]
City officials said that the plant had only been operating in Summer Mode since the crisis. Many of the $64 million worth in improvements recommended by the state were covered in the $60 million allocated to the plant in the city's 5-year capital improvement plan. [109] Avula said that the city had already addressed one core point of failure by operating in that mode since the crisis. [110]
VDH said that it would be sending the official notice of alleged violations a couple of weeks after the release of the report and that the city would have 45 days to respond. [109]
The state recommended that the city seal certain pipes and access hatches to prevent the clearwells from overflowing, which SEH said might increase the risk of pressure buildup and major building structural failure. Adding new overflow pipes would be a difficult solution to implement because the clearwells being underground makes it harder to remove water. [110]
Shelton said that certain steps already taken by the city, including several changes in senior management at DPU, were contributing to a culture of more active management and emergency preparation. [12]
While the report said that the crisis was mostly preventable, it did point to the plant's design as adding difficulty. City staff, aware of the history of flooding, and lacking any external visual cues to tell them about river level, had an easier time becoming complacent around the issue. [12]
Shelton also criticized the city's practice of using PILOT payments from the waterworks in its general fund, saying that at least $80 million could be used to make state-recommended infrastructure upgrades. [12]
The Richmonder raised concerns that the office was not being transparent enough in its FOIA requests. [111]
The Richmond Times-Dispatch submitted a FOIA request to VDH for communications between state and local officials during the crisis. The department returned the requested documents, which were heavily redacted under a "working papers" exemption, meant for documents produced by the governor or their administration for personal or deliberative use. Moomaw reported that the governor's office denied involvement, implying that the department had not consulted with them before redacting the documents under the exemption. The governor's office indicated that it would reassess the amount of material redacted, and Moomaw submitted an additional FOIA request. [112]
The city planned to focus its response around optimizing the investments being made in repairing the plant. It said that building new infrastructure elsewhere would be a significant expense, north of $1 billion, and that investments should focus on repairing and maintaining the current infrastructure. [113]
The city will be required to implement a formal Corrective Action plan due to the second violation notice sent by VDH. [101]
Levar Stoney, Richmond mayor from 2016 to 2024 and candidate for Lieutenant Governor in the 2025 Virginia elections, didn't take responsibility for the crisis in a podcast produced by WTVR. He said that backup systems should have been tested prior to the storm. [114]
DPU indicated that it would be updating all of its emergency procedures by June 1. [59]
Engineer Joel Paulsen, who has over 20 years of experience with water systems, in an interview with CBS 6, said that he had never seen a system that relied on backup batteries before generators, which are the industry standard because of their potentially-infinite running time. Additionally, he said that backup power only lasting for an hour was unacceptable for such critical infrastructure. He said that it was extremely rare for the water system of a capital city to go offline, especially after a power outage of less than three hours. [14] Further, Paulsen said that the plant should never have flooded, and that relief valves and overflows should have been designed into the system. [14]
Paulsen said that the power company should have been called during the initial stages of failure at the plant, when the VFDs were experiencing issues; he said that that course of proactive action might have been able to prevent further issues at the plant. He also said that the generators should have been turned on at 4:30 on the morning of the 6th, which also might have allowed the issues to be avoided. [8]
According to RVAMag, which published an article on the 10th, the timeline for critical upgrades remained unclear. [19] They say that the failure is part of a larger issue facing cities across the United States: one of aging infrastructure and underfunded efforts to modernize. The failure, they said, represents the results of deferred maintenance and insufficient capital investment. They argued in favor of systemic changes to restore trust and to ensure that the city's water system would be equipped for future challenges. [19] Mae Stevens, the CEO of the American Business Water Coalition, a group composed of businesses reliant on water, called for more water infrastructure investment across the United States. [115] Avula announced that the city had already spent $5 million dollars on the crisis, as of a City Council meeting on February 24. The spending was not discussed in great detail, but most of it was allocated towards making repair recommendations outlined in the initial consultant report. [116]
Morris said that system upgrades to make generators activate automatically in the case of power loss would not be completed until the end of the year, and that it would be difficult to give an estimate on the total costs of efforts to make the plant more resilient, but that an update would be available before the Council's budget meeting in March. Morris was not expecting to request significant additional capital investments because money was already being spent and the city was still assessing the capital needs for water infrastructure. [111] He is focusing on upgrades to plant resilience, including improved worker training and switching the plant to a more dependable power source that was formerly only used in the summer to avoid thunderstorm-related impacts. [111]
On January 14, Avula expressed that he anticipated that an independent investigation would take about 30 days. He said that the city would begin by gathering facts and understanding needs for immediate staffing and infrastructure changes. Then, the city would engage in a strengthening of its "emergency preparedness culture". Additionally, he called on the region to become less reliant on a singular water plant and source of water. [117] The City Council said that they would be investigating the crisis further at a later meeting on the week of January 20–24. [118]
City officials later announced the hiring of HNTB, with a $234,000 contract, to conduct an investigation into the plant's failure. The firm has not done work for the city before, and City Council was not given a copy of the contract before a meeting on Wednesday, January 22. Jason Hoff, a specialist in water infrastructure for the firm, told City Council that he expected the issues identified would be multi-faceted, based on experiences in other, similar, situations. [119] The city also hired consulting firm Hagerty to conduct a separate investigation into the crisis. [120]
City Council members expressed thankfulness that no one at the plant was injured, but that the HNTB report's focus on technical issues may have obscured whether the plant's failure was primarily operational or due to aging infrastructure and what the financial impact of the water crisis was. [6] Councilmember Kenya Gibson asked for more transparency as to why backup generators were not turned on during the crisis. [116]
Richmond officials limited questions at two public meetings about the crisis and redacted parts of communications that contain specific information about water infrastructure, citing security concerns. [16]
A preliminary report, describing the initial phase of the after-action review, was released on Thursday, January 13 by engineering firm HNTB. Notably, it did not interview Bingham. It recommended improved emergency preparedness and response protocols, including having on-call staff; creating and increasing the standardization of training manuals and operating procedures at the plant, both for typical and emergency situations, which currently don't exist in written form; installing additional back-up batteries that can last for at least an hour, one of which should be attached to the IT system; and putting an automatic transfer system for the backup generator system, which is part of a current capital project. [121]
HNTB found that the city was slow to communicate with state regulators and regional partners and, other than assigning snow removal at the plant, did little to prepare for the storm. [6]
The draft version of the report was released March 3rd. [11]
The final 94-page version [13] was released on April 3. [11] It found that the plant was operating in Winter Mode, and that the plant's bus tie failed to activate, leaving the plant without power for around 80 minutes. In addition to the mechanical failures, the report found that inadequate staffing and training, communication failures, and a lack of standard operating procedures. [11] The report found that the city's organizational structure also hindered communication, a problem which was heightened during the crisis. [13]
The report made several recommendations. Some have already been taken by the city, including always operating the plant in "Summer Mode" with dual power feeds; implementing new procedures for inclement weather events; increasing staffing, especially in critical operations, electrical, and engineering positions during critical weather events; updating emergency communications and inspections protocols; and investing $5 million in critical repairs and upgrades. [11] That number includes $191,000 for the renting of pumps and other equipment that allowed the city to restore service more quickly after the incident. The recommendations do not include UPS batteries that can last for longer than an hour as the switchgear upgrade and improved staffing should remove the need for longer-lasting battery backups. [13]
Roadcap criticized the HNTB report for not being as systemic as that of the state and for only finding what the city wanted it to find. [109] The report differed from that of the state in that it did not identify if the failure of the valves to close was caused by insufficient battery power or broader systems failures, whereas the state report said that battery failure prevented the valves from closing. [12]
City Councilor Kenya Gibson had proposed that the Richmond Utilities Commission work to investigate the crisis, but the city elected to use two outside firms instead. Commissioners requested a meeting with DPU Deputy Director Whitehurst, which became contentious; the city attorney had to step in multiple times to remind Commission members that he had appeared as a courtesy and to recommend that they keep their questions high-level until the release of the two reports. Commissioners expressed frustration with this and their inability to get answers to "seemingly simple" questions, along with a perceived lack of responsiveness from city employees, although they did also express sympathy for him, given that he had only inherited, not caused, the issues. Commissioners, in a meeting with City Council, expressed their willingness to do more, if the city would enable them by providing them with the requisite funds, support, and power. [120]
Mayor Avula said that, while he appreciated the work of April Bingham, director of the Richmond Department of Public Utilities, he wanted to ensure that the city was employing the correct personnel for the job. [122] CBS 6 noted their desire to ask questions directly to her for a report about a city press conference on the afternoon of January 9, but that she was not present. [9] It was later said that her non-attendance of press conferences was due to her presence being needed at the plant itself. [106] On January 15, Bingham announced her resignation after wide scrutiny of her work and the long-term issues at the plant; she had previously placed sole blame for the crisis on the snowstorm. [106] Additionally, she was scrutinized for not being an engineer. [106] Anthony Morris, a professional engineer and director of water at the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), was to serve as interim Director of Public Utilities. [123] In a City Council meeting on Wednesday, January 22, he introduced himself and expressed that the issues involved would be most likely attributable to the DPU's previous failure to build stronger emergency planning systems. [119] On January 23, Bingham attempted to rescind her resignation, and was the terminated by the city. [124] Bingham stated that she felt coerced into this resignation, and that she felt like the city's scapegoat. [125]
Despite her employment contract apparently including severance pay, Bingham was not given severance pay after she stepped down, although the city would not release the document under a FOIA request submitted by The Richmonder; they cited an exemption for documents relating to employee disputes. Avula expressed his willingness to release the document eventually. A separate FOIA request did not return any results for a possible resignation letter from Bingham. [126]
It was announced that Morris would transition into a permanent role as head of the department on February 26. [127] The change was announced after City Council members inquired as to why presentation materials listed Morris as only the DPU director; Joy-Hogg responded that the change had been made as of Monday, February 24. [111] Morris was unable to answer questions from City Council about past poor decisions and focused on upgrades to plant resilience, including improved worker training and switching the plant to a more dependable power source that was formerly only used in the summer to avoid thunderstorm-related impacts. [111]
Councilmember Sarah Abubaker raised the question at a Council meeting January 22 of whether Bingham was to be contacted for the sake of thoroughness. In a late email response to the Council, Bingham said that she was not asked to participate in any interview related to investigation of the crisis, nor was she given any sort of exit interview at all; 14 other DPU employees were given the chance to respond, including Towne and Whitehurst. Councilmember Kenya Gibson also identified her worry that the preliminary report was not detailed enough and was too technical. [111] The administration responded that the investigation would be independent, and as such, that HNTB would be free to contact who they wished; and that the final report would have much more detail. [128] According to Morris, Bingham was later asked to participate, but declined to do so; Bingham maintains that she has not been asked to participate. [111]
CBS 6 conducted an exclusive interview with Bingham in late March. She claimed that Joy-Hogg should have taken responsibility for regional communication during the crisis, as she was too busy at the water plant. She apologized for texting Chan's landline phone, but said that it was not reflective of her overall communicative abilities. The external reports found that there were no discussions relating to emergency planning; she blamed the staff below her for this, and for not briefing her on the state of the plant before the crisis. She said that staffing plans and the state of standby equipment were not part of her responsibilities as director. In retrospect, she stated in regard to being more proactive with seeking information that "maybe that's something that I would probably say could have happened," but continued to find fault with the people that didn't keep her, the director, informed. When asked whether she took ultimate responsibility for these issues as director of DPU, she responded that "Obviously the city felt that, because I'm no longer employed with the city." In contrast, she stated that her and the deputy director had been working to create job descriptions for plant employees, as she felt that some of them were in jobs beyond their skill sets; she first noticed this discrepancy when it took 2 years for the 2022 EPA report to reach her desk. Bingham stated that she would not take sole accountability for any of the issues identified in the after-action reports. [7]
In that interview, she stated that she had called someone in the city about the investigation, but that that call shouldn't have been construed as the only participation in the investigation that she was willing to engage in. [125]
She finished the interview by asking the region's residents to "reflect on the days when you did have water, to reflect on the time when things were working right." She said that she is looking for another city that will embrace her passion for safe and reliable service. [125]
A Daily Wire piece said that she was in the role due to DEI; her LinkedIn page had to be taken down due to racist comments against Black women after the story's publication. [106]
Todd Raviotta, in a piece for RVAMag, said that the city should consider re-opening its springs to the public, in part to allow for better resiliency in times of crisis such as this, especially given the city's aging infrastructure and the risks associated with climate change. He included a petition for people to sign and send to the Mayor and City Council. [129] The writers of the petition said that, even if the water wasn't safe for drinking, the springs could be used as community gathering hubs and as sources of water for community gardens. Councilmember Stephanie Lynch expressed interest in re-opening the springs. [130]
As of April 4, the city had received 61 separate FOIA requests from 22 different individuals. Many of the requests were complex, containing multiple sub-requests, and 55 staff members had been involved in fulfilling them. The city took the standard 7-day extension on 46 of the requests, surpassed the legal deadline for 5 of the requests, and collected roughly $1,400 in fees from all water-related requests. [131]
CBS 6 made 2 separate FOIA requests, which the city said would cost over $4,400 to fulfill. When asked why this cost was so high, Avula said that he would look into the matter; he expressed a desire to balance the costs involved in fulfilling FOIA requests and the desire for transparency and accountability, possibly by creating a library of FOIA requests. [104]
Richmond announced that it would be launching a FOIA reading room for information related to the crisis. Documents included would be those that had already been released under FOIA and that had been evaluated by subject-matter-experts as likely to be requested again. Both Avula and the city FOIA director commented that the project was a pilot; if the model proved successful, other records might be included. They also said that it was intended to show their good faith to both the general public and journalists in particular. [131]
The city said that it would be providing residents a five-day grace period for January bills with no late penalty or interest applied. [132] However, credits were not being applied and bills were not being lowered or cancelled, with city officials telling ratepayers that they would not be charged for water that they didn't use. [133] Colleen Heflin, an economist with the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Policy at Syracuse University, remarked to CBS 6 that she was worried over how low-income households would handle the crisis, especially because it occurred in January, a time already difficult for low-income households. She pointed to possible childcare and employment difficulties from the crisis. She predicted that it will have ripple effects through low-income households' finances and that some may be pushed over the brink. She recommended that medical providers screen for food insecurity and access to prescription drugs. [115] City officials designed the week of Friday, January 24, to Friday, January 31, as Water Recovery Week, with the goal of supporting local businesses whose operations, and thus revenue streams, were negatively impacted by the crisis. [134]
Avula announced that city leaders would be reactivating a relief fund from the COVID-19 pandemic in order to raise money to assist individuals and small businesses that had suffered financially from the crisis. [117] The city partnered with United Way of Greater Richmond & Petersburg to support those impacted by the crisis by establishing the Water Crisis Fund. It would begin accepting applications on January 31, and personal expenses would be covered in payments directly to the biller. Avula donated $25,000 from his Richmond Forward Together PAC to the fund. [15] The city repurposed its family crisis fund from the COVID-19 era and allocated about $650,000 to the fund. Those who had already received money from the fund would be eligible for less money, about $800. DPU bills would not be eligible for payment from the fund. Avula announced his desire to focus on people whose housing situations would be at risk because of the crisis. The deadline for application submission was March 14. [133] As of Monday, February 3, all the money in the fund had been claimed, although it was still accepting donations, money which Avula said would be distributed if it became available. Nonprofit partners worked to verify applicant eligibility, and applicants were expected to be contacted in about 10-15 business days. [135]
The city announced that it would be accepting applications from small businesses for water recovery fund grants between March 17 and 28; to be eligible, businesses would have to have less than $3 million in annual revenue, be in a water-dependent industry, and operate in a commercial space. [136] The city received over 200 applications for assistance within the first two days. The distributing entity for the fund is the Metropolitan Business League. Henrico businesses are ineligible for assistance from this fund. [137] The fund was seeded by Altria and Dominion Energy; nearly 200 applications were received, 117 met the requirements, and 114 had had their money distributed as of April 30. [102]
The city is proposing more than $60 million dollars of upgrades to the plant as part of its 5-year capital improvement plan, including electrical upgrades, automation improvements, and a redesigned overflow system to prevent future flooding. [101]
The city raised its utility, including water, rates due to increased operational costs; however, the cost increases were not directly related to costs from the crisis, because many of the improvements were included in the city's capital plan. [138] The water rate was increased 5.75%. [99]
The city expanded and improved its 311 program in order to increase access to local government and hopefully restore citizen trust in the process. [105]
Avula announced a hiring limitation in city government due to the impacts of the crisis on the budget. All hiring decisions would need to go through interim Chief Administrative Officer Sabrina Joy-Hogg in order to reduce the amount of people hired. This centralization of hiring decisions is a common way to reduce municipality budgets in times of crisis, whereas normally budgets are handled by individual departments. [105]
Goldman said in his editorial that this could be a defining moment for Mayor Avula, but that Avula needs to initiate reforms soon, or the moment may pass. He says that Avula has the opportunity to dramatically change city administration from the pattern established during what he called the "Jones-Stoney" era of Richmond politics by making a long-term plan to fund Richmond's increasingly crumbling infrastructure. [139] Jon Baliles, who has worked extensively in city government in the past decades, in an RVA 5x5 editorial, called for more transparency from city government and disagreed with Avlua's claim that communication during the crisis had been effective. [140]
Stoney, who is currently running for lieutenant governor, declined to answer CBS 6's request for comment on the water crisis. He did say that he did add funding for the water crisis into his proposed budgets, and that he would not have been involved in any procurement decisions. He also called upon other governmental partners to help the city fund its water plant. [141]
Henrico expressed interest in becoming more self-sufficient and engaging in additional regional cooperation. [113]
Henrico County officials hired two outside firms to analyze its response to the water crisis; Whitman, Requardt & Associates (WRA) and Aqua Law. Their analysis is to include the timeline of events, Henrico's water service agreements with other localities, and recommendations on how to make the County's water system more resilient. [36] The WRA analysis was to focus on providing short-term, medium-term, and long-term solutions to provide better water supply to Eastern Henrico, and was to cost about $89,777. The proposed solutions will be finalized by February 4 and presented to the Board of Supervisors on February 11. [142] The county also planned to conduct an internal review, the findings of which will be presented to the Board of Supervisors at their February 11 meeting. [36] The Aqua Law report was to focus on the crisis of the timeline and the county's response.
Vithoulkas said that millions of dollars would be needed to make the county's water supply more resilient and to move more Henrico customers to Henrico's water system. [36] When asked on January 8 whether the county would consider using their water treatment plant to supply water to the entire county, not just the western portion, Vithoulkas said that the idea would be under consideration. [40] According to Chan, even before the outage, county officials had begun the process of upgrading the county's water system with the goal of creating a countywide backup system as a safeguard against failure. [20]
Large parts of the water main on Staples Mill Road, which had many failures during the crisis, are to be replaced by the Henrico Department of Public Utilities after a planning period in the preceding summer because of the pipe's age and the amount of repairs that had been completed in the past 18 months. During the planning process, officials will evaluate whether there is a need to install a larger line, change the pipe's path, or make any other changes. Officials will also install new connections from the pipe to properties that front Staples Mill Road on the side of the pipe. [52]
Vithoulkas said that the county's dozens of crisis-related water main breaks could make the county legally eligible for reimbursement. [143] [144]
Chan said that communication from the city was normally much better, to include timely notifications about regular maintenance, and that when unexplained issues started arising without communication from the city, they knew that something was wrong. [145]
In its budget, the county increased water and sewer rates for the fiscal year starting July 1, 2025 and running to June 30, 2026, while reducing property taxes. This change allowed the department to increase its planned revenue by $10 million to $152 million. This rate increase follows a pattern of the county increasing rates almost every year; [146] [147] the county had increased the rate 2 to 6% annually for the past 50 years. Chan expressed his support for this practice and said that he felt that the rate increases were far more proactive than in other localities, allowing the county to stay abreast of increasing needs for funding and avoid "rate shock" for consumers. It was estimated that the average water user, who consumes about 3,750 gallons a month, would have their rate increase about $3.68. Customers unable to pay the increased rate wouldn't have their supply cut off immediately. [147]
The increased revenue generally is used to fund immediate needs and repairs, including some of the 207 water main breaks that had occurred in 2025 as of April 8. [146] Water main breaks had been occurring in Henrico for a while, with 374 happening in 2024. The repairs would be focused along Staples Mill Road, West Broad Street, and Monument Avenue, which had each had multiples breaks in recent years. Properties along those lines would be switched to backup sources during the replacements. Traffic is planned to be affected during the repairs. Chan rebutted a question posed by a citizen regarding whether pipes buried underground would change temperature rapidly by explaining that the multiple breaks were caused by warm water rapidly entering the cold pipes during the system's re-pressurization, rather than the fact that the pipes were buried underground. [147]
The county's budget also included $50 million to make the county's water supply more reliable and independent. Chan hoped that that money would continue for up to the next seven years in order to fund the WRA report's recommendations, for which there was increasing support among the county supervisors. Supervisors also emphasized that they would be continuing conversations with surrounding localities, and that future steps were yet to be determined, but that equitable water access in the East End was a priority. [146] [147]
In the April 8 Board of Supervisors meeting where these changes were decided, a local resident and frequent public commenter argued that the East End water system expansion was intended primarily for data centers built and planned to be built, not residents. County supervisors and officials rebutted this claim, saying that data centers only make up a small part of the county's total water use, that property tax rate changes wouldn't affect the money available for water system expansion, and that the changes were primarily intended to respond to citizen concerns about an inequitable lack of access to water. Nelson said that the Board was not sold out to data center companies and that most of the supervisors didn't want them in the county. [147]
According to the AquaLaw report, a lack of communication from the city to the county was responsible for much of the Henrico-specific crisis, [144] with which Vithoulkas expressed agreement. [23] Nelson indicated that, unless Henrico employees could work at the plant, he would prefer Henrico to manage its own water system entirely. [144]
The AquaLaw report found that Bingham attempted to text Chan's landline phone on January 6. Nelson expressed frustration with how the county was left out of communication in the later days of the crisis. However, the report did mention that successful communication early on January 6 allowed the county to switch away from city water in order to lessen its demand on the city's system. It also found that overly-optimistic estimations from the city, especially the delay until Monday afternoon in being told that the plant would not come back online on Monday, delayed the county's response. Henrico officials had initially said that the county would not be affected by the crisis. AquaLaw indicated that it was given full editorial control over the contents of the report and that county employees were cooperative. While it was focused on Henrico's actions, the close working relationship necessitated by the crisis allowed the report to expose the communication of city officials with their Henrico counterparts. County supervisors expressed their belief that the city intentionally delayed its communications, but it was unclear this was because they believed that things would all turn out all right or because they wanted to mask the seriousness of the situation. County officials identified the need for better communication in the future. [16]
On Tuesday, February 11, WRA released its report to the Board of Supervisors, presenting multiple options for the short-term, medium-term, and long-term. None of the plans were less expensive than the Cobb Creek Reservoir project, as Chan initially indicated would be a possibility. [143]
Along with supporting the medium-term option, Vithoulkas reported to the Board of Supervisors that, given the ability of the county to provide water to residents in other jurisdictions, the county could consider negotiating with the City of Richmond to provide water to them. Additionally, at a February 11 meeting between Henrico and Richmond officials, multiple options were presented, including buying the city's treatment plant, forming a Henrico-Richmond regional water authority to manage the plant, Henrico becoming the region's primary water supplier, [143] [144] or Henrico using its new reservoir to draw water out of the river and sell it to other localities as part of a regional water system. [144]
On February 25, the county proposed its budget for the next fiscal year, which includes $50 million towards a planned $328 million in water resiliency upgrades; subsequent budgets would have the same amount until the project was fully funded. The county was continuing to engage in talks with the City about the future of regional water supply. [148]
Hanover, like Henrico, expressed interest in becoming more self-sufficient and engaging in additional regional cooperation. [113]
The Hanover after-action report mentioned the unprecedented nature of the crisis, and that something of the sort had never happened since Hanover began purchasing water from the city in 1994. Their report found that the Hanover DPU followed correct emergency protocols, but that larger issues not caused or changeable by the county led to the length of the water crisis. Hanover found that its ability to respond was hampered by communication delays from the city of Richmond. Further, the county said that it successfully communicated with residents and other stakeholders to the extent possible under the circumstances, but wanted a more established communication plan for the future. Some areas experienced water losses once Hanover exhausted its water sources, which was possible because the system was not designed for a prolonged loss of water from the city. [149]
The county planned to enhance interconnections with Henrico to increase its water supply options, conduct a long-term study to identify possible future water sources, and develop a crisis plan for future water crises. [149]
Chesterfield's budget for the 2026 fiscal year included money for a $426 million plant to be located in the Appomattox Tidal Basin and serve as the county's fourth water source. [150]