Signed on October 3, 2020, the Juba Peace Agreement (also called the Juba Agreement) is a landmark concord between Sudan's transitional government and a handful of the country's rebel groups. Since Sudan gained its independence in 1956, the nation has been plagued by various civil wars and internal conflicts—namely the Darfur War (2003–2020). Nearly 400,000 people died in the crisis and over 2.5 million were displaced [1] due to the fighting between rebel groups within the region, which heavily prompted the implementation of peace-building legislation after nearly two decades of bloodshed. The Juba Peace Agreement served to amend the 2019 Constitutional Charter in Sudan, which is the most recent in a long line of unsuccessful legislation put in place to equalize the power dynamic between civil government and military/armed force rule.
The primary protocol outlined in the Juba Peace Agreement directly relates to the practice of federalism in Sudan and South Sudan. The general principles of the agreement range from establishing Sudan is a sovereign state for its people to denouncing violence as a political practice. This section also places a heavy emphasis on the ethnic diversity of Sudan, and stating that power-sharing among these groups is necessary for democratic governance.
As for the more specific protocols outlined, this section of the agreement claimed the entire document's supremacy over the 2019 charter, agreed to restore a regional-federal system of governance, established a provision of proportional representation for Darfur, and more. Also for Darfur, the agreement promised 28 different plans for the region's well being.
Much like the first protocol, this one has many general principles such as recognizing that fair allocation of resources/revenue/resources is for the betterment of Sudan. That statement itself is the first principle, which encapsulates the many similar points spelled out in the beginning part of this section. The same overarching themes find their way into the more detailed aspects of this section. For example, the establishment of a National Revenue Fund, Darfur Reconstruction and Development Commission, and other development projects are all loaded with promises of wealth sharing. This area of the document also makes sure to explicitly mention what exclusive revenue sources the Darfur Region and its states have (i.e. taxes on property/land, tourism, domestic loans). All in all, there are 29 unique principles that are in this section relating to the fair economic outlook of Sudan.
The third protocol of the Juba Peace Agreement seeks to address the plethora of human rights violations that had occurred in the region for years. This portion's general principles largely surrounding the respecting, upholding, and adopting of justice measures to combat war crimes and genocide. Many of these focuses are to help victims of violence in Sudan to have justice on a legal and democratic level. A big change made in these sections is that unless a violation of law requires the ICC, the National Judiciary's (newly-added in the latter part of this section) Special Court for Darfur, Truth and Reconciliation Committees, and Sudanese Courts have the power to exercise authority. Chapter 3 of the Juba Peace Protocols also has a section on memorialization of victims in Darfur to promote symbolic peace.
Chapter 4 of the Juba Peace Agreement focuses on the justice financially and institutionally for those who were victims of the conflict in Darfur. This chapter says that said justice can be in the form of compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, commemoration, and/or satisfaction. It also establishes that the term "victims of the conflict in Darfur" relates to the following:
Furthermore, this chapter of the peace agreement also explains the rights of those seeking compensation/reparations and the establishment of a fund for the aforementioned causes.
To start of Chapter 5 of the agreement's protocols, there are clear definitions of the terms internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, displaced persons, and residents on lands of others (people illegally living on others' lands after Darfur began. These definitions set the table for a handful of protocols to ensure all parties involved in Darfur are bound to international law relating to displaced persons and refugees. In addition, the document states that IDPs and refugees have the right of return, citizenship, identity, participation, ownership, and housing. This section also lays out the logistics of compensation for property and housing as well as creating suitable conditions for return.
On a more global level, Chapter 5 guarantees that IDPs and refugees were to receive urgent humanitarian aid and a comprehensive strategy on resettlement. Additionally, it paved the way for the creation of an IDP and Refugees Commission (IDPRC) and elaborates on the planning for it.
This chapter of the protocols directly highlighted the issues that brought about the War in Darfur—mainly the environmental aspect. The war itself is wildly complex, and one of the many reasons for its inception was the differing styles of agriculture practiced among the more rural tribal groups of the region. The dispute between nomadic and sedentary farmers over land was used as an opportunity by the Sudanese government to manufacture conflict between the Arab nomads and African pastoralists. But in the aftermath of the violence, this section outlined a path to equality between nomads and herders.
In particular, Chapter 6 hones in on the prevention of future tribal friction by assuring resources are protected and invested in. Considering environmental detriment exacerbated the fight for resources, this plan was installed in the Juba Agreement to ensure a more equitable future for both resources and the groups using them. Most of this section lays out the foundation of promoting peace between the various ethnic groups through creating agencies for agricultural cooperation.
A Hawakeer is an exclusively Sudanese term for means traditional or tribal land ownership rights deemed in effect by the people living in a particular area. This is the point of emphasis in Chapter 7 of the Juba Peace protocols. Recognizing the traditional ownership of these tribal lands and the historic rights of related lands are the main focusses of this portion—specifically regarding livestock routes and water access. The primary way the agreement decides to solve tension about land rights is with official demarcating of Darfur's borders and the creation of the Darfur Lands and Hawakeer Commission (DLHC). The rest of this chapter spells out the responsibilities and powers of the DLHC as well as its funding.
Both the longest and most detailed portion of the protocols, Chapter 8 meticulously details the plans for achieving immediate peace that can provide the stability needed to implement the prior sections. A preamble with five overarching statements begins the section before definitions are provided for a myriad of terms used throughout. From there, Chapter 8 states the purpose of the agreement, the parties involved, the guiding principles of the agreement, and a prelude to the phases of Final Security Agreements. The first of those agreements is the cessation of hostilities, followed by a permanent ceasefire (which is thoroughly described in the agreement). After that, both permissible and prohibited acts are listed for all parties involved, before the ceasefire preparations are explained. Majority of the remaining components of the section are centered around the code of conduct during the ceasefire and the guardrails put in place at the time of the ceasefire and beyond. Along the multifaceted guidelines of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), all the signing parties are given a well thought out path towards stability. Lastly, after even more information regarding implementations of various programs/methods/organizations, the final chapter of the Juba Agreement concludes with rules for the mediators of the document and final provisions.
Following a 2019 coup d'etat and subsequent removal of former President Omar al-Bashir, Sudan implemented a transitional government to shift towards a democratic system. Though this government hasn't come without turmoil of its own, it did oust the president who intensified the conflict in Darfur and is seen as one of the leading culprits of the bloodshed. Upon being thrust into leadership, the transitional government led by Abdalla Hamdok and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan led the new state's efforts to find common ground with the rebel groups of Darfur
The SLM is a primarily South-Sudanese was formed at 1989 as a direct result of Hassan al-Turabi's National Islamic Front gaining power of Sudan following the overthrowing of Ahmed al-Mirghani. The NIF implemented unequal policies against non-Arab regarding land and power sharing (therefore setting the table for Darfur years in advance). Therefore, the SLM has pushed for their rights/representation far before any violence was inflicted upon non-Arabs. Though, after that violence occurred, it became just another reason the SLM joined in on the Juba agreement—which gave each of its factions three seats on the sovereignty council, a total of five ministers in the transitional cabinet and a quarter of seats in the transitional legislature.
Spearheaded by al-Hadi Idris Yahya, this faction of the SLM broke away from its parent group because of its unwillingness to negotiate with former president Omar al-Bashir. Once the transitional government was implemented after al-Bashir's removal, the group signed onto the peace agreement.
After the Black Book, a manuscript that detailed the marginalization of non-Arabs in Sudan, was published in 2000, the JEM was founded with a strong focus on restoring democracy and diplomacy to the state. Given the two's similar viewpoints, the JEM and SLM's primary factions allied around 2010 and served as some of the leading forces in the forced removal of president Al-Bashir. The JEM and the SLM also received the same representation across the transitional government when they signed onto the Juba agreement.
The SPLM-N was established by various factions of the SPLM/A that remained in Sudan following the South Sudan gaining independence in 2011. The group then split into a pair of factions, named SPLM-N (Agar) and SPLM-N (al-Hilu), after being unable to see eye-to-eye on secularization in 2017. That, coupled with fighting in the Blue Nile, saw a falling out between the SPLM-N's two primary ideological groups. However, both the Agar and al-Hilu signed onto the Juba Agreement in 2020.
This party is a byproduct of the various factions and splinter groups of the main groups involved in the war in Darfur. The SLFA includes three rebel groups: the SLM-Unity faction, the Liberation and Justice Movement (LJM), and a portion of the JEM. Each of these different parties consists of multiple tribes and rebel groups within.
On Saturday 3 October 2020, Juba, the capital of South Sudan, witnessed the signing of the final stage of peace agreement between the Sudanese government and a number of armed movements, to resolve decades of conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan and Southern Blue Nile that led to the displacement of millions and the deaths of hundreds of thousands, with the participation of many sponsors, most notably the UAE .
The signing ceremony at Freedom Square in Juba was attended by the presidents of Chad, Djibouti and Somalia, along with the prime ministers of Egypt and Ethiopia, the Emirati Minister of Energy, the US Special Envoy for Sudan and South Sudan and representatives of a number of Western countries. Among the armed groups that signed the Juba Agreement, the Sudan Liberation Army Movement, The Arko Minawi wing, the Justice and Equality Movement, and the popular movement, Malik Aqar's wing, along with other factions.
In the days and months after the signing of the Juba Peace agreement, various global powers announced their support for the transitional government of Sudan in its efforts to democratize. Namely, the United Nations, [4] who had a key role in overseeing the agreement. In a statement released on October 9, 2020, the UN Security Council congratulated Sudan on the concord, while also praising the various parties involved (specifically South Sudan). Furthermore, the Security Council also introduced the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) and the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). However, UNITAMS was terminated by Sudan in November 2023 and the UN agreed to do so. This decision was made due to a lack of progress implementing certain aspects of the agreement, which has become a common trend in the immediate years following the finalization in Juba.
As for the United States, [5] it joined the UN in commending the Juba Agreement's signatories in October 2021—one year after its signings. This statement from the U.S. was a joint release alongside the United Kingdom and Norway, which focussed on applauding the progress made in the time after the signing but urging for less delays in implementing the entire accord.
Coincidentally enough, Amnesty International, [6] one of the global human rights leaders, hinted at these issues possibly arising when it released its statement prior to the official signing of the JPA. The organization's article mentioned the need for the agreement to be a practice and not just a document, which has proven to be an issue in the time since its signing.
The Justice and Equality Movement is an opposition group in Sudan founded by Khalil Ibrahim. Gibril Ibrahim has led the group since January 2012 after the death of Khalil, his brother, in December 2011. The JEM supported the removal of President of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir and nation-wide government reform.
The Sudan Liberation Movement/Army is a Sudanese rebel group active in Darfur, Sudan. It was founded as the Darfur Liberation Front by members of three indigenous ethnic groups in Darfur: the Fur, the Zaghawa, and the Masalit, among whom were the leaders Abdul Wahid al-Nur of the Fur and Minni Minnawi of the Zaghawa.
The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was an African Union (AU) peacekeeping force operating primarily in the country's western region of Darfur to perform peacekeeping operations related to the Darfur conflict. It was founded in 2004, with a force of 150 troops. By mid-2005, its numbers were increased to about 7,000. Under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1564, AMIS was to "closely and continuously liaise and coordinate ... at all levels" its work with the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). AMIS was the only external military force in Sudan's Darfur region until UNAMID was established. It was not able to effectively contain the violence in Darfur. A more sizable, better equipped UN peacekeeping force was originally proposed for September 2006, but due to Sudanese government opposition, it was not implemented at that time. AMIS' mandate was extended repeatedly throughout 2006, while the situation in Darfur continued to escalate, until AMIS was replaced by UNAMID on 31 December 2007.
The Sudan People's Liberation Movement is a political party in South Sudan. It was initially founded as the political wing of the Sudan People's Liberation Army in 1983. On January 9, 2005 the SPLA, the SPLM and the Government of Sudan signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, ending the civil war. SPLM then obtained representation in the Government of Sudan, and was the main constituent of the Government of the then semi-autonomous Southern Sudan. When South Sudan became a sovereign state on 9 July 2011, SPLM became the ruling party of the new republic. SPLM branches in Sudan separated themselves from SPLM, forming the Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North. Further factionalism appeared as a result of the 2013–2014 South Sudanese Civil War, with President Salva Kiir leading the SPLM-Juba and former Vice President Riek Machar leading the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition.
The War in Darfur, also nicknamed the Land Cruiser War, was a major armed conflict in the Darfur region of Sudan that began in February 2003 when the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) rebel groups began fighting against the government of Sudan, which they accused of oppressing Darfur's non-Arab population. The government responded to attacks by carrying out a campaign of ethnic cleansing against Darfur's non-Arabs. This resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of civilians and the indictment of Sudan's president, Omar al-Bashir, for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court.
Suliman Arcua Minnawi, also known as "Minni Minnawi", is a Sudanese politician the leader of a faction of the Sudanese Liberation Army. A former educator, Minnawi served as secretary to Sudan Liberation Army leader Abdul Wahid al-Nur before the organisation split in 2004.
The politics of South Sudan concern the system of government in the Republic of South Sudan, a country in East Africa, and the people, organizations, and events involved in it.
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement, also known as the Naivasha Agreement, was an accord signed on 9 January 2005, by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and the Government of Sudan. The CPA was meant to end the Second Sudanese Civil War, develop democratic governance countrywide, and share oil revenues. It also set a timetable for a Southern Sudanese independence referendum.
The Darfur Peace Agreement may refer to one of three peace agreements that were signed by the Government of Sudan and Darfur-based rebel groups in 2006, 2011 and 2020 with the intention of ending the Darfur Conflict.
The Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North, or SPLM–N, is a political party and militant organisation in the Republic of the Sudan, based in the states of Blue Nile and South Kordofan. The group's armed forces are formally known as the Sudan People's Liberation Army–North or SPLA–N. As of 2017, its two factions, SPLM-N (Agar) and SPLM-N (al-Hilu) were engaged in fighting each other and against the government of Sudan, and as of 2023, the al-Hilu faction is fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), while the leader of the Agar faction was appointed into the military-run government.
The Sudanese conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile was an armed conflict in the Sudanese states of South Kordofan and Blue Nile between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement–North (SPLM-N), a northern affiliate of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) in South Sudan. After some years of relative calm following the 2005 agreement which ended the second Sudanese civil war between the Sudanese government and SPLM rebels, fighting broke out again in the lead-up to South Sudan independence on 9 July 2011, starting in South Kordofan on 5 June and spreading to the neighboring Blue Nile state in September. SPLM-N, splitting from newly independent SPLM, took up arms against the inclusion of the two southern states in Sudan with no popular consultation and against the lack of democratic elections. The conflict is intertwined with the War in Darfur, since in November 2011 SPLM-N established a loose alliance with Darfuri rebels, called Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF).
Abdelaziz Adam al-Hilu is a Sudanese politician and the current chairperson of the Sudan People's Liberation Army – SPLA–North.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2003, adopted unanimously on July 29, 2011, after reaffirming all previous resolutions and statements on the situation in Sudan, the Council extended the mandate of the African Union – United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) for a further 12 months until July 31, 2012.
The Sudan Revolutionary Front, or the Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF), is an alliance between Sudanese factions that was created in opposition to the government of President Omar al-Bashir. It was declared on 12 November 2011, following several months of support by Darfuri rebel groups for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North in the conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile.
The South Sudanese Civil War was a multi-sided civil war in South Sudan between forces of the government and opposition forces. In December 2013, President Salva Kiir accused his former deputy Riek Machar and 10 others of attempting a coup d'état. Machar denied trying to start a coup and fled to lead the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO). Fighting broke out between the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) and SPLM-IO, igniting the civil war. Ugandan troops were deployed to fight alongside the South Sudanese government. The United Nations has peacekeepers in the country as part of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).
The following lists events that happened during 2006 in Sudan.
A series of political agreements among Sudanese political and military forces for a democratic transition in Sudan began in July 2019. Omar al-Bashir overthrew the democratically elected government of Sadiq al-Mahdi in 1989 and was himself overthrown in the 2019 Sudanese coup d'état, in which he was replaced by the Transitional Military Council (TMC) after months of sustained street protests. Following further protests and the 3 June Khartoum massacre, TMC and the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) alliance agreed on 5 July 2019 to a 39-month transition process to return to democracy, including the creation of executive, legislative and judicial institutions and procedures.
The Sudanese peace process consists of meetings, written agreements and actions that aim to resolve the War in Darfur, the Sudanese conflict in South Kordofan and Blue Nile, and armed conflicts in central, northern and eastern Sudan.
The Third Front, known as Tamazuj, is a claimed rebel group based in the Darfur and Kordofan regions of Sudan.
Tumaini Peace Initiative, which was launched on May 9, 2024, in the Kenyan Capital Nairobi, is a high-level mediation seeking everlasting tranquility for the conflict in South Sudan by incorporating all the holdout groups that have not signed the 2018 R-ARCSS. Kenyan President William Ruto, South Sudan President Salva Kiir, and former Kenyan Army Commander and Chief Mediator Major-Gen Lazarus Sumbeiywo are the lead initiative mediators.