"Shouting fire in a crowded theater" is a popular analogy for speech or actions whose principal purpose is to create panic, and in particular for speech or actions which may for that reason be thought to be outside the scope of free speech protections. The phrase is a paraphrasing of a dictum, or non-binding statement, from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s opinion in the United States Supreme Court case Schenck v. United States in 1919, which held that the defendant's speech in opposition to the draft during World War I was not protected free speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The case was later partially overturned by Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969, which limited the scope of banned speech to that directed to and likely to incite imminent lawless action (e.g. an immediate riot). [1]
The paraphrasing differs from Holmes's original wording in that it typically does not include the word falsely, while also adding the word crowded to describe the theatre. [2]
The utterance of "fire!" in and of itself is not generally illegal within the United States: "sometimes you could yell 'fire' in a crowded theater without facing punishment. The theater may actually be on fire. Or you may reasonably believe that the theater is on fire". [3] Furthermore, within the doctrine of first amendment protected free speech within the United States, yelling "fire!" as speech is not itself the legally problematic event, but rather, "there are scenarios in which intentionally lying about a fire in a crowded theater and causing a stampede might lead to a disorderly conduct citation or similar charge." [3]
In the 19th and early 20th centuries, panics caused by false shouts of "fire" in crowded theaters and other venues were not uncommon. [4] Most notably, the Canonsburg Opera House disaster of 1911 led to 26 deaths, and the 1913 Italian Hall disaster saw 73 people die in the crush that ensued from a false alarm in a crowded banquet hall. [5]
The problem was widespread enough that the person falsely shouting "fire" became a stock character in popular writing, representing an example of foolish or villainous behavior. [6]
Laws were enacted in some jurisdictions to protect the public from such panics, such as the Indianapolis municipal code of 1917, which made it illegal to "[c]ry out a false alarm of 'fire' in any church, public hall, theater, moving picture showroom, or any other building of a similar or different character, while the same is occupied by a public assemblage." [7] [8]
The first known use of the analogy in the context of free speech occurred in the 1918 trial of Eugene V. Debs. [9] Debs was charged with violations of the Espionage Act of 1917 for an anti-war speech he had delivered in Canton, Ohio. [10] In his closing argument, Debs offered as his sole legal defense that his speech was protected by the First Amendment. [11] Federal prosecutor Edwin Wertz then argued in his closing rebuttal: [12]
Now, he speaks about the Constitution of the United States giving him the authority to do what he did at Canton. The Constitution provides that there shall be no abridgement of free speech, it is true; yet it is a fact that a man in a crowded auditorium, or any theatre, who yells "fire" and there is no fire, and a panic ensues and someone is trampled to death, may be rightfully indicted and charged with murder, and may be convicted and sent to the electric chair for making such an outcry when there is no occasion for it. That is an abridgement of the right of free speech according to the defendant's idea.
[...]
According to his theory, a man could go into a crowded theatre, or even into this audience, and yell "fire" when there was no fire, and people trampled to death, and he would not be punished for it because the Constitution says he has the right of free speech.
Historians infer that Oliver Wendell Holmes read Wertz's speech while preparing his opinion in Debs v. United States and adopted the analogy in the Schenck case. [9] [13] [14]
Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, ruled that it was a violation of the Espionage Act of 1917 (amended by the Sedition Act of 1918) to distribute flyers opposing the draft during World War I. Holmes argued that this abridgment of free speech was permissible because it presented a "clear and present danger" to the government's recruitment efforts for the war. Holmes wrote:
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic... The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
The First Amendment holding in Schenck was later partially overturned by Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969, in which the Supreme Court held that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." [1] [15] The test in Brandenburg is the current Supreme Court jurisprudence on the ability of government to punish speech after it occurs. Despite Schenck being limited, the phrase "shouting fire in a crowded theater" has become synonymous with speech that, because of its danger of provoking violence, is not protected by the First Amendment.
Ultimately, whether it is legal in the United States to falsely shout "fire" in a theater depends on the circumstances in which it is done and the consequences of doing it. The act of shouting "fire" when there are no reasonable grounds for believing one exists is not in itself a crime, and nor would it be rendered a crime merely by having been carried out inside a theatre, crowded or otherwise. However, if it causes a stampede and someone is killed as a result, then the act could amount to a crime, such as involuntary manslaughter, assuming the other elements of that crime are made out. Similarly, state laws such as Colorado Revised Statute § 18-8-111 classify knowingly "false reporting of an emergency," including false alarms of fire, as a misdemeanour if the occupants of the building are caused to be evacuated or displaced, and a felony if the emergency response results in the serious bodily injury or death of another person. Somewhat more trivially, in some states it is a crime just to knowingly make a false report - or knowingly cause a false report to be made - of an emergency to emergency services. In the statute just cited, for example, it is a crime to knowingly cause "a false alarm of fire" to be transmitted to "any...government agency which deals with emergencies involving danger to life or property." This crime could plausibly be made out where, for instance, in response to the false shout, an innocent bystander calls emergency services to report the fire, and this is found to have been such a foreseeable response to the shouts that the shouter is deemed to have caused the false report to be made.
Christopher M. Finan, Executive Director of the National Coalition Against Censorship, writes that Justice Holmes began to doubt his decision due to criticism received from free-speech activists. He also met the legal scholar Zechariah Chafee and discussed his Harvard Law Review article "Freedom of Speech in War Times". [16] [17] According to Finan, Holmes's change of heart influenced his decision to join the minority and dissent in the Abrams v. United States case. Abrams was deported for issuing flyers saying the US should not intervene in the Russian Revolution. Holmes and Brandeis said that "a silly leaflet by an unknown man" should not be considered illegal. [16] [18] Chafee argued in Free Speech in the United States that a better analogy in Schenck might be a man who stands in a theatre and warns the audience that there are not enough fire exits. [19] [20]
In his introductory remarks to a 2006 debate in defense of free speech, writer Christopher Hitchens parodied the Holmes judgment by opening "FIRE! Fire, fire... fire. Now you've heard it", before condemning the famous analogy as "the fatuous verdict of the greatly over-praised Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes." Hitchens argued that the "Yiddish speaking socialists" protesting America's entry into World War I, who were imprisoned by the Court's decision, "were the real fire fighters, were the ones shouting fire when there really was a fire, in a very crowded theatre indeed. And who is to decide?" [21] [22]
Writer Emma Camp has pointed out that Schenck v. United States did not actually address the question of whether or not it is illegal to "shout fire in a crowded theater", since this analogy was simply non-binding dictum used to illustrate Justice Holmes' point. [23]
Ken White, an attorney and owner of Popehat, has stated that even though Schenck v. United States affirmed that the First Amendment is not absolute, "you can't shout fire in a crowded theater" is frequently used as a red herring when discussing whether or not a particular instance of speech falls under exceptions set by the Supreme Court. Citing the later ruling of United States v. Stevens , White also pointed out that the currently accepted limitations to the First Amendment are narrow and well-defined, and the court is unlikely to introduce new ones based on balancing the value that some speech possesses with the potential harm it does to society. [24] [25]
People have falsely shouted "Fire!" or been misheard in crowded public venues and caused panics on several occasions, such as:
In contrast, during the Brooklyn Theatre fire of December 5, 1876, theatre staff were reluctant to cause a panic by shouting fire and instead pretended that the fire was part of the performance. This delayed the evacuation, leading to a death toll of at least 278.
Clear and present danger was a doctrine adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States to determine under what circumstances limits can be placed on First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, or assembly. Created by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. to refine the bad tendency test, it was never fully adopted and both tests were ultimately replaced in 1969 with Brandenburg v. Ohio's "imminent lawless action" test.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning enforcement of the Espionage Act of 1917 during World War I. A unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., concluded that Charles Schenck and other defendants, who distributed flyers to draft-age men urging resistance to induction, could be convicted of an attempt to obstruct the draft, a criminal offense. The First Amendment did not protect Schenck from prosecution, even though, "in many places and in ordinary times, the defendants, in saying all that was said in the circular, would have been within their constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." In this case, Holmes said, "the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Therefore, Schenck could be punished.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Court held that the government cannot punish inflammatory speech unless that speech is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". Specifically, the Court struck down Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute, because that statute broadly prohibited the mere advocacy of violence. In the process, Whitney v. California (1927) was explicitly overruled, and Schenck v. United States (1919), Abrams v. United States (1919), Gitlow v. New York (1925), and Dennis v. United States (1951) were overturned.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution had extended the First Amendment's provisions protecting freedom of speech and freedom of the press to apply to the governments of U.S. states. Along with Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago (1897), it was one of the first major cases involving the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. It was also one of a series of Supreme Court cases that defined the scope of the First Amendment's protection of free speech and established the standard to which a state or the federal government would be held when it criminalized speech or writing.
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. was an American jurist who served as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1902 to 1932. Holmes is one of the most widely cited and influential Supreme Court justices in American history, noted for his long tenure on the Court and for his pithy opinions—particularly those on civil liberties and American constitutional democracy—and deference to the decisions of elected legislatures. Holmes retired from the Court at the age of 90, an unbeaten record for oldest justice on the Supreme Court. He previously served as a Brevet Colonel in the American Civil War, in which he was wounded three times, as an associate justice and chief justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, and as Weld Professor of Law at his alma mater, Harvard Law School. His positions, distinctive personality, and writing style made him a popular figure, especially with American progressives.
The Sedition Act of 1918 was an Act of the United States Congress that extended the Espionage Act of 1917 to cover a broader range of offenses, notably speech and the expression of opinion that cast the government or the war effort in a negative light or interfered with the sale of government bonds.
In the United States, freedom of speech and expression is strongly protected from government restrictions by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, many state constitutions, and state and federal laws. Freedom of speech, also called free speech, means the free and public expression of opinions without censorship, interference and restraint by the government The term "freedom of speech" embedded in the First Amendment encompasses the decision what to say as well as what not to say. The Supreme Court of the United States has recognized several categories of speech that are given lesser or no protection by the First Amendment and has recognized that governments may enact reasonable time, place, or manner restrictions on speech. The First Amendment's constitutional right of free speech, which is applicable to state and local governments under the incorporation doctrine, prevents only government restrictions on speech, not restrictions imposed by private individuals or businesses unless they are acting on behalf of the government. The right of free speech can, however, be lawfully restricted by time, place and manner in limited circumstances. Some laws may restrict the ability of private businesses and individuals from restricting the speech of others, such as employment laws that restrict employers' ability to prevent employees from disclosing their salary to coworkers or attempting to organize a labor union.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States upholding the criminal arrests of several defendants under the Sedition Act of 1918, which was an amendment to the Espionage Act of 1917. The law made it a criminal offense to criticize the production of war materiel with intent to hinder the progress of American military efforts.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court in which the Court articulated the fighting words doctrine, a limitation of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.
"Imminent lawless action" is one of several legal standards American courts use to determine whether certain speech is protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The standard was first established in 1969 in the United States Supreme Court case Brandenburg v. Ohio.
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), was a United States Supreme Court decision, relevant for US labor law and constitutional law, that upheld the Espionage Act of 1917.
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, was a decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, that addressed advocacy of illegal activity under the First Amendment. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Hand’s ruling in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten (1917).
Zechariah Chafee Jr. was an American judicial philosopher and civil rights advocate, described as "possibly the most important First Amendment scholar of the first half of the twentieth century" by Richard Primus. Chafee's avid defense of freedom of speech led to Senator Joseph McCarthy calling him "dangerous" to America.
In United States law, the bad tendency principle was a test that permitted restriction of freedom of speech by government if it is believed that a form of speech has a sole tendency to incite or cause illegal activity. The principle, formulated in Patterson v. Colorado (1907), was seemingly overturned with the "clear and present danger" principle used in the landmark case Schenck v. United States (1919), as stated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. Yet eight months later, at the start of the next term in Abrams v. United States (1919), the Court again used the bad tendency test to uphold the conviction of a Russian immigrant who published and distributed leaflets calling for a general strike and otherwise advocated revolutionary, anarchist, and socialist views. Holmes dissented in Abrams, explaining how the clear and present danger test should be employed to overturn Abrams' conviction. The re-emergence of the bad tendency test resulted in a string of cases after Abrams employing that test, including Whitney v. California (1927), where a woman was convicted simply because of her association with the Communist Party. The court ruled unanimously that although she had not committed any crimes, her relationship with the Communists represented a "bad tendency" and thus was unprotected. The "bad tendency" test was finally overturned in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) and was replaced by the "imminent lawless action" test.
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a "breach of peace" ordinance of the City of Chicago that banned speech that "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance" was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case finding a requirement mandating a permit to speak on religious issues in public was unconstitutional. It was argued October 17, 1950, and decided January 15, 1951, 8–1. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion for the Court. Justice Black and Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result only. Justice Jackson dissented.
Speech crimes are certain kinds of speech that are criminalized by promulgated laws or rules. Criminal speech is a direct preemptive restriction on freedom of speech, and the broader concept of freedom of expression.
On September 19, 1902, a stampede occurred at the Shiloh Baptist Church in Birmingham, Alabama, resulting in the deaths of 115 people. At the time of the crush, 3,000 people were gathered to hear Booker T. Washington address the National Convention of Negro Baptists. The stampede occurred after the end of Washington's speech, when someone yelled "There's a fight!". The word "fight" was mistaken for "fire", causing the congregation to head for the exit en masse. Many people died after they got stuck between the brick walls of a stairwell that led to the street. Most of the dead were women. Physicians said in many cases they fainted and died from suffocation.
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the First Amendment that reaffirmed and clarified the imminent lawless action test first articulated in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969). Hess is still cited by courts to protect speech threatening future lawless action.
The Canonsburg Opera House disaster occurred on August 26, 1911 in Canonsburg, Pennsylvania. A false shout of "fire" triggered a panic that killed twenty-six people.