Abrams v. United States | |
---|---|
Argued October 21–22, 1919 Decided November 10, 1919 | |
Full case name | Jacob Abrams, et al. v. United States |
Citations | 250 U.S. 616 ( more ) 40 S. Ct. 17; 63 L. Ed. 1173; 1919 U.S. LEXIS 1784 |
Case history | |
Prior | Defendants convicted, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York |
Subsequent | None |
Holding | |
Defendants' criticism of American involvement in World War I was not protected by the First Amendment because they advocated a strike in munitions production and the violent overthrow of the government. | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Majority | Clarke, joined by White, McKenna, Day, Van Devanter, Pitney, McReynolds |
Dissent | Holmes, joined by Brandeis |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. amend. I; 50 U.S.C. § 33 (1917) | |
Overruled by | |
Brandenburg v. Ohio , 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (in part) |
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States upholding the criminal arrests of several defendants under the Sedition Act of 1918, which was an amendment to the Espionage Act of 1917. The law made it a criminal offense to criticize the production of war materiel with intent to hinder the progress of American military efforts. [1]
The defendants had been arrested in 1919 for printing and distributing anti-war leaflets in New York City. After their conviction under the Sedition Act, they appealed on free speech grounds. The Supreme Court upheld the convictions under the clear and present danger standard, which allowed the suppression of certain types of speech in the public interest. [2]
The ruling is best known for its dissent by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, which led to a gradual liberalization of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. [3] [4] The clear and present danger standard, used in this ruling to uphold the criminal convictions, fell out of favor and was largely overturned by the Supreme Court in 1969. [5]
On August 12, 1919, Hyman Rosansky was arrested after throwing flyers out of a fourth-floor window of a hat factory in Lower Manhattan. Rosansky had received the flyers at an anarchist meeting the previous day. There were two separate leaflets: one in English and signed "Revolutionists" that denounced the sending of American troops to intervene in the Russian Civil War; and a second in Yiddish that favored the communist side in the Russian Revolution and denounced the American production of weapons to be used against the communists. [6] Jacob Abrams, whose name was eventually used in the Supreme Court ruling, had printed the leaflets in his basement workshop. Relying on information provided by Rosansky, police soon arrested Abrams, Mollie Steimer, and four other activists. All including Rosansky had emigrated to the United States from Russia and supported the communists in their efforts to depose the incumbent czarist regime. [7]
The defendants were charged under the Sedition Act of 1918 for inciting resistance to American military actions and urging curtailment of production of essential war materiel. They were also charged for conspiring with Germany, which was an opponent of both the United States and Russia at the time. [2] One defendant–Jacob Schwartz– died while in jail from the Spanish Flu, while another– Gabriel Porter–was acquitted. [6] The five remaining defendants were convicted in criminal court and received various sentences ranging from three to twenty years in prison; some were also condemned to deportation to their native Russia after the completion of their prison sentences. The defendants attempted a free speech argument and claimed that the Sedition Act conflicted with the free speech protections of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but this argument was rejected by the criminal court. [2] All five appealed their convictions to the United States Supreme Court with a focus on the First Amendment argument.
The Supreme Court ruled 7–2 that the defendants' freedom of speech had not been violated. Justice John Hessin Clarke, author of the majority opinion, argued that Congress had passed the Sedition Act with the rationale that critics of American military efforts presented an "imminent danger that it [the offending speech] will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States constitutionally may seek to prevent." [2] The Supreme Court upheld the defendants' criminal convictions per the clear and present danger test that it had formulated earlier the same year in Schenck v. United States , a case that also involved a speech-related arrest under the Sedition Act. [8]
Clarke argued that the defendants' leaflets in Abrams demonstrated an intent to hinder production of war materiel, which was a clear violation of the terms of the Sedition Act and could not be characterized as simple expressions of political opinion. Clarke concluded:
This is not an attempt to bring about a change of administration by candid discussion, for no matter what may have incited the outbreak on the part of the defendant anarchists, the manifest purpose of such a publication was to create an attempt to defeat the war plans of the government of the United States, by bringing upon the country the paralysis of a general strike, thereby arresting the production of all munitions and other things essential to the conduct of the war. [2]
For the defendants' claim that they were merely supporters of Russian revolutionaries in a conflict that was purely internal to Russia, Clarke found a connection to the then-current conflict between the United States and Germany. Clarke reasoned that the defendants resented "our Government [for] sending troops into Russia as a strategic operation against the Germans on the eastern battle front." [2] During the hearing, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes objected on the grounds that the criminal prosecutors should have shown specific intent by the defendants to bring about the harms for which they were charged, but the majority dismissed this argument. [3]
The Court held that the leaflets' call for the curtailment of war materiel production violated the Sedition Act and the arrests were justifiable per statute. Congress's determination that all such propaganda posed a danger to the war effort was ruled sufficient to meet the standard set in Schenck v. United States for prosecution of attempted crimes, regardless of whether the attempt was made through speech or writing. Thus, the criminal convictions were upheld. [2]
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes had sided with the majority in the earlier cases, notably Schenck, in which the Supreme Court upheld speech-related criminal convictions under the Sedition Act. In Abrams, Holmes issued a dissenting opinion that reflected a change in his views on criticism of government and the intent to create harms to the public or the nation. [3] Holmes rejected the argument that the defendants' leaflets posed a clear and present danger and argued that the defendants had received prison sentences "not for what the indictment alleges but for the creed that they avow." [2]
Holmes wrote that, although the defendant's leaflets called for a cessation of weapons production, they had not violated the Sedition Act of 1918 because the leaflets did not display a criminal intent "to cripple or hinder the United States in the prosecution of the war" against Germany. The defendants were objecting only to the American military's intervention in the Russian civil war. [2] Holmes's previous opinion in Schenck had been criticized by Constitutional scholar Zechariah Chafee for failing to distinguish between speech-based opposition to military operations and intent to commit a crime. He also objected to the idea that the Sedition Act could be used to prosecute all seditious speech regardless of the military conflict being discussed. [3]
Holmes continued with a defense of free speech and criticism of government, which he believed should be protected by the Constitution. He may have also been influenced by the fact that some friends in the Jewish immigrant community had recently been harassed by authorities for their left-wing political opinions. [3] [4] Holmes also had experience as a judge in criminal court and was familiar with the common law of convictions and sentencing, which is believed to have informed his changing views on the prosecution of speech-based offenses. [9] In Abrams, he found the prison sentences to be excessive, arguing that even if the defendants' speech could be punished as an attempted crime, even if "enough can be squeezed from these poor and puny anonymities to turn the color of legal litmus paper," they had been convicted not for dangerous crimes, but for their beliefs. [2]
Holmes then turned to the value of speech that is critical of government, and the ability of those who disagree to react to that speech, without intervention by government or punishment of those with unpopular opinions. He argued that efforts to suppress opinions by force therefore contradict a fundamental principle of the Constitution. [2] While he did not use the term himself, this focus on public debate rather than government prosecution has since been dubbed the marketplace of ideas. [10] Holmes's passionate, indignant opinion on this matter has become very influential [11] and is often quoted:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power, and want a certain result with all your heart, you naturally express your wishes in law, and sweep away all opposition... But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas — that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out. [2]
While the criminal convictions against Jacob Abrams and the other defendants were upheld by the Supreme Court, the dissent by Holmes has proven to be more influential for later First Amendment jurisprudence. [3]
There is evidence that Holmes's dissent in Abrams was influenced by Zechariah Chafee, and colleagues like Louis Brandeis and Learned Hand, [12] while his apparently inconsistent views of speech that criticizes the government attracted some criticism. [13] However, his dissent was eventually acknowledged as a significant turning point in the American judiciary's views on political speech, with the marketplace of ideas analysis gradually becoming the standard in court disputes about government suppression of speech. [14] This indeed happened by the 1950s-60s, as the judiciary transitioned to a focus on the risk of imminent lawless action caused by speech that government officials find inappropriate. [15]
Those later cases were informed by the government's actions against its critics during World War II, at which time attitudes had changed since Abrams which was engendered by World War I. [4] A key turning point was a Second Circuit opinion by Judge Learned Hand in U.S. v. Dennis in 1950, [16] critiquing the clear and present danger standard. [17] This inspired further dissents in favor of unfettered political speech from a bitterly divided Supreme Court when they heard the case on appeal the following year. [18] The clear and present danger standard was gradually dropped in favor of the imminent lawless action standard, with more input for the marketplace of ideas. The imminent lawless action standard was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969. [5] That ruling effectively overturned Abrams and several other Supreme Court precedents from the same era. [12]
Contemporary discussions about the case were robust. Due to popular pressure, Congress repealed the statute at the heart of Abrams and several other recent Supreme Court rulings–the Sedition Act of 1918 –just one year after Abrams. Most arrestees were granted clemency by President Woodrow Wilson. [19]
Clear and present danger was a doctrine adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States to determine under what circumstances limits can be placed on First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, or assembly. Created by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. to refine the bad tendency test, it was never fully adopted and both tests were ultimately replaced in 1969 with Brandenburg v. Ohio's "imminent lawless action" test.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning enforcement of the Espionage Act of 1917 during World War I. A unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., concluded that Charles Schenck, who distributed flyers to draft-age men urging resistance to induction, could be convicted of an attempt to obstruct the draft, a criminal offense. The First Amendment did not protect Schenck from prosecution, even though, "in many places and in ordinary times, Schenck, in saying all that was said in the circular, would have been within his constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." In this case, Holmes said, "the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Therefore, Schenck could be punished.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case relating to Eugene Dennis, General Secretary of the Communist Party USA. The Court ruled that Dennis did not have the right under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to exercise free speech, publication and assembly, if the exercise involved the creation of a plot to overthrow the government. In 1969, Dennis was de facto overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Court held that the government cannot punish inflammatory speech unless that speech is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". Specifically, the Court struck down Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute, because that statute broadly prohibited the mere advocacy of violence. In the process, Whitney v. California (1927) was explicitly overruled, and Schenck v. United States (1919), Abrams v. United States (1919), Gitlow v. New York (1925), and Dennis v. United States (1951) were overturned.
The Espionage Act of 1917 is a United States federal law enacted on June 15, 1917, shortly after the United States entered World War I. It has been amended numerous times over the years. It was originally found in Title 50 of the U.S. Code but is now found under Title 18. Specifically, it is 18 U.S.C. ch. 37.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), was a United States Supreme Court decision upholding the conviction of an individual who had engaged in speech that raised a clear and present danger to society. While the majority of the Supreme Court Justices voted to uphold the conviction, the ruling has become an important free speech precedent due a concurring opinion by Justice Louis Brandeis recommending new perspectives on criticism of the government by citizens. The ruling was explicitly overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969.
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution had extended the First Amendment's provisions protecting freedom of speech and freedom of the press to apply to the governments of U.S. states. Along with Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago (1897), it was one of the first major cases involving the incorporation of the Bill of Rights. It was also one of a series of Supreme Court cases that defined the scope of the First Amendment's protection of free speech and established the standard to which a state or the federal government would be held when it criminalized speech or writing.
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. was an American jurist who served as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1902 to 1932. Holmes is one of the most widely cited Supreme Court justices and among the most influential American judges in history, noted for his long service, pithy opinions—particularly those on civil liberties and American constitutional democracy—and deference to the decisions of elected legislatures. Holmes retired from the court at the age of 90, an unbeaten record for oldest justice on the Supreme Court. He previously served as a Brevet Colonel in the American Civil War, in which he was wounded three times, as an associate justice and chief justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, and as Weld Professor of Law at his alma mater, Harvard Law School. His positions, distinctive personality, and writing style made him a popular figure, especially with American progressives.
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919), was a United States Supreme Court decision, relevant for US labor law and constitutional law, that upheld the Espionage Act of 1917.
"Shouting fire in a crowded theater" is a popular analogy for speech or actions whose principal purpose is to create panic, and in particular for speech or actions which may for that reason be thought to be outside the scope of free speech protections. The phrase is a paraphrasing of a dictum, or non-binding statement, from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.'s opinion in the United States Supreme Court case Schenck v. United States in 1919, which held that the defendant's speech in opposition to the draft during World War I was not protected free speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The case was later partially overturned by Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969, which limited the scope of banned speech to that which would be directed to and likely to incite imminent lawless action.
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held, 7–2, that a California statute banning red flags was unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In the case, Yetta Stromberg was convicted for displaying a red flag daily in the youth camp for children at which she worked, and was charged in accordance with California law. Chief Justice Charles Hughes wrote for the seven-justice majority that the California statute was unconstitutional, and therefore Stromberg's conviction could not stand.
Zechariah Chafee Jr. was an American judicial philosopher and civil rights advocate, described as "possibly the most important First Amendment scholar of the first half of the twentieth century" by Richard Primus. Chafee's avid defense of freedom of speech led to Senator Joseph McCarthy calling him "dangerous" to America.
In United States law, the bad tendency principle was a test that permitted restriction of freedom of speech by government if it is believed that a form of speech has a sole tendency to incite or cause illegal activity. The principle, formulated in Patterson v. Colorado (1907), was seemingly overturned with the "clear and present danger" principle used in the landmark case Schenck v. United States (1919), as stated by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. Yet eight months later, at the start of the next term in Abrams v. United States (1919), the Court again used the bad tendency test to uphold the conviction of a Russian immigrant who published and distributed leaflets calling for a general strike and otherwise advocated revolutionary, anarchist, and socialist views. Holmes dissented in Abrams, explaining how the clear and present danger test should be employed to overturn Abrams' conviction. The re-emergence of the bad tendency test resulted in a string of cases after Abrams employing that test, including Whitney v. California (1927), where a woman was convicted simply because of her association with the Communist Party. The court ruled unanimously that although she had not committed any crimes, her relationship with the Communists represented a "bad tendency" and thus was unprotected. The "bad tendency" test was finally overturned in Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) and was replaced by the "imminent lawless action" test.
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a "breach of peace" ordinance of the City of Chicago that banned speech that "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance" was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case finding a requirement mandating a permit to speak on religious issues in public was unconstitutional. It was argued October 17, 1950, and decided January 15, 1951, 8–1. Chief Justice Vinson delivered the opinion for the Court. Justice Black and Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result only. Justice Jackson dissented.
The Alien Registration Act, popularly known as the Smith Act, 76th United States Congress, 3d session, ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 is a United States federal statute that was enacted on June 28, 1940. It set criminal penalties for advocating the overthrow of the U.S. government by force or violence, and required all non-citizen adult residents to register with the federal government.
The Smith Act trials of Communist Party leaders took place in New York City from 1949 to 1958. These trials were a series of prosecutions carried out by the US federal government during the postwar period and the Cold War era, which was characterized by tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. The leaders of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) faced accusations of violating the Smith Act, a statute that made it illegal to advocate for the violent overthrow of the government. In their defense, the defendants claimed that they advocated for a peaceful transition to socialism and that their membership in a political party was protected by the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and association. The issues raised in these trials were eventually addressed by the US Supreme Court in its rulings Dennis v. United States (1951) and Yates v. United States (1957).
Freedom for the Thought That We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment is a 2007 non-fiction book by journalist Anthony Lewis about freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of thought, and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The book starts by quoting the First Amendment, which prohibits the U.S. Congress from creating legislation which limits free speech or freedom of the press. Lewis traces the evolution of civil liberties in the U.S. through key historical events. He provides an overview of important free speech case law, including U.S. Supreme Court opinions in Schenck v. United States (1919), Whitney v. California (1927), United States v. Schwimmer (1929), New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964), and New York Times Co. v. United States (1971).
The White Court refers to the Supreme Court of the United States from 1910 to 1921, when Edward Douglass White served as Chief Justice of the United States. White, an associate justice since 1894, succeeded Melville Fuller as Chief Justice after the latter's death, and White served as Chief Justice until his death a decade later. He was the first sitting associate justice to be elevated to chief justice in the Court's history. He was succeeded by former president William Howard Taft.
Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Company v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921), was a Supreme Court ruling that upheld the United States Postmaster General's power to revoke second-class mail privileges under the Espionage Act of 1917. The lawsuit was filed on behalf of the owners of the Milwaukee Leader, a socialist daily newspaper in Milwaukee, Wisconsin due to Postmaster General Albert S. Burleson's revocation of the Leader's second-class mailing privileges on the grounds of past anti-war articles it had published. The court ruled 7–2 in favor of the federal government, with Justice Clarke delivering the majority opinion while Justices Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. dissented.
In 1921, Woodrow Wilson offered clemency to most of those convicted under the Sedition and Espionage Acts.