Boy Scouts of America et al. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court, decided on June 28, 2000, that held that the constitutional right to freedom of association allowed the Boy Scouts of America (BSA) to exclude a homosexual person from membership in spite of a state law requiring equal treatment of homosexuals in public accommodations. More generally, the court ruled that a private organization such as the BSA may exclude a person from membership when "the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints". In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court ruled that opposition to homosexuality is part of BSA's "expressive message" and that allowing homosexuals as adult leaders would interfere with that message.
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978), is a U.S. constitutional law case which defined the free speech right of corporations for the first time. The United States Supreme Court held that corporations have a First Amendment right to make contributions to ballot initiative campaigns. The ruling came in response to a Massachusetts law that prohibited corporate donations in ballot initiatives unless the corporation's interests were directly involved.
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case which held that a court will defer to a federal agency's findings of fact if supported by "substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole." Universal Camera added another qualification to the substantial evidence test laid down in Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB. The evidence supporting the agency's conclusion must be substantial in consideration of the record as a whole, even including the evidence that is not consistent with the agency's conclusion.
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that California's blanket primary violates a political party's First Amendment freedom of association.
Pacific Gas & Electric v. Public Utilities Commission, 475 U.S. 1 (1986), was a United States Supreme Court case involving a dispute over newsletters that the San Francisco–based privately-owned public utility Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) had included with its monthly bills to customers. The special interest group Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN) sued PG&E, arguing that the extra space in the billing envelope taken by the newsletters constituted a form of political speech whose cost the public should not have to bear.
In law, commercial speech is speech or writing on behalf of a business with the intent of earning revenue or a profit. It is economic in nature and usually attempts to persuade consumers to purchase the business's product or service. The Supreme Court of the United States defines commercial speech as speech that "proposes a commercial transaction".
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), was an important case decided by the United States Supreme Court that laid out a four-part test for determining when restrictions on commercial speech violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Justice Powell wrote the opinion of the court. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. had challenged a Public Service Commission regulation that prohibited promotional advertising by electric utilities. Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens wrote separate concurring opinions, and the latter two were both joined by Justice Brennan. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), is a United States Supreme Court case that involved issues concerning statutory standing in antitrust law.
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court rejected the concept of taxpayer standing. The case was consolidated with Frothingham v. Mellon. The plaintiffs in the cases, Frothingham and Massachusetts, sought to prevent certain federal government expenditures which they considered to violate the Tenth Amendment. The court rejected the suits on the basis that neither plaintiff suffered particularized harm, writing:
We have no power per se to review and annul acts of Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. The question may be considered only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened, presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act. ... The party who invokes the power must be able to show not only that the statute is invalid but that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.
Consuelo Bland Marshall is a senior United States district judge of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986), was a 1986 appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States to determine whether Puerto Rico's Games of Chance Act of 1948 is in legal compliance with the United States Constitution, specifically as regards freedom of speech, equal protection and due process. In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Puerto Rico government (law) could restrict advertisement for casino gambling from being targeted to residents, even if the activity itself was legal and advertisement to tourists was permitted. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Puerto Rico Supreme Court conclusion, as construed by the Puerto Rico Superior Court, that the Act and regulations do not facially violate the First Amendment, nor did it violate the due process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), is a 6-to-3 ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that a severance tax in Montana does not violate the Commerce Clause or the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.
Lorillard v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), was a 2001 United States Supreme Court case brought by Lorillard Tobacco Company when Massachusetts instituted a ban on tobacco ads and sales of tobacco within 1,000 feet of schools and playgrounds. Lorillard argued that this was an infringement on its First Amendment rights and that the regulation was more extensive than necessary. Applying the Central Hudson Test, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Massachusetts' ban on advertising and tobacco sales was overbroad. The Supreme Court also held that the Massachusetts regulation was preempted by federal law.
United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), is a ruling by the United States Supreme Court which held that the Hatch Act of 1939 does not violate the First Amendment, and its implementing regulations are not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), is an administrative law case of the Supreme Court of the United States holding that extensive state regulation of a public utility does not transform its acts into state action that is reviewable by a federal court under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Board of Trustees of State University of New York v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court instructed a lower court to reevaluate the compatibility of a resolution of the State University of New York that prohibited private commercial enterprises from operating in SUNY facilities with the First Amendment. The Court instructed the lower court to use the standard outlined in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission (1980) and determine whether the restriction on speech advanced the state's interest and, if so, whether the state's method was the least restrictive means to that end. This approach ensures a balanced consideration, safeguarding the fundamental right to free speech while addressing the state's concerns in the most efficient and non-restrictive manner possible.
Public Utility Commission of the District of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), is a United States Supreme Court decision which held that the playing of radio programs on street cars and busses of a transit system regulated by the government as a public utility did not violate the First or Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
North American Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 327 U.S. 686 (1946), is a United States Supreme Court case holding that a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) order under the Public Utility Holding Company Act (PUHCA) directing a public utility holding company to divest its securities of all companies except for one electric company did not violate the Commerce Clause or the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 608 is a United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals case in which a public group of citizens, the Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference, organized and initiated legal action after the Federal Power Commission approved plans for Consolidated Edison to construct a power plant on Storm King Mountain, New York. The federal regulatory agency had denied that the environmental group could bring action, but the court disagreed, ruling that Scenic Hudson had legal standing because of their "special interest in aesthetic, conservational, and recreational aspects" of the mountain.
In order to insure that the Federal Power Commission will adequately protect the public interest in the aesthetic, conservational, and recreational aspects of power development, those who by their activities and conduct have exhibited a special interest in such areas must be held to be included in the class of 'aggrieved' parties under s. 313 (b). We hold that the Federal Power Act gives petitioners a legal right to protect their special interests.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court clarified when municipalities may impose content-based restrictions on signage. The case also clarified the level of constitutional scrutiny that should be applied to content-based restrictions on speech. In 2005, Gilbert, Arizona adopted a municipal sign ordinance that regulated the manner in which signs could be displayed in public areas. The ordinance imposed stricter limitations on signs advertising religious services than signs that displayed "political" or "ideological" messages. When the town's Sign Code compliance manager cited a local church for violating the ordinance, the church filed a lawsuit in which they argued the town's sign regulations violated its First Amendment right to the freedom of speech.
