Spence v. Washington | |
---|---|
Argued January 9, 1974 Decided June 25, 1974 | |
Full case name | Harold Omond Spence v. Washington |
Citations | 418 U.S. 405 ( more ) |
Case history | |
Prior | Appellant convicted sub nom. State v. Spence; conviction reversed, 5 Wash. App. 752, 490 P.2d 1321 (1971); reversed, 81 Wash. 2d 788, 506 P.2d 293 (1973); probable jurisdiction noted, 414 U.S. 815 (1973) |
Holding | |
A Washington state statute forbidding displaying the American flag affixed with decorations, as applied to appellant's activity, impermissibly infringed a form of protected expression. | |
Court membership | |
| |
Case opinions | |
Per curiam | |
Concurrence | Blackmun |
Concurrence | Douglas |
Dissent | Burger |
Dissent | Rehnquist, joined by Burger, White |
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974), was a United States Supreme Court case dealing with non-verbal free speech and its protections under the First Amendment. The Court, in a per curiam decision, ruled that a Washington state law that banned the display of the American flag adorned with additional decorations was unconstitutional as it violated protected speech. The case established the Spence test that has been used by the judicial system to determine when non-verbal speech may be sufficiently expressive for First Amendment protections.
In May 1970, Harold Spence, a college student in Seattle, Washington, had hung an American flag on his apartment window, displayed upside-down and adorned with peace symbols as a means to protest the United States' recent actions in the invasion of Cambodia and the Kent State shootings. Police officers saw the flag and after speaking to Spence, arrested him. Rather than being charged under Washington's flag desecration statute, Spence was charged with violating the state's "improper use" statute, which disallowed the public display of the American flag with any additional adornments.
Spence requested a jury trial at the King County Superior Court. There, he argued his motives for displaying the adorned flag in protest of recent actions by the U.S. government. The jury found him guilty, amounting to 10 days suspended sentence and a small fine. Spence appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, which overturned the conviction on the basis that the ruling did not consider Spence's intent, and the statute enforced in this way violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The state appealed to the Washington Supreme Court which reversed the Court of Appeals ruling and reinstated the conviction.
The student petitioned to the Supreme Court based on the lower court rulings. Oral arguments were heard on January 9, 1974, and the Court published its per curiam decision on June 25, 1974. The unsigned opinion stated that with non-verbal communications, it was "necessary to determine whether [this] activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First [...] Amendment". A two-part test was used:
While Washington state had defended the law as a need to preserve the flag as a national symbol, the Court pointed out that the student had not done any act that desecrated the flag nor harmed public or government property, nor meant to incite violence with the display, and thus the state had no compelling interest to deny the student his First Amendment rights.
While the opinion was per curiam and unsigned, Justices Harry Blackmun and William O. Douglas concurred separately. Justice Blackmun concurred in result without opinion. Justice Douglas concurred in a separate opinion, relying on symbolic speech grounds. Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justice William Rehnquist wrote separate dissents, with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Byron White joining Rehnquist. Both dissents expressed concern that the Court's decision overreached the state's authority to enforce its own laws.
It is not clear why the opinion was not signed.
The Court's decision established the Spence test as a means to determine when non-verbal activities can be considered expressive to qualify for First Amendment protections: "An intent to convey a particularized message was present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be understood by those who viewed it." [1] The Spence test was used in the Supreme Court's ruling in Texas v. Johnson (491 U.S. 397 (1989)) which ruled that states' flag desecration laws were unconstitutional since they infringed on actions deemed expressive speech under a Spence evaluation. [2] [3] [4] Johnson notably altered the formation of the Spence test by removing the "surrounding circumstances" phrase, creating the Spence-Johnson test which focuses on the particularized message and the likelihood that message would be understood. [5]
Robert Post, a professor of law at Yale University, questioned the nature of the Spence test, as "is transparently and manifestly false. The test cannot plausibly be said to express a sufficient condition for bringing 'the First Amendment into play.'". [2] Post argued that the Spence test would allow for graffiti that defaces property to be protected under the First Amendment, while abstract works of art such as Andy Warhol's Sleep or Marcel Duchamp's Fountain , where the intended message would be difficult to understand, would fail the Spence test, despite clear recognition as works of art normally protected by the First Amendment. [2] The Supreme Court case Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston (515 U.S. 557 (1995)) subsequently altered the Spence test. In Hurley, parade organizers denied participation by an LGBT group, arguing that the group's message did not fit the theme of the parade, meant to celebrate St. Patrick's Day and Evacuation Day. The unanimous Supreme Court ruled in favor of the parade organizers in that the parade was a form of expression and protected by the First Amendment, even if the parade did not have a single, clear message. In the opinion, the Court ruled counter to Spence that a "narrow, succinctly articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection, which if confined to expressions conveying a 'particularized message,' would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll." [6]
Hurley's take on Spence created a circuit split in the following years on the particulars of whether actions qualify as expressive, protected speech, which, as of 2015, had yet to be revolved by the Supreme Court. Some circuits have favored Spence, others Hurley, and yet others even have taken a hybrid approach of both, called the Spence-Hurley test. [6] [5] [1]
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning enforcement of the Espionage Act of 1917 during World War I. A unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., concluded that Charles Schenck, who distributed flyers to draft-age men urging resistance to induction, could be convicted of an attempt to obstruct the draft, a criminal offense. The First Amendment did not protect Schenck from prosecution, even though, "in many places and in ordinary times, Schenck, in saying all that was said in the circular, would have been within his constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." In this case, Holmes said, "the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Therefore, Schenck could be punished.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), is a case of the United States Supreme Court that unanimously struck down St. Paul's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance and reversed the conviction of a teenager, referred to in court documents only as R.A.V., for burning a cross on the lawn of an African-American family since the ordinance was held to violate the First Amendment's protection of freedom of speech. The Court reasoned that an ordinance like this constitutes "viewpoint discrimination" which may have the effect of driving certain ideas from the marketplace of ideas.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Court held that the government cannot punish inflammatory speech unless that speech is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". Specifically, the Court struck down Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute, because that statute broadly prohibited the mere advocacy of violence. In the process, Whitney v. California (1927) was explicitly overruled, and Schenck v. United States (1919), Abrams v. United States (1919), Gitlow v. New York (1925), and Dennis v. United States (1951) were overturned.
United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990), was a United States Supreme Court case that by a 5–4 decision invalidated a federal law against flag desecration as a violation of free speech under the First Amendment. It was argued together with the case United States v. Haggerty. It built on the opinion handed down in the Court's decision the prior year in Texas v. Johnson (1989), which invalidated on First Amendment grounds a Texas state statute banning flag burning.
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989), is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held, 5–4, that burning the Flag of the United States was protected speech under the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as doing so counts as symbolic speech and political speech.
Symbolic speech is a legal term in United States law used to describe actions that purposefully and discernibly convey a particular message or statement to those viewing it. Symbolic speech is recognized as being protected under the First Amendment as a form of speech, but this is not expressly written as such in the document. One possible explanation as to why the Framers did not address this issue in the Bill of Rights is because the primary forms for both political debate and protest in their time were verbal expression and published word, and they may have been unaware of the possibility of future people using non-verbal expression. Symbolic speech is distinguished from pure speech, which is the communication of ideas through spoken or written words or through conduct limited in form to that necessary to convey the idea.
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court, ruling that a criminal prohibition against burning a draft card did not violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech. Though the court recognized that O'Brien's conduct was expressive as a protest against the Vietnam War, it considered the law justified by a significant government interest unrelated to the suppression of speech and was tailored towards that end.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), is a United States Supreme Court case involving whether a display of the Ten Commandments on a monument given to the government at the Texas State Capitol in Austin violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held, 7–2, that a California statute banning red flags was unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In the case, Yetta Stromberg was convicted for displaying a red flag daily in the youth camp for children at which she worked, and was charged in accordance with California law. Chief Justice Charles Hughes wrote for the seven-justice majority that the California statute was unconstitutional, and therefore Stromberg's conviction could not stand.
Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007), is a United States Supreme Court case where the Court held, 5–4, that the First Amendment does not prevent educators from prohibiting or punishing student speech that is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use.
The following is a timeline of the flag of the United States.
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the First Amendment and the ability of the government to outlaw certain forms of expressive conduct. It ruled that the state has the constitutional authority to ban public nudity, even as part of expressive conduct such as dancing, because it furthers a substantial government interest in protecting the morality and order of society. This case is perhaps best summarized by a sentence in Justice Souter's concurring opinion, which is often paraphrased as "Nudity itself is not inherently expressive conduct."
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court regarding free speech rights, specifically the rights of groups to determine what message their activities convey to the public. The Court ruled that private organizations, even if they were planning on and had permits for a public demonstration, were permitted to exclude groups if those groups presented a message contrary to the one the organizing group wanted to convey. Addressing the specific issues of the case, the Court found that private citizens organizing a public demonstration may not be compelled by the state to include groups who impart a message the organizers do not want to be presented by their demonstration, even if the intent of the state was to prevent discrimination.
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984), is a United States Supreme Court case with the National Park Service's regulation which specifically prohibited sleeping in Lafayette Park and the National Mall at issue. The Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) group had planned to hold a demonstration on the National Mall and Lafayette Park where they would erect tent cities to raise awareness of the situation of the homeless. The group obtained the correct permits for a seven-day demonstration starting on the first day of winter. The Park Service however denied the request that participants be able to sleep in the tents. The CCNV challenged this regulation on the basis that it violated their First Amendment right.
Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995), is a United States Supreme Court case that focused on First Amendment rights and the Establishment Clause. Vincent Pinette, an active member of the Ku Klux Klan in Columbus, Ohio, wanted to place an unattended cross on the lawn of the Capitol Square during the 1993 Christmas season. Pinette and his fellow members of the KKK submitted their request. The advisory board originally denied this request. However, Pinette and the other members of the Ohio Chapter of the Klan fought this decision in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. The court found in favor of the Klan and the advisory board issued the permit. The Board appealed to the United States Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the district court. The board made one last petition to the Supreme Court where the decision was made, by a vote of seven to two, that the Klan was permitted to display the cross at the public forum.
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court clarified when municipalities may impose content-based restrictions on signage. The case also clarified the level of constitutional scrutiny that should be applied to content-based restrictions on speech. In 2005, Gilbert, Arizona adopted a municipal sign ordinance that regulated the manner in which signs could be displayed in public areas. The ordinance imposed stricter limitations on signs advertising religious services than signs that displayed "political" or "ideological" messages. When the town's Sign Code compliance manager cited a local church for violating the ordinance, the church filed a lawsuit in which they argued the town's sign regulations violated its First Amendment right to the freedom of speech.
Caetano v. Massachusetts, 577 U.S. 411 (2016), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously vacated a Massachusetts conviction of a woman who carried a stun gun for self-defense.
Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218 (2017) is a Supreme Court of the United States case that affirmed unanimously the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that the provisions of the Lanham Act prohibiting registration of trademarks that may "disparage" persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols with the United States Patent and Trademark Office violated the First Amendment.
Anderson v. City of Hermosa Beach, 621 F. 3d 1051 (2010), was a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which ruled that tattoos, the process of tattooing, and the business of tattooing are pure expressive activities that are fully protected by the First Amendment's free speech clause. The court determined that the process of tattooing constitutes pure expressive activity rather than conduct that is sufficiently imbued with elements of communication. As pure expressive activity, the process of tattooing can only be regulated by a proper time, place, and manner restriction. The court found in Anderson v. The City of Hermosa Beach that the Hermosa Beach Municipal Code banning tattoo parlors within the city was not a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction because the regulation was not narrowly tailored to meet the government's interest and the regulation did not leave open ample alternative avenues for the same messages to be conveyed.
Shurtleff v. City of Boston, 596 U.S. ___ (2022), was a United States Supreme Court case related to the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The case concerned the City of Boston's program that allowed groups to have their flags flown outside Boston City Hall. In a unanimous 9–0 decision, the Court ruled that the city violated a Christian group's free speech rights when it denied their request to raise a Christian flag over City Hall.