Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.

Last updated
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued April 24, 1990
Decided June 21, 1990
Full case nameMichael Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Company, et al.
Citations497 U.S. 1 ( more )
110 S. Ct. 2695; 111 L. Ed. 2d 1; 1990 U.S. LEXIS 3296; 58 U.S.L.W. 4846; 17 Media L. Rep. 2009
Case history
Prior Directed verdict for respondents, Court of Common Pleas, Lake County, Ohio; reversed and remanded, 65 Ohio App. 2d 143, 416 N.E.2d 662 (App. Ct. 11th 1979); appeal dismissed by Supreme Court of Ohio; certiorari denied, 449 U.S. 966(1980); summary judgment to petitioner at trial court; affirmed on appeal; reversed and remanded, 15 Ohio St.3d 292, 473 N.E.2d 1191 (1984); cert. denied, 474 U.S. 953(1985); trial court, summary judgment in favor of respondents; affirmed, 46 Ohio App. 3d 20; appeal dismissed, Supreme Court of Ohio; cert. granted, 493 U.S. 1055(1990).
SubsequentSettled out of court
Holding
The First Amendment does not require a separate "opinion" privilege limiting the application of state defamation laws. Supreme Court of Ohio reversed and remanded.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall  · Harry Blackmun
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
Case opinions
MajorityRehnquist, joined by White, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy
DissentBrennan, joined by Marshall
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. I

Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990), was a United States Supreme Court case that rejected the argument that a separate opinion privilege existed against libel. [1] It was seen by legal commentators as the end of an era that began with New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and continued with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. , in which the court clarified and greatly expanded the range and scope of what could be said in the press without fear of litigation. [2]

Contents

The case took a long time to come before the court, which twice declined to hear it. When it finally did, the justices suggested they would clarify once and for all the extent to which opinions could be expressed without fear of being held libellous. The actual decision, however, was regarded as having confused the issue somewhat instead. Several state courts have responded by recognizing an opinion privilege in some way as part of their state constitution.

Background of the case

On February 8, 1974, a key high school wrestling match between teams from the Cleveland suburbs of Maple Heights and Mentor, fierce rivals at the time, degenerated into a brawl in which first the Maple Heights team, then its fans, attacked the Mentor squad. Several members were hospitalized as a result.

Allegedly, many present believed that Mike Milkovich, then the Maple Heights High School coach, had played a large part in causing the brawl by publicly criticizing decisions made by referees and inciting the crowd. At a hearing shortly afterwards, the Ohio High School Athletic Association (OHSAA) put the school on probation for a year and ruled Maple Heights ineligible for the next year's state tournament.

Several wrestlers and their parents filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County, where cases against the state are commonly heard. Petitioners argued that OHSAA had denied them due process. After a hearing that November in which both Milkovich and the school district's superintendent, H. Donald Scott, testified again, the court granted a temporary injunction against OHSAA's ruling.

The following day, Ted Diadiun, a sports writer and columnist for the News Herald , Mentor's daily newspaper, wrote about the decision. He had been at the original wrestling match and the OHSAA hearing but not at the court hearing. He did, however, quote OHSAA commissioner Harold Meyer as saying that "some of the stories told to the judge sounded pretty darned unfamiliar.... It certainly sounded different from what they told us" but without citing any specific examples.

On that apparent basis, his column took it as a given that Milkovich and Scott had lied to the court and took them to task for demonstrating to their students that they could do so with impunity in order to avoid accountability for their actions. "Anyone who attended the meet," Diadiun wrote, "whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer, knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth."

Litigation history

Milkovich filed suit, alleging that the suggestion that he had lied had defamed him. Since perjury is a felony in Ohio, the statements were found to be defamatory and Milkovich was ruled a private figure, both of which were helpful to his case. However, the trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the newspaper since it found Diadiun's column to be a statement of opinion, which cannot be libelous, and that there was no actual malice, per Sullivan. Milkovich appealed to the Ohio Eleventh District Court of Appeals, which found that there was actual malice. In turn, the newspaper appealed to the state Supreme Court, which dismissed it on the grounds that there were no significant constitutional issues. In 1979 the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari .

On remand, the trial court issued summary judgment in favor of the respondents, this time citing Gertz in ruling the original column to be constitutionally protected opinion. In addition, it said, Milkovich had failed, as a public figure, to establish a prima facie claim of actual malice. The appeals court upheld the trial court once again, only to be reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court. Another certiorari petition made its way to Washington in 1984, and met with the same fate as its predecessor.

In the interim, Scott had been pursuing a separate action which the Ohio Supreme Court considered in 1986. In ruling the column to be opinion, OSC applied a four-pronged test which had come out of Ollman v. Evans , a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in determining whether Diadiun's column was opinion or fact for purposes of libel law. It announced also that it was reconsidering its decision in Milkovich. The trial court again granted summary judgment, the appeals court upheld and the state Supreme Court, as it had the first time around, dismissed the appeal. This time the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The court's decision

Observers and First Amendment law experts had expected that the Court would formalize its observation in Gertz that "there is no such thing as a false idea" into an opinion privilege against libel claims, expanding the traditional fair comment defense. They were taken aback when it declined to, instead suggesting that the constitutional safeguards it had already erected were enough to protect statements of opinion from being actionable.

Majority opinion

After recounting the case history and the court's recent rulings in libel cases, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority that the statement from Gertz was not "intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion'" since "expressions of 'opinion' may often imply an assertion of objective fact." [3] Diadiun's column, it found, strongly suggested that Milkovich perjured himself and was not couched hyperbolically, figuratively or in any other way that would mean the writer didn't seriously mean it. And since that statement could easily be found true or false by comparing Milkovich's statements at the OHSAA hearing with his court testimony (which the column did not do), it was moot whether it was intended as opinion or not since it asserted a matter of objective fact. "The connotation that petitioner committed perjury is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false," the Court concluded. [4]

Dissent

"The majority does not rest its decision today on any finding that the statements at issue explicitly state a false and defamatory fact. Nor could it," wrote Justice Brennan in his dissent. [5] He and Justice Marshall agreed with the lower courts that there was sufficient indication that the column was opinion to protect it as such: it was on the sports page, it had a picture of the author with "TD Says" in it, and in the text itself, "Diadiun not only reveals the facts upon which he is relying, but he makes it clear at which point he runs out of facts and is simply guessing." He notes that Diadiun used "apparently" when referring to Milkovich and Scott's testimony in Columbus and that no one could take "knows in his heart" as a statement of literal fact, as it is inherently hyperbolic. "Readers could see that Diadiun was focused on the court's reversal of the OHSAA's decision, and was angrily supposing what must have led to it," he concluded. [6] Citing several recent historical incidents where many commentators had speculated as to what had occurred with much less complete knowledge of the facts, he said "conjecture is a means of fueling a national discourse on such questions and stimulating public pressure for answers from those who know more ... Punishing (it) protects reputation only at the cost of expunging a genuinely useful mechanism for public debate." [7]

Nonetheless, even in arguing for Diadiun's right to express such a bold opinion without fear of being sued, he chastised the columnist for his "naïveté" in assuming that since the court overturned OHSAA, Milkovich had therefore lied under oath. "To anyone who understands the patois of the legal profession, there is no reason to assume — from the court's decision — that such testimony must have been given," since the Franklin County judge could have overturned the athletic association's decision for a number of reasons and the column itself notes the denial of due process as the reason. [7]

Subsequent jurisprudence

Lower courts had been relying on their standards for distinguishing expressions of opinion from statements of fact in defamation actions for several years'[ citation needed ] Having expected Milkovich to give them some test or standard to apply, they were caught off guard when the Supreme Court backed off.[ citation needed ].

Since Milkovich, there have been no significant defamation rulings by the court. Free-speech advocates,[ who? ] however, continue to press and hope for the recognition of an opinion privilege.

In 2004, the court denied certiorari in Santa Barbara News-Press v. Ross , a case in which the appellant sought to establish that corporate executives such as the appellee were automatically public figures.

State interpretations

State courts responded by filling in the gap, grounding an opinion privilege in their own constitutions. New York's ruled that as long as an opinion relied on accurately stated and reported facts, it was not actionable as long as the content, tone and apparent purpose of the statement distinguished it as opinion. This privilege does not apply, however, to any accusations of criminal or illegal activity.

Illinois courts [8] required that the factual basis of a statement must be clearly disclosed for it to qualify as opinion. Any statement of opinion without underlying facts is to be treated as a factual assertion per se . If it implies the existence of undisclosed facts which are false and defamatory, it is actionable. False statements of fact couched in an opinion context are actionable unless clearly set aside by "loose, figurative or hyperbolic language." [9]

Texas applied Milkovich more literally [ citation needed ]. Prior to it, only statements of fact were actionable. Afterwards [ citation needed ], opinions that imply false statements of objective fact were held by at least one court to be unprotected, and it declared that there was no opinion privilege in Texas.

In 1991, a California appellate court, in the case Kahn v. Bower, rejected the claim that a "categorical exception for opinion exists independently under California law". [10]

Disposition

After the Supreme Court ruled against them, the Journal Co. reached an out of court settlement with Milkovich, who had by that time retired.[ citation needed ] Milkovich and Diadiun have since reconciled and appeared together at panel discussions of the case and First Amendment law.[ citation needed ]

Diadiun remains in journalism, serving as an editorial writer for The Plain Dealer and cleveland.com. [11]

See also

Notes

  1. ↑ Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
  2. ↑ Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. , 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
  3. ↑ Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18.
  4. ↑ Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21.
  5. ↑ Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 28 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
  6. ↑ Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 30 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
  7. 1 2 Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
  8. ↑ Rose v. Hollinger International Inc., 889N.E.2d644 ( Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
  9. ↑ Rose, 889 N.E.2d at 648 (quoting Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21).
  10. ↑ Kahn v. Bower et al., 232Cal. App. 3d1599 , 1607, n.2( Ca. App. Ct. 1991)("Respondents suggest that a categorical exemption for opinion exists independently under California law. We find no support for this proposition in the cited defamation cases.").
  11. ↑ Diadiun, Ted. "After a decade as reader rep, it's time to hear Ted Diadiun's opinion". The Plain Dealer . Retrieved Oct 30, 2015.

Related Research Articles

Defamation is the oral or written communication of a false statement about another that unjustly harms their reputation and usually constitutes a tort or crime. In several countries, including South Korea, a true statement can also be considered defamation.

Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court ruling that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit public figures from recovering damages for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), if the emotional distress was caused by a caricature, parody, or satire of the public figure that a reasonable person would not have interpreted as factual.

<i>Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto</i>

Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto February 20, 1995- July 20, 1995. 2 S.C.R. 1130 was a libel case against the Church of Scientology, in which the Supreme Court of Canada interpreted Ontario's libel law in relation to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court ruling that the freedom of speech protections in the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution restrict the ability of American public officials to sue for defamation. Specifically, it held that if a plaintiff in a defamation lawsuit is a public official or person running for public office, not only must he or she prove the normal elements of defamation—publication of a false defamatory statement to a third party—he or she must also prove that the statement was made with "actual malice", meaning that the defendant either knew the statement was false or recklessly disregarded whether or not it was true.

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court under which prior restraint on publication was found to violate freedom of the press as protected under the First Amendment. This principle was applied to free speech generally in subsequent jurisprudence. The Court ruled that a Minnesota law that targeted publishers of "malicious" or "scandalous" newspapers violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Legal scholar and columnist Anthony Lewis called Near the Court's "first great press case".

Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court establishing the standard of First Amendment protection against defamation claims brought by private individuals. The Court held that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, states are free to establish their own standards of liability for defamatory statements made about private individuals. However, the Court also ruled that if the state standard is lower than actual malice, the standard applying to public figures, then only actual damages may be awarded.

Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734 (2005), is a United States Supreme Court case involving libel.

Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal.4th 33 (2006), was a California Supreme Court case concerning online defamation. The case resolved a defamation claim brought by Stephen Barrett, Terry Polevoy, and attorney Christopher Grell against Ilena Rosenthal and several others. Barrett and others alleged that the defendants had republished libelous information about them on the internet. In a unanimous decision, the court held that Rosenthal was a "user of interactive computer services" and therefore immune from liability under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.

Fair comment is a legal term for a common law defense in defamation cases. It is referred to as honest comment in some countries.

In US law, false light is a tort concerning privacy that is similar to the tort of defamation. The privacy laws in the United States include a non-public person's right to protection from publicity which puts the person in a false light to the public. That right is balanced against the First Amendment right of free speech.

The criminal statutes protecting nobility from criticism in 16th- and 17th-century England eventually evolved into various categories of political libel. Cases of political libel and eventually damages actions were handled by the infamous Star Chamber until its abolition in 1641. By the end of that century, many elements of the common law of libel had been established.

Modern libel and slander laws, as implemented in many Commonwealth nations as well as in the United States and in the Republic of Ireland, are originally descended from English defamation law. The history of defamation law in England is somewhat obscure; civil actions for damages seem to have been relatively frequent as far back as the reign of Edward I (1272–1307), though it is unknown whether any generally applicable criminal process was in place. The first fully reported case in which libel is affirmed generally to be punishable at common law was tried during the reign of James I (1603-1625). Scholars frequently attribute strict English defamation law to James I's outlawing of duelling. From that time, both the criminal and civil remedies have been found in full operation.

The origins of the United States' defamation laws pre-date the American Revolution; one influential case in 1734 involved John Peter Zenger and established precedent that "The Truth" is an absolute defense against charges of libel. Though the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was designed to protect freedom of the press, for most of the history of the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court failed to use it to rule on libel cases. This left libel laws, based upon the traditional "Common Law" of defamation inherited from the English legal system, mixed across the states. The 1964 case New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, however, radically changed the nature of libel law in the United States by establishing that public officials could win a suit for libel only when they could prove the media outlet in question knew either that the information was wholly and patently false or that it was published "with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not". Later Supreme Court cases barred strict liability for libel and forbade libel claims for statements that are so ridiculous as to be obviously facetious. Recent cases have added precedent on defamation law and the Internet.

The People of the State of New York v. Harry Croswell, commonly known and cited as People v. Croswell, is an important case in the evolution of United States defamation law. It was a criminal libel case brought against a Federalist journalist named Harry Croswell for his statements about a number of public officials, including then-President Thomas Jefferson.

Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), is a United States Supreme Court case involving issues of privacy in balance with the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and principles of freedom of speech.

In United States constitutional law, false statements of fact are statements of fact that are false. Such statements are not always protected by the First Amendment. This is usually due to laws against defamation, that is making statements that harm the reputation of another. In those cases, freedom of speech comes into conflict with the right to privacy. Because it is almost impossible for someone to be absolutely sure that what they say is true, a party who makes a false claim isn't always liable. Whether such speech is protected depends on the situation. The standards of such protection have evolved over time from a body of Supreme Court rulings.

<i>Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox</i>

Obsidian Finance Group, LLC v. Cox is a 2011 case from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon concerning online defamation. Plaintiffs Obsidian Finance Group and its co-founder Kevin Padrick sued Crystal Cox for maintaining several blogs that accused Obsidian and Padrick of corrupt and fraudulent conduct. The court dismissed most of Cox's blog posts as opinion, but found one single post to be more factual in its assertions and therefore defamatory. For that post, the court awarded the plaintiffs $2.5 million in damages. This case is notable for the court's ruling that Cox, as an internet blogger, was not a journalist and was thus not protected by Oregon's media shield laws, although the court later clarified that its ruling did not categorically exclude blogs from being considered media and indicated that its decision was based in part upon Cox offering to remove negative posts for a $2,500 fee. In January 2014 the Ninth Circuit Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's judgment awarding compensatory damages to the bankruptcy trustee. It also ordered a new trial on the blog post at issue.

Harte-Hanks Communications Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States supplied an additional journalistic behavior that constitutes actual malice as first discussed in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964). In the case, the Court held that departure from responsible reporting and unreasonable reporting conduct alone were not sufficient to award a public figure damages in a libel case. However, the Court also ruled that if reporters wrote with reckless disregard for the truth, which included ignoring obvious sources for their report, plaintiffs could be awarded compensatory damages on the grounds of actual malice.

Opinion privilege is a protected form of speech, of importance to US federal and state law. The US First Amendment guarantees free speech, subject to certain limitations. One of these limitations is defamation, in various forms, notably libel. While federal precedent does not explicitly state that opinion is protected against prosecution under libel laws, the combined effect of several rulings is such as to effectively make such the case.

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971), was a United States Supreme Court case of libel brought by George Rosenbloom against Metromedia. This case was responsible for establishing the idea that the knowingly and recklessly false standard for defamatory statements should apply to private individuals as well as public officials in matters of public concern. Concluding that the story was a matter of public concern, the Supreme Court ruled that it did not matter that Rosenbloom was a private citizen; however, the evidence provided in the case did not support the damages awarded to Rosenbloom. The decision was made June 7, 1971 with a 5-3 decision.

References

Further reading

This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.