Forsyth County, Georgia v. The Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court limited the ability of local governments to charge fees for the use of public places for private activities. By a 5–4 vote, the court ruled that an ordinance allowing the local government to set varying fees for different events violated the First Amendment due to the lack of "narrowly drawn, reasonable, and definite standards" governing the amount of the fee.
In law, commercial speech is speech or writing on behalf of a business with the intent of earning revenue or a profit. It is economic in nature and usually attempts to persuade consumers to purchase the business's product or service. The Supreme Court of the United States defines commercial speech as speech that "proposes a commercial transaction".
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), was an important case decided by the United States Supreme Court that laid out a four-part test for determining when restrictions on commercial speech violated the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Justice Powell wrote the opinion of the court. Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. had challenged a Public Service Commission regulation that prohibited promotional advertising by electric utilities. Justice Brennan, Justice Blackmun, and Justice Stevens wrote separate concurring opinions, and the latter two were both joined by Justice Brennan. Justice Rehnquist dissented.
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a law prohibiting the distribution of handbills from door to door violated the First Amendment rights of a Jehovah's Witness, specifically their freedom of speech. The ruling was 5-4 and deemed trespassing laws a better fit for the town imposing the ordinance.
Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a statute prohibiting the sale of books without a license was constitutional because it covered not a religious ritual but only individuals who engaged in a commercial activity.
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a town ordinance's provisions making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with town officials and receiving a permit violates the First Amendment as it applies to religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills.
Jamison v. State of Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a Dallas city ordinance, which prohibited distribution of handbills on the streets, violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment because the material being distributed is religious in its nature.
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld the right of lawyers to advertise their services. In holding that lawyer advertising was commercial speech entitled to protection under the First Amendment, the Court upset the tradition against advertising by lawyers, rejecting it as an antiquated rule of etiquette.
Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld a state's restriction on lawyer advertising under the First Amendment's commercial speech doctrine. The Court's decision was the first time it did so since Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), lifted the traditional ban on lawyer advertising.
44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a complete ban on the advertising of alcohol prices was unconstitutional under the First Amendment, and that the Twenty-first Amendment, empowering the states to regulate alcohol, did not lessen other constitutional restraints of state power.
Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States found that an ordinance prohibiting the posting of "for sale" and "sold" signs on real estate within the town violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution protections for commercial speech.
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), was a United States Supreme Court decision that established First Amendment protection for commercial speech. The ruling is an important precedent on challenges to government regulation of advertising, determining that such publications qualify as speech under the First Amendment.
Consuelo Bland Marshall is a senior United States district judge of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), was a United States Supreme Court ruling that the passing out of anti-war leaflets at the Lloyd Center in Portland, Oregon, was an infringement on property rights. This differed from Marsh v. Alabama (1946) and Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza (1968) in that Marsh had the attributes of a municipality and Logan Valley related to picketing a particular store, while the current case, the distribution of leaflets, is unrelated to any activity in the property.
Mexicali Rose v. Superior Court, 1 Cal. 4th 617 (1992), was a Supreme Court of California case in which the court’s decision held that restaurants, grocery stores, and other food service establishments in California can be held liable for injuries sustained by patrons from foreign objects—including natural food parts—that are left in food.
Laura E. Little is an American legal scholar and author, specializing in conflict of laws, federal courts, humor and the law, the law of freedom of expression, and constitutional law. She is the James G. Schmidt Professor of Law at Temple University School of Law.
Chicago Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), was a United States Supreme Court case which concerned freedom of speech under the First Amendment. Oral argument for this case was consolidated with Grayned v. City of Rockford, but separate opinions were issued for each. Earl Mosley had protested employment discrimination by carrying a sign on the sidewalk in front of a Chicago high school, until the city of Chicago made it illegal to do so. Although Chicago believed that its ordinance was a time, place, or manner restriction, and therefore was a constitutional law, the Supreme Court ruled that it was a content-based restriction, because it treated labor-related protests differently from other protests. Since the ordinance did not meet the higher standards for content-based restrictions, it was ruled unconstitutional.
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that states can require an advertiser to disclose certain information without violating the advertiser's First Amendment free speech protections as long as the disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers. The decision effected identified that some commercial speech may have weaker First Amendment free speech protections than non-commercial speech and that states can compel such commercial speech to protect their interests; future cases have relied on the "Zauderer standard" to determine the constitutionality of state laws that compel commercial speech as long as the information to be disclosed is "purely factual and uncontroversial".
Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court upheld a city's ban on political advertising within its public transportation system. The Court ruled that ad space on public transit is not a "public forum", meaning that speech within this space receives lower First Amendment protections.
City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that
taking the allegations in the complaint as true, [...] the City violated the First Amendment by refusing to issue a franchise to more than one cable television company when there was sufficient excess physical and economic capacity to accommodate more than one.
