Background
New York's Criminal Anarchy Law was passed in 1902 following the assassination of President William McKinley by an anarchist in Buffalo, New York, in September 1901. [1] Under the Criminal Anarchy Law, people seen as activists supporting the destruction of American government through revolutionary means could be arrested in an attempt to prevent American Bolsheviks from gaining a national following. [2] [3]
Following the Red Scare of 1919–20, a variety of leftists, either anarchists, sympathizers with the Bolshevik Revolution, labor activists, or members of a communist or socialist party, were convicted for violating the Espionage Act of 1917 and Sedition Act of 1918 on the basis of their writings or statements. Benjamin Gitlow, a member of the Socialist Party of America, who had served in the New York State Assembly, was charged with criminal anarchy under New York's Criminal Anarchy Law of 1902 for publishing in July 1919 a document called "Left wing manifesto" in The Revolutionary Age, a newspaper for which he served as business manager. Gitlow's trial counsel was renowned defense attorney Clarence Darrow. [4] His trial lasted from January 22 to February 5, 1920.
His defense contended that the Manifesto represented historical analysis rather than advocacy. Moreover, he claimed that he should not be arrested for his writing since the manifesto's distribution was not the inciting incident for any actions against the government. [3] The prosecution refuted Gitlow's claim, stating, "Prosecutions have been for the use of words or printed arguments urging actions which if carried out by the reader or hearer would have resulted in the commission of a crime." The prosecution claimed that the Manifesto's intent was to convince American readers to commit crimes, and that in itself should be punishable by law. It took the jury three hours to convict Gitlow on February 11, 1920, and sentenced to 5 to 10 years in prison. [2] He served more than two years at Sing Sing prison before his motion to appeal was granted and he was released on bail. State courts of appeal upheld his conviction. [5]
Gitlow was the first major First Amendment case that the American Civil Liberties Union argued before the Supreme Court. [6]
The Court had to consider whether it could review a challenge to a state law on the basis that it violated the federal constitution. If it determined that such a challenge lay within the scope of its authority, then it had to review the application of the law to the case at hand, the specific violation of the statute.
Supreme Court ruling
Free speech
The Supreme Court upheld Gitlow's conviction 7–2, with Louis Brandeis and Oliver W. Holmes dissenting on the grounds that even "indefinite" advocacy of overthrowing government should be protected speech. [7]
The Court upheld Gitlow's conviction on the basis that the government may suppress or punish speech that directly advocates the unlawful overthrow of the government and it upheld the constitutionality of the state statute at issue, which made it a crime to advocate the duty, need, or appropriateness of overthrowing government by force or violence.
Justice Edward Terry Sanford's majority opinion attempted to define more clearly the "clear and present danger" test developed a few years earlier in Schenck v. United States . [8] He embraced "the bad tendency test" found in Shaffer v. United States , which held that a "State may punish utterances endangering the foundations of government and threatening its overthrow by unlawful means" because such speech clearly "present[s] a sufficient danger to the public peace and to the security of the State." [9]
According to Sanford, a "single revolutionary spark may kindle a fire that, smoldering for a time, may burst into a sweeping and destructive conflagration." He said the Manifesto contained "the language of direct incitement" and was not "the expression of philosophical abstraction." [7] Relying on the argument that incendiary speech may be suppressed “preemptively” ustice Sanford asserted that governments cannot be required to wait until revolutionary publications “lead to actual disturbances of the public peace or imminent and immediate danger of its own destruction” but can “suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency” or “extinguish the spark without waiting until it has enkindled the flame or blazed into the conflagration.” [10]
In his dissent, Holmes, the author of Schenck's clear and present danger test, wrote that he believed it was still the appropriate test to employ in judging the limits of freedom of expression. Joined by Brandeis, he argued that Gitlow presented no present danger because only a small minority of people shared the views presented in the manifesto and because it directed an uprising at some "indefinite time in the future." Moreover, he responded to Sanford's kindling metaphor by refuting the claim that the Manifesto is an example of "incitement."
Holmes states, "It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory, that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between an expression of opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker's enthusiasm for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason, but, whatever may be thought of the redundant discourse before us, it had no chance of starting a present conflagration. If, in the long run, the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way." [11] [12] [7] [2]
Incorporation
The Supreme Court previously held, in Barron v. Baltimore , that the Constitution's Bill of Rights applied only to the federal government, that states were free to enforce statutes that restricted the rights enumerated in the Bill of Rights, and that the federal courts could not interfere with the enforcement of such statutes. [13] Gitlow v. New York partly reversed that precedent and began a trend toward its near complete reversal. The Supreme Court now holds that almost every provision of the Bill of Rights applies to both the federal government and the states, with the exception of the Third and Seventh Amendments, and the Fifth Amendment's grand jury provision. [14]
The Supreme Court relied on the "due process clause" of the Fourteenth Amendment, which prohibits a state from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." The Court stated that "For present purposes we may and do assume that" the rights of freedom of speech and freedom of the press were "among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the states".
Aftermath
On November 9, 1925, Gitlow surrendered to New York Authorities for transportation back to Sing Sing Prison to finish his sentence. [5] On December 11, 1925, New York Gov. Al Smith pardoned him, saying that while Gitlow had been "properly and legally convicted", he needed to consider "whether or not he has been sufficiently punished for a political crime." He concluded that "no additional punishment would act as a deterrent to those who would preach an erroneous doctrine of Government." [15] Gitlow was later briefly elected General Secretary of the American Communist Party in 1929. [2]
The Court used the doctrine first enunciated in Gitlow in other cases, such as De Jonge v. Oregon , [16] Wolf v. Colorado , [17] and Gideon v. Wainwright , [18] to extend the reach of the Bill of Rights. Constitutional scholars refer to this as the "incorporation doctrine," meaning that the Supreme Court has identified rights specified in the Bill of Rights and incorporated them into the liberties covered by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 2010, the Supreme Court ruled in McDonald v. Chicago that the 2nd Amendment Right to "keep and bear arms," for lawful purposes such as self-defense is both a fundamental and individual right of all law-abiding Citizens over 21 years of age and of sound mind as self-defense is the "central component" of the 2nd Amendment, and these Rights are "fully applicable" in all of the 50 States. [19]
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prevents the government from making laws that: regulate an establishment of religion; prohibit the free exercise of religion; abridge the freedom of speech, the freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, or the right to petition the government for redress of grievances. It was adopted on December 15, 1791, as one of the ten amendments that constitute the Bill of Rights.
Clear and present danger was a doctrine adopted by the Supreme Court of the United States to determine under what circumstances limits can be placed on First Amendment freedoms of speech, press, or assembly. Created by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. to refine the bad tendency test, it was never fully adopted and both tests were ultimately replaced in 1969 with Brandenburg v. Ohio's "imminent lawless action" test.
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning enforcement of the Espionage Act of 1917 during World War I. A unanimous Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., concluded that Charles Schenck, who distributed flyers to draft-age men urging resistance to induction, could be convicted of an attempt to obstruct the draft, a criminal offense. The First Amendment did not protect Schenck from prosecution, even though, "in many places and in ordinary times, Schenck, in saying all that was said in the circular, would have been within his constitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." In this case, Holmes said, "the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Therefore, Schenck could be punished.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case relating to Eugene Dennis, General Secretary of the Communist Party USA. The Court ruled that Dennis did not have the right under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to exercise free speech, publication and assembly, if the exercise involved the creation of a plot to overthrow the government. In 1969, Dennis was de facto overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), is a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The Court held that the government cannot punish inflammatory speech unless that speech is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action". Specifically, the Court struck down Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute, because that statute broadly prohibited the mere advocacy of violence. In the process, Whitney v. California (1927) was explicitly overruled, and Schenck v. United States (1919), Abrams v. United States (1919), Gitlow v. New York (1925), and Dennis v. United States (1951) were overturned.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), was a United States Supreme Court decision upholding the conviction of an individual who had engaged in speech that raised a clear and present danger to society. While the majority of the Supreme Court Justices voted to uphold the conviction, the ruling has become an important free speech precedent due a concurring opinion by Justice Louis Brandeis recommending new perspectives on criticism of the government by citizens. The ruling was explicitly overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969.
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 269 U.S. 510 (1925), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court striking down an Oregon statute that required all children to attend public school. The decision significantly expanded coverage of the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to recognize personal civil liberties. The case has been cited as a precedent in more than 100 Supreme Court cases, including Roe v. Wade, and in more than 70 cases in the courts of appeals.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States upholding the 1918 Amendment to the Espionage Act of 1917 which made it a criminal offense to urge the curtailment of production of the materials necessary to wage the war against Germany with intent to hinder the progress of the war. The 1918 Amendment is commonly referred to as if it were a separate Act, the Sedition Act of 1918.
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court in which the Court articulated the fighting words doctrine, a limitation of the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech.
"Imminent lawless action" is one of several legal standards American courts use to determine whether certain speech is protected under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The standard was first established in 1969 in the United States Supreme Court case Brandenburg v. Ohio.
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court held, 7–2, that a California statute banning red flags was unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In the case, Yetta Stromberg was convicted for displaying a red flag daily in the youth camp for children at which she worked, and was charged in accordance with California law. Chief Justice Charles Hughes wrote for the seven-justice majority that the California statute was unconstitutional, and therefore Stromberg's conviction could not stand.
Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, was a decision by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, that addressed advocacy of illegal activity under the First Amendment. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals overturned Hand’s ruling in Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten (1917).
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause applies freedom of assembly against the states. The Court found that Dirk De Jonge had the right to speak at a peaceful public meeting held by the Communist Party, even though the party generally advocated an industrial or political change in revolution. However, in the 1950s with the fear of communism on the rise, the Court ruled in Dennis v. United States (1951) that Eugene Dennis, who was the leader of the Communist Party, violated the Smith Act by advocating the forcible overthrow of the United States government.
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case involving Irving Feiner's arrest for a violation of section 722 of the New York Penal Code, "inciting a breach of the peace," as he addressed a crowd on a street.
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a "breach of peace" ordinance of the City of Chicago that banned speech that "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance" was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Edward Terry Sanford was an American jurist who served as an associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States from 1923 until his death in 1930. Prior to his nomination to the high court, Sanford served as a United States Assistant Attorney General under President Theodore Roosevelt from 1905 to 1907, and as a United States district judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee and the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee from 1908 to 1923. As of 2023, he is the last sitting district court judge to be elevated directly to the Supreme Court.
In the United States, criminal anarchy is the crime of conspiracy to overthrow the government by force or violence, or by assassination of the executive head or of any of the executive officials of government, or by any unlawful means. The advocacy of such doctrine either by word of mouth or writing is a felony in many U.S. states. Circa 1955, the United States Solicitor General said that forty-two States plus Alaska and Hawaii had statutes which in some form prohibited advocacy of the violent overthrow of established government.
The Smith Act trials of Communist Party leaders took place in New York City from 1949 to 1958. These trials were a series of prosecutions carried out by the US federal government during the postwar period and the Cold War era, which was characterized by tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. The leaders of the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA) faced accusations of violating the Smith Act, a statute that made it illegal to advocate for the violent overthrow of the government. In their defense, the defendants claimed that they advocated for a peaceful transition to socialism and that their membership in a political party was protected by the First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and association. The issues raised in these trials were eventually addressed by the US Supreme Court in its rulings Dennis v. United States (1951) and Yates v. United States (1957).
The Taft Court refers to the Supreme Court of the United States from 1921 to 1930, when William Howard Taft served as Chief Justice of the United States. Taft succeeded Edward Douglass White as Chief Justice after the latter's death, and Taft served as Chief Justice until his resignation, at which point Charles Evans Hughes was nominated and confirmed as Taft's replacement. Taft was also the nation's 27th president (1909–13); he is the only person to serve as both President of the United States and Chief Justice.
Walter Pollak (1887–1940) was a 20th-century American civil liberties lawyer, who established important precedents while working with other leading radical lawyers in the 1920s and 1930s. His best known cases involved the defense before the Supreme Court of Communist Benjamin Gitlow and the Scottsboro Boys.
