Matal v. Tam

Last updated

Matal v. Tam
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Supreme Court of the United States
Argued January 18, 2017
Decided June 19, 2017
Full case nameJoseph Matal, Interim Director, United States Patent and Trademark Office, Petitioner v. Simon Shiao Tam
Docket no. 15-1293
Citations582 U.S. 218 ( more )
137 S. Ct. 1744; 198 L. Ed. 2d 366; 122 U.S.P.Q.2d 1757
Case history
PriorIn re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015); cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2016).
Holding
The Lanham Act's prohibition against registering disparaging trademarks with the United States Patent and Trademark Office violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Court membership
Chief Justice
John Roberts
Associate Justices
Anthony Kennedy  · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg  · Stephen Breyer
Samuel Alito  · Sonia Sotomayor
Elena Kagan  · Neil Gorsuch
Case opinions
MajorityAlito (Parts I, II, and III–A), joined by Roberts, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kagan; Thomas (except Part II)
PluralityAlito (Parts III–B, III–C, and IV), joined by Roberts, Thomas, Breyer
ConcurrenceKennedy (in part and in judgment), joined by Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Kagan
ConcurrenceThomas (in part and in judgment)
Gorsuch took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied

Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218 (2017) (previously known as Lee v. Tam) is a Supreme Court of the United States case that affirmed unanimously the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit that the provisions of the Lanham Act prohibiting registration of trademarks that may "disparage" persons, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols with the United States Patent and Trademark Office violated the First Amendment. [1]

Contents

Background

Simon Tam is the founder and bassist for the Asian-American dance-rock band The Slants. Tam gave that name to his band to "reclaim" and to "take ownership" of Asian stereotypes. On March 5, 2010, Tam filed his first application to register THE SLANTS. After several appeals, the application was eventually abandoned. On November 14, 2011, Tam filed his second application (App. No. 85/472,044) seeking to register the mark THE SLANTS for "Entertainment in the nature of live performances by a musical band", based on his use of the mark since 2006. The examiner at the US Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) refused to register Tam's mark and found it likely disparaging to "persons of Asian descent" under § 2(a). The examiner found that the mark likely referred to people of Asian descent in a disparaging way and explained that the term "slants" had "a long history of being used to deride and mock a physical feature" of people of Asian descent. The examiner found that a substantial composite of persons of Asian descent might find the term offensive [2] precisely because it was being used by an Asian American band: "Here, the evidence is uncontested that applicant is a founding member of a band that is self described as being composed of members of Asian descent. ... Thus, the association of the term SLANTS with those of Asian descent is evidenced by how the applicant uses the work - as the name of an all Asian-American band." [3] That determination made Tam decide to appeal before the Federal Circuit. [2]

Before the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Washington, DC, [4] [5] the case was titled In re Tam. The PTO interpreted the likely meaning of "The Slants" as a term to refer to people of Asian descent, despite claims from the band that the actual meaning referred to its perspective and that it was repurposing the term from an offensive slur. [6] The PTO used anecdotal sources like Urban Dictionary to support its claims but ignored survey data, linguistics experts, and legal declarations from Asian American community leaders. [7] [8] [9] The opinion was heard en banc by the Federal Circuit and the majority, which was written by Circuit Judge Moore. The court determined that the Disparaging Provision ( 15 U.S.C.   § 1052(a) ) of the Lanham Act is unconstitutional and found that Tam was entitled to trademark registration. [4] [10] Tam was represented by John C. Connell, Ron Coleman and Joel MacMull, then of Archer & Greiner.

The US government petitioned the US Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted in September 2016. In addition to the case, there was another case before the Fourth Circuit, Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse , 112 F. Supp. 3d 439 (E.D. Va. 2015), to decide the same issue of whether or not the disparaging provision of the Lanham Act was unconstitutional. [11] [12] Despite an attempt by Pro Football to merge the two cases, the Supreme Court refused to grant the motion.

Section 2(a)'s ban on the federal registration of "immoral" or "scandalous" marks originated in the trademark legislation of the Lanham Act. A disparaging mark is a mark that "dishonors by comparison with what is inferior, slights, deprecates, degrades, or affects or injures by unjust comparison". [13]

Relevant areas of law

Lanham Act's disparaging provision

No trademark by which the goods of the applicant may be distinguished from the goods of others shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its nature unless it—

(a) Consists of or comprises immoral, deceptive, or scandalous matter; or matter which may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt, or disrepute; or a geographical indication which, when used on or in connection with wines or spirits, identifies a place other than the origin of the goods and is first used on or in connection with wines or spirits by the applicant on or after one year after the date on which the WTO Agreement (as defined in section 3501(9) of title 19) enters into force with respect to the United States. [14]

Viewpoint discrimination

Viewpoint discrimination occurs when the government bans not only certain content or topics but also certain ideas. [15] The test for viewpoint discrimination is "[o]ther things being equal, viewpoint discrimination occurs when government allows one message while prohibiting the messages of those who can reasonably be expected to respond." [16] Additionally, viewpoint discrimination involves the intent to discourage one viewpoint and to advance another. [17] The general concern is that the government tries to eradicate not only content from the marketplace but also certain viewpoints, whether positive or negative. [18] Something that rises to the level of viewpoint-based discrimination is deemed to be unconstitutional. [19]

Content discrimination

In Reed v. Town of Gilbert , the court stated, "Government regulation of speech is content based if a law applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed." [20] The Court further determined, "This commonsense meaning of the phrase 'content based' requires a court to consider whether a regulation of speech 'on its face" draws distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys." [21] For that reason, content-based discrimination is presumptively invalid. [21] If something is found to discriminate on the basis of content, it must survive strict scrutiny. [22]

Strict scrutiny

According to Nat'l Assoc. of Mfrs. v. Taylor: "[t]o satisfy strict scrutiny, the government must establish three elements: (1) 'the interests the government proffers in support' of the statute must be properly characterized as 'compelling'; (2) the statute must 'effectively advance [] those interests'; and (3) the statute must be 'narrowly tailored to advance the compelling interests asserted.' [23]

Central Hudson: intermediate scrutiny

For Central Hudson to apply, the court would have to determine that the statute at issue deals with commercial speech. [24] From Central Hudson, the Supreme Court developed a four-part test to determine whether a statute passes muster: [2] (1) Whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment—for it to fall here, it must concern lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial; (3) whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted; and (4) whether the regulation is no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest—there must be a "reasonable fit" between the government's ends and the means of achieving those ends. [2]

Government speech

For something to be classified as government speech, courts look at four factors: (1) the central purpose of the program in which the speech in question occurs; (2) the degree of editorial control exercised by the government or private entities over the content of the speech; (3) the identity of the literal speaker; and (4) whether the government or the private entity bears the ultimate responsibility for the content of the speech. [25]

Federal Circuit

Simon Tam v. United States Patent and Trademark Office
Court United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Full case nameIn re Tam
ArguedOctober 2, 2015
DecidedDecember 22, 2015
Citation(s)808 F.3d 1321
Case history
Prior history108 U.S.P.Q.2d 1305 (finding THE SLANTS trademark invalid as disparaging under § 2(a) of the Lanham Act)
Holding
The disparaging provision of the Lanham Act is unconstitutional for violating citizen's First Amendment rights. Vacated and Remanded.
Court membership
Judge(s) sittingMoore, Prost, Newman, O'Malley, Wallach, Taranto, Chen, Hughes, Stoll, Dyk, Lourie, Reyna
Case opinions
MajorityMoore, joined by Prost, Newman, O'Malley, Wallach, Taranto, Chen, Hughes, Stoll
ConcurrenceO'Malley, joined by Wallach
ConcurrenceDyk, joined by Lourie, Reyna
DissentLourie
DissentReyna
Laws applied

The central issue before the Federal Circuit was to determine whether the disparaging provision of the Lanham Act was unconstitutional and should therefore be voided. [4] In the case In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), Circuit Judge Moore decided that the disparaging provision of the Lanham Act was unconstitutional for various reasons and that Tam should be granted trademark protection on THE SLANTS. [4] [26]

Viewpoint-based and content-based discrimination

The court determined that the Lanham Act was viewpoint-based discriminatory because the government chooses to deny trademark protection to a mark always because of the message that the mark conveys. [4] The government tried to defend their position before the Federal Circuit by saying that it should be able to deny protection to the most "vile" racial epithets and images, but the Federal Circuit stated, "When the government discriminates against speech because it disapproves of the message conveyed by the speech, it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint." [27] The Federal Circuit bolstered its stance that it is viewpoint discriminatory because the PTO refused to register "The Slants", but registered marks such as "Celebrasians" and "Asian Efficiency". [4]

The Federal Circuit found the only difference between marks such as "The Slants" and "Celebrasians" and "Asian Efficiency" is the messages conveyed. The Slants could be seen as being derogatory towards those of Asian descent and the others positive. [4]

In the alternative, the Federal Circuit determined that the disparaging provision is content-based discriminatory, in addition to viewpoint-discriminatory. [4] Additionally, the Federal Circuit came to the determination that even though trademarks inherently deal more with commercial speech that expressive speech, when the government cancels a mark under the disparaging provision, it affects more the expressive aspects of speech than not its commerciality. [4] Therefore, the Federal Circuit found that if the disparaging provision is not found to be viewpoint discriminatory in light of a higher court potentially overturning parts of the case, it must be content-based discriminatory and survive strict scrutiny unless an exception applied. [4] [28]

Strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny (Central Hudson)

The government raised the argument that the disparaging provision of the Lanham Act should be reviewed under intermediate scrutiny by way of the Central Hudson test because the inherent nature of trademarks was commercial. [4] However, the Federal Circuit determined that when the PTO chooses to cancel trademarks under the disparaging provision of the Lanham Act, it is usually because of their expressive components, not their commercial components. [4] The Federal Circuit went on to say that commercial speech mixed with expressive speech should be treated as expressive under deciding whether to apply strict or intermediate scrutiny. [4] Therefore, the Federal Circuit decided that strict scrutiny should be applied. [4] [29]

Federal Circuit's analysis

In the Federal Circuit's effort to show the unconstitutionality of the disparaging provision of the Lanham Act, it chose to analyze the provision under the Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny. [4] The part of the Central Hudson test that the Lanham Act failed was the "legitimate interest" element.

For that element, the government raised three arguments for having a legitimate interest:

  1. The government argued that it had a legitimate interest to dissociate itself from speech it finds odious.
  2. The government argued that it had a legitimate interest in "declining to expend its resources to facilitate the use of racial slurs as source identifiers in interstate commerce".
  3. The government also argued that it has a legitimate interest in allowing states to make their own determinations about whether trademarks should be unenforceable on grounds of public policy. [4]

The Federal Circuit determined that none of the arguments raised by the government created an interest legitimate enough to pass the Central Hudson test. Since it did not pass the Central Hudson test, the Federal Circuit determined that it would also not pass strict scrutiny, which sets a higher standard. [4]

Government subsidy

The government raised the argument that the Lanham Act should be classified as a government subsidy and therefore exempt from the strict scrutiny requirement. [4] The Federal Circuit ultimately determined that no taxpayer dollars are used in registering trademarks, and their operation is completely user-funded from application fees. The Federal Circuit determined that therefore the government subsidy exception to strict scrutiny did not apply. [2]

Government speech

The government also raised the argument that the disparaging provision of the Lanham Act was government speech and so fell outside of the purview of the First Amendment. [4] The government argued that because of the ability to place the "®" or "TM" on the registered mark. [4]

The Federal Circuit found that argument to be without merit. [4] The court said that the only message the government conveys when a mark is registered with the PTO is that "a mark is registered". [4] The court cited many reasons for its determination, but the most prominent was a policy consideration. [4] The court was concerned that if they allowed that argument to win the day, it would also affect other areas of law, such as copyright and patent law. [4] The general concern was that the government could then control what they would and would not grant protections to and would therefore affect the types of speech expressed. That would have the effect of abridging free speech, which violates the First Amendment. [4]

Concurrence by Judge O'Malley

In addition to agreeing with Circuit Judge Moore's opinion, Judge O'Malley added that the disparaging provision of the Lanham Act was unconstitutional also by the vagueness doctrine. [4]

Partial concurrence and partial dissent by Judge Dyk

Circuit Judge Dyk generally agreed with the majority opinion that the disparaging provision of the Lanham Act is unconstitutional, but the majority erred in going "beyond the facts of this case and holding the statute facially unconstitutional as applied to purely commercial speech". [4] Judge Dyk also believed that many trademarks lack expressive characteristics that would merit First Amendment protection and so the analysis should be under the Central Hudson test, not strict scrutiny. [4] [29]

Dissent by Judge Lourie

Lourie disagreed with the majority in many ways:

Dissent by Judge Reyna

Reyna disagreed with the majority, feeling that trademarks are exclusively commercial speech and so should be analyzed under the Central Hudson test, meaning intermediate scrutiny. [4] Reyna then determined he government has a legitimate interest in promoting the orderly flow of commerce and so the law should pass intermediate scrutiny. [4] Reyna stated that when the legitimate interest of the disparaging provision is balanced on how narrowly tailored the statute is, it makes sense for the Lanham Act provision to survive scrutiny. [4]

Supreme Court

External audio
Nuvola apps arts.svg Audio from Oyez (click "Oral Argument - January 18, 2017" at left)

The United States Patent and Trademark Office appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court by presenting the following question in its petition for certiorari: "whether the disparagement provision in 15 U.S.C. 1052(a) is facially invalid under the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment?" [32] The Supreme Court agreed to grant certiorari in September 2016. [33] Oral arguments were heard on January 18, 2017. [33]

On June 19, 2017, the Supreme Court delivered judgment in favor of Tam by voting unanimously to affirm the lower court. [34] [35] The majority opinion stated, "The disparagement clause violates the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause. Contrary to the Government’s contention, trademarks are private, not government speech." [1]

The Court ruled that the government cannot ban expression merely because it is offensive. In the majority opinion, Justice Alito wrote:

Speech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, religion, age, disability, or any other similar ground is hateful; but the proudest boast of our free speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express "the thought that we hate." United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U. S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting). [1]

The Court also ruled that the law was viewpoint discriminatory. Alito reasoned that the Court need not resolve whether the speech involved only commercial speech or also political speech because the federal law at issue could not pass even the Central Hudson test. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion that stated "by mandating positivity, the law here might silence dissent and distort the marketplace of ideas." [36]

Justice Neil Gorsuch had not yet been a member of the court during the oral argument and so he did not participate in the decision.

Impact on racial reclamation practices

Matal v. Tam has become linked with the Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, which was vacated after Tam. Pro-Football had ruled in favor of Blackhorse's claim that the "Redskins" trademark "may disparage" Native Americans. [37] Tam limited the option for Blackhorse to use Section 2(a) to challenge the disparaging Redskins mark. Simon Tam stated in a New York Times Article that Matal v. Tam was "a win for all marginalized groups" while recognizing that "[n]o one builds better communities by shutting people out." [38]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Lanham Act</span> United States trademark law

The Lanham (Trademark) Act (Pub. L.Tooltip Public Law  79–489, 60 Stat. 427, enacted July 5, 1946, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq. is the primary federal trademark statute in the United States. In other words, the Act is the primary statutory foundation of United States trademark law at the federal level. The Act prohibits a number of activities, including trademark infringement, trademark dilution, and false advertising.

Disparagement, in United States trademark law, was a statutory cause of action which permitted a party to petition the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) of the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to cancel a trademark registration that "may disparage or falsely suggest a connection with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols, or bring them into contempt or disrepute". In 2017, the Supreme Court struck down the disparagement provision as unconstitutional in Matal v. Tam.

Intermediate scrutiny, in U.S. constitutional law, is the second level of deciding issues using judicial review. The other levels are typically referred to as rational basis review and strict scrutiny.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Milan Smith</span> American judge (born 1942)

Milan Dale Smith Jr. is an American attorney and jurist serving as a United States circuit judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Smith's brother, Gordon H. Smith, was a Republican U.S. Senator from 1997 to 2009. Milan Smith is neither a Republican nor a Democrat.

Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986), was a 1986 appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States to determine whether Puerto Rico's Games of Chance Act of 1948 is in legal compliance with the United States Constitution, specifically as regards freedom of speech, equal protection and due process. In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the Puerto Rico government (law) could restrict advertisement for casino gambling from being targeted to residents, even if the activity itself was legal and advertisement to tourists was permitted. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Puerto Rico Supreme Court conclusion, as construed by the Puerto Rico Superior Court, that the Act and regulations do not facially violate the First Amendment, nor did it violate the due process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">The Slants</span> Rock band and nonprofit organization

The Slants is an American dance-rock band composed entirely of Asian Americans. The band was formed in Portland, Oregon, by Simon Tam in 2006. The band went through a number of early lineup changes, but had a core lineup for its albums and tours by 2009 consisting of Aron Moxley (vocals), Tam, Jonathan Fontanilla (guitar), and Tyler Chen. After experiencing some transitions, the core lineup consisted of Tam, lead singer Ken Shima, and guitarist Joe X. Jiang by 2015. The band's name originates from an effort of reappropriation and was the source of a protracted legal battle that took them to the Supreme Court of the United States in the case Matal v. Tam.

Inwood Laboratories Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844 (1982), is a United States Supreme Court case, in which the Court confirmed the application of and set out a test for contributory trademark liability under § 32 of the Lanham Act.

Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001), is a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States concerning the constitutionality of funding restrictions imposed by the United States Congress. At issue were restrictions on the Legal Services Corporation (LSC), a private, nonprofit corporation established by Congress. The restrictions prohibited LSC attorneys from representing clients attempting to amend existing welfare law. The case was brought by Carmen Velazquez, whose LSC-funded attorneys sought to challenge existing welfare provisions since they believed that it was the only way to get Velazquez financial relief.

Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that appeals from the USPTO Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences are to be reviewed for whether the Board's conclusions are supported by "substantial evidence" under the APA.

Simon Tam is an American author, musician, activist, and entrepreneur. He is best known as the bassist and founder of the Asian American dance-rock band, the Slants, who won their case against the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office at the United States Supreme Court. The case, Matal v. Tam, was a landmark legal battle that clarified First Amendment rights in trademark law. The court ruled unanimously in Tam's favor, holding that trademark registrations may not be rejected under the Disparagement Clause of the Lanham Act (1946) since that would be considered viewpoint discrimination; this includes, as in Tam's case, trademarks using such language filed by members of minority groups who wish to reclaim slurs that would have been previously denied.

Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States holding that, under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, a claim of trademark dilution requires proof of actual dilution, not merely a likelihood of dilution. This decision was later superseded by the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006 (TDRA).

<i>Connection Distributing Co. v. Holder</i>

Connection Distributing Co. v. Holder, 557 F.3d 321 is a case in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the record-keeping provisions of the Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act did not violate the First Amendment.

Amanda Blackhorse is a social worker and member of the Navajo people who is known for her work as an activist on the Washington Redskins name controversy. She is the lead plaintiff in Blackhorse v. Pro-Football, Inc.

The Washington Redskins trademark dispute was a legal effort by Native Americans to define the term "redskin" to be an offensive and pejorative racial slur to deprive the owners of the NFL's Washington Redskins of the ability to maintain federal trademark protection for the name. These efforts had primarily been carried forward in two cases brought before the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). While prevailing in the most recent case in which the trademarks were cancelled, petitioners withdrew for further litigation now that the legal issue has become moot due to a decision in another case which found the relevant portion of the trademark law to be an unconstitutional infringement on freedom of speech.

Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (2015), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court clarified when municipalities may impose content-based restrictions on signage. The case also clarified the level of constitutional scrutiny that should be applied to content-based restrictions on speech. In 2005, Gilbert, Arizona adopted a municipal sign ordinance that regulated the manner in which signs could be displayed in public areas. The ordinance imposed stricter limitations on signs advertising religious services than signs that displayed "political" or "ideological" messages. When the town's Sign Code compliance manager cited a local church for violating the ordinance, the church filed a lawsuit in which they argued the town's sign regulations violated its First Amendment right to the freedom of speech.

Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996), was a case heard by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Colorado Republican Party challenged the Federal Election Commission (FEC) as to whether the "Party Expenditure Provision" of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) violated the First Amendment right to free speech. This provision put a limit on the amount of money a national party could spend on a congressional candidate's campaign. The FEC argued that the Committee violated this provision when purchasing a radio advertisement that attacked the likely candidate of the Colorado Democratic Party. The court held that since the expenditures by the committee were made independently from a specific candidate, they did not violate the campaign contribution limitations established by the FECA, and were protected under the First Amendment.

Iancu v. Brunetti, No. 18–302, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), is a Supreme Court of the United States case related to the registration of trademarks under the Lanham Act. It decided 6–3 that the provisions of the Lanham Act prohibiting registration of trademarks of "immoral" or "scandalous" matter is unconstitutional by permitting the United States Patent & Trademark Office to engage in viewpoint discrimination, which violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

Romag Fasteners, Inc. v. Fossil, Inc., 590 U.S. ___ (2020), was a United States Supreme Court case related to trademark law under the Lanham Act. In the 9–0 decision on judgement, the Court ruled that a plaintiff in a trademark infringement lawsuit is not required to demonstrate that the defendant willfully infringed on their trademark to claim lost profit damages.

Barr v. American Assn. of Political Consultants, Inc., 591 U.S. ___ (2020), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the use of robocalls made to cell phones, a practice that had been banned by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 (TCPA), but which exemptions had been made by a 2015 amendment for government debt collection. The case was brought by the American Association of Political Consultants, an industry trade group, and others that desired to use robocalls to make political ads, challenging the exemption unconstitutionally favored debt collection speech over political speech. The Supreme Court, in a complex plurality decision, ruled on July 6, 2020, that the 2015 amendment to the TCPA did unconstitutionally favor debt collection speech over political speech and violated the First Amendment.

Vidal v. Elster,, is a pending United States Supreme Court case dealing with 15 U.S.C. § 1052, a provision of the Lanham Act regarding trademarks using the name of living individuals without their consent. The court will decide whether such a provision violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.

References

The citations in this article are written in Bluebook style. Please see the talk page for more information.

  1. 1 2 3 Matal v. Tam,No. 15-1293 , 582 U.S. ___, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Id.
  3. ↑ "In re Simon Shiao Tam – Ex Parte Appeal Brief of Simon Tam of the PTO's Refusal to Register THE SLANTS Trademark". JD Supra. Retrieved April 9, 2018.
  4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 In re Tam, 808F.3d1321 (Fed. Cir.2015).
  5. ↑ The Supreme Court, 2016 Term – Leading Cases, 131 Harv. L. Rev. 243 (2017).
  6. ↑ "The Slants on the Power of Repurposing a Slur". The New York Times. June 23, 2017. ISSN   0362-4331 . Retrieved April 9, 2018.
  7. ↑ Jeong, Sarah (2017). "Should We Be Able to Reclaim a Racist Insult – as a Registered Trademark?". The New York Times. ISSN   0362-4331 . Retrieved April 9, 2018.
  8. ↑ "Asian-American Band Fights To Trademark Name 'The Slants'". NPR. Retrieved April 9, 2018.
  9. ↑ "Asian-American Group The Slants Head to Supreme Court Over Band Name". Rolling Stone. Retrieved April 9, 2018.
  10. ↑ "Recent Case: Federal Circuit Holds the Lanham Act's Antidisparagement Provision Unconstitutional", 129 Harvard Law Review 2265 (2016).
  11. ↑ "DISPARAGING TRADEMARKS: The case of 'in re Tam' and its current impact". Potente.
  12. ↑ "Government Can't Deny Trademarks Over Offensive Names, Appeals Court Rules". NPR.
  13. ↑ In re Geller, 751 F.3d 1355, 1358 (2014)(alterations omitted).
  14. ↑ 15 U.S.C.   § 1052(a)
  15. ↑ Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)
  16. ↑ Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 894 (1995).
  17. ↑ United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 736 (1990) (citing Monterey County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. United States Postal Serv., 812 F.2d 1194, 1198-1199 (9th Cir. 1987)).
  18. ↑ In re Tam, 808 F.3d at 1334-35.
  19. ↑ Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Comm'r of the Va. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 623 (4th Cir. 2002).
  20. ↑ Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).
  21. 1 2 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (citing Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663, 180 L. Ed. 2d 544-55).
  22. ↑ See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum , 555 U.S. 460, 469 (2009).
  23. ↑ Nat'l Assoc. of Mfrs. v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 943, 314 U.S. App. D.C. 52 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
  24. ↑ See generally Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/447/557/).
  25. ↑ Pro-Football, Inc. v. Blackhorse, 112 F. Supp. 3d 439, 460, (E.D. Va. 2015) (citing Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Vehicles, 288 F.3d at 618).
  26. ↑ "Asian-American band 'The Slants' overturns USPTO rule on 'disparaging' trademarks". Ars Technica.
  27. ↑ In Re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (citing Sorrell, 131 S.Ct. at 2664).
  28. ↑ "Federal appeals court decides 'The Slants' case: excluding 'disparaging marks' from trademark registration violates the First Amendment". The Washington Post.
  29. 1 2 Philip G. Hampton, II, Scott Benfield, & Alexander B. Lutzky (January 5, 2016). "Federal Circuit Rules Disparagement Clause of §2(a) of the Lanham Act Unconstitutional". Haynes Boone. Archived 2016-08-07 at the Wayback Machine .
  30. ↑ Eriq Gardner (December 22, 2015). "Rock Band Wins First Amendment Appeal Over 'Disparaging' Trademarks". Hollywood Reporter.
  31. ↑ Brent Kendall (December 22, 2015). "Government Can't Reject Trademarks for Being Offensive, Court Says". Wall Street Journal.
  32. ↑ Lee v. Tam, No. 15-1293, Pet. for Certiorari at I.
  33. 1 2 Docket No. 15-1293, Supreme Court of the United States (last accessed June 3, 2017).
  34. ↑ Liptak, Adam (June 20, 2017). "Justices Strike Down Law Banning Disparaging Trademarks". The New York Times . p. A14. Retrieved December 5, 2017.
  35. ↑ Clay Calvert, Beyond Trademarks and Offense: Tam and the Justices’ Evolution on Free Speech, 2016–2017 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 105 (2017)
  36. ↑ "Matal v. Tam". SCOTUSblog. Retrieved February 25, 2020.
  37. ↑ Doori Song, Blackhorse's Last Stand: The First Amendment Battle against the Washington Redskins Trademark after Matal v. Tam, 19 WAKE Forest J. Bus. & INTELL. PROP. L. 173 (2019).:https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/wakfinp19&div=14&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals
  38. ↑ Coscarelli, Joe (June 20, 2017). "Why the Slants Took a Fight Over Their Band Name to the Supreme Court". The New York Times. ISSN   0362-4331 . Retrieved December 30, 2021.
This page is based on this Wikipedia article
Text is available under the CC BY-SA 4.0 license; additional terms may apply.
Images, videos and audio are available under their respective licenses.