Pennock v. Dialogue

Last updated
Pennock v. Dialogue
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued January 21, 1829
Decided January 26, 1829
Full case nameAbraham L. Pennock & James Sellers, Plaintiffs in Error v. Adam Dialogue
Citations27 U.S. 1 ( more )
2 Pet. 1; 7 L. Ed. 327; 1829 U.S. LEXIS 388
Court membership
Chief Justice
John Marshall
Associate Justices
Bushrod Washington  · William Johnson
Gabriel Duvall  · Joseph Story
Smith Thompson
Case opinion
MajorityStory, joined by unanimous

Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829), was a United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court held invalid a patent on a method of making hose, because the inventor had commercially exploited the invention for years before filing the patent application. [1] The case has been cited many times for the proposition that the U.S. patent system was not established for the purpose of enriching inventors or their financiers but rather for the purpose of furthering the public interest by stimulating technological progress. [2]

Contents

Background

Abraham L. Pennock and James Sellers in 1811 invented "an improvement in making leather hose or tubes for conveying water and other fluids; and they are constructed by lapping their edges over, and fastening them by metallic rivets and burs, so as to be rendered water proof, and capable of resisting a heavy pressure of that fluid." [3] In 1818 they obtained a patent, but in the period before they applied for the patent they caused upwards of 13,000 feet of fire hose to be made and sold by a licensee Jenkins. [4]

Pennock and Sellers sued Adam Dialogue in the circuit court in Philadelphia for infringing their patent, and the jury returned a verdict for the defendant Dialogue. Pennock and Sellers then appealed to the Supreme Court. [5]

Ruling of Supreme Court

Justice Joseph Story Daguerreotype of Joseph Story, 1844.jpg
Justice Joseph Story

Justice Joseph Story wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court. He began his analysis by explaining that "many of the provisions of our patent act are derived from the principles and practice which have prevailed in the construction of that of England." Although the 1624 Statute of Monopolies is not identical with the U.S. statute, "the construction of it adopted by the English courts, and the principles and practice which have long regulated the grants of their patents, as they must have been known and are tacitly referred to in some of the provisions of our own statute," are instructive for us. [6]

The main object of the patent system was "to promote the progress of science and useful arts." Story then asked how this object could best be accomplished, and explained that Pennock's seven years of commercial exploitation of the invention before filing a patent application was inconsistent with that:

[T]this could be done best, by giving the public at large a right to make, construct, use, and vend the thing invented, at as early a period as possible, having a due regard to the rights of the inventor. If an inventor should be permitted to hold back from the knowledge of the public the secrets of his invention; if he should for a long period of years retain the monopoly, and make, and sell his invention publicly, and thus gather the whole profits of it, relying upon his superior skill and knowledge of the structure, and then, and then only, when the danger of competition should force him to secure the exclusive right, he should be allowed to take out a patent and thus exclude the public from any further use than what should be derived under it during his fourteen years, it would materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts and give a premium to those who should be least prompt to communicate their discoveries. [7]

Accordingly, it would not be unreasonable for a patent law to "withhold from an inventor the privilege of an exclusive right unless he should, as early as he should allow the public use, put the public in possession of his secret and commence the running of the period that should limit that right." Such a provision should be in the statute, and if not there should be in the case law. Story found such case law in the jurisprudence surrounding the Statute of Monopolies, which is limited to "new manufactures" that "others, at the time of making such letters patent and grants, shall not use." Lord Coke, in his commentary upon this said that "if any other did use it at the making of the letters patent, or grant of the privilege, it [the patent] is declared and enacted to be void," and Story quoted English case law that held, "The public sale of that which is afterwards made the subject of a patent, though sold by the inventor only, makes the patent void." [8]

Story then concluded that the U.S. statute should be interpreted to the same effect. That is:

[T]he first inventor cannot acquire a good title to a patent; if he suffers the thing invented to go into public use or to be publicly sold for use before he makes application for a patent. His voluntary act or acquiescence in the public sale and use is an abandonment of his right, or rather creates a disability to comply with the terms and conditions on which alone the Secretary of State is authorized to grant him a patent. [9]

Therefore, Pennock's patent was void.

Subsequent developments

The Supreme Court has repeatedly cited Pennock v. Dialogue as authority that the public interest is the principal concern under the patent law, rather than the creation of private gain. For example:

Related Research Articles

Patent Law conferring a monopoly on a new invention

A patent is a type of intellectual property that gives its owner the legal right to exclude others from making, using, or selling an invention for a limited period of years, in exchange for publishing an enabling public disclosure of the invention. In most countries, patent rights fall under private law and the patent holder must sue someone infringing the patent in order to enforce his or her rights. In some industries patents are an essential form of competitive advantage; in others they are irrelevant.

Invention Novel device, material or technical process

An invention is a unique or novel device, method, composition or process. The invention process is a process within an overall engineering and product development process. It may be an improvement upon a machine or product or a new process for creating an object or a result. An invention that achieves a completely unique function or result may be a radical breakthrough. Such works are novel and not obvious to others skilled in the same field. An inventor may be taking a big step toward success or failure.

Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913), was a 1913 United States Supreme Court decision involving whether a purchaser of a patented product bearing a price-fixing notice incurs guilt of patent infringement by reselling the product at a price lower than that which the notice commands. A divided Court (5—4) held that it was not.

In United States patent law, utility is a patentability requirement. As provided by 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is "useful" if it provides some identifiable benefit and is capable of use. The majority of inventions are usually not challenged as lacking utility, but the doctrine prevents the patenting of fantastic or hypothetical devices such as perpetual motion machines.

The inventive step and non-obviousness reflect a general patentability requirement present in most patent laws, according to which an invention should be sufficiently inventive—i.e., non-obvious—in order to be patented. In other words, "[the] nonobviousness principle asks whether the invention is an adequate distance beyond or above the state of the art".

Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55 (1998), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that determined what constituted being "on sale" for the purposes of barring the grant of a patent for an invention.

Sufficiency of disclosure or enablement is a patent law requirement according to which a patent application must disclose a claimed invention in sufficient detail for the notional person skilled in the art to carry out that claimed invention. The requirement is fundamental to patent law: a monopoly is granted for a given period of time in exchange for a disclosure to the public how to make or practice the invention.

The history of patents and patent law is generally considered to have started with the Venetian Statute of 1474.

Under United States law, a patent is a right granted to the inventor of a (1) process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter, (2) that is new, useful, and non-obvious. A patent is the right to exclude others, for a limited time from profiting of a patented technology without the consent of the patent-holder. Specifically, it is the right to exclude others from: making, using, selling, offering for sale, importing, inducing others to infringe, applying for an FDA approval, and/or offering a product specially adapted for practice of the patent.

In patent law, an inventor is the person, or persons in United States patent law, who contribute to the claims of a patentable invention. In some patent law frameworks, however, such as in the European Patent Convention (EPC) and its case law, no explicit, accurate definition of who exactly is an inventor is provided. The definition may slightly vary from one European country to another. Inventorship is generally not considered to be a patentability criterion under European patent law.

The history of United States patent law started even before the U.S. Constitution was adopted, with some state-specific patent laws. The history spans over more than three centuries.

Copyright Clause Clause of the U.S. constitution allowing intellectual property protection

The Copyright Clause describes an enumerated power listed in the United States Constitution.

Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court holding a state anti-plug molding law preempted because it partially duplicated and therefore interfered with the balance Congress had struck by federal patent law. The decision reaffirmed the Supreme Court's earlier decision in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co. (1964), which held a state unfair competition law preempted on the same ground.

Stanford University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 563 U.S. 776 (2011), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that title in a patented invention vests first in the inventor, even if the inventor is a researcher at a federally funded lab subject to the 1980 Bayh–Dole Act. The judges affirmed the common understanding of U.S. constitutional law that inventors originally own inventions they make, and contractual obligations to assign those rights to third parties are secondary.

Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that a novel process for making a known steroid did not satisfy the utility requirement because the patent applicants did not show that the steroid served any practical function. The Court ruled that "a process patent in the chemical field, which has not been developed and pointed to the degree of specific utility, creates a monopoly of knowledge which should be granted only if clearly commanded by the statute." Practical or specific utility, so that a "specific benefit exists in currently available form" is thus the requirement for a claimed invention to qualify for a patent.

Ex parte Wood, 22 U.S. 603 (1824), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a patent could not be repealed based on summary proceedings without the opportunity for a jury trial. The case exemplifies a tradition in early 19th century United States patent caselaw in which patents were regarded specifically as an absolute property right to exclusive use of the invention, rather than requiring a balancing between public and private interests.

Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), is United States Supreme Court decision that is notable as an early example of the patent misuse doctrine. It held that, because a patent grant is limited to the invention described in the claims of the patent, the patent law does not empower the patent owner, by notices attached to the patented article, to extend the scope of the patent monopoly by restricting the use of the patented article to materials necessary for their operation but forming no part of the patented invention, or to place downstream restrictions on the articles making them subject to conditions as to use. The decision overruled The Button-Fastener Case, and Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., which had held such restrictive notices effective and enforceable.

The Mercoid casesMercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944), and Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944)—are 1944 patent tie-in misuse and antitrust decisions of the United States Supreme Court. These companion cases are said to have reached the "high-water mark of the patent misuse doctrine." The Court substantially limited the contributory infringement doctrine by holding unlawful tie-ins of "non-staple" unpatented articles that were specially adapted only for use in practicing a patent, and the Court observed: "The result of this decision, together with those which have preceded it, is to limit substantially the doctrine of contributory infringement. What residuum may be left we need not stop to consider." The Court also suggested that an attempt to extend the reach of a patent beyond its claims could or would violate the antitrust laws: "The legality of any attempt to bring unpatented goods within the protection of the patent is measured by the antitrust laws, not by the patent law."

Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980), is a 1980 5-4 decision of the United States Supreme Court limiting the patent misuse doctrine and explaining the scope of the 1952 amendment of the patent laws that resurrected the contributory infringement doctrine in the wake of the Mercoid cases. The Mercoid cases and a few predecessor cases had denied relief against patent infringement to patentees who were deriving revenue from the sale of unpatented products used as supplies for patented combinations or as components of patented combinations, even when the unpatented products were specially adapted for use with the patented combinations and even when they lacked any utility other than that use. The patentees used contributory infringement suits or threats of such suits to enforce their business model, which the Mercoid cases outlawed.

References

The citations in this article are written in Bluebook style. Please see the talk page for more information.

  1. Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet. ) 1 (1829). PD-icon.svg This article incorporates public domain material from this U.S government document.
  2. See, e.g., Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co. , 243 U.S. 502, 511 (1917) ("Since Pennock v. Dialogue, 2 Pet. 1, was decided in 1829, this Court has consistently held that the primary purpose of our patent laws is not the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents, but is 'to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.'").
  3. Pennock v. Dialogue, 19 F. Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825).
  4. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 3.
  5. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 13.
  6. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 18.
  7. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 19.
  8. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 19–20.
  9. Pennock, 27 U.S. at 23–24.