Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. | |
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Argued March 30–31, 1959 Decided May 25, 1959 | |
Full case name | Bibb, Director, Department of Public Safety of Illinois v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., et al. |
Citations | 359 U.S. 520 ( more ) 79 S. Ct. 962; 3 L. Ed. 2d 1003; 1959 U.S. LEXIS 1777 |
Case history | |
Prior | Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois |
Holding | |
The Illinois law requiring trucks to have mudguards was unconstitutional under the Commerce clause. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Douglas, joined by Warren, Black, Frankfurter, Clark, Brennan, Whittaker |
Concurrence | Harlan, joined by Stewart |
Laws applied | |
Commerce clause Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause |
Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Illinois law requiring trucks to have unique mudguards was unconstitutional under the Commerce clause.
The state of Illinois enacted a statute requiring curved mud guards, instead of straight mudflaps on trucks driven in Illinois. Although there was no federal regulation requiring mudflaps or mudguards, Arkansas required straight mudflaps, which were legal in at least 45 states. [1] The Illinois legislature asserted that the unique curved mudguards would be more useful in preventing stones and other debris to be kicked up from the back of trucks, thus preventing more accidents than other types of mudflaps. The plaintiffs were trucking companies who drove through Illinois and would have to use one form of mudflap equipment while in Illinois, but other mudflap equipment while in other states. The named plaintiff was Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., of New Mexico.
The only issue was whether in the absence of federal regulation, in this context did the Commerce Clause allow one State to prescribe standards that would affect interstate carriers in a way that would conflict with the standards of another State.
The Supreme Court held that the Illinois law was unconstitutional under the Commerce clause, technically the Dormant Commerce Clause.
In Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959), the Supreme Court stated:
These safety measures carry a strong presumption of validity when challenged in court. If there are alternative ways of solving a problem, we do not sit to determine which of them is best suited to achieve a valid state objective. Policy decisions are for the state legislature, absent federal entry into the field. Unless we can conclude on the whole record that "the total effect of the law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it we must uphold the statute."
— Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.
The court was unanimous, but Justice Harlan filed a concurrence, which was joined by Justice Stewart. To find the statute unconstitutional, the Court balanced the benefit of the regulation to the state (in the form of increased safety) against the burden on interstate commerce arising from out of state truck drivers having to stop at the Illinois border and change mudguards. Because the benefit to Illinois was small and the burden on interstate commerce large, the Court held that
This is one of those cases—few in number—where local safety measures that are nondiscriminatory place an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce.
— Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.
It is considered one of the leading precedents on the law of Interstate commerce.[ citation needed ]
The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was a regulatory agency in the United States created by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. The agency's original purpose was to regulate railroads to ensure fair rates, to eliminate rate discrimination, and to regulate other aspects of common carriers, including interstate bus lines and telephone companies. Congress expanded ICC authority to regulate other modes of commerce beginning in 1906. Throughout the 20th century, several of ICC's authorities were transferred to other federal agencies. The ICC was abolished in 1995, and its remaining functions were transferred to the Surface Transportation Board.
The Dormant Commerce Clause, or Negative Commerce Clause, in American constitutional law, is a legal doctrine that courts in the United States have inferred from the Commerce Clause in Article I of the US Constitution. The primary focus of the doctrine is barring state protectionism. The Dormant Commerce Clause is used to prohibit state legislation that discriminates against, or unduly burdens, interstate or international commerce. Courts first determine whether a state regulation discriminates on its face against interstate commerce or whether it has the purpose or effect of discriminating against interstate commerce. If the statute is discriminatory, the state has the burden to justify both the local benefits flowing from the statute and to show the state has no other means of advancing the legitimate local purpose.
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States holding that the Commerce Clause gave the U.S. Congress power to force private businesses to abide by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or national origin in public accommodations.
The Commerce Clause describes an enumerated power listed in the United States Constitution. The clause states that the United States Congress shall have power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes". Courts and commentators have tended to discuss each of these three areas of commerce as a separate power granted to Congress. It is common to see the individual components of the Commerce Clause referred to under specific terms: the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Interstate Commerce Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause.
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), was a 1963 decision of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court declined to invalidate a California law that imposed minimum fat content standards on avocados sold in the state, including those imported from other states. The law prohibited the sale of avocados that did not contain at least 8% oil by weight. Florida, a major avocado producer, employed, for wholesale marketing purposes, a federal standard unrelated to oil content. Most Florida avocados that were marketable at home failed to meet the California standard, because they were a different variety from those sold in California, with a lower fat content. Accordingly, Florida avocado growers brought this suit, arguing (unsuccessfully) that the California law (1) was preempted by federal law, (2) violated equal protection, and (3) unduly burdened and interfered with their right to engage in interstate commerce. The case is widely used in law school casebooks on constitutional law and federal jurisdiction as illustrative of preemption issues.
The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 is a United States federal law that was designed to regulate the railroad industry, particularly its monopolistic practices. The Act required that railroad rates be "reasonable and just," but did not empower the government to fix specific rates. It also required that railroads publicize shipping rates and prohibited short haul or long haul fare discrimination, a form of price discrimination against smaller markets, particularly farmers in Western or Southern Territory compared to the official Eastern states. The Act created a federal regulatory agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which it charged with monitoring railroads to ensure that they complied with the new regulations.
A mudflap or mud guard is used in combination with the vehicle fender to protect the vehicle, passengers, other vehicles, and pedestrians from mud and other flying debris thrown into the air by a rotating tire on a wheeled vehicle. A mudflap is typically made from a flexible material such as rubber that is not easily damaged by contact with flying debris, the tire, or the road surface.
Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the application of the Dormant Commerce Clause to an Iowa state statute restricting the length of tractor-trailers.
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), was a landmark case on the issue of religious and economic liberty decided by the United States Supreme Court. In a 6–3 decision, the Court held that a Pennsylvania blue law forbidding the sale of various retail products on Sunday was not an unconstitutional interference with religion as described in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, Wisconsin, 340 U.S. 349 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case dealing with the Dormant Commerce Clause, used to prohibit states from limiting interstate commerce.
C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383 (1994), was a case before the United States Supreme Court in which the plaintiff, a private recycler with business in Clarkstown, New York, sought to ship its non-recyclable waste to cheaper waste processors out-of-state. Clarkstown opposed the move, and the company then brought suit, raising the unconstitutionality of Clarkstown's "flow control ordinance," which required solid wastes that were not recyclable or hazardous to be deposited at a particular private company's transfer facility. The ordinance involved fees that were above market rates. The Supreme Court sided with the plaintiff, concluding that Clarkstown's ordinance violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Southern Pacific Company v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Arizona Train Limit Law of 1912, which prohibited passenger trains with more than fourteen cars and prohibited freight trains with more than seventy cars, placed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. The Court held that the law imposed a burden far greater than necessary to achieve Arizona's legitimate interest in lowering the rate of train accidents. This case is part of the Court's so-called negative commerce clause jurisprudence.
Smith v. Turner; Norris v. Boston, 48 U.S. 283 (1849), were two similar cases, argued together before the United States Supreme Court, which decided 5–4 that states do not have the right to impose a tax that is determined by the number of passengers of a designated category on board a ship and/or disembarking into the State. The cases are sometimes called the Passenger Case or Passenger Cases.
George W. Bush & Sons Co. v. Malloy, 267 U.S. 317 (1925), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court, which held that the state statute under which the Maryland Public Service Commission (PSC) issued certificates of public convenience and necessity to common carriers engaged in interstate commerce violated the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994), was a United States Supreme Court case.
The Railroad Commission Cases, 116 U.S. 307 (1886), is a United States Supreme Court case concerning the power of states to set transportation charges of railroad companies. The Court held that the fixing of freight and passenger rates in railroad transportation was a permissible exercise of state police power.
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that power of states to pass laws interfering with interstate commerce is limited when the law poses an undue burden on businesses.
Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), was a United States Supreme Court case concerning whether a town ordinance regulating a use of a property was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, finding the law in question was constitutional as an exercise of the town's police powers.
H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held a New York protectionist law which prohibits licensure to suppliers who are alleged will create “destructive competition” in the local market to violate the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
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