The Dormant Commerce Clause, or Negative Commerce Clause, in American constitutional law, is a legal doctrine that courts in the United States have inferred from the Commerce Clause in Article I of the US Constitution. The primary focus of the doctrine is barring state protectionism. The Dormant Commerce Clause is used to prohibit state legislation that discriminates against interstate or international commerce. Courts first determine whether a state regulation discriminates on its face against interstate commerce or whether it has the purpose or effect of discriminating against interstate commerce. If the statute is discriminatory, the state has the burden to justify both the local benefits flowing from the statute and to show the state has no other means of advancing the legitimate local purpose.
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that states could not discriminate against another state's articles of commerce.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that there was an exception to the "virtually per se rule of invalidity" of the dormant commerce clause. The Supreme Court of the United States found that a Maine law prohibiting the importation of out-of-state bait fish was constitutional because Maine authorities couldn't be certain that imported fish would be free of "parasites and nonnative species" that might pose environmental harm to local ecology. Discriminatory laws may be upheld only if they serve "legitimate local purposes that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives," wrote Justice Blackmun, author of the majority opinion. In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court had previously ruled that New Jersey's ban of out-of-state solid waste was facially discriminatory to the state's residents in a national market and was therefore overturned.
United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor and Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a city can pressure private employers to hire city residents, but the same exercise of power to bias private contractors against out-of-state residents may be called into account under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four of the United States Constitution.
The Oregon Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) is the chief regulatory agency of the government of the U.S. state of Oregon responsible for protecting and enhancing the state's natural resources and managing sanitary and toxic waste disposal. The agency employs approximately 700 scientists, engineers, technicians, administrators, and environmental specialists. It has headquarters in Portland, regional administrative offices in Bend, Eugene, and Portland; and field offices in Coos Bay, Medford, Pendleton, Salem, and The Dalles. The Laboratory and Environmental Assessment Division operates an environmental laboratory in Hillsboro. The agency's director has the authority to impose fines for violations of the state's anti-pollution laws. In addition to its state mandate, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has delegated authority to DEQ to administer federal environmental programs including the federal Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and Resource Conservation and Recovery Act within the state.
C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, New York, 511 U.S. 383 (1994), was a case before the United States Supreme Court in which the plaintiff, a private recycler with business in Clarkstown, New York, sought to ship its non-recyclable waste to cheaper waste processors out-of-state. Clarkstown opposed the move, and the company then brought suit, raising the unconstitutionality of Clarkstown's "flow control ordinance," which required solid wastes that were not recyclable or hazardous to be deposited at a particular private company's transfer facility. The ordinance involved fees that were above market rates. The Supreme Court sided with the plaintiff, concluding that Clarkstown's ordinance violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717 (1992), is a United States Supreme Court case that resulted in an eight to one ruling that the eight public universities in Mississippi had not sufficiently integrated and that the state must take affirmative action to change this under the Equal Protection Clause. The Court found that, although the state had eliminated explicit prohibitions on the admission of black students to institutions including the University of Mississippi, Mississippi State University, and the University of Southern Mississippi, the Court of Appeals had not properly reviewed the set of discriminatory policies used by the state to suppress black enrollment at these schools. On this point, the Court stated that "[i]f the State perpetuates policies and practices traceable to its prior system that continue to have segregative effects - whether by influencing student enrollment decisions or by fostering segregation in other facets of the university system - and such policies are without sound educational justification and can be practicably eliminated, the State has not satisfied its burden of proving that it has dismantled its prior system."
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for the majority, found that the federal government may not require states to “take title” to radioactive waste through the "Take Title" provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act, which the Court found to exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Court permitted the federal government to induce shifts in state waste policy through other means.
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992), was a United States Supreme Court case that held that an Alabama law imposing a fee on out-of-state hazardous waste being disposed of in-state violated the Dormant Commerce Clause.
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976), was a case argued before the Supreme Court of the United States. Maryland created a program that, 1) purchased junked cars, 2) paid a bounty for those with Maryland license plates and, 3) imposed more stringent documentation requirements on out-of-state processors, in an effort to reduce the number of abandoned cars in Maryland.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), was a United States Supreme Court decision, which held that the United States Congress may enact legislation governing wildlife on federal lands.
United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U.S. 330 (2007), was a United States Supreme Court case about interstate commerce. Chief Justice John Roberts wrote the opinion of the Court, holding that a New York state ordinance forcing private waste management companies to deliver waste to a public facility did not discriminate against interstate commerce. Justice Samuel Alito wrote a dissent.
Canton Railroad Company v. Rogan, 340 U.S. 511 (1951), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that a state franchise tax upon the services performed by a railroad in handling imported and exported goods did not violate the Import-Export Clause of the United States Constitution.
Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), was a decision by the US Supreme Court that interpreted a provision of the Clean Water Act. Section 404 of the Act requires permits for the discharge of dredged or fill materials into "navigable waters," which is defined by the Act as "waters of the United States." That provision was the basis for the federal wetlands-permitting program.
West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994), was a United States Supreme Court case.
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981), was a United States Supreme Court case which found no violation of the equal protection or commerce clauses in a Minnesota state statute banning retail sale of milk in plastic nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers, but permitting such sale in other nonreturnable, nonrefillable containers.
Arizona Public Service Co. v. Snead, 441 U.S. 141 (1979), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a New Mexico tax on the generation of electricity was invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution. Snead was the director of the New Mexico Taxation and Revenue Department.
Comptroller of the Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 575 U.S. 542 (2015), is a 2015 U.S. Supreme Court decision which applied the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine to Maryland's personal income tax scheme and found that the failure to provide a full credit for income taxes paid to other states was unconstitutional.
Article I, § 10, clause 2 of the United States Constitution, known as the Import-Export Clause, prevents the states, without the consent of Congress, from imposing tariffs on imports and exports above what is necessary for their inspection laws and secures for the federal government the revenues from all tariffs on imports and exports. Several nineteenth century Supreme Court cases applied this clause to duties and imposts on interstate imports and exports. In 1869, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Import-Export Clause only applied to imports and exports with foreign nations and did not apply to imports and exports with other states, although this interpretation has been questioned by modern legal scholars.
Guam v. United States was a U.S. Supreme Court case dealing with a dispute on fiscal responsibility for environmental and hazardous cleanup of the Ordot Dump created by the United States Navy on the island of Guam in the 1940s, which Guam then ran after becoming a territory in 1950 until the landfill's closure in 2011. The Supreme Court ruled unanimously that under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Guam had filed its lawsuit to recover a portion of cleanup costs for the landfill from the United States government in a timely manner, allowing their case to proceed.
