Texas v. Cobb

Last updated
Texas v. Cobb
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued January 16, 2001
Decided April 2, 2001
Full case nameTexas, Petitioner v. Raymond Levi Cobb
Citations532 U.S. 162 ( more )
121 S. Ct. 1335; 149 L. Ed. 2d 321
Argument Oral argument
Holding
Because the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is "offense specific," it does not extend to offenses that are "factually related" to those that have actually been charged.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
David Souter  · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg  · Stephen Breyer
Case opinions
MajorityRehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas
ConcurrenceKennedy, joined by Scalia, Thomas
DissentBreyer, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg

Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162 (2001), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific and does not always extend to offenses that are closely related to those where the right has been attached. This decision reaffirmed the Court's holding in McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) by concluding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the onset of adversarial proceedings.

Contents

Background

In 1994 Raymond Levi Cobb confessed to a home burglary, but denied involvement in the disappearance of a woman and child from the same home. Cobb later retained an attorney to represent him for the burglary charge but didn’t have one for the case involving the woman and child. While Cobb was free on bond in the burglary case, Cobb’s father contacted the police to tell them his son had confessed to killing the woman and child. The police questioned Cobb, who waived his Miranda rights and confessed to both murders. He was subsequently charged with both murders. After his conviction and death sentence, Cobb appealed to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals on the grounds that his confession had been obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Cobb argued the confession should have been suppressed because his right to counsel had been invoked once he had been charged in the burglary case. The Texas Court of Appeal held that Cobb's confession regarding an uncharged murder offense when he was charged with burglary, was inadmissible.

Opinion of the Court

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals's holding was reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court, which stated that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific, and attaches to charged and sufficiently related uncharged offenses, not necessarily offenses 'factually related' to those that have actually been charged. [1]

Subsequent developments

Critics of the 5–4 decision predicted that the offense-specific rule would endanger suspects’ rights and grant police too much power to carry out interrogations without the presence of counsel. The majority, in response, pointed to suspects’ abilities to invoke their Miranda rights during interrogations –rights which were waived by Cobb. The majority opinion also introduced the Blockburger test — which is used in determining double jeopardy — into Sixth Amendment jurisprudence when using its dictates to determine the distinctiveness of the crimes at issue in the case. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, the majority opinion’s author, saw no reason to make a distinction between the meaning of the term “offense” in the Fifth Amendment and the Sixth. Chief Justice Rehnquist further stated that at the time Cobb confessed to the murders, he had been indicted for burglary [charged offense] but had not been charged in the murders. As defined by Texas law, these crimes are not the same offense under Blockburger. Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel did not bar police from interrogating Cobb regarding the murders [uncharged offense], and his confession was therefore admissible. Cobb's death sentence was later commuted to life in prison after the Supreme Court banned the death penalty for juveniles in Roper v. Simmons (2005), as Cobb was 17 at the time of the murder.

The Minority

This differed from the more ambiguous “closely related” test the minority felt was appropriate for Sixth Amendment considerations. The minority predicted the Blockburger test would prove difficult to administer for police — as it has proven to be for judges and lawyers — and would undermine other decisions where the “closely related” test was used.

See also

Related Research Articles

<i>Miranda</i> warning notification given by American police to criminal suspects in police custody advising them of their rights

In the United States, the Miranda warning is a type of notification customarily given by police to criminal suspects in police custody advising them of their right to silence; that is, their right to refuse to answer questions or provide information to law enforcement or other officials. These rights are often referred to as Mirandarights. The purpose of such notification is to preserve the admissibility of their statements made during custodial interrogation in later criminal proceedings.

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution part of the Bill of Rights, which sets out rights of the accused in a criminal prosecution

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution sets forth rights related to criminal prosecutions. It was ratified in 1791 as part of the United States Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has applied most of the protections of this amendment to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution prevents prosecutors from using a person's statements made in response to interrogation in police custody as evidence at their trial unless they can show that the person was informed of the right to consult with an attorney before and during questioning, and of the right against self-incrimination before police questioning, and that the defendant not only understood these rights, but voluntarily waived them.

Ernesto Miranda American rapist

Ernesto Arturo Miranda was a laborer whose conviction on kidnapping, rape, and armed robbery charges based on his confession under police interrogation was set aside in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Miranda v. Arizona, which ruled that criminal suspects must be informed of their right against self-incrimination and their right to consult with an attorney before being questioned by police. This warning is known as a Miranda warning.

Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), was a United States Supreme Court case holding that criminal suspects have a right to counsel during police interrogations under the Sixth Amendment. The case was decided a year after the court had held in Gideon v. Wainwright that indigent criminal defendants had a right to be provided counsel at trial.

Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), was a United States Supreme Court case clarifying the standard of review of a criminal defendant's allegedly coerced confession.

Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), upheld the requirement that the Miranda warning be read to criminal suspects and struck down a federal statute that purported to overrule Miranda v. Arizona (1966).

A false confession is an admission of guilt for a crime for which the confessor is not responsible. False confessions can be induced through coercion or by the mental disorder or incompetency of the accused. Research has demonstrated that false confessions occur on a regular basis in case law. Juveniles have a significantly higher rate of false confessions than do adults.

Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654 (2002), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld the Alabama Supreme Court's ruling that counsel must be provided for the accused in order to impose a suspended prison sentence.

McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991), held that the right to counsel secured by the Sixth Amendment and the right to counsel protected by Miranda v. Arizona are separate and distinct, such that invoking one does not implicitly invoke the other.

Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the government from eliciting statements from the defendant about themselves after the point that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.

Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986), was a U.S. Supreme Court case that was initiated by Francis Connelly, who insisted that his schizophrenic episode rendered him incompetent, nullifying his waiver of his Miranda rights.

Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution Amendment guaranteeing rights related to trials and due process

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution addresses criminal procedure and other aspects of the Constitution. It was ratified in 1791 as part of the Bill of Rights. The Fifth Amendment applies to every level of the government, including the federal, state, and local levels, as well as any corporation, private enterprise, group, or individual, or any foreign government in regard to a US citizen or resident of the US. The Supreme Court furthered the protections of this amendment through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), represented the Supreme Court's movement away from the amorphous voluntariness standard for determining whether police violated due process standards when eliciting confessions and towards the modern rule in Miranda v. Arizona. In Spano, the Court focused less on factors such as meals provided to the accused and more on whether the accused had access to legal counsel.

Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004), is a United States Supreme Court case regarding the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel.

Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States set an important standard to prevent double jeopardy.

Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986), was a case decided by the United States Supreme Court regarding the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel in a police interrogation. In a decision written by Justice Stevens, the Court held that once an accused individual has claimed a right to counsel at a plea hearing or other court proceeding, a waiver of that right during later police questioning would be invalid unless the accused individual initiated the communication.

Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009), is a 5–4 decision by the United States Supreme Court that overruled the Court's decision in Michigan v. Jackson. The case concerned the validity of a defendant's waiver of his right to counsel during a police interrogation. In reversing Jackson, the Court said such a waiver was valid.

Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), is a decision by the United States Supreme Court holding that once a defendant invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel police must cease custodial interrogation. Re-interrogation is only permissible once defendant's counsel has been made available to him, or he himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Statements obtained in violation of this rule are a violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.

Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), was a United States Supreme Court case that affirmed the legality of deceptive interrogation tactics.

References

Further reading