Treaty of Berlin (August 27, 1918)

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The Treaty of Berlin of August 27, 1918 was an agreement signed after several months of negotiations between Bolshevik representatives and the Central Powers, mainly represented by the Germans. This treaty completed and clarified the political and economic clauses of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which had been left out of the winter 1917-1918 negotiations. The latter were aimed at ending the war between the Central Powers and Russia and clarifying the extent of Russia's territorial losses, but left unresolved the question of war indemnities due to the Imperial Reich [Note 1] and its allies. Similarly, the nature of the new economic relations between the Central Powers and Russia was not discussed in depth at Brest-Litovsk. Consequently, in accordance with the terms of the peace treaty signed in early 1918, negotiations should regulate future economic relations between the Central Powers and Bolshevik Russia, and lead to the conclusion of an agreement between the Reich and its allies, on the one hand, and Russia, on the other. However, due to the rapid development of the conflict during September and October 1918, the provisions contained in the text of this treaty never came into force. Nevertheless, this agreement laid the foundations for the Treaty of Rapallo between the Reich and Bolshevik Russia, which came into force in 1922.

Contents

Context

Bolshevik power in the summer of 1918

After the Bolsheviks seized power in November 1917, the new Russian leadership took over the reins of Russian government, to halt the process of disintegration of power. [1] The conclusion of peace with the Central Powers also considerably weakened this new power. [2]

Divided on foreign policy, the Bolshevik leaders also had to confront their opponents, including their former allies, the left-wing socialist-revolutionaries, who, like all opponents of Bolshevik power, were in favor of continuing the war. Faced with the Bolsheviks, who were in the minority on this issue, the Socialist-Revolutionaries stepped up their terrorist activities, committing numerous attacks during the spring and summer of 1918, both against the Bolshevik leaders [Note 2] and against their German allies. [2] On July 6, 1918, they assassinated Count Wilhelm von Mirbach, German ambassador to the Russian government. [3]

German-Russian relations in 1918

Karl Helfferich, ambassador to Moscow appointed in July 1918, was in favor of overthrowing the regime set up in the aftermath of the October Revolution. Karl Helfferich.jpg
Karl Helfferich, ambassador to Moscow appointed in July 1918, was in favor of overthrowing the regime set up in the aftermath of the October Revolution.

Despite the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Germans anticipated a rapid overthrow of the regime that had emerged from the October Revolution. [1] It soon became clear to both Germans and Russians that the February treaty had left a number of uncertainties in relations between the two countries. Finally, the clauses of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk provided for the opening of new negotiations to reach agreement on the nature of future economic ties between the two countries. [4]

Consequently, in the spring of 1918, diplomatic relations were officially re-established between the Central Powers and the Council of People's Commissars, and ambassadors were exchanged between Moscow and Berlin. [5] However, against the backdrop of the terrorist wave led by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, former allies of the Bolshevik party, the main German leaders were divided on the question of maintaining relations with the Russian government: Wilhelm II, Erich Ludendorff and Karl Helfferich, the new ambassador to Moscow, were in favor of overthrowing the Bolshevik government, by various means. [Note 3] [6]

Leonid Krassine, l'un des negociateurs russes. Krasin2.jpg
Leonid Krassine, l'un des négociateurs russes.

Finally, in the summer of 1918, when the situation of the Bolshevik regime seemed critical, the Bolshevik negotiators Adolf Joffe and Leonid Krasin succeeded in convincing the Reich's main economic policy-makers at war, first and foremost Gustav Stresemann, of the solidity of the regime that had given them their mandate. [3] With Stresemann supporting the plan to renew economic relations with Lenin's regime, the Reich drew closer to the Bolsheviks to avoid, or at least delay, the reconstitution of an Eastern Front, while the Imperial German Army stepped up operations in support of the Red Army, wherever the armies of the Central Powers were in a position to intervene. [7] Following the assassinations in the summer of 1918 of the Reich ambassador in Moscow and the commander of German troops in Ukraine, the Reich government hesitated as to which policy to follow, with part of the Imperial Cabinet calling for the establishment of a conservative government favorable to the central powers. [2]

German objectives in Russia

With the Central Powers having imposed a peace on the Russian Republic, sanctioning a major Russian territorial withdrawal, the Reich was keen to renew trade relations with the new power in Moscow.

The conclusion of peace with the power that emerged from the October Revolution not only allowed German war aims to be realized in Eastern Europe, but also authorized the Reich to pursue an active policy in Russia and neighboring regions, despite the uncertainties then surrounding the future of the Bolshevik regime. [5] At a time when the Central Powers were victorious on the Eastern Front, some German officials aspired to see the Reich pursue an active policy in the new Russia. Thus, Paul von Hintze, Secretary of State [Note 4] from July 9, 1918, wanted to achieve the war aims of 1914, [8] by relying on the Bolsheviks, the only political party opposed to the Triple Entente. [9]

Moreover, in a context marked by preparations for the post-war period, the Reich's leaders, betting on the maintenance of an Allied blockade after the conflict, attempted to establish trade relations with the Russian authorities. [4] Leading representatives of industry met on several occasions in the spring of 1918 to define the objectives sought by the German negotiators, as well as the legal framework for achieving these objectives. [10]

At the same time, the Germans were preparing a military intervention in Russia; although they supported the Bolshevik regime, in order to take advantage of it in the Reich's best interests, German diplomats nevertheless anticipated its downfall, which would risk dragging Russia into chaos. The German military prepared for this intervention, whose main driving force would be the restoration of order. [11]

Parallel to the objectives set by members of the government and the military, representatives of the Reich's heavy industry set out their specific demands after a meeting in Düsseldorf; fearing that the Reich would be ousted from world markets after the conflict, they called for the establishment of a continental market, economically underdeveloped and therefore unlikely to find competition for German manufactured goods. [12] They suggested a proactive policy of substantial loans to Russia, to finance German exports to the country, as well as the establishment of an economic grouping to coordinate German efforts to take economic control of Russia and Ukraine. [10]

Agreement clauses

The German-Russian agreement, the fruit of three months of negotiations, included both political and economic clauses, guaranteeing both the survival of the Bolshevik regime and the resumption of economic relations between Russia and the Central Powers. These clauses were supplemented by secret notes detailing the reciprocal obligations of the two contracting parties. [13]

Negotiations

Faced with a catastrophic political and economic situation, Lenin's government proposed the opening of negotiations with representatives of the central powers. [9] The Bolshevik representatives dangled the prospect of an alliance between the Reich and the new Russia, the delivery of arms and a far-reaching trade agreement. [3]

The negotiations were held in Berlin and opened in mid-May 1918, in the presence of the Reich's State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Richard von Kühlmann, and were closed by his successor, Paul von Hintze. [12] The new Russian government delegated Adolf Joffe and Leonid Krasine, experienced Bolshevik militants, to defend the interests of the Moscow regime. [14]

As the Reich became increasingly exhausted in futile offensives, its negotiators quickly became more conciliatory towards the demands put forward by their Russian counterparts. The Germans offered to supply Russia with cereal, coal, iron and oil, while rail links between the Caucasian territories occupied by the central powers and northern Russia were promised to be rapidly restored. However, it did not escape Joffe, the main Russian negotiator, that concluding the agreement on the basis proposed by the Germans would strengthen the Reich's economic control over Russia, which had already been significant before the war. [15]

Political clauses

In essence, these clauses are contained in the notes that were exchanged between the German government and the Soviet government.

They definitively fixed Russia's borders along the lines decided at Brest-Litovsk, obliging Russia to recognize the independence of Lithuania and the Duchy of Courland and Semigallia on the borders of the Baltic and Georgia, which were then totally under German political and economic control. [13] In exchange for this recognition, the Reich agreed to return Baku to Russia, in exchange for a guarantee that a third of the oil produced in the region would be delivered to the German economy. [13]

Finally, these clauses oblige the Reich to question its support for Krasnov's and Alekseyev's White Armies. [13]

Economical clauses

The treaty of August 27 laid the foundations for the resumption of economic exchanges between the Reich and the new Russia. [4] The Germans renounced compensation for German holdings in Russian companies nationalized by the decree of June 28, 1918. [1]

However, despite this renunciation, the Russian government had to pay the Reich war indemnities of six billion gold rubles, both in gold and in goods. [13]

Application and consequences

Ratified by the contracting parties on September 6, 1918, it never came into force due to the defeat of the Reich in the following months. The Armistice of Rethondes obliged the defeated Reich to denounce all agreements and treaties signed by its representatives with Romania, Russia and the new states born at the beginning of 1918: Finland, the Baltic States and Ukraine.

Ratification

Friedrich Ebert, pictured here in December 1918, outlines the reservations of his party, the SPD. Bundesarchiv Bild 146-1970-096-03, Friedrich Ebert.jpg
Friedrich Ebert, pictured here in December 1918, outlines the reservations of his party, the SPD.

Ratification of the Treaty of August 27 by the Reich took the form of a simple government act. The treaty was not submitted to the Reichstag, as required by the Empire's constitution, for reasons of domestic policy; Friedrich von Payer, Vice-Chancellor of the Reich, wished to avoid a parliamentary debate on his foreign policy, and a possible collapse of the government in this debate. Only Friedrich Ebert, on behalf of his party, the Social Democratic Party, expressed reservations about the treaty's clauses and ratification procedures. [16]

Despite these reservations, the treaty was ratified by the Reichstag Main Committee on September 24, 1918. [Note 5] [17]

Expiration

The events of November 1918 quickly invalidated the terms of the treaty.

Shortly before, in September 1918, the Reich's political and military leaders were hoping to preserve the structure built up in Eastern Europe since the February peace for the benefit of the Reich: Paul von Hintze and Friedrich von Payer, supported by Gustav Stresemann, declared their determination to defend the eastern gains of the conflict. [18]

However, article 15 of the 1918 armistice text obliged the Reich to withdraw from the treaty of August 27, 1918. [19] The Allies considered this treaty to be a consequence of the peace of defeat imposed by the Reich on Russia. [20] Parallel to the Allied demand, the Council of People's Commissars terminated the treaties binding Russia and the Reich on November 13, 1918, once the terms of the armistice between the Reich and the Allies were known in Russia. [19]

Consequences

In the summer of 1918, the outcome of the German-Russian negotiations depended on the outcome of operations on the Western Front; [21] this German-Russian agreement was a first step towards the German-Soviet relations of the 1920s.

While the Balkan front, poorly supported by the weakened Bulgarian army, collapsed following the Battle of Doiran, German negotiators obtained concessions from the states established following the break-up of Russia, placing these newly independent countries in strict dependence on the Reich. [18]

Accepting the regime put in place following the October Revolution, and acknowledging the economic interests of Bolshevik-ruled Russia, the Reich's leaders were the first to recognize the power of the Council of People's Commissars. This recognition paved the way for a longer-term relationship with the Soviet Union. [Note 6] This early recognition of Moscow's new government paved the way for agreements that would benefit both states over the following decade. [22]

See also

Notes

  1. Between 1871 and 1945, the official name of the German state was Deutsches Reich, later simplified to Reich.
  2. For example, Lenin was wounded in an assassination attempt on August 30, 1918.
  3. Helfferich wanted to use a call for help from the Council of People's Commissars to occupy Moscow and overthrow its power, Ludendorff was in favor of immediate military action, while Wilhelm II was under pressure from the Baltics in his entourage.
  4. In the Reich, the State Secretary acts as Foreign Minister.
  5. For the first time, the Reichstag ratified international treaties signed by the government, the first tangible manifestation of the Reich's reform process, launched a few weeks earlier in the face of military defeat.
  6. Having recognized the new Russian regime as early as 1918, the Reich benefited from this anteriority and from early contacts with the Bolshevik leaders; these contacts continued after the end of the conflict.

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References

  1. 1 2 3 Renouvin (1934 , p. 579)
  2. 1 2 3 Fischer (1970 , p. 565)
  3. 1 2 3 Fischer (1970 , p. 571)
  4. 1 2 3 Soutou (1989 , p. 694)
  5. 1 2 Fischer (1970 , p. 561)
  6. Fischer (1970 , p. 566)
  7. Renouvin (1934 , p. 589)
  8. Fischer (1970 , p. 568)
  9. 1 2 Fischer (1970 , p. 570)
  10. 1 2 Fischer (1970 , p. 563)
  11. Fischer (1970 , p. 569)
  12. 1 2 Fischer (1970 , p. 562)
  13. 1 2 3 4 5 Fischer (1970 , p. 575)
  14. Fischer (1970 , p. 572)
  15. Fischer (1970 , p. 573)
  16. Fischer (1970 , p. 574)
  17. Fischer (1970 , p. 631)
  18. 1 2 Fischer (1970 , p. 632)
  19. 1 2 Soutou (1989 , p. 700)
  20. Renouvin (1934 , p. 645)
  21. Renouvin (1934 , p. 590)
  22. Soutou (1989 , p. 701)

Bibliography

External sites