Empathy gap

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An empathy gap, sometimes referred to as an empathy bias, is a breakdown or reduction in empathy (the ability to recognize, understand, and share another's thoughts and feelings) where it might otherwise be expected to occur. Empathy gaps may occur due to a failure in the process of empathizing [1] or as a consequence of stable personality characteristics, [2] [3] [4] and may reflect either a lack of ability or motivation to empathize.

Contents

Empathy gaps can be interpersonal (toward others) or intrapersonal (toward the self, e.g. when predicting one's own future preferences). A great deal of social psychological research has focused on intergroup empathy gaps, their underlying psychological and neural mechanisms, and their implications for downstream behavior (e.g. prejudice toward outgroup members).

Classification

Cognitive empathy gaps

Failures in cognitive empathy (also referred to as "perspective-taking") may sometimes result from a lack of ability. For example, young children often engage in failures of perspective-taking (e.g., on false belief tasks) due to underdeveloped social cognitive abilities. [5] Additionally, neurodivergent individuals often face difficulties inferring others' emotional and cognitive states. [6] Failures in cognitive empathy may also result from cognitive biases that impair one's ability to understand another's perspective (for example, see the related concept of naive realism.) [7]

One's ability to perspective-take may be limited by one's current emotional state. For example, behavioral economics research has described a number of failures in empathy that occur due to emotional influences on perspective-taking when people make social predictions. People may either fail to accurately predict one's own preferences and decisions (intrapersonal empathy gaps), or to consider how others’ preferences might differ from one's own (interpersonal empathy gaps). [8] For example, people not owning a certain good, underestimate their attachment to that good were they to own it. [9]

In other circumstances, failures in cognitive empathy may occur due to a lack of motivation. [10] For example, people are less likely to take the perspective of outgroup members with whom they disagree.

Affective empathy gaps

Affective (i.e. emotional) empathy gaps may describe instances in which an observer and target do not experience similar emotions, [11] or when an observer does not experience anticipated emotional responses toward a target, such as sympathy and compassion. [12]

Certain affective empathy gaps may be driven by a limited ability to share another's emotions. For example, psychopathy is characterized by impairments in emotional empathy. [13]

Individuals may be motivated to avoid empathizing with others' emotions due to the emotional costs of doing so. For example, according to C.D. Batson's model of empathy, empathizing with others may either result in empathic concern (i.e. feelings of warmth and concern for another) or personal distress (i.e. when another's distress causes distress for the self). [14] A trait-level tendency to experience personal distress (vs. empathic concern) may motivate individuals to avoid situations which would require them to empathize with others, and indeed predicts reduced helping behavior.

Notable examples

Intergroup empathy gaps

Humans are less likely to help outgroup members in need, as compared to ingroup members. [15] People are also less likely to value outgroup members’ lives as highly as those of ingroup members. [16] These effects are indicative of an ingroup empathy bias, in which people empathize more with ingroup (vs. outgroup) members.

Intergroup empathy gaps are often affective or cognitive in nature, but also extend to other domains such as pain. For example, a great deal of research has demonstrated that people show reduced responses (e.g. neural activity) when observing outgroup (vs. ingroup) members in pain. [17] [18] [19] [20] These effects may occur for real-world social groups such as members of different races. In one study utilizing a minimal groups paradigm (in which groups are randomly assigned, ostensibly based on an arbitrary distinction), individuals also judged the perceived pain of ingroup members to be more painful than that of outgroup members. [21]

Intergroup schadenfreude

Perhaps the most well-known “counter-empathic” emotion—i.e., an emotion that reflects an empathy gap for the target—is schadenfreude, or the experience of pleasure when observing or learning about another's suffering or misfortune. [22] Schadenfreude frequently occurs in intergroup contexts. [23] [24] In fact, the two factors that most strongly predict schadenfreude are identification with one's group and the presence of competition between groups in conflict. [25] [26] Competition may be explicit; for example, one study found that soccer fans were less likely to help an injured stranger wearing a rival team shirt than someone wearing an ingroup team shirt. [27] However, schadenfreude may also be directed toward members of groups associated with high-status, competitive stereotypes. [28] These findings correspond with the stereotype content model, which proposes that such groups elicit envy, thereby precipitating schadenfreude.

Occupational burnout

Stress related to the experience of empathy may cause empathic distress fatigue and occupational burnout, [29] particularly among those in the medical profession. Expressing empathy is an important component of patient-centered care, and can be expressed through behaviors such as concern, attentiveness, sharing emotions, vulnerability, understanding, dialogue, reflection, and authenticity. [30] However, expressing empathy can be cognitively and emotionally demanding for providers. [31] Physicians who lack proper support may experience depression and burnout, particularly in the face of the extended or frequent experiences of personal distress.

Forecasting failures

Within the domain of social psychology, "empathy gaps" typically describe breakdowns in empathy toward others (interpersonal empathy gaps). However, research in behavioral economics has also identified a number of intrapersonal empathy gaps (i.e. toward one's self). For example, "hot-cold empathy gaps" describe a breakdown in empathy for one's future self—specifically, a failure to anticipate how one's future affective states will affect one's preferences. [32] Such failures can negatively impact decision-making, particularly in regards to health outcomes. Hot-cold empathy gaps are related to the psychological concepts of affective forecasting and temporal discounting.

Psychological factors

Mentalizing processes

Both affective and cognitive empathy gaps can occur due to a breakdown in the process of mentalizing others' states. For example, breakdowns in mentalizing may include but are not limited to:

Neural evidence also supports the key role of mentalizing in supporting empathic responses, particularly in an intergroup context. For example, a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of intergroup social cognition found that thinking about ingroup members (in comparison to outgroup members) was more frequently related to brain regions known to underlie mentalizing. [35]

Gender norms

Gender differences in the experience of empathy have been a subject of debate. In particular, scientists have sought to determine whether observed gender differences in empathy are due to variance in ability, motivation, or both between men and women. Research to date raises the possibility that gender norms regarding the experience and expression of empathy may decrease men's willingness to empathize with others, and therefore their tendency to engage in empathy.

A number of studies, primarily utilizing self-report, have found gender differences in men's and women's empathy. A 1977 review of nine studies found women to be more empathic than men on average. [36] A 1983 review found a similar result, although differences in scores were stronger for self-report, as compared to observational, measures. [37] In recent decades, a number of studies utilizing self-reported empathy have shown gender differences in empathy. [6] [38] [39] According to the results of a nationally representative survey, men reported less willingness to give money or volunteer time to a poverty relief organization as compared to women, a finding mediated by men's lower self-reported feelings of empathic concern toward others. [40]

However, more recent work has found little evidence that gender differences in self-reported empathy are related to neurophysiological measures (hemodynamic responses and pupil dilation). [41] This finding raises the possibility that self-reported empathy may not be driven by biological differences in responses, but rather gender differences in willingness to report empathy. Specifically, women may be more likely to report experiencing empathy because it is more gender-normative for women than men. [42] In support of this idea, a study found that manipulating the perceived gender normativity of empathy eliminated gender differences in men and women's self-reported empathy. Specifically, assigning male and female participants to read a narrative describing fictitious neurological research evidence which claimed that males score higher on measures of empathy eliminated the gender gap in self-reported empathy. [43]

Trait differences

Psychological research has identified a number of trait differences associated with reduced empathic responses, including but not limited to:


Neural mechanisms

Neural simulation

According to the perception–action-model of empathy, [50] perception–action-coupling (i.e., the vicarious activation of the neural system for action during the perception of action) allows humans to understand others’ actions, intentions, and emotions. According to this theory, when a "subject" individual observes an "object" individual, the object's physical movements and facial expressions activate corresponding neural mechanisms in the subject. [51] That is, by neurally simulating the object's observed states, the subject also experiences these states, the basis of empathy.

The mirror neuron system [52] has been proposed as a neural mechanism supporting perception-action coupling and empathy, although such claims remain a subject of scientific debate. Although the exact (if any) role of mirror neurons in supporting empathy is unclear, evidence suggests that neural simulation (i.e., recreating neural states associated with a process observed in another) may generally support a variety of psychological processes in humans, including disgust, [53] pain, [54] touch, [55] and facial expressions. [56]

Reduced neural simulation of responses to suffering may account in part for observed empathy gaps, particularly in an intergroup context. This possibility is supported by research demonstrating that people show reduced neural activity when they witness ethnic outgroup (vs. ingroup) members in physical or emotional pain. [17] [18] In one study, Chinese and Causian participants viewed videos of Chinese and Causasian targets, who displayed neutral facial expressions as they received either painful or non-painful stimulation to their cheeks. [17] Witnessing racial ingroup faces receive painful stimulation increased activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and anterior insula (two regions which generally activate during the experience of pain.) However, these responses were diminished toward outgroup members in pain. These results replicated among White-Italian and Black-African participants. [19] Additionally, EEG work has shown reduced neural simulation of movement (in primary motor cortex) for outgroup members, compared to in-group members. [20] This effect was magnified by prejudice and toward disliked groups (i.e. South-Asians, Blacks, and East Asians).

Oxytocin

A great deal of social neuroscience research has been conducted to investigate the social functions of the hormone oxytocin, [57] including its role in empathy. Generally speaking, oxytocin is associated with cooperation between individuals (in both humans and non-human animals). However, these effects interact with group membership in intergroup settings: oxytocin is associated with increased bonding with ingroup, but not outgroup, members, and may thereby contribute to ingroup favoritism and intergroup empathy bias. [58] However, in one study of Israelis and Palestinians, intranasal oxytocin administration improved opposing partisans' empathy for outgroup members by increasing the salience of their pain. [59]

In addition to temporary changes in oxytocin levels, the influence of oxytocin on empathic responses may also be influenced by an oxytocin receptor gene polymorphism, [60] such that certain individuals may differ in the extent to which oxytocin promotes ingroup favoritism.

Specific neural correlates

A number of studies have been conducted to identify the neural regions implicated in intergroup empathy biases. [61] [33] [62] This work has highlighted candidate regions supporting psychological processes such as mentalizing for ingroup members, deindividuation of outgroup members, and the pleasure associated with the experience of schadenfreude.

Role of dmPFC

A meta-analysis of 50 fMRI studies of intergroup social cognition found more consistent activation in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) during ingroup (vs. outgroup) social cognition. [35] dmPFC has previously been linked to the ability to infer others’ mental states, [63] [64] [65] which suggests that individuals may be more likely to engage in mentalizing for ingroup (as compared to outgroup) members. dmPFC activity has also been linked to prosocial behavior; [66] [67] thus, dmPFC's association with cognition about ingroup members suggests a potential neurocognitive mechanism underlying ingroup favoritism.

Role of anterior insula

Activation patterns in the anterior insula (AI) have been observed when thinking about both ingroup and outgroup members. For example, greater activity in the anterior insula has been observed when participants view ingroup members on a sports team receiving pain, compared to outgroup members receiving pain. [68] In contrast, the meta-analysis referenced previously [35] found that anterior insula activation was more reliably related to social cognition about outgroup members.

These seemingly divergent results may be due in part to functional differences between anatomic subregions of the anterior insula. Meta-analyses have identified two distinct subregions of the anterior insula: ventral AI, which is linked to emotional and visceral experiences (e.g. subjective arousal); and dorsal AI, which has been associated with exogenous attention processes such as attention orientation, salience detection, and task performance monitoring. [69] [70] [71] Therefore, anterior insula activation may occur more often when thinking about outgroup members because doing is more attentionally demanding than thinking about ingroup members. [35]

Lateralization of function within the anterior insula may also help account for divergent results, due to differences in connectivity between left and right AI. The right anterior insula has greater connectivity with regions supporting attentional orientation and arousal (e.g. postcentral gyrus and supramarginal gyrus), compared to the left anterior insula, which has greater connectivity with regions involved in perspective-taking and cognitive motor control (e.g. dmPFC and superior frontal gyrus). [72] The previously referenced meta-analysis found right lateralization of anterior insula for outgroup compared to ingroup processing. [35] These findings raise the possibility that when thinking about outgroup members, individuals may use their attention to focus on targets' salient outgroup status, as opposed to thinking about the outgroup member as an individual. In contrast, the meta-analysis found left lateralization of anterior insula activity for thinking about ingroup compared to outgroup members. This finding suggests that left anterior insula may help support perspective-taking and mentalizing about ingroup members, and thinking about them in an individuated way. However, these possibilities are speculative and lateralization may vary due to characteristics such as age, gender, and other individual differences, which should be accounted for in future research. [73] [72]

Role of ventral striatum

A number of fMRI studies have attempted to identify the neural activation patterns underlying the experience of intergroup schadenfreude, particularly toward outgroup members in pain. These studies have found increased activation in the ventral striatum, a region related to reward processing and pleasure. [74]

Consequences

Helping behavior

Breakdowns in empathy may reduce helping behavior, [75] [76] a phenomenon illustrated by the identifiable victim effect. Specifically, humans are less likely to assist others who are not identifiable on an individual level. [77] A related concept is psychological distance—that is, we are less likely to help those who feel more psychologically distant from us. [78]

Reduced empathy for outgroup members is associated with a reduction in willingness to entertain another's points of view, the likelihood of ignoring a customer's complaints, the likelihood of helping others during a natural disaster, and the chance that one opposes social programs designed to benefit disadvantaged individuals. [79] [69]

Prejudice

Empathy gaps may contribute to prejudicial attitudes and behavior. However, training people in perspective-taking, for example by providing instructions about how to take an outgroup member's perspective, has been shown to increase intergroup helping and the recognition of group disparities. [80] Perspective-taking interventions are more likely to be effective when a multicultural approach is used (i.e., an approach that appreciates intergroup differences), as opposed to a "colorblind" approach (e.g. an approach that attempts to emphasize a shared group identity). [80] [81] [82]

See also

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Prejudice</span> Attitudes based on preconceived categories

Prejudice can be an affective feeling towards a person based on their perceived group membership. The word is often used to refer to a preconceived evaluation or classification of another person based on that person's perceived personal characteristics, such as political affiliation, sex, gender, gender identity, beliefs, values, social class, age, disability, religion, sexuality, race, ethnicity, language, nationality, culture, complexion, beauty, height, body weight, occupation, wealth, education, criminality, sport-team affiliation, music tastes or other perceived characteristics.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Empathy</span> Capacity to understand or feel what another person is experiencing

Empathy is generally described as the ability to take on another's perspective, to understand, feel and possibly share and respond to their experience. There are more definitions of empathy that include but is not limited to social, cognitive, and emotional processes primarily concerned with understanding others. Often times, empathy is considered to be a broad term, and broken down into more specific concepts and types that include cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, somatic empathy, and spiritual empathy.

The out-group homogeneity effect is the perception of out-group members as more similar to one another than are in-group members, e.g. "they are alike; we are diverse". Perceivers tend to have impressions about the diversity or variability of group members around those central tendencies or typical attributes of those group members. Thus, outgroup stereotypicality judgments are overestimated, supporting the view that out-group stereotypes are overgeneralizations. The term "outgroup homogeneity effect", "outgroup homogeneity bias" or "relative outgroup homogeneity" have been explicitly contrasted with "outgroup homogeneity" in general, the latter referring to perceived outgroup variability unrelated to perceptions of the ingroup.

In-group favoritism, sometimes known as in-group–out-group bias, in-group bias, intergroup bias, or in-group preference, is a pattern of favoring members of one's in-group over out-group members. This can be expressed in evaluation of others, in allocation of resources, and in many other ways.

System justification theory is a theory within social psychology that system-justifying beliefs serve a psychologically palliative function. It proposes that people have several underlying needs, which vary from individual to individual, that can be satisfied by the defense and justification of the status quo, even when the system may be disadvantageous to certain people. People have epistemic, existential, and relational needs that are met by and manifest as ideological support for the prevailing structure of social, economic, and political norms. Need for order and stability, and thus resistance to change or alternatives, for example, can be a motivator for individuals to see the status quo as good, legitimate, and even desirable.

In psychology and other social sciences, the contact hypothesis suggests that intergroup contact under appropriate conditions can effectively reduce prejudice between majority and minority group members. Following WWII and the desegregation of the military and other public institutions, policymakers and social scientists had turned an eye towards the policy implications of interracial contact. Of them, social psychologist Gordon Allport united early research in this vein under intergroup contact theory.

Social identity is the portion of an individual's self-concept derived from perceived membership in a relevant social group.

Self-categorization theory is a theory in social psychology that describes the circumstances under which a person will perceive collections of people as a group, as well as the consequences of perceiving people in group terms. Although the theory is often introduced as an explanation of psychological group formation, it is more accurately thought of as general analysis of the functioning of categorization processes in social perception and interaction that speaks to issues of individual identity as much as group phenomena. It was developed by John Turner and colleagues, and along with social identity theory it is a constituent part of the social identity approach. It was in part developed to address questions that arose in response to social identity theory about the mechanistic underpinnings of social identification.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Stereotype</span> Generalized but fixed and oversimplified image or idea of a particular type of person or thing

In social psychology, a stereotype is a generalized belief about a particular category of people. It is an expectation that people might have about every person of a particular group. The type of expectation can vary; it can be, for example, an expectation about the group's personality, preferences, appearance or ability. Stereotypes are often overgeneralized, inaccurate, and resistant to new information. A stereotype does not necessarily need to be a negative assumption. They may be positive, neutral, or negative.

The ultimate attribution error is a type of attribution error which describes how attributions of outgroup behavior are more negative than ingroup behavior. As a cognitive bias, the error results in negative outgroup behavior being more likely to be attributed to factors internal and specific to the actor, such as personality, and the attribution of negative ingroup behavior to external factors such as luck or circumstance. The bias reinforces negative stereotypes and prejudice about the outgroup and favouritism of the ingroup through positive stereotypes. The theory also extends to the bias that positive acts performed by ingroup members are more likely a result of their personality.

Empathic concern refers to other-oriented emotions elicited by, and congruent with the perceived welfare of, someone in need. These other-oriented emotions include feelings of tenderness, sympathy, compassion and soft-heartedness.

In psychology, empathic accuracy is a measure of how accurately one person can infer the thoughts and feelings of another person.

Intergroup anxiety is the social phenomenon identified by Walter and Cookie Stephan in 1985 that describes the ambiguous feelings of discomfort or anxiety when interacting with members of other groups. Such emotions also constitute intergroup anxiety when one is merely anticipating interaction with members of an outgroup. Expectations that interactions with foreign members of outgroups will result in an aversive experience is believed to be the cause of intergroup anxiety, with an affected individual being anxious or unsure about a number of issues. Methods of reducing intergroup anxiety and stress including facilitating positive intergroup contact.

The common ingroup identity model is a theoretical model proposed by Samuel L. Gaertner and John F. Dovidio that outlines the processes through which intergroup bias may be reduced. Intergroup bias is a preference for one's in-group over the out-group. Derived from the social identity approach to intergroup behaviour, the common ingroup identity model is rooted in the process of social categorization, or how people conceive of group boundaries. The model describes how intergroup bias can be reduced if members of different groups can be induced to conceive of themselves to be part of the same group, then they would develop more positive attitudes of the former outgroup members. An individual will change the way they view the out-group through a social categorization process called recategorization where former out-group members become incorporated into individual's representations of the in-group.

Pain empathy is a specific variety of empathy that involves recognizing and understanding another person's pain.

David Amodio is an American scientist who examines the psychological and neural mechanisms underlying social behavior, with a focus on self-regulation and intergroup relations. Amodio is known for his role in developing the field of social neuroscience and for his neuroscientific approach to social psychology.

There is a great deal of research on the factors that lead to the formation of prejudiced attitudes and beliefs. There is also a lot of research on the consequences of holding prejudiced beliefs and being the target of such beliefs. It is true that advances have been made in understanding the nature of prejudice. A consensus on how to end prejudice has yet to be established, but there are a number of scientifically examined strategies that have been developed in attempt to solve this social issue.

Claus Lamm is a Professor of Biological Psychology and the head of the Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience Unit at the Faculty of Psychology of the University of Vienna. His research focuses on the psychological and biological mechanisms underlying social cognition, affect, and behavior. His main research interest are the neural underpinnings of empathy, to whose understanding he has made pioneering contributions.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Male warrior hypothesis</span> Hypothesis in evolutionary psychology

The male warrior hypothesis (MWH) is an evolutionary psychology hypothesis by Professor Mark van Vugt which argues that human psychology has been shaped by between-group competition and conflict. Specifically, the evolutionary history of coalitional aggression between groups of men may have resulted in sex-specific differences in the way outgroups are perceived, creating ingroup vs. outgroup tendencies that are still observable today.

Intergroup relations refers to interactions between individuals in different social groups, and to interactions taking place between the groups themselves collectively. It has long been a subject of research in social psychology, political psychology, and organizational behavior.

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