Allying with several kingdoms, including Armenia, Antony began a campaign against Parthia with a massive force in 36 BC. Since the Euphrates front was found to be strong, Antony chose the route via Armenia. Upon entering Atropatene, the Roman baggage train and siege engines, which had taken a different route, were destroyed by a Parthian cavalry force. Antony moved on and besieged the Atropatene capital but was unsuccessful. The arduous journey of retreat to Armenia and then Syria further inflicted losses on his force, making the war a tactical Roman disaster and a strategic draw. Peace was later negotiated by Augustus.
Benjamin Kelly (2008) noted that apart from agreeing on a few basic facts, the primary sources on Antony's 36 Atropatene campaign contradict each other on virtually everything.[5] Discrepancies range from troop strength and losses; to which city was targeted by Antony's siege; to whether almost all Roman soldiers except Polemon I of Pontus in Statianus' supply forces were killed, or that many more were captured; to whether Antony's retreating infantry used the testudo formation tactic once or multiple times to ward off the Parthians; and whether the Armenian king was held responsible for the campaign's failure or not.[5] Florus claims that at some point Antony walked into a Parthian trap and lost two legions, which no other source mentions, although one would expect Dio or Plutarch to do so.[6] Florus alleged that the blazing heat of Armenia and the snowfall of Cappadocia inflicted lethal attrition on the retreating Romans, while Plutarch and Dio wrote that the snow and ice of Armenia were killing Antony's soldiers.[6] Dio and especially Orosius asserted that many Romans deserted the army during the withdrawal, while Plutarch emphasised that the troops remained loyal to Antony.[6] Plutarch indicates explicitly and implicitly that he based his account on multiple, sometimes conflicting sources, leading to duplications of the same events (such as the Romans twice fraternising with Parthians, being misled along a "safe" passage but attacked by Parthians anyway), and contradicting himself on whether the Armenian king's withdrawal of the cavalry, or Antony's decision to campaign during the winter season, was to blame for the expedition's failure.[7]
The Judean high priest and puppet Roman ruler, Hyrcanus II, was overthrown and sent as prisoner to Seleucia, and the pro-Parthian Hasmonean Antigonus was installed in his place. Antigonus was the only remaining son of the former King Aristobulus II, whom the Romans deposed and installed the weaker Hyrcanus II as high priest (but not king) in 63 BC. Upon capturing Hyrcanus II, Antigonus bit off his uncle's ears to disqualify him from ever serving as high priest again.[9]
With the aid of Mark Antony, a lover of Egyptian Ptolemaic Queen Cleopatra VII, the son-in-law of Hyrcanus, Herod, returned to Judea and recaptured Jerusalem in 37 BC.[3]
Campaign
36 BC, Antony went on to attack the Parthian Empire. Having 16 legions (about 80,000 men), he joined with forces from the client kingdoms of Galatia, Cappadocia, Pontus and Armenia (7,000 infantry and 6,000 heavy cavalry). The invasion force reached a total of 90,000 to 100,000 men with siege engines in 300 wagons (a train ~5 miles (8.0km) long) and an 80 foot (24m) long battering ram. Cleopatra accompanied Antony as far as the city of Zeugma, where he drew together the army.[citation needed]
Late into the campaigning season of 36, Antony attacked Media Atropatene via Armenia.[10]
As the Parthians were concentrated on the Euphrates, Antony chose the route via Armenia towards Atropatene.[2] From there, Antony and the bulk of the force took the convenient caravan route. The baggage train, which was protected by two legions under legatus Oppius Statianus and accompanied by King Artavasdes II of Armenia, took a different longer route. After entering Atropatene, the latter convoy was attacked by a Parthian cavalry force under Monaeses[11][2][12] (according to Kelly (2008), King Phraates himself commanded the attack on the Roman baggage train).[10] Statianus and 10,000 legionaries were killed[12][13] and the Antony's supplies and siege engines were destroyed.[2] King Polemon I of Pontus was captured,[14] but King Artavasdes II and his cavalry had hastily retreated and did not engage.[12]
The retreat of the Armenian king was later interpreted as treason in Antony's camp. However, a pro-Antony bias is present in the narrations of the campaign by Strabo and Plutarch, whose primary source was a written report by Antony's friend, Quintus Dellius, who had masked Antony's poor management and put the blames on the Armenian king.[2]
Antony still proceeded to besiege the fortified Atropatenian capital Phraata/Praaspa (identified as either Maragheh or less probably Ganzak/Takht-e Soleyman). Ceaselessly harassed by the Parthian and Atropatenian cavalry, Antony finally abandoned the siege and realised his defeat.[2][10]
Antony then began an exhausting retreat to Armenia along a mountainous road and was ceaselessly harassed by the Parthian cavalry.[10] His forces reached the border of Armenia Major after 27 days.[15] A survey of the troops suggested 24,000 men were lost.[2]
In Armenia, Antony hid his resentment of the Armenian king and his intentions to punish him in the future, as he needed support to continue his journey through Armenia back to the Roman soil in Syria.[2] Although safe from Parthian attacks after arriving in Armenia, additional Roman soldiers died on the march to the Mediterranean due to inclement weather.[10] The arduous journey through the mountains of Armenia in winter greatly reduced the strength of Antony's army. Around 32,000 men of his army were lost in total.[2]
Some Roman sources blame the Armenian king for the heavy defeat, but others do not; Strabo and Plutach disagree sharply on the issue.[16] Plutach even contradicts himself on whether the Armenian king's withdrawal of the cavalry, or Antony's decision to campaign during the winter season, was to blame for the expedition's failure.[7] Modern sources note Antony's poor management and planning.[2]
Again with Egyptian money,[citation needed] citing abandonment of the Romans in 36 after initially supporting them, Antony invaded Armenia in 34, capturing king Artavasdes and taking control of Armenia for a time.[10] On his return to Egypt, the equivalent of a Roman triumph was celebrated in the streets of Alexandria.[citation needed] At the end of the celebration, the whole city was summoned to hear a very important political statement,[citation needed] later known as the Donations of Alexandria, which effectively ended Antony's alliance with Octavian.[citation needed]
Parthian King Phraates IV was unable to follow up the victory because of a civil war from 32 BC to 25 BC. It began by a rebellion of Tiridates that was probably supported by aristocratic circles and the Romans.[17]
Among the prized possessions taken by Antony from Media Atropatene were the first Nisean horses in Rome. When Antony died, these horses fell into the hands of Augustus.[18]
Marcus Antonius, commonly known in English as Mark Antony, was a Roman politician and general who played a critical role in the transformation of the Roman Republic from a constitutional republic into the autocratic Roman Empire.
This article concerns the period 39 BC – 30 BC.
Alexander Helios was a Ptolemaic prince and son of Pharaoh Cleopatra VII of the Ptolemaic dynasty and Roman triumvir Mark Antony. Alexander's fraternal twin sister was Cleopatra Selene II. Cleopatra named her son after Alexander the Great. His second name in Ancient Greek means "Sun"; this was the counterpart of his twin sister's second name Selene (Σελήνη), meaning "Moon".
The Battle of Carrhae was fought in 53 BC between the Roman Republic and the Parthian Empire near the ancient town of Carrhae. An invading force of seven legions of Roman heavy infantry under Marcus Licinius Crassus was lured into the desert and decisively defeated by a mixed cavalry army of heavy cataphracts and light horse archers led by the Parthian general Surena. On such flat terrain, the Legion proved to have no viable tactics against the highly mobile Parthian horsemen, and the slow and vulnerable Roman formations were surrounded, exhausted by constant attacks, and eventually crushed. Crassus was killed along with the majority of his army. It is commonly seen as one of the earliest and most important battles between the Roman and Parthian Empires and one of the most crushing defeats in Roman history. According to the poet Ovid in Book 6 of his poem Fasti, the battle occurred on 9 June.
Phraates IV was King of Kings of the Parthian Empire from 37 to 2 BC. He was the son and successor of Orodes II, and was given the throne after the death of his brother Pacorus I. Phraates IV soon murdered all his brothers, and also possibly his father. His actions alienated the Armenians and also some of his nobles, including the distinguished Monaeses, who fled to the Roman triumvir Mark Antony, but shortly returned and reconciled with Phraates IV.
Orodes II, was King of Kings of the Parthian Empire from 57 BC to 37 BC. He was a son of Phraates III, whom he murdered in 57 BC, assisted by his elder brother Mithridates IV. The two brothers quickly fell out and entered into a dynastic struggle, in which Orodes was triumphant.
Artavasdes II, also known as Artavazd II, was king of Armenia from 55 BC to 34 BC. A member of the Artaxiad dynasty, he was the son and successor of Tigranes the Great, who ascended the throne of a still powerful and independent state. His mother was Cleopatra of Pontus, thus making his maternal grandfather the prominent King of Pontus Mithridates VI Eupator. Like his father, Artavasdes continued using the title of King of Kings, as seen from his coins.
Pacorus I was a Parthian prince, who was the son and heir of Orodes II. The numismatist David Sellwood deduced that Pacorus ruled in c. 39 BC. It is uncertain whether Pacorus ruled alongside his father, or ruled independently. His wife was an unnamed Armenian princess, who was a sister of the Artaxiad king of Armenia, Artavasdes II.
Artaxias II, also known as Artaxes II and Artashes was a prince of the Kingdom of Armenia, member of the Artaxiad dynasty and King of Armenia from 34 BC until 20 BC.
Antigonus II Mattathias, also known as Antigonus the Hasmonean was the last Hasmonean king of Judea. He was the son of King Aristobulus II of Judea. In 37 BCE Herod handed him over to the Romans for execution, after Antigonus's three-year reign during which he led the Jews' fierce struggle for independence against the Romans.
Polemon I Pythodoros was the Roman Client King of Cilicia, Pontus, Colchis and the Bosporan Kingdom. Polemon was the son and heir of Zenon and possibly Tryphaena. Zenon and Polemon adorned Laodicea with many dedicated offerings.
The Parthian Empire, also known as the Arsacid Empire, was a major Iranian political and cultural power centered in ancient Iran from 247 BC to 224 AD. Its latter name comes from its founder, Arsaces I, who led the Parni tribe in conquering the region of Parthia in Iran's northeast, then a satrapy (province) under Andragoras, who was rebelling against the Seleucid Empire. Mithridates I greatly expanded the empire by seizing Media and Mesopotamia from the Seleucids. At its height, the Parthian Empire stretched from the northern reaches of the Euphrates, in what is now central-eastern Turkey, to present-day Afghanistan and western Pakistan. The empire, located on the Silk Road trade route between the Roman Empire in the Mediterranean Basin and the Han dynasty of China, became a center of trade and commerce.
Quintus Labienus Parthicus was a Roman general in the Late Republic period. The son of Titus Labienus, he made an alliance with Parthia and invaded the Roman provinces in the eastern Mediterranean which were under the control of Mark Antony. He occupied the Roman province of Syria together with the Parthians in 40 BC. He then pushed into southern Anatolia, still with Parthian support. The main Parthian force took charge of Syria and invaded Judea. Both Labienus and the Parthians were defeated by Publius Ventidius Bassus, who recovered these provinces for Mark Antony.
The Roman–Parthian Wars were a series of conflicts between the Parthian Empire and the Roman Republic and Roman Empire. It was the first series of conflicts in what would be 682 years of Roman–Persian Wars.
Artavasdes I of Media Atropatene, also known as Artavasdes I of Atropatene and Artabazus, was a prince who served as a king of Media Atropatene. Artavasdes I was an enemy of King Artavasdes II of Armenia and his son Artaxias II. He was a contemporary with the Ptolemaic Greek Queen Cleopatra VII and Roman Triumvir Mark Antony, as Artavasdes I was mentioned in their diplomatic affairs.
Ariobarzanes II of Atropatene also known as Ariobarzanes of Media; Ariobarzanes of Armenia; Ariobarzanes II; Ariobarzanes II of Media Atropatene and Ariobarzanes was king of Media Atropatene who ruled sometime from 28 BC to 20 BC until 4 and was appointed by the Roman emperor Augustus to serve as a Roman client king of Armenia from 2 AD until 4.
Julius Caesar's planned invasion of the Parthian Empire was a planned war of the Roman Republic against the Parthian Empire. The assassination of Julius Caesar in 44 BC prevented the invasion from taking place.
Monaeses was a Parthian nobleman.
Antony's campaign against Armenia occurred in 34 BCE as retaliation for Armenian cavalry deserting Mark Antony against Parthia. Antony thus set out to conquer Armenia.
Augustus' Eastern policy represents the political-strategic framework of the eastern imperial borders of the Roman Empire at the time of Augustus' principate, following the occupation of Egypt at the end of the civil war between Octavian and Mark Antony.
1 2 3 Strauss, Barry (22 March 2022). The War That Made the Roman Empire: Antony, Cleopatra, and Octavian at Actium. Simon and Schuster. pp.72–74. ISBN978-1-9821-1667-5.
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