Battle of Arkansas Post (1863)

This article is about the Civil War battle. For the American Revolutionary War battle, see Battle of Arkansas Post (1783).

Battle of Arkansas Post
Part of the American Civil War
The Bombardment and Capture of Fort Hindman, Arkansas Post, Ark. Jany. 11th 1863 by Currier & Ives
Date January 9–11, 1863 Location Arkansas Post, Arkansas 34°01′00″N91°20′43″W / 34.01667°N 91.34528°W / 34.01667; -91.34528 Result Union victory
Belligerents
United States (Union)	Confederate States
Commanders and leaders
John A. McClernand David D. Porter	Thomas J. Churchill
Units involved
Army of the Mississippi Mississippi Squadron	Garrison of Fort Hindman
Strength
~30,000	~5,000
Casualties and losses
1,092	60 killed ~80 wounded 4,791 captured
Arkansas Post class=notpageimage| Location within Arkansas

The Battle of Arkansas Post, also known as Battle of Fort Hindman, was fought from January 9 to 11, 1863, along the Arkansas River at Arkansas Post, Arkansas, as part of the Vicksburg campaign of the American Civil War. Confederate forces had constructed a fort known as Fort Hindman near Arkansas Post in late 1862. Also in late 1862, Major General John A. McClernand of the Union Army was authorized to recruit troops in the midwest in preparation for an expedition down the Mississippi River against Vicksburg, Mississippi. Union Major General Ulysses S. Grant began an overland campaign against Vicksburg along the Mississippi Central Railroad in November. Grant and Major General Henry Halleck did not trust McClernand, and machinated start the riverine movement south against Vicksburg under the command of Major General William T. Sherman before McClernand could arrive. Sherman's movement was defeated in the Battle of Chickasaw Bayou in late December, and Confederate cavalry raids forced Grant to abandon his overland campaign.

McClernand arrived at Memphis, Tennessee, in late December and found that Sherman had left without him. McClernand moved downriver, joined Sherman's force, and took command in early January 1863, calling it the Army of the Mississippi. Both Sherman and McClernand had independently come to the conclusion that Arkansas Post should be attacked. The Union Navy's contribution to the operation was commanded by David Dixon Porter. Porter's fleet and McClernand's troops moved upriver towards the Arkansas River, but entered the White River first as a diversion. After moving through a cutoff connecting the two rivers, the waterborne expedition entered the Arkansas River and began unloading troops downriver from the fort late on January 9. The next day, some of Porter's warships bombarded the fort, while McClernand's troops on land maneuvered into position. At 1:00 pm on January 11, Porter's warships began another bombardment of the fort, and McClernand's troops attacked the Confederate positions, which consisted of the fort and a line of rifle pits extended west to a bayou.

While McClernand's attack was repulsed, white flags of surrender began to appear over parts of the Confederate line in uncertain circumstances. Confusion ensued, and Union troops moved up close to and swamped parts of the Confederate line. The Confederate commander, Brigadier General Thomas J. Churchill, agreed to surrender. When Grant learned of the operation against Arkansas Post, he disapproved and ordered McClernand back to the Mississippi River, although Grant was later convinced of the wisdom of the operation. Having received permission from Halleck to do so, Grant relieved McClernand of command of the operations against Vicksburg on January 30 and took command of the campaign against the city personally. In April and May, Grant's army crossed the Mississippi River downriver from Vicksburg and won a series of battles. The Confederate forces withdrew into the Vicksburg defenses in mid-May. The Siege of Vicksburg ended with a Confederate surrender on July 4, 1863; this was a key event in the outcome of the war.

Background

Initial Union plans and operations

Early in the American Civil War, the Union military leadership developed the Anaconda Plan, which was a strategy to defeat the Confederate States of America by controlling its coastline and major rivers. A significant component of this strategy was controlling the Mississippi River. ^[1] Much of the Mississippi Valley fell under Union control in early 1862 after the capture of New Orleans, Louisiana, and several land victories. ^[2] The strategically important city of Vicksburg, Mississippi, was still in Confederate hands, and it served as a strong defensive position that commanded the river and prevented the Union from separating the two halves of the Confederacy. ^[3] Union Navy elements were sent upriver from New Orleans in May to try to take the city, a move that was unsuccessful. ^[4] In late June, a joint army–navy expedition returned to make another campaign against Vicksburg. ^[5] Union Navy leadership decided that the city could not be taken without more infantry, who were not forthcoming. An attempt to construct Williams's Canal across a meander of the river in June and July, bypassing Vicksburg, failed. ^{[6] [7]}

On November 26, Union Major General Ulysses S. Grant began an overland movement through the state of Mississippi down the Mississippi Central Railroad with 40,000 men in an campaign to capture Vicksburg. ^[8] In September, Major General John A. McClernand, had discussed with President Abraham Lincoln about a campaign down the Mississippi River to take control of the river, as McClernand (a former politician turned military officer) believed that Confederate control of the river was dampening support for the war in the Old Northwest. Despite some hesitancy from high ranking Union military and political figures about McClernand's suitability for an independent command, an arrangement was reached where McClernand was permitted to recruit soldiers in the midwest and then take this force downriver to operate against Vicksburg, Mississippi. ^[9]

However, Major General Henry Halleck, who distrusted McClernand, used language in the official orders the latter had received to undercut him: McClernand could only use troops not required by Grant or Halleck elsewhere. ^[10] Halleck transferred McClernand's newly recruited troops to Memphis, Tennessee, or Helena, Arkansas, as they entered service. ^[11] On December 5, Halleck suggested to Grant a naval operation down the Mississippi River against Vicksburg, using a portion of Grant's force. At that time, Grant was also growing concerned about the length of his supply line in Mississippi, as well as the condition of the roads that further movement by his column would be using. Halleck had informed him that the downriver movement had the support of the president, and Grant assumed that McClernand, who Grant had a low opinion of, would command the movement. ^[12] Grant decided to take control of McClernand's accumulated troops, and place them under the command of Major General William T. Sherman, who was to lead them on a riverine expedition down the Mississippi River to Vicksburg. Sherman had command of over 30,000 men, drawn from Memphis and Helena, ^[13] and from one division Sherman took from Grant's main column. ^[14] After Sherman reached Memphis on December 12, Halleck informed Grant that his army was to be split into four corps, and that McClernand was to command the movement downriver. Grant, in turn, knowing that Sherman was expected to begin the expedition in a matter of days, sent McClernand a letter (intentionally eschewing faster telegraph service) authorizing him to take command of the force moving downriver. ^[14] This message was not received because of Confederate cavalry raids in western Tennessee. ^[15]

Acting Rear Admiral David D. Porter was in command of the Union Navy portion of the riverine movement towards Vicksburg. ^[16] Sherman's men left Memphis on December 20. ^[8] McClernand was still in Illinois and the movement he had intended to command left without him. ^[17] McClernand received communication from Halleck on December 21 confirming that he was intended to command the downriver expedition, but he believed that he was required to remain in Illinois according to his orders. Telegraphic communications with United States Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, who was not aware of Halleck's machinations against McClernand, cleared up the confusion. ^[18] After getting married on December 26, McClernand continued downriver and reached Memphis on December 28, where he learned that Sherman had left without him. Communications with Grant resulted in McClernand receiving orders the next day to command the downriver expedition. ^[19]

The same day that Sherman left, Confederate cavalry raids destroyed Grant's supply lines, and he was forced to retreat. ^[8] Sherman's operation, which contained over 30,000 men, reached the Vicksburg area on Christmas Eve, and sailed up the Yazoo River. After landing on December 26 and 27, the Union soldiers made a frontal attack against Confederate defenses at Chickasaw Bayou on December 29, but were repulsed with heavy losses in the Battle of Chickasaw Bayou. Defeated, Sherman's men re-boarded their ships on January 1, 1863, and withdrew from the battlefield. ^[20]

Confederate preparations

Map and plan of the fortification

Control of the Arkansas River Valley was vital for the Confederate defense of Arkansas and the Indian Territory. ^[21] As late as September 1862, Confederate defenses on the Arkansas and White rivers were minimal. On September 28, Colonel John W. Dunnington, a former officer in the Confederate States Navy, was appointed commander of river defenses within the state. Dunnington selected a location for a fortification on the Arkansas River near the settlement of Arkansas Post. ^[22] The fort was located 0.25 miles (400 m) north of the village, at a point commanding the river on a hairpin curve. ^{[23] [24]}

Known by both the names Fort Hindman and the Post of Arkansas, the fortification was square-shaped, with sides 100 yards (91 m) long, surrounded by a ditch that was 20 feet (6.1 m) wide and 8 feet (2.4 m) deep. Behind the parapet, behind which was a firing step. The fort had four bastions, each of which had emplacements for three cannons; another cannon was on the north side curtain wall of the fortification. The southern side of the northeastern bastion included a 18 feet (5.5 m) by 15 feet (4.6 m) casemate, one side of which was the parapet wall. Its walls and roof were composed of three layers of 14-inch (36 cm) timber; the roof was additionally protected by iron sheets nearly 1 inch (2.5 cm) thick. To cover the river approaches to the fort, a 9-inch (23 cm) Columbiad cannon was position in the northeastern bastion's casemate, and another in the southeastern bastion. An 8-inch (20 cm) Columbiad was mounted in another casement in the fort's southern curtain wall, which overlooked the river. Eight other cannons –four 10-pounder Parrott rifles and two 6-pounder smoothbore cannons –were distributed among the bastions. Three buildings, two magazines, and a well were located in the fort. The columbiads were originally from the ram CSS Pontchartrain. ^[25] From the northwest bastion, a line of rifle pits ran 720 yd (660 m) west to Post Bayou. ^[26] The position was strengthened by obstructions placed in the river. Construction on another line of rifle pits 2 miles (3.2 km) downriver from the fort was begun, with another tier of rifle pits between the outer line and the fort. ^[27] Many of the men assigned to defend the fort were concerned that it was poorly sited. ^[28] In November, Union troops from Helena attempted to raid the fort site, but the attempt was foiled by flooding along the riverbanks. ^[29] On December 10, Brigadier General Thomas J. Churchill was appointed to command the post. ^[30]

Prelude

Further information: Battle of Arkansas Post order of battle: Union and Battle of Arkansas Post order of battle: Confederate

Operations against Vicksburg, including the Arkansas Post Expedition

  Confederate

  Union

When Sherman reached the Mississippi from the Yazoo, he met McClernand, who was upset about being sidestepped in command of the river expedition. After a discussion between the two officers, McClernand took command of the force, naming it the Army of the Mississippi, with Sherman becoming a subordinate commander in the army. ^[31] Sherman did not approve of McClernand's appointment to command and in a letter to his wife stated that Lincoln "will get his fill before he is done". ^[32] In late December, Confederate troops had captured the Union supply steamer Blue Wing8 miles (13 km) downriver from Napoleon, Arkansas, and sent it back to Arkansas Post. ^[33] Sherman heard of the raid, and believed that more raids from the position at Arkansas Post were likely. Viewing Arkansas Post as a threat and believing that a victory would restore his men's broken morale, ^[34] Sherman began planning a movement against the Confederate position. He believed that the fort could be easily captured from its land-facing side. ^[35]

On December 30, while traveling downriver from Memphis to join the expedition against Vicksburg, McClernand met with Brigadier General Willis Gorman at Helena. McClernand and Gorman discussed the military situation at Helena, which had been stripped of troops for Sherman's operation, and the Confederate presence at Arkansas Post. Sherman and McClernand had separately come to the conclusion that the Confederate position at Arkansas Post should be reduced. Separately, McClernand had also decided on a movement on Arkansas Post. ^[36] On the night of January 3/4, the two officers went to speak with Porter about using his naval vessels in the movement. Porter disliked McClernand and his treatment of Sherman, but agreed to the movement for Sherman. ^[35] Writing about Sherman's support for the plan, Richard L. Kiper wrote that his motives were "somewhat suspect" and likely based on desiring a victory to restore the damage his reputation had taken from Chickasaw Bayou. ^[37] McClernand informed Union Major General Samuel R. Curtis of the plan, as the operation would occur within Curtis's area of command. ^[38]

During this time, McClernand believed that he was an army commander, while he really only held a corps command under Grant. ^[39] On January 4, McClernand organized his command into two corps. Sherman commanded the Second Corps, while the First Corps was under Brigadier General George W. Morgan, ^[40] whom Sherman blamed for the defeat at Chickasaw Bayou. ^[41] Morgan's corps had been officially designated as the XIII Corps and Sherman's as the XV Corps by orders of December 18, but they were not organized as such at the time of McClernand's reorganization. ^[42] Both corps had two divisions: the XIII Corps had those of Brigadier Generals Andrew J. Smith and Peter J. Osterhaus, while the XV Corps's two were commanded by Brigadier Generals Frederick Steele and David Stuart. ^[41] Meanwhile, Churchill had about 5,000 Confederates at Arkansas Post. These men were largely dismounted cavalrymen from Arkansas and Texas, although only about 3,000 were healthy enough to fight due to outbreaks of disease. Most were armed with short-range carbines and shotguns as opposed to longer-range rifles. ^[24] Churchill's command was divided into three brigades, commanded by Colonels Dunnington, Robert Garland, and James Deshler. ^[43]

Battle

January 9 and 10

McClernand's force, which consisted of about 30,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry as well as 40 cannons, ^[44] for a total strength of 31,753. ^[45] The army began moving upriver on January 5. ^[46] In order to keep the element of surprise, ^[47] the Union fleet entered the White River instead of the Arkansas, before using a connecting cutoff between the two rivers to move back into the Arkansas. ^[48] The infantrymen were moved on transport vessels, with warships in support. ^[49] Three of the supporting warships were ironclads: USS Baron DeKalb, USS Louisville, and USS Cincinnati. ^[50] On the afternoon of January 9, Churchill was informed of the approaching Union fleet. Sending out his small cavalry force as scouts, he ordered his men to defend the outer set of incomplete rifle pits, which were still incomplete. As it was believed that the Union troops already heavily occupied the area of the lower rifle pits, the orders were changed to hold the inner line of rifle pits, closer to the fort. A force of Texans from Garland's brigade was sent forward as skirmishers, and the six cannons of Hart's Arkansas Battery were positioned on the right flank of the line of rifle pits, near the river. ^[51]

Beginning at 4:00 pm ^[52] or 5:00 pm on January 9, Sherman's men were offloaded from their transports about 3 (4.8) from Arkansas Post, at the Notrebe plantation. ^[53] As not all of the transports arrived before nightfall, part of Sherman's troops could not be landed until the next morning; Sherman's men finished the landing process by 11:00 am on January 10. ^[54] That evening, Porter learned of the obstructions placed in the river from an invidual in a boat in the river who was picked up by the Union troops. ^[50] Morgan's transports halted at a landing on the opposite side of the river, 9 miles (14 km) downriver from Notrebe's, to offload Colonel Daniel Lindsey's brigade. ^[55] On the morning on January 10, Lindsey's troops landed ashore, along with some 10-pounder Parrott rifles from the Chicago Mercantile Battery. These troops used a road to move across the base of the peninsula formed by the curve in the river, and took up a position upstream from the fort to prevent the Confederates from reinforcing the fort via the river. ^[54]

McClernand and his staff went ashore early on January 10 to conduct a reconnaisance of the river road. At 8:00 that morning, the gunboat USS Black Hawk and the tinclad USS Rattler moved upstream and bombarded the Confederate rifle pits. Churchill ordered Hart's battery to hold its fire, thinking the three heavy guns at the fort could handle the Union vessels, but issues with bad gunpowder prevent the guns in the fort from firing far enough to hit Black Hawk and Rattler. ^[56] McClernand ordered Sherman to move to the northwest and try to get around the Confederate fort and into its rear, but he later decided that the river road was also a feasible approach route. ^[57] Sherman and Steele's division began the movement around the fort, guided by escaped slaves, ^[58] while Stuart's division advanced directly along the river road. ^[59] At around 1:00 pm, the rest of Morgan's corps landed on the same side of the river as Sherman's men, at a place known as Muldin's below Notrebe's. ^[60] Steele's flanking column was blocked by swampy ground and a bayou, and the division was withdrawn to rejoin Stuart. ^[61] The flanking column returned to Notrebe's around the same time that Morgan's corps reached it. ^[60]

Naval bombardment of Arkansas Post

Around 2 p.m., Churchill learned of Sherman's flanking maneuver and decided to withdraw his forces from the rifle pits. The Confederate rear guard was formed from the previously-deployed skirmishers and a portion of the 10th Texas Infantry Regiment. Colonel Giles Smith's brigade of Stuart's division pushed forward after the Confederates, led by the 6th Missouri Infantry Regiment and the 8th Missouri Infantry Regiment as skirmishers. The two Union regiments pushed forward until they came under fire from the fort. ^[62] After a reconnaisance, Stuart shifted his line to the right, so that it ran 0.75 miles (1.21 km) from the river to the Little Rock road. Two regiments from Colonel T. Kilby Smith's brigade were sent to support Stuart's skirmishers; the skirmishers approached the fort and came under heavy fire which resulted in seventeen casualties. The 57th Ohio Infantry Regiment was sent to the right to scout the area around Post Bayou. ^[63]

Morgan's men advanced with A. J. Smith's division in the front and Osterhaus's to the rear. While Stuart's men shifted right, A. J. Smith's filled in the space to the left by the river. ^[64] McClernand had told Porter that his men would be ready to attack at 2 pm. At 5:30 pm., McClernand told Porter that his men were finally ready, and the Union vessels advanced towards the fort to bombard it. The three ironclads moved in to close range and were each assigned one of the heavy Confederate guns. The timberclad Lexington and Black Hawk provided supporting fire. ^[65] The shooting from the naval vessels killed most of the horses within the Confederate position, ^[47] but there were few human casualties. The bombardment ceased at around 7:30 pm. Porter tried to slip Rattler upriver to bombard the fort from behind, but the tinclad came under heavy fire. Rattler also fouled on the obstructions in the river, and withdrew back to the main fleet, ^[66] having been damaged. The Confederate batteries had been silenced, but it was too dark to accomplish anything further and McClernand did not attack. ^[67] Baron DeKalb suffered seventeen casualties, with another eleven on Louisville. ^[68]

Churchill was informed by Lieutenant General Theophilus Holmes that he was expected to "hold out till help arrived or all dead". ^[49] Holmes vacillated and originally denied reinforcements, but then stated that he would send some. ^[69] On January 9, Churchill had sent a message to the commander of the Confederate garrison at St. Charles requesting reinforcements. This request resulted in a company of Texans reaching the Confederate position on the night of January 10. Further reinforcements were on their way in the form of nearly 200 men from the 24th Arkansas Infantry Regiment. ^[70] Churchill made his troops dispositions to receive the expected Union attack. The fort itself was defended by a portion of the 19th Arkansas Infantry Regiment, a battalion of Arkansas infantry, and a detachment of sailors from Pontchartrain, all under the command of Dunnington. ^[71] The rifle pits from the fort to Post Bayou were defended by the rest of the 19th Arkansas Infantry on the right, then Garland's brigade, and Deshler's on the left. ^[72] A gap remained between Deshler's line and Post Bayou. The Confederates spent the night strengthening their defenses, and Deshler ordered the razing of huts in front of his line that had previously been used as housing by Confederate troops. ^[73] Churchill spoke to his men, and told them "gentlemen, the fight will commence in a very short time, and we must win it or die in the ditches". ^[74] Earlier in the day, McClernand had sent a detachment of Illinois cavalry to scout the Post Bayou area. ^{[75] [a]} In response to the information from the scouting party, McClernand order Steele's division moved from its camp in the Union rear to form on the right of Stuart's line. ^{[78] [76]}

January 11

A map of the battle

On the morning of January 11, Steele ordered Brigadier General Charles E. Hovey to advance his brigade. This threatened the gap between Deshler's flank and the bayou, so Deshler drew detachments from all of his regiments and arrayed the combined detachments as a unit of skirmishers in the gap. ^[78] In response to the movement, Churchill ordered about 120 soldiers from Texas and Louisiana to guard the line of the bayou from Deshler's left down to the Arkansas River. He also pulled troops from the right of the rifle pits line to support Deshler, and sent four guns from Hart's battery to Deshler as well. Further positional adjustments were made by Sherman's corps that morning. One of Steele's brigades, commanded by Brigadier General John M. Thayer. ^[79] Brigadier General Francis P. Blair Jr.'s brigade had taken heavy casualties at Chickasaw Bayou and was held in reserve. Stuart advanced Giles Smith's brigade to the left of Thayer's brigade, with T. Kilby Smith's brigade to the rear. ^[80]

At these dispositions had been made, Sherman informed McClernand that his troops were ready for the assault. However, there were delays in getting Morgan's lines established and for the navy to finish its preparations. ^[81] A. J. Smith deployed Brigadier General Stephen G. Burbridge's brigade in two lines to the left of Stuart's division, while Colonel William J. Landrams brigade was deployed in three lines to the left and rear of Burbridge. ^[82] The decision to deploy only one brigade on the front line was necessitated by a lack of space. ^[83] Between Landram's brigade and the river was the brigade of Colonel Lionel A. Sheldon, from Osterhaus's division. This was the only one of Osterhaus's brigades in line, as one brigade had been left to guard the transports and Lindsey was on the other side of the river. ^[84] Porter's warships were to open fire on the Confederates as the signal for the attack, which would be followed by a bombardment by Sherman's artillery. Once Sherman's guns ceased firing, the assault was to begin. At 1 pm, Porter's ships moved towards the fort to again bombard it. ^[81] Porter had ordered the sides of his ships to be coated in "tallow or slush" to help deflect cannon shots. ^[85]

Map of Arkansas Post Battlefield core and study areas by the American Battlefield Protection Program

The three Union ironclads, supported by Lexington, Rattler, and the tinclad USS Glide, fired from the river, while the Union cannons on land joined in as well. From across the river, the two guns of the Chicago Mercantile Battery opened fire, along with two 20-pounder Parrott rifles from the 1st Wisconsin Battery that had been sent to join Lindsey the day before. ^[86] Cincinnati fired 100 shots, Louisville 212, and Baron DeKalb 158, with the latter ironclad being the most effective. ^[87] The fire silenced all of the Confederate guns in the fort except for the one facing the land side. ^[88] Porter then sent Rattler, Glide, and the ram USS Monarch upriver past the fort to cut off the Confederates' path of retreat. Monarch was stopped by low water, but the two tinclads were able to continue further and destroy a ferry. ^[89] The Union land artillery had orders to fire for thirty minutes after the naval bombardment opened, which was to be followed by an infantry attack three minutes after thirty-minute firing interval. ^[90] When the infantry attack began, the men were ordered to yell loudly, so that the naval vessels would hear the noise and know to shift their fire to prevent friendly fire. ^[91] Morgan could observe the progress of the gunboats, while Sherman had to judge by sound. With the Confederates not firing in response to his cannonade, Sherman cut his cannon fire off early and sent his infantry in for the assault. ^[92] The historian Timothy B. Smith estimates that Sherman's guns only fired for about fifteen minutes. ^[93]

When Hovey's brigade attacked, it came under fire from Confederates on the other side of Post Bayou. To counter this threat, the 17th Missouri Infantry Regiment was aligned along Post Bayou. Fire from Deshler's Confederates and two 10-pounder Parrott rifles from Hart's battery halted the Union attack until the 76th Ohio Infantry Regiment moved up and drove the Confederate cannon crews off. Hovey suffered an arm wound but remained on the field. ^[94] To the left, Thayer's brigade was repulsed by the 10th Texas Infantry. Hovey in turn had the 3d Missouri Infantry Regiment and the 31st Iowa Infantry Regiment attack the 15th Texas Cavalry Regiment (dismounted), but they were also repulsed. Deshler sent a portion of the 19th Arkansas to support the Texans, but a game still remained between the Texans and the Arkansans. ^[95] The transfer of the 19th Arkansas required Garland to stretch his line to fill the space formerly occupied by the Arkansans. ^[96] Two further attacks by the 3rd Missouri Infantry and the 31st Iowa Infantry were repulsed. In Stuart's sector, Giles Smith's brigade came under heavy enfilade fire from Hart's battery, and men had to crawl forward to a wooded position to fire into the battery and silence it. T. Kilby Smith's brigade aligned on Giles Smith's left and two artillery batteries were brought forward. The two brigades were then held in preparation for a general storming of the Confederate works. To counter the attacks against his line, Deshler requested reinforcements, and was granted parts of three Texas cavalry units from Garland's brigade, as Garland's line had not been seriously tested yet. ^[97]

Across the Little Rock road, Morgan's corps began its advance, as the Union assault began brigade-by-brigade from right to left. Burbridge's brigade moved first. Confederate soldiers fired upon the brigade from a group of huts, but were cleared by an attack of the 23rd Wisconsin Infantry Regiment. The brigade's attack came to a halt 200 yards (180 m) from the Confederate line. ^[98] Landram's brigade was brought up in support, and the two brigades fought Garland's men for an hour and a half. After this, at 3 pm, Osterhaus sent Sheldon's brigade into the fray, and the Confederate defenders were driven from the parapet of the fort. ^[99] The 120th Ohio Infantry Regiment attempted to storm the fort, but became pinned down in a ravine by Confederate fire, where it remained for an hour. ^[100]

Brigadier General Stephen G. Burbridge planting the Union flag after the capture of the post. The drawing was made by an embedded illustrator accompanying Burbridge's staff.

The Confederates had repulsed all of the Union assaults to that point, and it was approaching nightfall. ^[102] The 24th Arkansas Infantry had arrived, but the Confederates had received no other reinforcements. At around 4:30 pm, white flags of surrender began to fly from the fort. ^[103] The Union troops were preparing for a final assault at this time. Garland noticed white flags flying among his troops, and heard rumors that Churchill had ordered the surrender, but Garland did not believe them. ^[104] Morgan noted that at various times, white flags were raised and then suppressed along the Confederate lines. The historian Timothy B. Smith suggests that it is possible that fire from Porter's ships and Lindsey's artillery striking the rear of the Confederate lines prompted the raising of the surrender flags. The end result of this all was significant battlefield confusion. ^[105] Some of Morgan's troops advanced towards the Confederate lines, seeing the flags of surrender, but were fired on by Confederate troops who had not surrendered. ^[106] Churchill denied ordering a capitulation. ^[47]

As the white flags continued to fly, Union troops moved forward and mingled in the rifle pits with Garland's troops. Seeing the white flags, Sherman ordered Steele to stop fighting and moved to the Confederate position, where he ordered Garland to have his brigade stack arms. In turn, A. J. Smith had Burbridge advance to the fort to personally plant a flag. Confederate soldiers insisted to Burbridge that the fort had not surrendered, but Burbridge pointed out the white flags to them. ^[107] Burbridge met with Churchill and Dunnington, who agreed that surrender was the only practical course of action for the Confederates. Churchill personally surrendered to McClernand. ^[108] The former naval officer Dunnington would only surrender to Porter. ^[106] Deshler did not believe that a surrender had occurred, and interpreted the white flags as faded company flags. His men kept fighting until Union troops presented a flag of truce. During the truce, Deshler discussed with Steele and informed him that he intended to keep fighting. Steele informed Sherman of this development, who sent Churchill to talk with Deshler. Eventually, Deshler agreed to surrender after Sherman pointed out that his line had been swamped with Union soldiers. ^[109]

Aftermath

When the surrender was completed, 4,791 Confederates had been captured. Confederate casualty records are incomplete, ^[110] but a listing of casualties provided by the historian Ed Bearss indicates sixty killed, seventy-three wounded, and eighty missing. ^[111] The historian Richard L. Kiper has non-prisoner Confederate losses at sixty killed and between seventy-five and eighty wounded. ^[112] The historian Michael B. Ballard places Confederate battle losses as sixty killed and eighty wounded. ^[113] McClernand reported capturing 17 cannons, 3,000 stands of infantry weapons, and additional equipment. The men lost at Arkansas Post amounted to about a third ^[114] or fourth of the Confederate soldiers then in Arkansas. ^[47] Additionally, seven Confederate cannons were destroyed during the battle. ^[110] A few hundred men had managed to escape back to Holmes. ^[115] Union losses were 1,092 men. ^[115] McClernand's force had suffered 1,061 casualties, and Porter 31; ^[116] the breakdown of McClernand's casualties were 134 killed, 898 wounded, and 29 missing. The majority of these casualties were suffered by the brigades of Burbridge and Hovey. ^[110] Burbridge alone took 349 casualties. ^[117] Some of the materials lost with Blue Wing were recaptured. ^[110]

"Glorious! Glorious! My star is ever in the ascendant."

John A. McClernand responding to the victory ^[118]

Of the reinforcements sent by Holmes to relieve Arkansas Post, one brigade learned of the fall of the fort when it reached Brownsville, while Major General John G. Walker's Texas Division reached as close as 25 miles (40 km) of the fort on January 12, when it learned of the surrender. ^[119] On January 12, McClernand ordered the remains of the Confederate fort to be destroyed. ^[120] When Grant learned of McClernand's expedition to Arkansas Post, he became angry and wrote to Halleck on January 11, describing the movement as a "wild-goose chase". ^[121] Grant viewed the Arkansas Post operation as diverting troops away from more important operations to an objective of lesser strategic significance. ^[122] That same day, ^[123] Grant ordered McClernand back to the Vicksburg area. ^[124] On January 12, Halleck gave Grant permission to relieve McClernand and take personal command of the operations against Vicksburg. ^[123] Also on January 12, McClernand's Army of the Mississippi ceased to exist, and Sherman's corps became the XV Corps of the Army of the Tennessee; Morgan's corps became that army's XIII Corps two days later. ^[125]

On January 14, in a meeting with Sherman and Porter, McClernand proposed moving up the Arkansas River and striking against the Confederate force at Brownsville. However, McClernand developed doubts about the feasibility of this plan, as the water level in the Arkansas River was falling. That same day, McClernand received Grant's order to return to the Mississippi River. ^[122] McClernand's two corps reached Napoleon on January 16, traveling through bad winter weather. Grant also traveled to Napoleon, ^[126] where he met with Porter and Sherman on January 18. ^[127] Grant sent McClernand and his troops further down the Mississippi River, while he returned to Memphis. ^[128] Porter and Sherman were able to convince Grant of the military value of the Arkansas Post expedition. Grant later noted that the Confederate force at Arkansas Post could have proved problematic if left untended. ^[118] On January 26, Grant moved downriver to the Vicksburg area, where he joined McClernand's camp. A spat between Grant and McClernand arose on January 30, after Grant issued orders changing the position of one of McClernand's units. McClernand responded with an insubordinate letter. ^[129] That day, Grant used his authorization from Halleck to relieve McClernand from command of the operations against Vicksburg, and Grant took command of the campaign. McClernand reverted to commander of XIII Corps the next day. ^[130]

After a series of canal- and bayou-related operations failed, Grant was faced with a choice between three options: a direct amphibious assault against Vicksburg from across the Mississippi River, a withdrawal to Memphis in preparation for another overland campaign, and to move further down the Mississippi River and cross the river below Vicksburg. Grant chose the latter option. ^[131] Grant wanted to cross his army at Grand Gulf, Mississippi, but on April 29, Porter's warships were unable to silence Confederate batteries there in the Battle of Grand Gulf. Grant instead crossed his army further downriver at Bruinsburg, Mississippi, on April 30 and May 1. Grant's troops won the Battle of Port Gibson on May 1, the Battle of Raymond on May 12, and the Battle of Jackson on May 14. ^[132] Confederate Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton's army was badly mauled by Grant's at the Battle of Champion Hill on May 16, and Grant won another victory at the Battle of Big Black River Bridge the next day. The Confederates withdrew into the defenses of Vicksburg, and repulsed Union assaults on May 19 and 22. After the failure of these assaults, Grant's army began siege operations against the city. ^[133] Running low on supplies, Pemberton surrendered his army on July 4. The fall of the city marked one of the key events of the war. ^[134]

Part of the Arkansas Post battlefield is located within Arkansas Post National Memorial, although 360 acres (150 ha) have been submerged due to river course changes and the construction of the Arkansas Post Canal. ^[135] The remains of the fort were washed away by the river as early as 1880. ^[136]

See also

• American Civil War portal
• Arkansas portal

• Arkansas in the American Civil War
• List of American Civil War battles
• Trans-Mississippi Theater of the American Civil War
• Troop engagements of the American Civil War, 1863

Notes

1. The historian Richard L. Kiper states that the scouting party determined that Post Bayou could not easily be crossed, although Kiper notes that Morgan claimed after the battle that he deemed Post Bayou to be easily crossable. ^[76] The historian Ed Bearss instead states that the scouts reported that Post Bayou was only 18 inches (46 cm) deep, had several good crossings, and that the commander of the scouting party informed Sherman that troops placed on the far side of Post Bayou could enfilade the Confederate rifle pits. ^[77]

References

Citations

1. Miller 2019, pp. 6–7.
2. Miller 2019, pp. 117–118.
3. Bearss 2007, p. 203.
4. Shea & Winschel 2003, pp. 15–16, 18–20.
5. Miller 2019, pp. 135–138.
6. Miller 2019, p. 153.
7. "Grant's Canal". National Park Service. October 25, 2018. Archived from the original on October 31, 2022. Retrieved December 26, 2020.
8. Winschel 1998, p. 154.
9. Bearss 1985, pp. 26–27.
10. Miller 2019, pp. 195–196.
11. Bearss 1985, p. 28.
12. Miller 2019, p. 220–221.
13. Shea & Winschel 2003, p. 41.
14. Miller 2019, p. 222.
15. Kiper 1999, p. 154.
16. Miller 2019, p. 236.
17. Shea & Winschel 2003, p. 43.
18. Bearss 1985, pp. 28, 358–359.
19. Bearss 1985, p. 359.
20. Winschel 1998, pp. 154, 156.
21. Christ 2010, p. 5.
22. Bearss 1985, p. 349–350.
23. House 1998, p. 6.
24. Shea & Winschel 2003, p. 56.
25. Bearss 1985, pp. 350–351.
26. Bearss 1985, p. 351.
27. Christ 2010, p. 40.
28. Christ 2010, pp. 40–41.
29. Christ 2010, pp. 41–42.
30. Christ 2010, p. 44.
31. Miller 2019, pp. 256–257.
32. Kiper 1997, p. 62.
33. Bearss 1985, p. 355.
34. Miller 2019, p. 257.
35. Bearss 1985, p. 361.
36. Bearss 1985, pp. 360–361.
37. Kiper 1997, p. 63.
38. Ballard 2004, p. 149.
39. Shea & Winschel 2003, pp. 55–56.
40. Welcher 1993, p. 857.
41. Bearss 1985, p. 363.
42. Welcher 1993, pp. 857–858.
43. Chatelain 2020, p. 210.
44. Christ 2010, p. 52.
45. Kiper 1999, p. 161.
46. Bearss 1985, p. 63.
47. Christ 2024.
48. Christ 2010, p. 51.
49. Chatelain 2020, p. 211.
50. Smith 2023, p. 46.
51. Bearss 1985, pp. 363–364.
52. Kiper 1999, p. 170.
53. Bearss 1985, p. 365.
54. Bearss 1985, p. 366.
55. Christ 2010, pp. 54–55.
56. Bearss 1985, pp. 211, 366.
57. Bearss 1985, pp. 366–367.
58. Christ 2010, p. 55.
59. Bearss 1985, p. 367.
60. Bearss 1985, p. 369.
61. Smith 2023, p. 47.
62. Bearss 1985, p. 368.
63. Bearss 1985, pp. 368–369.
64. Bearss 1985, pp. 369–370.
65. Bearss 1985, pp. 139, 371.
66. Christ 2010, pp. 60–61.
67. Bearss 1985, p. 371.
68. Christ 2010, p. 61.
69. Shea & Winschel 2003, pp. 56–57.
70. Bearss 1985, p. 373.
71. Bearss 1985, p. 372.
72. Christ 2010, p. 63.
73. Bearss 1985, pp. 372–373.
74. Smith 2023, p. 53.
75. Bearss 1985, p. 370.
76. Kiper 1999, p. 172.
77. Bearss 1985, p. 370–371.
78. Bearss 1985, p. 374.
79. Bearss 1985, p. 375.
80. Smith 2023, p. 60.
81. Smith 2023, pp. 60–61.
82. Bearss 1985, pp. 377–378.
83. Smith 2023, p. 67.
84. Bearss 1985, p. 378.
85. Christ 2010, p. 67.
86. Bearss 1985, pp. 370, 379.
87. Smith 2023, pp. 57–58.
88. Smith 2023, p. 59.
89. Christ 2010, pp. 68–69.
90. Bearss 1985.
91. Kiper 1997, p. 72.
92. Bearss 1985, p. 380.
93. Smith 2023, p. 61.
94. Bearss 1985, pp. 380–381.
95. Bearss 1985, p. 381.
96. Smith 2023, p. 56.
97. Bearss 1985, pp. 381–383.
98. Bearss 1985, p. 383.
99. Bearss 1985, p. 401.
100. Bearss 1985, pp. 401–402.
101. Christ 2010, p. 78.
102. Smith 2023, p. 72.
103. Bearss 1985, pp. 379, 402.
104. Christ 2010, pp. 76–77.
105. Smith 2023, p. 74.
106. Christ 2010, p. 77.
107. Bearss 1985, pp. 402–403.
108. Smith 2023, p. 75.
109. Bearss 1985, pp. 404–405.
110. Bearss 1985, p. 405.
111. Bearss 1985, p. 419.
112. Kiper 1999, p. 174.
113. Ballard 2004, p. 153.
114. Chatelain 2020, p. 212.
115. Shea & Winschel 2003, p. 58.
116. Kiper 1997, p. 73.
117. Smith 2023, p. 69.
118. Miller 2019, p. 258.
119. Bearss 1985, p. 406.
120. Bearss 1985, pp. 406–407.
121. Smith 2023, pp. 80–81.
122. Bearss 1985, p. 408.
123. Smith 2023, p. 81.
124. Kiper 1997, p. 68.
125. Welcher 1993, p. 859.
126. Smith 2023, pp. 91–92.
127. Welcher 1993, p. 860.
128. Smith 2023, p. 92.
129. Smith 2023, pp. 93–94.
130. Welcher 1993, pp. 859–860.
131. Winschel 2004, pp. 6–8.
132. Winschel 2004, p. 9–10.
133. Winschel 2004, pp. 10–13.
134. Smith 2006, pp. 397–398.
135. American Battlefield Protection Program 2010, pp. 8, 16.
136. Sesser 2024.

Sources

• Ballard, Michael B. (2004). Vicksburg: The Campaign that Opened the Mississippi. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press. ISBN   0-8078-2893-9.
• Bearss, Edwin C. (1985). The Campaign for Vicksburg. Vol. I: Vicksburg is the Key. Dayton, Ohio: Morningside House, Inc. ISBN   089029-312-0.
• Bearss, Edwin C. (2007) [2006]. Fields of Honor. Washington, D.C.: National Geographic. ISBN   978-1-4262-0093-9.
• Chatelain, Neil P. (2020). Defending the Arteries of Rebellion: Confederate Naval Operations in the Mississippi River Valley, 1861–1865. El Dorado Hills, California: Savas Beatie. ISBN   978-1-61121-510-6.
• Christ, Mark K. (2010). Civil War Arkansas 1863: The Battle for a State. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press. ISBN   978-0-8061-4433-7.
• Christ, Mark K. (July 2, 2024). "Battle of Arkansas Post". Encyclopedia of Arkansas. Archived from the original on November 9, 2024. Retrieved January 2, 2025.
• House, John S. (December 13, 1998). "National Register of Historic Places Registration Form – Arkansas Post". National Park Service. Retrieved September 19, 2021.
• Kiper, Richard L. (1997). "John Alexander McClernand and the Arkansas Post Campaign". Arkansas Historical Quarterly. 56 (1): 59–79. doi:10.2307/40031001. JSTOR   40031001.
• Kiper, Richard L. (1999). Major General John Alexander McClernand: Politician in Uniform. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. ISBN   0-87338-636-1.
• Miller, Donald L. (2019). Vicksburg: Grant's Campaign that Broke the Confederacy. New York, New York: Simon and Schuster. ISBN   978-1-4516-4139-4.
• Sesser, David (November 1, 2024). "Fort Hindman". Encyclopedia of Arkansas. Archived from the original on December 27, 2024. Retrieved January 2, 2025.
• Shea, William L.; Winschel, Terrence J. (2003). Vicksburg Is the Key: The Struggle for the Mississippi River. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press. ISBN   978-0-8032-9344-1.
• Smith, Timothy B. (2006) [2004]. Champion Hill: Decisive Battle for Vicksburg. El Dorado Hills, California: Savas Beatie. ISBN   1-932714-19-7.
• Smith, Timothy B. (2023). Bayou Battles for Vicksburg: The Swamp and River Expeditions, January 1–April 30, 1863. Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas. ISBN   978-0-7006-3566-5.
• "Update to the Civil War Sites Advisory Commission Report on the Nation's Civil War Battlefields: State of Arkansas" (PDF). American Battlefield Protection Program. December 2010. Retrieved September 19, 2021.
• Welcher, Frank J. (1993). The Union Army 1861–1865: Organization and Operations. Vol. II: The Western Theater. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. ISBN   0-253-36454-X.
• Winschel, Terrence J. (1998). "Chickasaw Bayou, Mississippi". In Kennedy, Frances H. (ed.). The Civil War Battlefield Guide (2nd ed.). Boston, Massachusetts/New York, New York: Houghton Mifflin. pp. 154–156. ISBN   978-0-395-74012-5.
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Further reading

• Bearss, Edwin C. (1959). "The Battle of the Post of Arkansas". Arkansas Historical Quarterly . 18 (3): 237–279. doi:10.2307/40019212. JSTOR   40019212.

External links

• Media related to Battle of Arkansas Post (1863) at Wikimedia Commons
• Battle of Arkansas Post (1863) at the Historical Marker Database