Battle of Lawdar (2010)

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Battle of Lawdar (2010)
Part of the al-Qaeda insurgency in Yemen
Date19–24 August 2010 (2010-08-19 2010-08-24)
(5 days)
Location 13°53′0″N45°52′0″E / 13.88333°N 45.86667°E / 13.88333; 45.86667
Status

Yemeni victory

  • Government forces secure Lawdar
  • Most AQAP forces escape
Belligerents
Yemen
Commanders and leaders
  • Adel Saleh Hardaba 
Units involved
Military of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
Strength
Hundreds ~200
~200
Casualties and losses
Per AFP:
11 killed [a]
Per AFP:
19 killed
3 civilians killed
3,000 displaced
Battle of Lawdar (2010)

On 19 August 2010, gunmen from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) attacked a group of soldiers at a market in Lawdar, a city in Abyan Governorate. The next day, an ambush perpetrated by the group on a convoy of soldiers in the city left 11 dead. In response to the attacks, the Yemeni Armed Forces besieged the city on 21 August and announced an imminent offensive commander by defense minister Mohammed Nasser Ahmed, urging the militants and civilians to leave. Intense clashes broke out at the night of 22 August between AQAP militants and Yemeni Army after the ultimatum expired.

By 23 August, AQAP was believed to be withdrawing most of its forces from Lawdar. The next day, the Yemeni government declared that the military had secured the city. According to Agence-France Presse, 11 soldiers and 19 militants were killed during the conflict from 20 August onwards, while three civilians were also killed. Commentators noted that the operation was the first large-scale military confrontation between the Yemeni government and AQAP.

Background

Since 2009, the Yemeni government began to intensify its counterterrorism campaign against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) under pressure from regional powers in the Arab world as well as the United States. Prior to the battle, security forces were primarily engaged in "targeted attacks and small-scale operations against al Qaeda leaders." [1] Previously in similar instances, the government utilized mediation to avoid direct, large-scale conflict with the group. [2]

AQAP's area of operations are concentrated in southern Yemen, particularly Abyan Governorate. [3] The group's attacks on security forces had intensified since June 2010, when it declared open war on the Yemeni state. [2] In Abyan, assassinations and grenade attacks had increased in the two months prior to the offensive. [1]

Battle

The conflict was instigated by an AQAP ambush on Yemeni soldiers in Lawdar on 19 August. [2] During that attack, AQAP gunmen encountered a small group of soldiers in a crowded souk and proceeded to open fire on them. Witness accounts described the soldiers surrendering their weapons and begging to no avail. At least two soldiers were killed in the shooting. [4] The army sent additional units into Lawdar in response, leading to a two-hour clash in which another two soldiers were wounded before the militants fled. [5]

On 20 August, at least 11 soldiers from the Central Security Forces [6] (CSF) were killed in an ambush utilizing rocket-propelled grenades perpetrated by AQAP along with "outlaws cooperating with them." The army retaliated by bombarding the buildings from which they were attacked near the marketplace, killing three civilians. [7] Seven AQAP members, including three foreign fighters of unspecified nationalities, were killed according to the government. [3]

In response to the attacks, the Yemeni government sent a large contingent of soldiers to besiege Lawdar. [2] The operation was directly overseen by Minister of Defense Mohammed Nasser Ahmed, who arrived in the area with army forces on the night of 21 August. The army took positions at the entrances of the city in preparation for an offensive. On 22 August, soldiers began distributing pamphlets to civilians urging them to leave as they prepared to move in and launch raids on homes believed to be AQAP safehouses. [3] Most shops in the town were closed down, and many did not attend Taraweeh prayers at the local mosque as is tradition for Muslims amidst Ramadan. [8] Security officials believed there being up to 200 AQAP fighters in Lawdar, along with another 200 from the Southern Movement, a secular secessionist coalition which the government alleged were fighting alongside AQAP. These claims were denied by the Southern Movement. [1]

An ultimatum for all militants to surrender was issued by authorities at 3:00 a.m. and expired 12 hours later at 3:00 p.m. on 22 August. [9] By that point, the army claimed that most civilians had left Lawdar and that those who remained were primarily AQAP militants, some of whom were suspected to be Saudi and Pakistani foreign fighters. [10] Clashes began at 5:00 p.m. as army soldiers raided a home belonging to a local AQAP commander, killing three members of the group. Two other militants were killed as they attempted an RPG attack on the local CSF headquarters. [3] [6] Army forces raided several other barricade houses, where they found larges stashes of heavy weaponry including rockets and anti-tank weapons. [10] Intense clashes continued to take place overnight. [11] [10]

AQAP began withdrawing its forces from Lawdar on 23 August after transporting their wounded out of the city. [10] By the afternoon of 24 August, Yemeni officials reported that the army had entered Lawdar and had retaken control over most of the city. [12] By late noon, the government declared full control over Lawdar, with deputy interior minister Saleh al-Zaweri stating that security forces were now "chasing the runaway elements". An Agence France-Presse tally based on official and medical sources placed the total death count since 20 August at 33 people, them being 11 soldiers, 19 militants and three civilians. Among the militant casualties included Adel Saleh Hardaba, a 27-year-old AQAP member believed to be the group's second-in-command for Lawdar. [13]

Analysis

Journalist Abdul Wahab Badrakhan suggested that Lawdar's strategic significance amounted to it being a crosspoint for AQAP members travelling through Abyan, Shabwah and Marib governorates, but also for it allegedly being the site of burgeoning cooperation between AQAP and the Southern Movement, which the government sought to neutralize before it grew to a further extent. He also claimed that the offensive was meant to showcase the government's dedication to counterterrorism to its foreign funders. [14]

Observers regarded the battle as the first major military confrontation between AQAP and the Yemeni government. It was noted that previous RPG ambushes and assassinations perpetrated by AQAP did not elicit such a strong response from the government. Intelligence publication Stratfor questioned whether the government had already intended for an operation in Lawdar prior to the 19–20 August killings, and that the latter had "provided the military with the impetus to attack." [2]

A similar military operation took place in the town al-Hawtah in Shabwah during September, involving a siege to neutralize AQAP elements and the launching of artillery shelling and airstrikes, along with significant civilian displacement. Despite their operation success, the majority of AQAP forces had managed to escape from Lawdar and al-Hawtah into the countryside, [15] [16] including the primary targets of the sieges according to Jeremy Scahill. [17] The United States intelligence community reportedly believed the operations were a "sham." [16] The Sunday Times wrote "One of the biggest problems for the US when it comes to Yemen is encapsulated in the story of the Lodar siege: few people appear to know what exactly is going on there or who al-Qaeda really are – an intelligence gap that carries huge risks for operations against them." [18]

In a 2013 report reflecting on the history of al-Qaeda in Yemen, W. Andrew Terrill of the Strategic Studies Institute regarded the battle as a notable event in AQAP's development into an insurgent force rather strictly a terrorist organization. According to him, the fact that AQAP did not immediately retreat from Lawdar during the operation "indicated a level of commitment to their cause, as well as perhaps some degree of contempt for the quality of Yemeni military forces." He attributed low militant casualties in the battle to reluctance from AQAP in dedicating significant resources to hold Lawdar. [19]

Aftermath

Of the population of nearly 80,000 people in Lawdar and surrounding areas, a reported 3,000 residents left their homes after the ultimatum was issued. [1] The army's evacuation order was lifted three days after its initial issuing. [20] Hundreds of homes were also damaged and destroyed according to Human Rights Watch. [21] Ali Dahmas, leader of the Joint Meeting Parties, claimed that a large-scale operation was unnecessary to neutralize the AQAP threat in Lawdar, as the perpetrators of the original ambush could have been easily arrested by a small contingent of soldiers. He also criticized shelling of civilian homes during the operation and said that it had further inflamed tensions in the area. [8]

The Southern Movement acknowledged that its members were present in Lawdar, but denied that they were fighting alongside AQAP and claimed that they were simply involved in "peaceful struggle". [11] Ali Salem al-Beidh, an influential separatist leader and former President of South Yemen, said that the government's claim of neutralizing AQAP was simply being used as a pretext to brutalize the Southern Movement. [22] On 23 September, an estimated 8,000 people, many of them armed, took part in a Southern Movement demonstration in Lawdar in defiance of the army. [23]

See also

Notes

  1. From 20–24 August

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 Holmes, Oliver (24 August 2010). "Residents Flee Beseiged Yemeni City" . The Wall Street Journal . ISSN   0099-9660. Archived from the original on 18 August 2023. Retrieved 16 October 2025.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 "Yemen: Military Faces AQAP in the South" . Stratfor . 24 August 2010. Archived from the original on 20 November 2019. Retrieved 7 January 2025.
  3. 1 2 3 4 "Five al-Qaeda fighters killed in Yemen". SBS News . Australian Associated Press. 23 August 2010. Retrieved 17 October 2025.
  4. Knickmeyer, Ellen (27 September 2010). "Al-Qaida Takes Lessons Learned To Yemen". NPR . GlobalPost . Retrieved 16 October 2025.
  5. "13 soldiers, 2 civilians killed in Yemen clashes". Al Arabiya . 20 August 2010. Retrieved 16 October 2025.
  6. 1 2 مقتل سبعة من ‘عناصر القاعدة’ في جنوب اليمن [Seven al-Qaeda members killed in southern Yemen]. Al-Quds al-Arabi (in Arabic). Agence France-Presse. 23 August 2010. Retrieved 17 October 2025.
  7. "Yemen says five Qaeda members among 19 killed". Dawn . Agence France-Presse. 21 August 2010. Retrieved 16 October 2025.
  8. 1 2 Bin Sallam, Mohammad (22 August 2010). "21 killed in confrontations in Abyan". Yemen Times . Archived from the original on 25 August 2010. Retrieved 16 October 2025.
  9. "Ultimatum Yaman Terhadap Gerilyawan Al-qaeda Berakhir" [Yemen's Ultimatum Against Al-Qaeda Militants Expires]. Antara News (in Indonesian). Agence France-Presse. 23 August 2010. Retrieved 17 October 2025.
  10. 1 2 3 4 "Al Qa'eda 'fleeing' after Yemen gunbattle" . The National . Agence France-Presse. 24 August 2010. Archived from the original on 31 July 2021. Retrieved 7 January 2025.
  11. 1 2 "Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula clashes with Yemeni military at Lawdar". Jamestown Foundation . 16 September 2010. Retrieved 8 January 2025.
  12. "Thousands flee south Yemen city". Al Jazeera . 24 August 2010. Archived from the original on 24 August 2010. Retrieved 7 January 2025.
  13. al-Haidari, Fawaz (25 August 2010). "Yemen army 'regains control' of southern town". Agence France-Presse . Archived from the original on 1 March 2014. Retrieved 8 January 2025.
  14. Badrakhan, Abdul Wahab (26 August 2010). هل تغير معركة "لودر" منحى المواجهة في اليمن؟ [Will the Battle of Lawdar change the course of the confrontation in Yemen?]. Monte Carlo Doualiya (in Arabic). Retrieved 16 October 2025.
  15. Boucek, Christopher (1 September 2010). "The Evolving Terrorist Threat in Yemen". Combating Terrorism Center at West Point . Retrieved 5 January 2026.
  16. 1 2 Smoltczyk, Alexander; Windfuhr, Volkhard (11 November 2010). "A President Struggles to Keep Yemen Together". Der Spiegel . ISSN   2195-1349 . Retrieved 5 January 2026.
  17. Scahill, Jeremy (2013). Dirty Wars: The World Is a Battlefield. Nation Books. pp. 387–388. ISBN   9781568587271.
  18. "As long as the enemies are all al Qaeda, US military aid will keep coming" . The Sunday Times . 26 August 2010. Archived from the original on 16 October 2025. Retrieved 5 January 2026.
  19. Terrill, W Andrew (1 June 2013). The Struggle For Yemen And The Challenge of Al-Qaeda In The Arabian Peninsula (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute. pp. 35–37. ISBN   9781500358068 . Retrieved 5 January 2026.
  20. "Obama's other surge -- in Yemen" . The Christian Science Monitor . 25 August 2010. ISSN   0882-7729. Archived from the original on 18 February 2025. Retrieved 5 January 2026.
  21. Roth, Ken (9 November 2010). "Letter Regarding US Counterterrorism Assistance to Yemen". Human Rights Watch . Retrieved 5 January 2026.
  22. الحكومة اليمنية: مسلحو القاعدة يفرون من لودر [Yemeni government: Al-Qaeda militants flee Lawdar]. BBC News Arabic (in Arabic). 24 August 2010. Retrieved 16 October 2025.
  23. "Police disperse separatist rallies in south Yemen". Arab News . 24 September 2010. Retrieved 5 January 2026.