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On 3 February 2006, a group of 23 convicts escaped from a prison administered by the Political Security Organization (PSO) in Sanaa, Yemen. The prisoners had spent two months digging a 44-meter long tunnel from their cell, which they had all shared, using makeshift tools such as spoons and cooking pots. They escaped through the tunnel into the women's bathroom of a nearby mosque, where they recited prayers and left through the front doors. Among the escapees included several militants affiliated with al-Qaeda and its local organization in Yemen, most notably Jamal al-Badawi, a mastermind of the USS Cole bombing, Fawaz al-Rabeiee, the leader of a militant cell responsible for the MV Limburg bombing, and Jaber Elbanah, a US citizen associated with the Lackawanna Six.
The escape was a major embarrassment for the Yemeni government and strained its counterterrorism-focused relations with the United States. Several commentators and officials suspected that members of the PSO may have facilitated the escape. An investigation launched by the Yemeni Interior Ministry concluded that the prison guards did not take sufficient precautions to prevent the escape, with 12 officers being tried and found guilty of gross negligence. Yemeni authorities and security forces launched an intense manhunt for the 23 fugitives, with all but six of them remaining free by late 2007. Retrospectively, the escape has been seen by commentators and analysts as the catalyst for the revival of al-Qaeda's presence in Yemen. Two of the escapees, Nasir al-Wuhayshi and Qasim al-Raymi, would go on to serve as leaders of al-Qaeda in Yemen and its successor organization, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
Context
After the killing of leader Abu Ali al-Harithi in 2002 and the arrest of his successor Muhammad al-Ahdal in 2003, al-Qaeda in Yemen was effectively eliminated as a threat.[1][2] A crackdown on the rest of the group's leadership and local militants generally preferring to travel to Iraq to participate in the insurgency there left al-Qaeda in Yemen mostly dormant.[3]
With al-Qaeda relatively contained the Yemeni government shifted its focus elsewhere, primarily to the Houthi war in Saada Governorate, which began in June 2004.[4] President Ali Abdullah Saleh viewed the Houthis as a legitimate threat to his power rather than al-Qaeda, which was seen primarily as an issue for the West.[5] Simultaneously, the United States had also deprioritized al-Qaeda as its main foreign policy issue regarding Yemen. Counterterrorism-focused ambassador Edmund Hull left the country in mid-2004 as the US began pressuring Saleh to address political reform and corruption.[4]
Escape
All 23 fugitives were kept in a single cell in a below-surface prison underneath the PSO headquarters in Sanaa.[6] The escape was likely inspired by the foiled tunnel escape in Camp Bucca in Iraq the previous year. The plan could have came from an escapee from Iraq who had described it to the rest of the fugitives, or by a colluding visitor who had read about it on the internet.[7]
Initial estimates reported that the tunnel may have taken approximately two months to have complete.[8][9] Several improvised tools were used to dig the tunnel, such as four soccer balls, shovels made from fan parts and spoons attached to broomsticks, and a u-shaped scoop made from three cookings pots attached to each other.[7][10] Authorities found four soccer balls with plastic tubing attached to them, creating a device which allowed the inmates to breathe below surface while they were digging. Dirt from the tunnel was removed with two buckets and hid in various parts of their cells, such as under piles of clothing and in the cell bathroom, which was filled to its ceiling.[11][7]
The prisoners kicked a soccer ball in their cell and recited loud chants as they were digging in order to mask the sound of their work.[8][10] In one instance, the prisoners attacked an officer and soldier who attempted to enter their ward in order to quell the chants.[8] The tunnel itself was 60 by 80 centimeters wide,[12] 44 meters-long, almost a third being within prison grounds,[13] and went down 3 meters below the cell's surface.[7][8] The southern wall of the prison, the direction in which the tunnel was dug, was 40 meters away from the cell of the prisoners. A 12-meter dead-end street then separated the wall with the al-Awkaf Mosque. Several guards outside the prison reported sounds of digging at different places and times, though their reports were not investigated any further.[8]
On 3 February, at around 4:30AST, the escapees each crawled through the tunnel and breached the floor of the women's bathroom of the mosque, the least frequented part of the building as most Muslim women pray at home.[10][14] They proceeded to recite morning prayers in the mosque and then left through the front doors among the attendants.[15] The hole in the bathroom was eventually discovered by a janitor at the mosque.[16] He informed the imam who later notified authorities, who had realized the escape by the next day.[14][16]
Jamal al-Badawi, a central facilitator of the USS Cole bombing who was sentenced to death on 29 September 2004 for orchestrating the attack.[20] He had previously escaped from an Aden prison on 10 April 2003 alongside nine other suspects involved in the bombing, though he was recaptured by 19 March 2004.[21][22]
Fawaz al-Rabeiee, the ringleader of a 15-man al-Qaeda cell responsible for several attacks and plots, including the attempted shootdown of a Hunt Oil helicopter and the MV Limburg bombing. He was sentenced to death by a court in February 2005.[23]
Umar Saeed Jarallah, Muhammed al-Umda and Fawzi al-Wajayhi, members of Rabeiee's cell sentenced to prison in August 2004 for plotting the MV Limburg bombing.[24] Jarallah's sentence was raised to 15 years in an appeal in February 2005, while the sentences of Umda and Wajayhi were upheld at 10 years.[23]
Ibrahim al-Huwaydi, Aref Saleh Mujali, Muhammad al-Daylami and Qasim al-Raymi, tried as part of Rabeiee's cell and found guilty in August 2004 for plotting to bomb several diplomatic embassies in Sanaa and to assassinate then US ambassador Hull.[24] Their sentences of 5 years in prison were upheld in February 2005.[23]
Hizam Saleh Mujali, sentenced to death as part of Rabeiee's cell for killing a police officer.[24]
Ibrahim Mohammed al-Muqri, Abdullah Yahya al-Wadai, Mansur Nasser al-Bayhani and Shafiq Ahmad Zayd, charged as part of an 11-man cell accused of forging passports, possession of weapons and explosives, planning to travel to Iraq and forming an armed gang to carry out attacks in Yemen. The former three were convicted only of forging passports in March 2005, while Muqri was cleared of all charges.[25] Despite this, the four men all remained imprisoned together until their escape.[18]
Khaled Mohammed al-Batati and Abdulrahman Basurah, part of an 8-man militant cell in Yemen called "Kataib al-Tawhid", led by Iraqi militant Anwar al-Jilani.[26] In August 2005, the group was found guilty of planning attacks on the British and Italian embassies and the French cultural center in Sanaa, Batati being sentenced to three years and two months in prison and Basurah being sentenced to three years and four months.[27][28]
Jaber Elbanah, a US citizen and affiliate of the Lackawanna Six who was arrested by Yemeni authorities in late 2003 in connection to the investigation of Fawaz al-Rabeiee.[30]
Nasir al-Wuhayshi, a veteran al-Qaeda member who was arrested in Iran after fleeing Afghanistan in the aftermath of the Battle of Tora Bora. He was extradited to Yemen by Iran in November 2003, where he was held without being officially charged for any crime before his escape.[31][32]
Hamza al-Quaiti, Zakariya Hasan al-Bayhani and Zakariya Ubadi Qasim al-Yafai, extradited from Saudi Arabia in 2003 without any charges.[19]
Yasser Nasser al-Hamayqani, charged with travelling to Iraq.[18]
Investigation
Senior Interior Ministry officials held an emergency meeting shortly after the escape. A ministry spokesperson announced on 4 February that an investigation headed by the Interior Minister was underway in order to determine if the fugitives received any internal or external assistance.[17][33] They also stated that the prison officials were reshuffled by Yemeni authorities and the prison chief and his deputy were both dismissed.[17] The investigation was being headed by the National Security Bureau, the PSO's rival intelligence organization.[10][34] PSO officers and soldiers were being investigated on the grounds that the prisoners could not have determined the direction and angle at which the tunnel was dug to the mosque without support from highly qualified individuals.[34] A report on the investigation ran by a pro-government newspaper said that the prison guards did not take adequate steps to ensure that an escape would not occur. Outside co-conspirators were also found to have "helped in moving and hiding the escapees", according to an official.[35] Five majors and two prison guards were detained and interrogated on 10 February in suspicion that they gave tools and information to the prisoners to help them escape.[36][37]
More than 80 people were detained for the investigation, including prison officers, relatives of the fugitives and members of Islamist groups.[38] On 15 February, a Yemeni official stated that 135 people had been arrested and were being interrogated in connection to the escape. Authorities received "important information" from the detainees, who were arrested in police searches of suspected places and houses of relatives of the fugitives.[39] A US request to interrogate the detainees was rejected by Yemeni authorities on the grounds that it violated the nation's sovereignty.[12]
On 21 February, an investigative committee published its official report on the escape, charging several prison officials with gross negligence which allowed the jailbreak to happen.[11] On 27 April, officials confirmed that the suspects would be put on trial after the investigation was complete. They also stated that the individuals would be tried in a military court.[40] On 25 May, attorney general Abdullah al-Olufi reported that a military court had put on trial 12 PSO officers accused of negligence leading to the escape.[41] Four officers were convicted of facilitating the escape, while the rest were found guilty of negligence. On 12 July, the court gave sentences to the 12 men ranging from 8 months to 3 years in prison.[42] The officers were all dismissed from their positions, but kept their retirement payment and remuneration.[43]
Reactions
The escape was a major embarrassment for the Yemeni government and called into question its counterterrorism campaign against al-Qaeda.[14][44][45] It placed a significant strain on relations between Yemen and the United States, and was a setback in their partnership against terrorism.[46][47] US officials were particularly angered that Badawi was among the escapees, due to the fact that he was involved in an attack on a US Navy warship and had had escaped from prison once before.[48][49] State Department spokesperson Sean McCormack emphasized to the Yemeni government the importance of capturing the fugitives and offered assistance if requested.[50] Speaking at a press conference on 9 February, Homeland Security Advisor Frances Townsend said:
I find the developments in Yemen not only deeply disappointing, but of enormous concern to us, especially given the capabilities and the expertise of the people who were there. We are disappointed that they were all housed together. We are disappointed that their restrictions in prison weren't more stringent. We have spoken with our colleagues in Yemen through our ambassador and expressed this to them and asked them for the strongest and most transparent cooperation so that we can help them.[51]
Several former US officials suspected that the escape was facilitated in some way by elements within the Yemeni government.[33][49][52] Suspicion fell particularly on the PSO due to its history of unreliability[49] as well as the fact that it had assisted hundreds of Yemenis in joining the Afghan mujahideen and absorbed many former jihadists after the Soviet–Afghan War, potentially compromising it with internal al-Qaeda sympathizers.[33][44] An anonymous US official described a cable from the US embassy in Sanaa which noted "the lack of obvious security measures on the streets" and concluded that "PSO insiders must have been involved."[10] A European counterterrorism official called the escape "impossible ... without any involvement of prisons guards, prison administration, etc."[52]
Aftermath
The escapees mostly dispersed throughout the tribal areas of southern and eastern Yemen.[53] Security personnel set up checkpoints around Sanaa in an attempt to capture the fugitives before they could flee to mountainous areas where they could receive tribal protection.[54] The Yemeni government launched searches in Abyan Governorate, as well as in Sanaa and several other areas in the country perceived as strongholds of Islamic extremist groups.[14]
On 5 February, Interpol issued an alert for the 23 escapees, calling them a "clear and present danger to all countries" and urging the Yemeni government to provide the names, photos and fingerprints of the individuals.[55] The organization later stated that they had not issued their highest level notice as it was still waiting for Yemen to provide fingerprints and arrest warrants for the fugitives.[52]
The US Navy issued a statement on 9 February saying that their ships, as part of the Dutch-led multinational Combined Task Force 150, were "monitoring international waters along the coast of Yemen in an attempt to either block possible maritime escape routes or capture the suspected terrorists if they make this attempt."[56]
On 14 February, the Yemeni Interior Ministry announced a YER 5 million reward ($25,600) for information leading to the capture of any of the prisoners, and an anonymous phone line for those who wanted to provide tip-offs. Yemeni television also aired the mugshots of the 23 escapees.[12] Authorities distributed photos and information on the suspects to all cities, villages and districts in all Yemeni governorates.[57] On 23 February, the FBI added Badawi and Elbanah to its Most Wanted Terrorists list, while Abdullah al-Raymi was added to the Seeking Information – Terrorism list.[58][59]
After the escape, a split eventually materialized between the older and younger generations of the escapees. The older generation managed to cut deals with the Yemeni government allowing them freedom if they agreed not to conduct any attacks within Yemen.[15] This was the case with the capture of Badawi in October 2007. Badawi pledged loyalty to the Yemeni President and agreed to help track down five other escaped militants in return for being freed from captivity.[60] The younger generation on the other hand rejected negotiations with the Yemeni government and continued fighting against it and evading captivity.[15][60] By late 2007, six of the 23 fugitives were dead (one being killed in Somalia after turning himself in and being released), 11 were in the custody of authorities and 6 were free, including Badawi.[18][19] By 2010, only four escapees, Umda, Wuhayshi, Badawi and Qasim al-Raymi, were still free.[61] They would eventually be killed by US drone strikes in 2012,[62] 2015,[63] 2019[64] and 2020,[65] respectively.
The escape is widely seen as a turning point in al-Qaeda's insurgency in Yemen, and the origin of its contemporary organization in the country, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.[83][84] Among the 23 escapees, the US concentrated heavily on the capture of Badawi and Elbanah as they were on the FBI's most wanted list. However, the two who would make the largest impact would be Wuhayshi and Qasim al-Raymi.[4] Wuhayshi, who studied Islam and was a close ally of Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan, became a spiritual leader for the fugitives while they were imprisoned, while Raymi lead prayers for the group, gave religious sermons on Fridays, and negotiated with the prison's administration.[48][85] Wuhayshi, Raymi and the militants who followed them have been referred to as the "second generation" of al-Qaeda in Yemen.[86]
In the aftermath of the escape, Wuhayshi became the leader of al-Qaeda in Yemen, being declared so in an announcement in mid-2007.[5] Along with Raymi, who was appointed as military commander, the two reorganized and rebuild the group throughout 2007 and 2008.[5][83][87] Al-Qaeda in Yemen launched increasingly deadlier attacks in the aftermath of the escape, such as pair of suicide attacks on two oil facilities in September 2006, a car bombing in Marib in 2007 and an attack on the US embassy in Sanaa in 2008.[44][86] Wuhayshi and Raymi would be among the founding members of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in January 2009.[4] Under Wuhayshi's leadership from 2009 to 2015, the group would come to be known as al-Qaeda's strongest affiliate, Wuhayshi himself being identified as the second highest-ranking leader of al-Qaeda entirely.[88] After his death from a US drone strike, Raymi succeeded him as leader from 2015 until his own death from a drone strike in 2020.[65]
↑ "احكام بالسجن على ستة متهمين بالانتماء الى القاعدة في اليمن"[Six Al-Qaeda suspects sentenced to prison in Yemen]. Al Bawaba (in Arabic). 8 August 2005. Retrieved 27 February 2025. [...and the Yemeni Abdul Rahman Basra (25 years old), were sentenced to three years and four months in prison. The Yemeni defendant, Khaled Al-Batati (23 years old), was sentenced to three years and two months in prison]
↑ Al-Hammadi, Khaled (28 April 2006). "اليمن: المحاكمة العسكرية للمتهمين الامنيين بقضية هروب 23 معتقلا من عناصر القاعدة تبدأ قريبا"[Yemen: Military trial of security suspects in the case of the escape of 23 Al-Qaeda detainees begins soon]. Al-Quds Al-Arabi (in Arabic). Retrieved 26 February 2025. [Official sources reported yesterday that the procedures for the trial of security suspects involved in the case of facilitating the escape of 23 Al-Qaeda detainees from the Central Political Security Organization (intelligence) prison in Sana'a have been completed and their military trial will begin soon after they have been investigated. They confirmed that higher directives were issued to refer the defendants to the military judiciary to take over the procedures for their trial on charges of negligence and neglect in performing their security work, which enabled the Al-Qaeda detainees to successfully carry out the escape from the Political Security prison.]
↑ "استجواب 135 يمنيا على خلفية هروب القاعديين"[135 Yemenis interrogated over Al-Qaeda escape]. Al Jazeera Arabic (in Arabic). 16 February 2006. Retrieved 24 February 2025. [It added that the security forces distributed photos of the escaped detainees with their data to all cities, villages and directorates in all Yemeni governorates.]
1 2 "استسلام فارين من عناصر القاعدة"[Surrender of fugitive Al-Qaeda elements]. Annedaa Newspaper (in Arabic). 30 August 2006. Retrieved 28 February 2025. [According to the sources, Sheikh Hadi Dalqam handed over the brothers Aref and Hazam Majli to the security authorities on Tuesday. The brothers were part of the group that escaped from the Political Security prison in Sana’a last February.]
↑ Al-Jabri, Abdul-Moneim (24 February 2008). "إبراهيم هويدي يسلم نفسه لسلطات الأمن"[Ibrahim Huwaidi surrenders himself to the security authorities]. Al Jazirah. Retrieved 28 February 2025. [In a related context, a fugitive Al-Qaeda member in Yemen surrendered himself to the Yemeni security authorities. Official sources in Sana'a said that Ibrahim Huwaidi, who escaped with a group of Al-Qaeda members from the Political Security (Yemeni Intelligence) prison in 2006, surrendered himself after mediation by tribal figures and a guarantee that his sentence would not be extended.]
↑ "محاولة تفجير انبوب نفط في صرواح وعضو في القاعدة يسلم نفسه للسلطات"[Attempted bombing of an oil pipeline in Sirwah and an Al-Qaeda member surrenders himself to the authorities]. Al-Wahdawi (in Arabic). 23 February 2008. Retrieved 28 February 2025. [Security sources told "Rai News" that Ibrahim Huwaidi, one of the wanted men, took the initiative to surrender himself after mediation by tribal figures and ensuring that his sentence would not be extended.]
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