The Crimes Act of 1825 (also known as the Federal Criminal Code of 1825), [1] formally titled An Act more effectually to provide for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States, and for other purposes, was the first piece of omnibus federal criminal legislation since the Crimes Act of 1790. In general, the 1825 act provided more punishment than the 1790 act. The maximum authorized sentence of imprisonment was increased from 7 to 10 years; the maximum fine from $5,000 to $10,000. [2] But, the punishments of stripes and pillory were not provided for. [2]
Drafted by Justice Joseph Story, and sponsored by Representative Daniel Webster of Massachusetts, the statute defined a series of new federal crimes applicable in areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction—the District of Columbia, federal territories, and federal enclaves—as well as felonies on the high seas and under federal admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
The Crimes Act of 1825 was "drawn along the same lines" as the Crimes Act of 1790, but "more comprehensive.” [3] Justice Joseph Story was an advocate for expanded federal jurisdiction, and in particular argued that the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the federal courts to define and punish common law offenses. [4] Although the common law crimes approach was rejected by the Supreme Court, [5] "[w]hat Story was not able to do as a Justice he remedied through his friendship with Webster, then Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee." [6] Other statutes drafted by Story include the Bankruptcy Act of 1841 and the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act of 1845. [7]
Story began drafting a crimes act in 1816. [8] Story drafted the act with the assistance of Representative Daniel Webster of Massachusetts, a frequent Supreme Court advocate. [9] [10] A contemporary manuscript by Story remarks that "few, very few, of the practical crimes . . . are now punishable by statutes, and if the court have no general common law jurisdiction . . . they are wholly dispunishable." [8] Story continued:
Story preferred the common law crime approach:
Congress was not persuaded to follow the common law approach and postponed consideration of the statute indefinitely. [8] Further attempts to create a new crimes act followed in 1818 and 1823. [2]
In 1824, the House commenced consideration of the bill. [2] The original draft contained only 16 sections, compared to 26 in the final draft. [2] Representative Charles A. Wickliffe of Kentucky objected to the extension of the death penalty to crimes other than treason, rape, and murder. [2] Representatives William Cox Ellis, James Buchanan, and Edward Livingston concurred with Wickliffe. [2] Livingston was the "principal speaker against the act." [2] Livingston moved to amend the act to remove the death penalty for arson. [11]
Webster defendant the act, and defended capital punishment. [12] Representative George Kremer offered an even more blood-thirsty defense of the death penalty. [12] Eventually, Webster "successfully guided [the act] through Congress." [10] According to Speranza:
The Crimes Act was passed on March 3, 1825.
The Act provided that all prior inconsistent legislation was repealed (without specifying such legislation). [14] According to Henderson, the act "supplanted" 12 sections of the Crimes Act of 1790, one section of the Piracy Act of 1819, the entirety of the Piracy Act of 1820, and the entirety of the Bank Act of 1816. [12]
"The Act of 1825 made several important contributions to federal criminal law." [6]
Building upon the Crimes Act of 1790, the 1825 Act created several new crimes applicable only to areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction—i.e. the District of Columbia, federal territories, and federal enclaves. Among these was the first federal Assimilative Crimes Act, which made the criminal laws of the surrounding states applicable to the federal enclaves. [6]
Section | Common offense name | Authorized sentence | Supreme Court cases |
---|---|---|---|
1 | Residential arson | Death | |
2 | Non-residential arson | 10 years hard labor and $10,000 | |
3 | Assimilative Crimes Act | Varies | United States v. Paul, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 141 (1832) |
In effect, the Crimes Act of 1825 amplified the definition of "high seas" to include "any river, haven, creek, basin, or bay, within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States." [6]
In United States v. Coombs (1838), in an opinion by Justice Story (the author of the 1825 Act), the Court held that the offense of shipwreck theft under § 9 of the Act did not extend above the high tide line. [15] But, Coombs held “probably for the first time, that the admiralty jurisdiction of the United States courts was an independent grant of legislative power to Congress.” [16] Although Coombs held that Congress could not punish an act occurring above the high tide line under its admiralty jurisdiction, [17] the Court also held that Congress could do so under its Commerce Clause power. [18]
Section | Common offense name | Authorized sentence | Supreme Court cases |
---|---|---|---|
4 | Murder (including deaths on land) and rape | Death | |
6 | Violent theft | 10 years hard labor and $5000 | |
7 | Vessel burglary or fixed floating object destruction | 5 years hard labor and $1000 | |
8 | Accessory after the fact to larceny | 3 years hard labor and $1000 | |
9 | Shipwreck theft or obstruction of shipwreck rescue | 10 years hard labor and $5000 | United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72 (1838) |
11 | Vessel arson | Death | |
22 | Vessel burglary | 3 years hard labor and $3000 |
In United States v. Germaine (1878), the Waite Court held that the extortion under color of office offense applied only to defendants who were officers of the United States within the meaning of the Appointments Clause of Article Two. Because Germaine (a surgeon appointed by the Commissioner of Pensions) was not appointed by the President, a court of law, or a head of a department, the Court held that the statute did not apply to Germaine. [19]
Section | Common offense name | Authorized sentence | Supreme Court cases |
---|---|---|---|
12 | Extortion under color of office | 1 year and $500 | United States v. Tingey, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 115 (1831) (dicta) United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. (9 Otto) 508 (1878) Williams v. United States, 168 U.S. 382 (1897) (dicta) |
16 | Theft or embezzlement by an employee of the Second Bank | 10 years hard labor and $5000 | |
24 | Coin embezzlement or dilution by a Mint employee | 10 years hard labor and $10,000 fine; 1 year mandatory minimum |
The Crimes Act of 1790 had established only one counterfeiting offense, which was punishable by death.
Section | Common offense name | Authorized sentence | Supreme Court cases |
---|---|---|---|
17 | Counterfeiting | 10 years hard labor and $5000 | |
18 | Counterfeiting the notes of the Second Bank | 10 years hard labor and $5000 | United States v. Randenbush, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 288 (1834) |
19 | Counterfeiting customs forms | 3 years hard labor and $1000 | |
20 | Counterfeiting gold or silver coins | 10 years hard labor and $3000 | United States v. Gardner, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 489 (1836) United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850) |
21 | Counterfeiting copper coins | 3 years hard labor and $1000 |
The Crimes Act of 1825 extended federal criminal jurisdiction to U.S. ships in foreign waters and foreign ports. [6] Section 5 made any offense committed in such a place punishable as if it had been committed on the high seas, so long as the defendant had not previously been convicted or acquitted for the same conduct in a foreign court. [21] Further, section 10 prohibited marooning. [22]
Section 13 increased the punishment for perjury or subornation to 5 years hard labor and $2000. [23] The Crimes Act of 1790 had limited the punishment for those crimes to 3 years, $800, 1 hour in the pillory, and incapacity to testify.
Section 23 made maritime insurance fraud punishable by 3 years hard labor and a $3000 fine. [24] (Previously, such had been punishable by death. [25] ) In dicta in Coombs, Justice Story explained that this provision (which he had penned) "is also derived from the power to regulate commerce." [26]
Section 14 provided for the entrance of a not guilty plea in cases where the defendant remained silent or refused to plea. [27] (The Crimes Act of 1790 had established this rule for treason and capital cases.)
Section 14 also re-enacted the venue provision of § 8 of the Crimes Act of 1790, with minor changes in wording. [27] Section 8 of the 1790 Act had provided that "the trial of crimes committed on the high seas, or in any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought." [28] Section 14 of the 1825 Act provided that "the trial of all offenses which shall be committed upon the high seas or elsewhere, out of the limits of any state or district, shall be in the district where the offender is apprehended, or into which he may be first brought." [27] The 1825 wording appeared to ratify the holding of Ex parte Bollman , which had held that the Territory of Orleans—in which federal territorial courts were constituted—was not a place eligible for alternate venue under the 1790 Act.
Since no federal prisons existed, § 15 provided that a sentence of hard labor could be served in a state penitentiary within the federal judicial district of the sentencing court. [29] Previously, a Congressional resolution accompanying the Crimes Act of 1790 had requested that the state make their prisons available to federal convicts. [30] The 1825 act codified this. [30]
"[F]rom 1825 until the close of the Civil War, the few additions to the list of statutory crimes which were made broke little new ground." [6]
There have been four revisions or re-codifications of federal criminal law since the Crimes Act of 1790: [31] (1) the Crimes Act of 1825; (2) the Revised Statutes; [32] (3) the Criminal Code of 1909; [33] and (4) the 1948 re-codification of the United States Code. [34] The latter three are merely re-codifications. "There has been no general revision of the criminal legislation of the United States since the Crimes Act of 1825, although there have been codifications of existing law, and, of course, many separate statutes adding greatly to the scope of federal criminal jurisdiction." [35]
A felony is traditionally considered a crime of high seriousness, whereas a misdemeanor is regarded as less serious. The term "felony" originated from English common law to describe an offense that resulted in the confiscation of a convicted person's land and goods, to which additional punishments including capital punishment could be added; other crimes were called misdemeanors. Following conviction of a felony in a court of law, a person may be described as a felon or a convicted felon.
A misdemeanor is any "lesser" criminal act in some common law legal systems. Misdemeanors are generally punished less severely than more serious felonies, but theoretically more so than administrative infractions and regulatory offences. Typically misdemeanors are punished with monetary fines or community service.
Perjury is the intentional act of swearing a false oath or falsifying an affirmation to tell the truth, whether spoken or in writing, concerning matters material to an official proceeding.
A statute of limitations, known in civil law systems as a prescriptive period, is a law passed by a legislative body to set the maximum time after an event within which legal proceedings may be initiated. In the United States, a government agency is permitted by the Congress to create under federal regulations its own statute of limitations.
The Code of Laws of the United States of America is the official compilation and codification of the general and permanent federal statutes of the United States. It contains 53 titles. The main edition is published every six years by the Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the House of Representatives, and cumulative supplements are published annually. The official version of those laws not codified in the United States Code can be found in United States Statutes at Large.
Burglary, also called breaking and entering and sometimes housebreaking, is the act of entering a building or other areas without permission, with the intention of committing a criminal offence. Usually that offence is theft, robbery or murder, but most jurisdictions include others within the ambit of burglary. To commit burglary is to burgle, a term back-formed from the word burglar, or to burglarize.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 was a United States federal statute enacted on September 24, 1789, during the first session of the First United States Congress. It established the federal judiciary of the United States. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution prescribed that the "judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and such inferior Courts" as Congress saw fit to establish. It made no provision for the composition or procedures of any of the courts, leaving this to Congress to decide.
An accessory is a person who assists in, but does not actually participate in, the commission of a crime. The distinction between an accessory and a principal is a question of fact and degree:
The Criminal law of Australia is the body of law in Australia that relates to crime.
In the United States, the law for murder varies by jurisdiction. In most US jurisdictions there is a hierarchy of acts, known collectively as homicide, of which first-degree murder and felony murder are the most serious, followed by second-degree murder and, in a few states, third-degree murder, followed by voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter which are not as serious, followed by reckless homicide and negligent homicide which are the least serious, and ending finally in justifiable homicide, which is not a crime. However, because there are at least 52 relevant jurisdictions, each with its own criminal code, this is a considerable simplification.
Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883), is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that followed the death of one member of a Native American tribe at the hands of another on reservation land. Crow Dog was a member of the Brulé band of the Lakota Sioux. On August 5, 1881 he shot and killed Spotted Tail, a Lakota chief; there are different accounts of the background to the killing. The tribal council dealt with the incident according to Sioux tradition, and Crow Dog paid restitution to the dead man's family. However, the U.S. authorities then prosecuted Crow Dog for murder in a federal court. He was found guilty and sentenced to hang.
Several statutes, mostly codified in Title 18 of the United States Code, provide for federal prosecution of public corruption in the United States. Federal prosecutions of public corruption under the Hobbs Act, the mail and wire fraud statutes, including the honest services fraud provision, the Travel Act, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) began in the 1970s. "Although none of these statutes was enacted in order to prosecute official corruption, each has been interpreted to provide a means to do so." The federal official bribery and gratuity statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) 15 U.S.C. § 78dd, and the federal program bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 666 directly address public corruption.
The Marshall Court (1801–1835) heard forty-one criminal law cases, slightly more than one per year. Among such cases are United States v. Simms (1803), United States v. More (1805), Ex parte Bollman (1807), United States v. Hudson (1812), Cohens v. Virginia (1821), United States v. Perez (1824), Worcester v. Georgia (1832), and United States v. Wilson (1833).
The Taney Court heard thirty criminal law cases, approximately one per year. Notable cases include Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), United States v. Rogers (1846), Ableman v. Booth (1858), Ex parte Vallandigham (1861), and United States v. Jackalow (1862).
The Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13, makes state law applicable to conduct occurring on lands reserved or acquired by the Federal government as provided in , when the act or omission is not made punishable by an enactment of Congress.
The Chase Court (1864–1873) issued thirty-five opinions in criminal cases over nine years, at a significantly higher rate than the Marshall Court or Taney Court before it. Notable such cases include Ex parte Milligan (1866), Pervear v. Massachusetts (1866), Ex parte McCardle, Ex parte Yerger (1868), and United States v. Kirby (1868).
During the tenure of Morrison Waite as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, the Supreme Court heard an unprecedented volume and frequency of criminal cases. In just fourteen years, the Court heard 106 criminal cases, almost as many cases as the Supreme Court had heard in the period from its creation to the appointment of Waite as Chief Justice. Notable cases include United States v. Cruikshank (1875), United States v. Reese (1875), Reynolds v. United States (1878), Wilkerson v. Utah (1879), the Trade-Mark Cases (1879), Strauder v. West Virginia (1880), Pace v. Alabama (1883), United States v. Harris (1883), Ex parte Crow Dog (1883), Hurtado v. California (1884), Clawson v. United States (1885), Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), United States v. Kagama (1886), Ker v. Illinois (1886), and Mugler v. Kansas (1887).
The Crimes Act of 1790, formally titled An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States, defined some of the first federal crimes in the United States and expanded on the criminal procedure provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789. The Crimes Act was a "comprehensive statute defining an impressive variety of federal crimes".
A certificate of division was a source of appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts to the Supreme Court of the United States from 1802 to 1911. Created by the Judiciary Act of 1802, the certification procedure was available only where the circuit court sat with a full panel of two: both the resident district judge and the circuit-riding Supreme Court justice. As Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, he did not have "the privilege of dividing the court when alone."