Empathic concern

Last updated November 24, 2024

Empathic concern refers to other-oriented emotions elicited by, and congruent with the perceived welfare of, someone in need.^[1] These other-oriented emotions include feelings of tenderness, sympathy, compassion and soft-heartedness.

Empathic concern is often confused with empathy. To empathize is to respond to another's perceived emotional state by experiencing feeling of a similar sort. Empathic concern or sympathy includes not only empathizing, but also having a positive regard or a non-fleeting concern for the other person.^[2]

Definition

C. Daniel Batson, a pioneer of the term, defines it as "other-oriented emotion elicited by and congruent with the perceived welfare of someone in need".^[3] Batson explains this definition in the following way:

First, "congruent" here refers not to the specific content of the emotion but to the valence—positive when the perceived welfare of the other is positive, negative when the perceived welfare is negative.… Third, as defined, empathic concern is not a single, discrete emotion but includes a whole constellation. It includes feelings of sympathy, compassion, softheartedness, tenderness, sorrow, sadness, upset, distress, concern, and grief. Fourth, empathic concern is other-oriented in the sense that it involves feeling for the other—feeling sympathy for, compassion for, sorry for, distressed for, concerned for, and so on.^[3]

Others use different terms for this construct or very similar constructs. Especially popular—perhaps more popular than "empathic concern"—are sympathy, compassion, or pity.^[4] Other terms include the tender emotion and sympathetic distress.^[5]

People are strongly motivated to be connected to others.^[6] In humans and higher mammals, an impulse to care for offspring is almost certainly genetically hard-wired, although modifiable by circumstance.

Evolutionary origins

At the behavioral level it is evident from the descriptions by comparative psychologists and ethologists that behaviors homologous to empathic concern can be observed in other mammalian species. Notably, a variety of reports on ape empathic reactions suggest that, apart from emotional connectedness, apes have an explicit appreciation of the other's situation.^[7] A good example is consolation, defined as reassurance behavior by an uninvolved bystander towards one of the combatants in a previous aggressive incident.^[8]

Developmental origins

Empathic concern is thought to emerge later in development and to require more self-control than either emotional contagion or personal distress.^[9] Developmental research indicates a broad range of social competencies children bring to their interpersonal relationships.^[10] As early as two years of age, children show (a) the cognitive capacity to interpret, in simple ways, the physical and psychological states of others, (b) the emotional capacity to experience, affectively, the state of others, and (c) the behavioral repertoire that permits attempts to alleviate discomfort in others.^[11]

Both temperament and social context contribute to individual differences in concern for others. Some developmental psychologists have hypothesized that empathic concern for others is an essential factor inhibiting aggression.^[12]

Contribution of social psychology

Empathic concern may produce an altruistic motivation to help people.^[13] The challenge of demonstrating the existence of altruistic motivation is to show how empathic concern leads to helping in ways that cannot be explained by prevailing theories of egoistic motivation. That is, a clear case needs to be made that it is concern about the other person's welfare, not a desire to improve one's own welfare, that primarily drives one's helping behavior in a particular situation.

Empirical studies conducted by social psychologist Daniel Batson demonstrate that one feels empathic concern when one adopts the perspective of another person in need. His work emphasizes the different emotions evoked when imagining another situation from a self-perspective or imagining from another perspective.^[14] The former is often associated with personal distress (i.e., feelings of discomfort and anxiety), whereas the latter leads to empathic concern.

Social neuroscience evidence

Social neuroscience explores the biological underpinnings of empathic concern (and more generally, interpersonal sensitivity), using an integrative approach that bridges the biological and social levels.^[15] Neural systems, including autonomic functions, that rely on brain stem neuropeptides, such as oxytocin and vasopressin, are plausible correlates for empathic concern. Alternatively, vasopressin might be implicated in situations where a more active strategy is required for an effective response.^[16]

An association between executive functions, underpinned by the prefrontal cortex with reciprocal connections with the limbic system, the sense of agency, and empathic concern has been suggested based on lesion studies in neurological patients and functional neuroimaging experiments in healthy individuals.^[17]

The difference between imagining from one's own perspective and imagining in the shoes or from the perspective of others is supported by a series of functional neuroimaging studies of affective processing. For instance, participants in one study reported more empathic concern when imagining the pain of others when adopting another's perspective, and more personal distress when imagining themselves to be in pain.^[18]

fMRI scans revealed that imagining self in pain was associated with strong activation in brain areas involved in affective response to threat and pain, including the amygdala, insula, and anterior cingulate cortex. Imagine-other instructions produced higher activity in the right temporoparietal junction, which is associated with self-other distinctiveness and the sense of agency.

Related Research Articles

Altruism is the principle and practice of concern for the well-being and/or happiness of other humans or animals largely independent of that person's opinion of or reaction to oneself. While objects of altruistic concern vary, it is an important moral value in many cultures and religions. It may be considered a synonym of selflessness, the opposite of self-centeredness.

Remorse is a distressing emotion experienced by an individual who regrets actions which they have done in the past that they deem to be shameful, hurtful, or wrong. Remorse is closely allied to guilt and self-directed resentment. When a person regrets an earlier action or failure to act, it may be because of remorse or in response to various other consequences, including being punished for the act or omission. People may express remorse through apologies, trying to repair the damage they've caused, or self-imposed punishments.

Empathy is generally described as the ability to take on other's perspective, to understand, feel, and possibly share and respond to their experience. There are more definitions of empathy that include but are not limited to social, cognitive, and emotional processes primarily concerned with understanding others. Often times, empathy is considered to be a broad term, and broken down into more specific concepts and types that include cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, somatic empathy, and spiritual empathy.

Compassion is a social feeling that motivates people to go out of their way to relieve the physical, mental, or emotional pains of others and themselves. Compassion is sensitivity to the emotional aspects of the suffering of others. When based on notions such as fairness, justice, and interdependence, it may be considered partially rational in nature.

Sympathy is the perception of, understanding of, and reaction to the distress or need of another life form.

C. Daniel Batson is an American social psychologist. He has two doctoral degrees, in theology and psychology. Batson obtained his doctorate under John Darley and taught at the University of Kansas. He retired in 2006 and now is an emeritus professor in the psychology department of the University of Tennessee. He is best known for his contributions to the social psychology of altruism, empathic concern, and psychology of religion.

Jean Decety is an American–French neuroscientist specializing in developmental neuroscience, affective neuroscience, and social neuroscience. His research focuses on the psychological and neurobiological mechanisms underpinning social cognition, particularly social decision-making, empathy, moral reasoning, altruism, pro-social behavior, and more generally interpersonal relationships. He is Irving B. Harris Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago.

Empathy-altruism is a form of altruism based on moral emotions or feelings for others.

Andrew N. Meltzoff is an American psychologist and an internationally recognized expert on infant and child development. His discoveries about infant imitation greatly advanced the scientific understanding of early cognition, personality and brain development.

The simulation theory of empathy holds that humans anticipate and make sense of the behavior of others by activating mental processes that, if they culminated in action, would produce similar behavior. This includes intentional behavior as well as the expression of emotions. The theory says that children use their own emotions to predict what others will do; we project our own mental states onto others.

The concept of the evolution of morality refers to the emergence of human moral behavior over the course of human evolution. Morality can be defined as a system of ideas about right and wrong conduct. In everyday life, morality is typically associated with human behavior rather than animal behavior. The emerging fields of evolutionary biology, and in particular evolutionary psychology, have argued that, despite the complexity of human social behaviors, the precursors of human morality can be traced to the behaviors of many other social animals. Sociobiological explanations of human behavior remain controversial. Social scientists have traditionally viewed morality as a construct, and thus as culturally relative, although others such as Sam Harris argue that there is an objective science of morality.

Prosocial behaviour is a social behavior that "benefit[s] other people or society as a whole", "such as helping, sharing, donating, co-operating, and volunteering". The person may or may not intend to benefits others; the behaviour's prosocial benefits are often only calculable after the fact. Obeying the rules and conforming to socially accepted behaviors are also regarded as prosocial behaviors. These actions may be motivated by culturally influenced value systems; empathy and concern about the welfare and rights of others; egoistic or practical concerns, such as one's social status or reputation, hope for direct or indirect reciprocity, or adherence to one's perceived system of fairness; or altruism, though the existence of pure altruism is somewhat disputed, and some have argued that this falls into the philosophical rather than psychological realm of debate. Evidence suggests that prosociality is central to the well-being of social groups across a range of scales, including schools. Prosocial behavior in the classroom can have a significant impact on a student's motivation for learning and contributions to the classroom and larger community. In the workplace, prosocial behaviour can have a significant impact on team psychological safety, as well as positive indirect effects on employee's helping behaviors and task performance. Empathy is a strong motive in eliciting prosocial behavior, and has deep evolutionary roots.

Helping behavior refers to voluntary actions intended to help others, with reward regarded or disregarded. It is a type of prosocial behavior.

In psychology, personal distress is an aversive, self-focused emotional reaction to the apprehension or comprehension of another's emotional state or condition. This negative affective state often occurs as a result of emotional contagion when there is confusion between self and other. Unlike empathy, personal distress does not have to be congruent with the other's state, and often leads to a self-oriented, egoistic reaction to reduce it, by withdrawing from the stressor, for example, thereby decreasing the likelihood of prosocial behavior. There is evidence that sympathy and personal distress are subjectively different, have different somatic and physiological correlates, and relate in different ways to prosocial behavior.

In psychology, empathic accuracy is a measure of how accurately one person can infer the thoughts and feelings of another person.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Tania Singer</span> German social neuroscientist (1969-)

Tania Singer is a German psychologist and social neuroscientist and the scientific director of the Max Planck Society's Social Neuroscience Lab in Berlin, Germany. Between 2007 and 2010, she became the inaugural chair of social neuroscience and neuroeconomics at the University of Zurich and was the co-director of the Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research in Zurich. Her research focuses on the developmental, neuronal, and hormonal mechanisms underlying human social behavior and social emotions such as compassion and empathy. She is founder and principal investigator of the ReSource project, one of the largest longitudinal studies on the effects of mental training on brain plasticity as well as mental and physical health, co-funded by the European Research Council. She also collaborates with the macro-economist Dennis Snower on research on caring economics. Singer's Caring Economics: Conversations on Altruism and Compassion, Between Scientists, Economists, and the Dalai Lama was published in 2015. She is the daughter of the neuroscientist Wolf Singer.

Claus Lamm is a Professor of Biological Psychology and the head of the Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience Unit at the Faculty of Psychology of the University of Vienna. His research focuses on the psychological and biological mechanisms underlying social cognition, affect, and behavior. His main research interest are the neural underpinnings of empathy, to whose understanding he has made pioneering contributions.

Moral emotions are a variety of social emotions that are involved in forming and communicating moral judgments and decisions, and in motivating behavioral responses to one's own and others' moral behavior. As defined by Jonathan Haidt, moral emotions "are linked to the interests or welfare either of a society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent". A person may not always have clear words to articulate, yet simultaneously knows it to be true.

Compassion fade is the tendency to experience a decrease in empathy as the number of people in need of aid increase. As a type of cognitive bias, it has a significant effect on the prosocial behaviour from which helping behaviour generates. The term was developed by psychologist and researcher Paul Slovic.

An empathy gap, sometimes referred to as an empathy bias, is a breakdown or reduction in empathy where it might otherwise be expected to occur. Empathy gaps may occur due to a failure in the process of empathizing or as a consequence of stable personality characteristics, and may reflect either a lack of ability or motivation to empathize.

References

↑
Batson, C.D. (1991). The altruism question: Toward a social-psychological answer. Hillsdale: Erlbaum Associates.
- Batson, C.D. (1987). "Prosocial motivation: Is it ever truly altruistic?" In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 20, pp. 65–122). New York: Academic Press.
↑ Chismar, D. (1988). "Empathy and sympathy: the important difference." The Journal of Value Inquiry, 22, pp. 257–266.
1 2 Batson, C.D. (2011). Altruism in Humans, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 11.
↑ These are used by numerous philosophers and social scientists including Charles Darwin, Frans de Waal, Nancy Eisenberg, and Stephen Darwall, as documented in Batson's Altruism in Humans, p. 12.
↑ These latter two terms are due, respectively, to William McDougall and Martin Hoffman. See Batson, C.D. (2011). Altruism in Humans, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 12.
↑ Batson, C.D. (1990). "How social an animal? The human capacity for caring." American Psychologist 45: 336–346.
↑ De Waal, F.B.M. (1996). Good Natured: The origins of right and wrong in humans and other animals. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
↑ De Waal, F.B.M., & van Roosmalen, A. (1979). "Reconciliation and consolation among chimpanzees." Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 5, 55–66.
↑ Eisenberg, N., & Strayer, J. (1997). Empathy and its Development. New York: Cambridge University Press.
↑ Decety, J., & Meyer, M. (2008). "From emotion resonance to empathic understanding: A social developmental neuroscience account." Development and Psychopathology, 20: 1053–1080.
↑ Zahn-Waxler, C, Radke-Yarrow, M., Wagner, E., & Chapman, M. (1992). "Development of concern for others." Developmental Psychology, 28: 126–136.
↑
Eisenberg, N., & Eggum, N.D. (2009). "Empathic responding: sympathy and personal distress." In: J. Decety and W. Ickes, The Social Neuroscience of Empathy. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 71–83.
- Hoffman, M.L. (2000). Empathy and Moral Development. New York: Cambridge University Press.
↑ Batson, C.D., & Shaw, L.L. (1991). "Evidence for altruism: Toward a pluralism of prosocial motives." Psychological Inquiry, 2: 107–122.
↑ Batson, C.D. (2009). "Two forms of perspective taking: imagining how another feels and imagining how you would feel." In K.D. Markman, W.M.P. Klein and J.A. Suhr (Eds.), Handbook of Imagination and Mental Simulation pp. 267–279. New York: Psychology Press.
↑ Decety, J., & Keenan, J.P. (2006). "Social neuroscience: A new journal." Social Neuroscience, 1: 1–4.
↑ Carter, C.S., Harris, J., & Porges, S.W. (2009). "Neural and evolutionary perspectives on empathy" In: J. Decety and W. Ickes, The Social Neuroscience of Empathy. Cambridge: MIT press, pp. 169–182.
↑ Decety, J., & Jackson, P.L. (2004). "The functional architecture of human empathy." Behavioral and Cognitive Neuroscience Reviews, 3: 71–100.
↑ Lamm, C., Batson, C.D., & Decety, J. (2007). "The neural substrate of human empathy: effects of perspective-taking and cognitive appraisal." Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 19: 42–58.